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MODERN GERMANY 



MODERN GERMANY 

ITS RISE, GROWTH, DOWNFALL 
AND FUTURE 



BY J. ELLIS BARKER 

AUTHOR or 

"THB FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY," "THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP" 

" ECONOMIC STATESMANSHIP," ETC. ETC, 



SIXTH EDITION, ENTIRELY RE WRITTEN 
AND VERY GREATLY ENLARGED 



NEW YORK 

E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY 

1919 



a)Dii7 

.332 



Z/ 






PREFACE 

The Sixth Edition of Modern Germany is, as the title-page 
states, " entirely re-written and very greatly enlarged." It 
is in reality a new book. Hence the question arose whether 
it should appear under its old title or under a new one. 

The first five editions were mainly devoted to pointing 
out the probability and danger of a German attack upon 
civilisation, and to analysing the sources of the strength 
of Imperial Germany and the elements of its weakness. 
The attack, of which I had warned the nations in general, 
and England in particular, in numerous books and articles 
ever since 1900, took place at the exact moment which I 
had indicated in 1907 (see p. 447 of this work), and it ended 
as I had often foretold (see, for instance, pp. 447 to 450), 
in Germany's defeat and downfall, in revolution, and in 
the disappearance of the HohenzoUern dynasty. A new 
Germany is arising. Owing to the march of events readers 
are no longer interested in the aims and ambitions and 
the foreign and domestic policy of defunct Imperial Ger- 
many. They wish to understand the causes of Germany's 
meteoric rise, of its wonderful political and economic 
success and of its downfall, and to form an idea as to the 
future of New Germany and of the German race. To 
analyse and describe these is the purpose of this book. 
Therefore, it had to be re-written throughout. 

There was a considerable demand for a new edition of 
Modern Germany both in England and in the United States. 
As portions of the fifth edition have been embodied in the 
present volume, it seemed only fair to intending purchasers 
to indicate that fact by preserving the old title for what is 
practically a new book. Of course, very drastic changes 
had to be made to bring it up to date. Large portions 
contained in the fifth edition, which are no longer of 



vi PREFACE 

interest except to historians, have been omitted, and the 
new situation created by the War has been considered from 
every point of view. The portions of the old text used 
have been compressed to the utmost. Thus the present 
issue gives in the most concise form all the information of 
permanent interest and value which was contained in the 
previous one, and considerably more than a hundred pages 
of additional matter. Seven chapters are entirely new. 

In its present form Modern Oermany is a companion 
volume to The Foundations of Germany — A Documentary 
Account Revealing the Secret of her Strength, Wealth, and 
Efficiency, the second and very greatly enlarged edition of 
which appeared in the autumn of 1918. The two books 
are designed to supplement one another, and may almost 
be considered the first and second volumes of a single work. 
Both should be equally useful to students of Grerman 
affairs. 

Modern Germany has had a most gratifying success in 
England and abroad. It has been used as a text-book at 
some of the leading American Universities, and has even 
been translated into Japanese and Mahratti. I hope that 
the present issue will meet with as kind a reception as its 
five predecessors. 

The bulk of this volume has previously appeared in the 
Nineteenth Century and After, the Fortnightly Review, the 
Contemporary Review, and the National Review. However, 
the chapters are not merely reprints of articles, some of 
which are now more or less out of date. The original 
essays have in many cases suppUed only the framework of 
the various chapters, and they have been organically con- 
nected. I would very cordially thank the editors of the 
periodicals mentioned for allowing me to reprint part or 
the whole of my contributions. 

For the convenience of readers the chapters of this book 
are briefly summarised in the Introduction. 

J. Ellis Barker. 

LOXDON, 

Jamuxry 1919. 



CONTENTS 



PAQB 



Preface "^ 

OEUPTBR 

I. Introduction 1 

II. The Rise and Fall of Prusso-Germany . 12 

III. William II.— His Character, Policy, and 

Achievements . . . . • .31 

IV. The Foreign Policy of Prusso-Germany . 43 

V. The War Machine op Prusso-Germany— its 

Creation and its Destruction . . 60 

VI. The Imperial German Navy and its 

Planned Oversea Operations , . 72 

VII. Prusso-Germany' s World Policy and its 

Policy towards the Anglo-Saxon States 82 

VIII. The Responsibility for Anglo-German 
Friction — German Evidence on the 
Subject 106 

IX. The Relations between Germany and 

France • • 125 

X. The Morocco Crisis of 1911 . . . 136 



vu 



viii CONTENTS 



J 



CHAPTER PAGB 

XI. Education and Mis-education in 

Germany ...... 148 

XII. The Fiscal Policy of Germany and its 

Results 169 



;/- XIII. The Rural Industries of Germany . 184 

V " XIV. The Railways and the Railway Policy 

OF Germany ..... 214 

"^ XV. Waterways and Canals. . . . 235 

XVI. The Shipbuilding and Shipping Indus- 
tries OF Germany .... 255 

XVII. The Chemical Industries . . . 266 

" XVIII. German Industrial Conditions pre- 
vious TO the War . . . .276 

XIX. The Rise, Growth, and Character of 

the Social Democrahc Party . .291 

XX. The Parliamentary Position in Germany 

before THE War . . . . .311 

XXI. Why and How Germany brought about 

THE Great War 324 

XXn. Why the Triple Alliance broke down 

IN 1914 357 

XXm. How the Military ruled Germany . . 370 

XXIV. How the Army has ruined Germany . 397 

XXV. The War Aims of the German Intel- 
lectuals .,•,.. 427 



CONTENTS ix 

CHAPTER PAGH 

XXVI. German Demands for the Domination of 

THE World 439 

XXVn. The Future of Germany and of the 

German Race 445 

XXVni. The Future of Germany and of the 
German Race (coritimied) — The Problem 
OF Austria ...... 476 

Analytical Index . , . . .491 



MODERN GERMANY 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

States are usually created by the collaboration of the 
many. Most democracies owe their rise to the people of 
whom they are composed. Modern Germany, Prusso- 
Grermany, was an exception to the general rule. Like some 
ancient feudal estate, it was the creation of a single family, 
of the HohenzoUerns. 

The HohenzoUerns were, as is pointed out in the second 
chapter, a family of adventurers, of daring and thriving 
Suabian robber-knights who obtained in the beginning of 
the fifteenth century the poor, neglected, lawless, and almost 
valueless district of Brandenburg from the Eong-Emperor 
in return for services rendered. They established in that 
savage country on the outskirts of the Empire a small State 
which flourished greatly, and which grew, by successful 
violence and trickery, into a kingdom and an empire. Thus 
a family of feudal robber-knights, possessed of a robber- 
knight morality and following a robber-knight policy, 
created in the wilds a robber State which they treated as 
if the land and the people dwelling therein were their personal 
possession. 

Nominally Prusso-Germany was a federation of inde- 
pendent self-governing States. Germany and the States 
of which it was composed possessed indeed all the para- 
phernalia of constitutional, popular, and democratic govern- 
ment. However, in reality Germany was merely an enlarged 
Prussia. The King of Prussia could with more truth 
proclaim Vitat c'est moi than Louis XIV. or Napoleon I. 

1 



2 INTRODUCTION 

The HohenzoUern rulers, considering the country their 
property, administered it in accordance with ancient custom 
as if it were a huge estate. They directed absolutely, and 
as a rule in person, the army, the civil administration, the 
foreign and domestic policy of the State, industry, trade, 
and commerce, the Protestant and the Roman Catholic 
Churches, the schools, the universities, and the press. They 
not only controlled and directed all the activities of the 
State, but they moulded the character of the people and 
controlled the speech, thought, and action of the citizens 
from the cradle to the grave. 

The character and welfare of a State so ruled and so 
constituted depend of course entirely upon the personality 
of its ruler, who, owing to his enormous power, is able to 
imprint his character upon the entire nation. During the 
reign of the moderate and well-balanced King-Emperor 
WiUiam I. Prusso-Germany behaved sanely and moderately, 
and the State grew great owing to the able direction of 
eminent experts, such as Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, who 
were given the fullest scope. Under the personal rule of 
the vain, boastful, capricious, impetuous, conceited, and 
utterly incompetent William II., in whom were combined 
the vices of most of his ancestors, the character of State 
and nation changed completely, as is shown in Chapter III. 
Experts in the art of government and administration were 
replaced by applauding courtiers and by spineless syco- 
phants. The complicated and delicate machinery of the 
State was thrown out of gear by the clumsy interference of 
its incompetent director. The character of the people was 
degraded by the Emperor's policy, teaching, and pernicious 
example. The whole nation became boastful, capricious, 
conceited, and utterly unscrupulous. 

Soon after his advent the Emperor proclaimed that he 
would be his own Chancellor, that he would steer the young 
Empire over a new course, his own course. He dismissed 
Prince Bismarck, and Germany's foreign policy began to 
reflect the Emperor's rashness, incapacity, and utter un- 
trustworthiness. By his constant interference, bluster, and 



INTRODUCTION 3 

threats, William II. completely transformed the character 
of Germany's policy and damaged irretrievably the political 
reputation of the State. Thus William II. destroyed 
Germany's predominance in Europe which Bismarck had 
created, and forced France, Russia, and England to combine 
in self-defence, as is shown in Chapter IV. 

Prusso- Germany was, by its history and tradition, a 
robber State. It had grown great by successful aggression. 
According to the Hohenzollern tradition, the army was the 
bodyguard of the sovereign, and its strength and eflficiency 
were the principal interest of the ruler. Moltke resigned 
shortly after the advent of WilHam II. His successors, as 
those of Prince Bismarck, were chosen not for their ability, 
but for their subserviency. They were servile courtiers and 
flatterers of WiUiam II., not men of the highest qualifications 
possessed of a strong character. The Emperor became not 
only his own Chancellor and his own Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, but his own Minister of War and his own Chief of 
the Staff as well. His constant interference with military 
matters was as disastrous to Germany as was his interference 
ill foreign and domestic politics. Thus William II. destroyed 
not only the life-work of Bismarck, but that of Moltke and 
of Roon as well, as is shown in Chapter V. 

William II. had often proclaimed that he would lead 
Germany towards a great and glorious future. Bismarck, 
after having made Germany supreme on the continent of 
Europe, desired his country to follow a moderate and 
peaceful policy. He attached particular value to good 
relations with England. William II. thirsted for glory. 
He completely lacked the sense of proportion. He wished 
to acquire the rule of the seas and the mastery of the world. 
He proclaimed in resounding sentences that Germany's 
future lay upon the water, and created a navy designed to 
humble England and the United States, as is shown in 
Chapters VI. and VII. He called into being a nation-wide 
agitation for the creation of a predominant fleet. The 
preamble of the Navy Law of 1900 proclaimed : " Germany 
requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest 



4 INTRODUCTION 

Naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy 
of that Power." The entire governmental machine of 
Germany and the great semi-official apparatus were em- 
ployed to promote the Emperor's naval ambition by preach- 
ing hostility to England, by preaching war with England. 
The whole tribe of Government servants, of Government 
nominees and of place-hunters, title-hunters, and decoration- 
himters, of generals and admirals, professors and school- 
masters, clergymen, lecturers, and journalists, was mobilised 
for this purpose. These men demanded in unmeasured 
and threatening language Germany's supremacy on the sea, 
the humihation of England and of the United States, and 
the establishment of a German world-empire dominating 
the universe. These demands were joyfully received and 
noisily supported by the masses of the people, who had been 
trained to obey implicitly and unquestioningly the directions 
received " from above." 

Owing to the criminal foUy of William II. and of his 
pUable and characterless supporters in the various Govern- 
ment offices, Germany challenged and provoked England and 
the United States not only by her naval armaments and her 
naval agitation, but by her diplomacy as well. The fact 
that Germany was chiefly, one might almost say solely, 
responsible for the strained relations with England previous 
to the War may be seen from Chapter IX., which shows, 
exclusively by means of German evidence, where lay the 
guilt for the protracted and acute Anglo-German tension. 

After the Franco-German War of 1870-71 Bismarck 
ensured Germany's security and peace by creating the 
Triple Alliance, and he made France impotent for a war 
of revenge by skilfully isolating it. William II. provoked 
in turn not only Russia, England, and the United States, 
but France as well, and he tried to humiliate that country 
by his intervention in Morocco in 1905 and 1911. The 
history of Germany's relations with France and the story 
of the very interesting and important Morocco crisis of 1911 
are told in Chapters IX. and X. 

Before the War German education was universally 



INTRODUCTION 6 

over-estimated. It was not sufficiently recognised abroad 
that the chief purpose of the German schools was not to 
elevate the character of the people, but to make them 
abjectly obedient tools in the hands of their ruler and of 
his government ; that they were designed to create not 
ability and individuality, but servility ; that much of the 
boasted training in the German educational establishments, 
even in the universities and technical schools, was totally 
misapplied. Mis-education has undoubtedly perverted the 
mind of the German nation. That has clearly been proved 
during the course of the War. Chapter XI., on " Education 
and Mis-Education in Germany," gives a critical appreciation 
of Grerman education, which is substantially reprinted from 
previous editions of this book. It was first published in 
the Contemporary Review in October 1906, and scandalised 
at the time many English educationalists who blindly 
admired the German educational system and wished to 
copy it in almost every particular. 

Chapters XII. to XVIII. deal with Economic Germany. 
The German rulers, not the German people, created the 
State and the nation, and they created also Germany's 
economic success. The Grerman industries owe their rise 
and growth largely to the economic policy of the State, and 
particularly to skilfully-framed Protective Tariffs. The 
result of Protection, which was introduced by Prince Bis- 
marck in 1879, is shoAvn in Chapter XII. — " The Fiscal 
Policy of Grermany and its Results." 

Chapter XIII. describes at length the rural industries of 
Grermany and analyses the causes of their extraordinary 
prosperity. 

Chapter XIV. deals with the railways and the railway 
policy of Germany. That chapter should be particularly 
interesting to those who wish the State to take over and 
manage the private railways. Germany has managed its 
State railways with considerable ability and success through 
its all-powerful and practically irresponsible bureaucracy. 
Whether England wiU be as successful in managing its 
railways as a State undertaking depends, of course, chiefly 



6 INTRODUCTION 

on the ability and the authority of those who will be called 
upon to direct them. Bureaucratic management of eco- 
nomic enterprises can be efficient only if it is carried on in 
a businesslike manner by the ablest experts, provided of 
course that these are not constantly hampered by party- 
political interference. The supremacy of bureaucratic 
routine, of " red-tape," of electoral influences, and the 
meddling of party politicians with the railways for party- 
political purposes would, of course, destroy their efficiency 
and their profit-earning capacity. Bureaucratic automata 
are as incapable of directing a great business undertaking 
successfully as are party politicians who are mainly in- 
terested in obtaining votes. 

It is not generally known that Germany has a very highly- 
developed system of inland waterways, that before the 
War the tonnage of its inland fleet was twice as great as that 
u-of its merchant marine, that its greatest harbour was not 
^Hamburg, but Ruhrort. Chapter XV. supplies full details 
as to Grermany's Waterways and Canals, which should be 
of particular interest to all who have the development of 
inland transport by water at heart. 

In its economic policy Germany was guided not by its 
professors, but by its business men, not by abstract theories 
and principles, but by practical considerations. Hence it 
adapted its political means to the economic end in view. 
While it developed its gigantic manufacturing industries 
by means of fiscal protection, it created a prosperous ship- 
building and shipping industry with the help of Free Trade. 
However, it fostered its shipbuilding and shipping industries 
also by preferential railway tariffs granted by the State 
Railways and by various other means, as is shown in 
Chapter XVI. 

In the chemical industry, and especially in the manufac- 
ture of dyes, Germany became predominant throughout 
the world not so much owing to the policy of Protection 
and to the high abihty of its chemists — the greatest chemical 
discoveries were made by EngUshmen and Frenchmen — 
but by State aid freely given for chemical research and for 



INTRODUCTION 7 

chemical tuition, and especially by organised research, by 
mass research, by team work, by the co-operation of an 
army of chemists for certain predetermined ends, as is 
described in Chapter XVII. 

Chapter XVIII. sums up the results of Germany's eco- 
nomic policy. It gives a picture of the vast and rapid 
economic progress of the country, and furnishes full details 
of the extraordinary prosperity which the German classes 
and masses enjoyed up to 1914. 

In Chapters XIX. and XX, the home-political position of 
Germany previous to the War is dealt with. The former 
chapter considers the rise, growth, and character of the 
Social Democratic Party, its organisation, its achievements, 
and its doctrines. The latter analyses the German parlia- 
mentary position previous to 1914, and shows incidentally 
that increasing difficulties in the field of domestic politics 
were a contributory cause to the World War. Prusso- 
Germany was ruled by the Emperor through a practically 
irresponsible military and bureaucratic administration, with 
the help of a subservient Conservative-governmental ma- 
jority in the Reichstag. However, this majority of pro- 
Government deputies represented only a minority of the 
electorate. It misrepresented the people as a whole. The 
great bulk of the electorate was opposed to the Government 
and its policy. The growing numerical strength of the 
opposition parties in the country made the management of 
the Reichstag extremely and increasingly difficult for the 
Government and its Conservative and other pro-Government 
supporters in that assembly. It was feared by many that 
before long the Government would find it impossible to secure 
a docile and obedient Reichstag majority. Consequently 
many Conservative politicians and soldiers thought that 
the maintenance of the mihtary and autocratic form of 
government imperatively demanded the disfranchisement 
of the Liberal and Social Democratic masses by an alteration 
of the franchise, which could be brought about only by a 
Governmental coup d'etat. Many of the Emperor's staunchest 
adherents thought that such a step could comparatively 



8 INTRODUCTION 

easily be effected after a successful war. They believed 
that a great victory would so immensely enhance the 
prestige and authority of the Emperor and of his Government 
that the disfranchisement of the masses could safely be 
undertaken. 

In Chapters XXI. to XXVIII. the Great War, its causes, 
and its consequences are considered. Chapter XXI. deals 
with the principal factors which led to its outbreak. The 
chapter following it describes the causes which estranged 
Italy from Germany and Austria- Hungary, and which 
impelled that country to abandon its partners in the Triple 
Alliance and to join the Entente group. 

Chapter XXIII. depicts how the military ruled Germany 
before the War ; how ambitious and reckless military 
leaders, enjojdng the support of the Emperor, were allowed 
to destroy the authority of the civil administration and to 
make the German Foreign Office a subordinate branch of 
the General Staff ; how the soldiers managed and mis- 
managed Germany's foreign and domestic policy ; how they 
influenced, guided, and corrupted public opinion throughout 
the country ; how they caused an aggressive jingoism to 
permeate even the heart of the young children in the ele- 
mentary schools ; how they warped and distorted the mind 
of the whole nation by preaching unceasingly a war of 
conquest and of spohation and by preparing the people 
for a great war of aggression. The famous Zabern incident 
is described in the same chapter. 

Prusso-Germany has been made great by its army and has 
been ruined by it, as is shown in Chapter XXIV. Bismarck 
and Moltke had in collaboration laid down a plan of cam- 
paign in case of a war with France and Russia combined. 
According to that plan, Germany was to respect strictly 
Belgium's neutrality and France was to be induced to 
violate it. If that plan had been carried out, England 
would scarcely have intervened at the beginning of the 
struggle. It would probably have preserved its neutrality, 
and very Hkely it would have sided against France, had 
France invaded Belgium, as Bismarck had expected. 



INTRODUCTION 9 

"Rverj^hing was to be done to tempt France to invade 
Germany through that country. Had Germany acted upon 
the wise Bismarck-Moltke plan of campaign, the Germans 
might have defeated their neighbours in the East and West 
and acquired absolute supremacy in Europe, However, 
to William II. or to those courtier-soldiers who succeeded 
the great Moltke this safe and sound plan seemed too 
obvious and too commonplace. They wished to dazzle the 
imagination of the world. They wished for a more spec- 
tacular, for a more overwhelming victory. Desiring to take 
Paris by a rush and to destroy or capture the whole of the 
French field armies by rapidly getting into their flank and 
rear, the military leaders resolved to invade France by way 
of Belgium. Thus they incurred at the outset the hostility 
of Great Britain. Not satisfied with having forced England 
into the ranks of their enemies, the military leaders of 
Grermany outraged and exasperated the conscience of the 
world by their barbarous and criminal warfare, and thus 
created a world coalition against Germany. 

In Chapter XXV. the war aims of the German intellectuals 
are given in the form of a weighty petition signed by more 
than a thousand university professors, high military and 
civic dignitaries, leading business men, etc. Chapter XXVI. 
supplies representative extracts from statements in which 
Germany's domination of the world was demanded during 
the War. 

Chapters XXVII. and XXVIII. treat at considerable 
length the future of Germany and of the German race. 
Germany may follow two courses. The country may 
either preserve its unity or become dissolved into its com- 
ponent parts. Both possibilities have to be considered. 

If the country should remain united, it will be utterly 
ruined economically. In consequence of its defeat, it has 
lost in Alsace-Lorraine, in Poland, and in the Danish districts 
7,000,000 wealth-creating citizens. In addition it has lost 
large stretches of agricultural territory, nearly one-half of 
its coal, the bulk of its iron ore, vast quantities of potash 
and of mineral oil, its Colonies, the bulk of its foreign trade. 



10 INTRODUCTION 

of its foreign investments, of its shipping, etc. While 
Germany's wealth-creating resources and income have been 
very greatly diminished, the country's financial burdens 
have been hugely increased through the War debt and 
through the necessity of paying enormous indemnities to 
the victorious nations. Consequently, Germany is bound 
to remain poor for decades. As the people will find it 
diflScult to make a living in Germany, the birthrate should 
decUne. Millions of Germans will have to emigrate, and 
they may be able to obtain abroad only the lowest and 
meanest work, because of the hatred which they have 
aroused against themselves throughout the world. The 
Germans settled abroad and those Germans who will 
emigrate from their country in the future will hasten to 
become completely de-Germanised in order to lose the 
terrible stigma which the War has imprinted upon the 
whole people. In consequence of the huge emigration of 
people from Germany which must be expected, and in 
consequence of the complete absorption of the Germans 
abroad by the people around them, the German race may 
become stationary, if not retrogressive. 

It seems extremely doubtful whether the Germans will 
succeed in preserving their political unity. Rightly con- 
sidered, the Germans are not a single race, but are men 
belonging to several distinct and very different races who 
happen to speak the same language. There are fundamental 
differences between the various German races which have 
fought each other in the past, and which only lately have 
become united rather by force than by the natural course 
of things. The differences between the various German 
races, and especially between the Prussians and the non- 
Prussians, are so great that it seems extremely doubtful 
whether the Germans will be able to preserve their unity. 
Very likely the country will be dissolved into its component 
parts. Moreover, the German peoples may be troubled for 
a very long time by civil commotions, for men who have 
lived in abject, unreasoning servility for centuries cannot 
easily estabhsh democratic self-government. Successful 



INTRODUCTION 11 

democracies cannot be made. They grow up slowly and 
painfully. They require men of a democratic temper and 
a democratic frame of mind. The Great War may have 
destroyed not only the Hohenzollern dynasty and the 
German Empire, but may also have destroyed the greatness 
of the German race. WiUiam II., desiring to become the 
ruler of the universe, may have ruined not only himself 
and his family, his brother monarchs, his allies and his 
country, but even the future of his race. 



CHAPTER II 

THE RISE AND FALL OF PRUSSO-GERMANY ^ 

The world-empires which military conquest has created in 
the past have, as a rule, proved exceedingly short-lived. 
The gigantic dominions subdued and ruled by Alexander 
the Great, Julius Csesar and his successors, Charlemagne, 
Otto the Great, Attila, Jenghiz lOian, Tamerlane, the 
Abbasids, Soliman the Magnificent, Charles V., and Napoleon 
have rapidly declined and decayed, but never in the world's 
history has a vast military empire collapsed so suddenly 
and so utterly as that of William II. The Bolsheviks were 
Germany's tools and Germany's agents. Hence all Germans 
saw in Russia a German protectorate, a German possession, 
a German India. In the summer of 1918 the empire of 
WiUiam II. extended from Zeebrugge to Vladivostok and 
to the Behring Strait, and from the Arctic Circle to the gates 
of India. It comprised 350,000,000 inhabitants. The last 
of the Hohenzollern rulers held sway over an immense 
empire, the territory of which vastly exceeded the gigantic 
empires conquered by the Romans, by Charlemagne, and 
by Napoleon. Only the empires conquered by Attila and 
by Jenghiz KJian could be compared to the new German 
world-empire. The Germans thought that they had firmly 
estabUshed the power of their country over the larger part 
of Europe and of Asia. Their faith in the permanence of 
their domination may be seen from the fact that after the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk they invested vast sums in Russia, 
and that, as late as the middle of September, Stock Exchange 
quotations in Berlin, which had steadily been rising, were 

1 From the Fortnightly Review, December 1918. 
12 



THE RISE OF GERMANY 13 

still at their highest. In a few weeks the greatest military 
empire the world has ever seen tumbled down like a house 
of cards, and Germany itself became a prey to a revolution 
which may lead to the permanent dissolution of the State. 
Overnight Germany has been precipitated from the giddy 
height of domination over the two most populous continents 
to the bottomless pit of ruin, chaos, poverty, and despair. 
The powerful and apparently invincible Germany of yester- 
day, which seemed firmly established for all time, has fallen 
and may never rise again. Let us then inquire into the 
causes of its downfall, and let us endeavour to cast a glance 
into its future. 

We can understand the historical events of the present 
only if we are guided by the knowledge of the past. 

In 1915 an eminent German historian, Herr Otto Hintze, 
published a history of modern Germany, It was entitled 
The Hohenzollerns and their Achievements — Five Hundred 
Years of German History. The writer had chosen a most 
appropriate title for his book. Modern Germany, Prusso- 
Germany, was indeed not a national, but a purely dynastic 
State. It was the State of the Hohenzollerns. The Hohen- 
zoUern djmasty had firmly imprinted its character upon the 
German State and nation. In fact the dynasty was the 
State. Louis XIV. 's words, " L'etat c'est moi," was far 
more applicable to the realm of the Hohenzollerns than it 
was to that of Louis XIV. and of Napoleon I. 

The Hohenzollerns were a family of daring and ambi- 
tious Suabian robber-knights who lived by plunder. They 
possessed the formidable castle of Zollern, perched high in 
the Suabian Alps, whence they descended and plundered 
the passing caravans of merchants and the townspeople 
round about. By ability, violence, and cunning they had 
succeeded in concentrating in their hands a considerable 
amount of territory, wealth, and power. Owing to their 
commanding position in the neighbourhood, they were made 
hereditary Burgraves, military governors, of the important 
city of Nuremberg. As Burgraves they had to defend the 
castle, the burg, of Nuremberg, and to protect the Emperor's 



14 THE RISE OF GERMANY 

interests. They were hereditary imperial officials, who had 
to keep order, defend the town and district, and look after 
its administration. 

In the past Grermany had elected rulers. One Frederick 
VI., Burgrave of Nuremberg, a man of considerable gifts, 
rendered very valuable services to the Emperor Sigismond. 
By unscrupulously influencing the election, he secured for 
that monarch the crown of Germany. He assisted Sigismond 
with advice, with money, and with arms, and received as 
a reward the hereditary viceroyship of the turbulent Mark 
of Brandenburg, with the government of which the much- 
coveted electoral dignity was connected. Thus, five cen- 
turies ago, Frederick VI. of Nuremberg became Frederick I. 
Margrave of Brandenburg and Elector of the Holy Roman 
Empire. 

Brandenburg was at the time a wild district on the out- 
skirts of Germany. The aboriginal inhabitants were Slavs. 
They were ruled, or rather exploited, by a number of 
reckless robber-knights, the Quitzows, Rochows, Puthtzs, 
and others, who plundered the country mercilessly and 
fllouted the Emperor. The modern Prussian Junkers are 
the direct descendants of these men. Margrave Frederick 
created order by the ruthless persecution of the evil-doers 
and made the robber-knights his servants. His successors 
increased the territory of Brandenburg and acquired, in 
addition, a considerable district situated outside the Ger- 
man Empire, the Dukedom of Prussia, which had been in 
the possession of the Teutonic Knights. These had settled 
among the Slavonic heathens and had governed the country 
with incredible barbarity. 

The Hohenzollerns and the Teutonic Knights before 
them, acting like the Germans of the present in their African 
colonies, ruled the heathen Slavs under their sway with 
the greatest cruelty. They endeavoured to attract settlers 
from the civilised south and west of Germany to the raw 
and barbarous east by granting them the land of the natives 
which they confiscated. Many of the new settlers were 
impecunious robber-knights. Many were criminals who 



THE RISE OF GERMANY 



15 



had fled from justice. These men formed henceforth part 
of the Brandenburg-Prussian aristocracy. The native in- 
habitants and the poorer German settlers as well became 
enslaved by a race of cruel, pitiless, and largely criminal, 
feudal taskmasters. Their entreaties and complaints were 
disregarded, and their revolts were suppressed with the 
utmost ferocity. In many districts the native Slavs were 
completely exterminated. Thus the pohcy of blood and 
iron became the traditional pohcy of the Hohenzollerns and 
of their supporters, and the native Prussians, who at one 
time had been a spirited people, became a nation of duU, 
dumb, and downtrodden serfs, who were ruled by homicidal 
fighting men whose will was law, whose argument was the 
sword, and who spent their Hves in gambhng, drinking, 
and robbing. Thus robber-knights with robber morals 
created in the wilderness of Eastern Europe a robber State. 
It flourished greatly. The growth of Brandenburg-Prussia- 
Germany may be visuaUsed from the following table : 



Elector Frederick the First 

Elector Frederick the Second 

Elector Albrecht Achilles 

Elector Johann Cicero 

Elector Joachim the First 

Elector Johann George 

Elector Johann Sigismond 

Elector Frederick WilUam the Great 

King Frederick the First 

King Frederick WilUam the First 

King Frederick the Great 

King Frederick William the Second 

King Frederick William the Third 

King Frederick William the Foiirth 

King-Emperor Willieun the First 



Sq. Kilometres. 

29,478 

39,985 

42,272 

36,363 

38,130 

39,413 

81,064 
110,836 
112,524 
118,926 
194,891 
305,669 
278,042 
279,030 
540,742 



Robbery in the form of war had been the trade of the 
Hohenzollerns since the earhest ages. Violence was their 
traditional policy, and their chief interest was the army. 
They had originally created a mihtary State on a feudal 
basis, a State composed of a servile people dominated by an 
all-powerful fighting aristocracy. Gradually the adminis- 



16 THE RISE OF GERMANY 

trative functions of the all-powerful aristocracy were 
transferred to an all-powerful bureaucracy, and an all- 
powerful military organisation took the place of the irregular 
feudal levies. Both the bureaucracy and the military 
apparatus were autocratically directed by the ruler, who 
treated the country as if it were his own personal property 
and the people as if they were his serfs. Thus a highly- 
organised one-man government was introduced. Frederick 
WilUam the Great Elector created the first standing army 
in Europe. Prussia became an armed camp. Mirabeau 
wittily said that Prussia was not a State which possessed 
an army, but an army which possessed a State. 

The table which gives a picture of the territorial growth 
of Brandenburg-Prussia-Germany shows that practically all 
Hohenzollern rulers greatly increased their possessions. 
They had created an extensive and powerful State out of 
the smallest and most unpromising beginning. Expansion 
by conquest became the principal Hohenzollern tradition, 
became the settled poHcy and the creed of the House. 

The Hohenzollerns were not merely a family of glorified 
robber-knights. Desiring to retain their conquests, they 
strove to organise their new territories and to reduce their 
inhabitants to unquestioning obedience. They recognised 
at an early date that a spirit of submissiveness to authority 
can be created not only by ruthless severity, but also by 
gentler means, by a suitable secular and spiritual education. 
Hence the Hohenzollerns cultivated with equal zeal their 
armies and their schools. The schools were created not 
so much for the purpose of increasing knowledge among the 
people, and of making them intellectually independent, as 
for that of making them useful to their rulers and of incul- 
cating in them absolute obedience and blindly devoted 
loyalty. In Prusso-Germany both the School and the 
Church were made parts of the all-powerful bureaucratic 
apparatus through which the Sovereign ruled the country. 

Although, according to the Prussian Constitution of 1850, 
teaching is free in Prussia, the private schools were sup- 
pressed. The State directed the whole educational appa- 



THE RISE OF GERMANY 17 

ratus. The schoolmasters formed a powerful supplementary 
army. The teachers were civil servants whose official 
position was deliberately disguised by not furnishing them 
with uniforms. The principal aim of the elementary schools 
was to teach patriotism and obedience to the Government, 
but patriotism in Prussia did not so much mean love of 
country as bUnd veneration of the Hohenzollerns. 

German education was purely secular, and its basis an 
unreasoning worship of the power of the State, personified 
in the ruUng House, was Hohenzollern worship. Mr. de 
Montmorency correctly stated in a letter to the Times 
that the German schools taught " knowledge divorced from 
morahty, efficiency divorced from responsibility, and Ufe 
divorced from reUgion." Rehgion was purely formal and 
conventional. On the other hand, the King-Emperor was 
treated as the only veritable divinity. The Deity, reUgion, 
and the civic virtues were considered matters of small 
account. The fact that the King-Emperor was placed 
high above the Deity may be seen even from the dry para- 
graphs of the German Penal Code. While blasphemy, a 
verbal insult to the Deity, was punishable by imprison- 
ment from one day to three years, lese-majesti, a verbal 
insult to the ruler, was punishable with imprisonment from 
two months to five years. Prosecutions for blasphemy 
were very rare and punishments mild, but prosecutions for 
lese-majeste were frequent and punishments rigorous. 

Both the Protestant and the Roman Cathohc Churches 
were made part of the all-powerful bureaucracy, were made 
subservient to the dynastic interests, to the ambitions, 
and to the absolute direction of the Hohenzollerns. The 
King-Emperor, as all-powerful summus episcopus of the 
Prussian Church, directed through his personally-appointed 
Supreme Church Council, the State-trained, State-selected, 
State-appointed, and State-salaried Protestant clergy. By 
indirect but exceedingly well-designed means the authority 
of the ruler and of his government over the Roman Cathohc 
bishops and clergy was made almost as great as that over 
the official Protestant estabUshment. The clergy, Uke the 



18 THE RISE OF GERMANY 

teachers, formed a well-drilled, army, whose duty was the 
defence of Hohenzollernism. Herein lies the reason that 
both the Protestant and the Roman Cathohc clergy in Grer- 
many disgraced themselves during the War by applauding 
every crime of the Emperor, by blasphemously declaring 
that the War was a just and holy one, and by excusing and 
even encouraging the greatest atrocities of the Grerman 
Army and Navy. 

Both the schools and the churches of Germany had for 
many years taught a perverted morality, a mediaeval robber- 
knight morality. They had taught that in pohtical matters 
might is right, that craft, untruthfulness, intrigue, violence, 
robbery, murder are praiseworthy if they benefit the State. 
Dr. Muehlon, a former director of Krupps, wrote sadly in 
his diary on the 31st of August 1914 : 

" Until the ways and aims of poHtics cease to be at 
variance with the plain principles of morahty universal 
among men, the vocation of pohtics will be only an occupa- 
tion for criminals. All servants of the State to-day main- 
tain the dogma that the State's advantage is the highest 
object, and one which consecrates all means. Craft, Ues, 
forgery, deception, treachery, corruption, and murder now 
call forth no disgust if only the State be advantaged." 

While the mind of the German masses was corrupted by 
the Governmental elementary schools and by the servile 
Protestant and Roman Cathohc Churches, that of the 
classes was similarly perverted in the Government-directed 
higher schools and universities. Whenever the Hohen- 
zollerns conquered a new portion of territory, they imme- 
diately created in it high schools and universities, and the 
bureaucracy took good care that all the professors of his- 
tory, philology, philosophy, law, etc., were rehable and 
active pohtical propagandists, who with servihty and 
unwearying zeal devoted themselves heart and soul to the 
cult of the Hohenzollern family and of the Hohenzollern 
ideal of conquest. Thus universities and schools were 
planted in conquered districts to act as instruments of 
Prussification. 



THE RISE OF GERMANY 19 

Practically all the historians of Prusso-Gtermany have 
been official historians, courtier-historians, and the result 
has been that the history of the HohenzoUerns and of their 
State, as written by Hohenzollern subjects, has been falsified 
and distorted to an incredible extent. As foreign historians 
rehed for information largely on native German sources, 
the fables relating to the HohenzoUerns which were set 
on paper by these servile official scribes were only too 
frequently accepted by the non-German historians who 
wrote on German affairs. To this fact the HohenzoUerns 
owe much of the prestige which they have enjoyed both in 
Germany and abroad. According to the German historians, 
nearly aU the HohenzoUerns were supermen, were men of 
the highest character and of the greatest abiUty in peace 
and war. They were endowed with all the human virtues. 
In reality, the great majority of the HohenzoUern rulers 
were personaUy worthless. They were men who were dis- 
tinguished by their rapacity, their unscrupulousness, their 
immorality, and their incapacity. Even those who were 
politically great were personally despicable. Frederick I., 
who in 1701 acquired the royal crown, was a vain and 
worthless debauchee, and his son, Frederick WiUiam I., 
" the drill-sergeant," was a choleric, homicidal brute. His 
successor, Frederick the Great, was an utterly unscrupulous 
cynic and a reckless gambler in human lives, who nearly 
ruined Prussia by his totaUy unjustified attack on Silesia, 
which furnished Wilham II. with a great precedent. King 
Frederick WiUiam II, was a weak and despicable voluptuary, 
who dabbled in mysticism and reUgion. His successor, 
Frederick WiUiam III., was a dull, unprincipled nonentity. 
His son. King Frederick William IV., was a muddle-headed 
dreamer, who suffered from incipient insanity, and who 
died from softening of the brain. His younger brother, 
the ELing-Emperor WiUiam I., was a conscientious worker 
and a weU-balanced normal man, whose successes in peace 
and war were due to Bismarck's guidance. The personal 
character of nearly aU the HohenzoUerns was evil. They 
were reckless, ruthless, and faithless robber-barons, who 



20 THE RISE OF GERMANY 

gave a free rein to their inherited criminal instincts and 
propensities and to their personal vices. Most possessed 
neither administrative nor mihtary abihty. Only the Great 
Elector, King Frederick WilUam I., and King Frederick 
the Great were brilliant exceptions, for they were great 
organisers and soldiers. 

The State of the HohenzoUerns was historically and 
traditionally a robber State. Its rulers were men who 
possessed a robber moraUty and who followed a robber 
policy. That was, of course, never admitted by the venal 
professors. On the contrary, these prostituted themselves 
and their sciences by excusing, encouraging, praising, and 
promoting a policy of naked and shameless violence and 
faithlessness. They were the jackals and hyaenas of Hohen- 
zollernism and were thrown some bones for their services. 
For them, as for their masters, moral considerations did 
not exist. So the Prussian philosophers and historians 
spent their lives in laboriously expounding the logic, the 
beauty, and the virtue of " Realpolitik," of " MachtpoUtik," 
and furnished a pseudo-scientific cloak to political crime. 
In the peaceful lecture-rooms and countless publications 
they preached a poUcy of conquest, of treachery, of unre- 
stricted brutality, of national crime, and pegged out claims 
of conquest. All sciences were made subservient to the 
HohenzoUern pohcy of aggression and plunder. For in- 
stance. Professor Daniel, an eminent geographer, in writing 
a compendium of geography of about 4,000 pages, which 
was first published in 1862, claimed for Germany the pos- 
session of Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. 
His book was very widely read, especially by advanced 
students, and particularly by the great army of school 
teachers who formed the mind of modern Grermany. In 
the preface of the second edition of 1867 the author stated : 

" Indignation has been expressed abroad at my treating 
Switzerland, Belgium, HoUand, and Denmark as appen- 
dages to Germany. ... In the third and fourth volumes 
I treat Grermany as a physical entity. Now, can anybody 
seriously deny that these four States, parts of Switzerland 



THE RISE OF GERMANY 21 

excepted, lie within the physical frontiers of Germany ? 
And can anybody seriously denj'^ that the historical justi- 
fication for their attachment to Germany is as strong as is 
the geographical justification ? Switzerland and Holland 
belonged to Germany till 1648, and Belgium till 1801, while 
Denmark has at one time been a part of the Holy Roman 
Empire." 

The ninth section of Vol. IV. is superscribed " The Out- 
lying German States — Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, 
Luxemburg, Denmark." In the text following this head- 
line we read : 

" The five States mentioned can only be described as the 
outlying States of Germany. Apart from small portions 
of Switzerland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland, all the 
States mentioned lie within Germany's natural boundaries, 
and they are inhabited by men of Germanic race. All of 
these States have belonged to the old German Empire in 
the past and were subject to feudal service. Germany 
deplores the loss of these valuable members, and the popu- 
lation of Switzerland and Belgium has strong sympathy 
for Germany. . . . Germany is advancing. Owing to the 
increase of its formidable military strength it will more and 
more become Europe's centre of gravity. The Swiss, the 
Belgians, and the Dutch are related to us Germans by 
race and by language. They will necessarily and gladly 
incline towards a powerful Germany, and both sides can 
only gain by such a reunion." 

In the first chapter of Daniel's third volume, which deals 
with the physical geography of Germany, we read : 

" The most northerly point of Germany is Cape Skagen, 
in the north of Denmark, the most southerly the Gulf of 
Fiume, the most westerly Cape Grisnez, on the English 
Channel, and the most easterly point lies on the River 
Warthe, in the neighbourhood of Rzgow and Tuszyn." 

The eminent and widely-read German geographical 
authority pegged out vast political-territorial claims for 
Grermany, not only within the immediate neighbourhood of 
the country, for his zeal took him much farther afield. In 



22 THE RISE OF GERMANY 

the second volume of the edition of 1875 Professor Daniel 
stated in the section which considers France : 

" In view of French arrogance it must always be asserted 
that we Germans possess historically justified claims to the 
territories on the Rhone. At any rate, we must not be 
more unhistorical than the French are themselves. There- 
fore we add to the French names the German ones." 

Continuing, the learned professor deals with the Provence 
(Provintz), Marseilles (Marsilien), Aries (Arelat), Aix 
(Waelsch Aachen), Orange (Orense), the Dauphine (Del- 
phinat), Grenoble (Graswalde), Vienne (Waelsch Wien), 
Lyon (Waelsch Leyden), Bescanyon (Bisanz), MontbeHard 
(Miimpelgart), Belfort (Beffort), Toul (Tul), Verdun (Virten), 
Nancy (Nanzig), Luneville (Liinstadt), Lille (Ryssel), Douai 
(Dauwey), Cambrai (Kameryk), Valenciennes (Schwanen- 
thal), Maubeuge (Malboden), etc. 

Dozens, nay, hundreds, of eminent scientists acted like 
Professor Daniel, as the advance guards of aggressive 
Hohenzollernism, inculcating in the people the divine right 
of conquest, and claiming for Germany the possession of 
the lands of other nations as a matter of right on philo- 
sophical, ethical, historical, geographical, ethnological, 
military, philological, and economic grounds. 

The servile German historians not only falsified German 
history, but aU history, for the furtherance of the Hohen- 
zollern idea of conquest and ruthlessness. The historians 
of antiquity, such as Mommsen, extolled the policy of 
conquest and of faithlessness, and treated democracy and 
the policy of righteousness with withering contempt. That 
may be seen by Mommsen's description of Julius Csesar 
and by his opinion on the breach of the Caudine Treaty by 
the Romans. His attitude is representative of practically 
all Grerman historians. Attila and other savage conquerors 
were held up to the admiration of the Germans. According 
to the German historians, France was decadent and foppish ; 
England, senile, cowardly, frivolous, and altogether des- 
picable ; the United States were not a nation, but merely 



THE RISE OF GERMANY 23 

a cosmopolitan crowd entirely devoted to mammon- worship, 
etc. The fact that other nations had achieved great things 
both in peace and in war was suppressed in the German 
text-books. " Deulschland iiber AUes " summed up the 
attitude of German science and German teaching towards 
other nations. There was only one great nation in the 
world, and that was Germany. Germany was foremost 
among the peoples in character, culture, military strength, 
ability, genius, and the HohenzoUerns were the greatest 
and the most gifted race of rulers that had ever lived. 

Prussia is, and always was, the most barbarous part of 
Germany. Until a short time ago she had no science, no 
art, no industry, no wealth. Frederick the Great despaired 
of Prussia ever acquiring a true civilisation. German cul- 
ture and German science were developed in the non- 
Prussian South and West of Germany and in the non- 
Prussian sea-coast towns. Prussia, having annexed by 
force of arms the non-Prussian districts of Germany, pro- 
ceeded to annex their cultural achievements as well and 
to proclaim them as her own. The Prussians were taught 
to consider all great Germans as their countrymen in the 
narrower sense of the term. Lately the Prusso-Germans 
were even taught that theirs was not merely the greatest 
but the only true civilisation in the world. Ludwig Wolt- 
mann devoted his life to proving by the most reckless 
assertions and with the help of magnificently illustrated 
books that all the most eminent Frenchmen, Italians, 
Englishmen, etc., were really Germans, were of German 
race, or at least of German descent, or possessed at all 
events German physical characteristics or German features. 
After the outbreak of the war he tactfully tried to gain for 
Germany the support of the Italian people on cultural 
grounds. Therefore, he asserted in a publication addressed 
to the Italians : 

" Anthropological investigations of the physical type 

have proved beyond a doubt that most of the great geniuses 

which Italy has produced were of German descent. To 

the blond German type belonged Giotto, Dante, Donatello, 

3 



24 THE RISE OF GERMANY 

Massaccio, Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael, Botticelli, Titian, 
Galilei, Tasso, Columbus, and among the modern Italians 
Morgagni, Alfieri, Volta, Foscolo, Leopardi, Garibaldi, 
Cavour, Bellini, Rossini, Donizetti, . Canova, Manzoni. 
Only a few Italians, such as Michelangelo, Ariosto, Machia- 
velli, Palestrina, Verdi, belonged to a mixed type." 

Succeeding Hohenzollern rulers had tightened up the 
national system of education, and had made it more and 
more an instrument of dynastic propaganda and of pro- 
vocative jingoism. In all schools, from the highest to the 
lowest, a robber-knight morality was inculcated. Appoint- 
ments, promotions, favours, honours, and money went to 
those teachers and scientists who were most active in 
promoting the Hohenzollern idea. Learned men are often 
feeble, poor, and vain. German science was deliberately 
corrupted and debauched by the Government. Eminent 
scientists vied with each other in flattering their rulers 
and extolling their very vices as the virtues of strong men. 
Professorial sycophants fawned for official favours and 
prostrated and prostituted themselves and the sciences to 
which they were supposed to devote themselves to the 
Hohenzollern fetish. Eminent German authorities on 
international law shamelessly taught that international 
law, as applied to war, existed only in the text-books and 
in the imagination of weak, foolish, un warlike, and deca- 
dent nations, that power was more important than right, 
that in case of war all international rules and conventions 
should be thrown to the winds, that for the State necessity 
was the highest law, that the German Army could of course 
not be hampered by the sacredness of treaties and by con- 
siderations of humanity. Political philosophers and others, 
eager to curry favour, taught that the State could flourish 
only if it were above law and morality, and advocated a 
policy of unrestrained brutal force, a robber-knight policy 
on the largest scale. They taught the Germans not only 
that might was right, but urged the German Government 
and people into a war for the conquest of Germany's neigh- 
bour States, of the sea, of England, of the world. Professor 



THE RISE OF GERMANY 25 

Treitschke and many other German historians spent their 
lives in urging Germany to embark upon a policy of conquest 
and of spoliation, in which they saw a holy duty. Professor 
Schmoller and many other leading political economists 
advocated for economic reasons a war with England. 
Scientists are supposed to devote themselves to the pro- 
motion of science and of truth, for science is incompatible 
with untruth. However, the unceasing advocacy of a 
robber-policy and the exaltation of a robber-morality had 
so completely destroyed the instinct of responsibility and 
of truth among Germany's intellectual leaders that ninety- 
three of Germany's most eminent scientists, among them 
many prominent theologians and legists, disgraced them- 
selves and German science for all time by issuing in 1914 
a manifesto to the world, in which they mendaciously pro- 
claimed that the other Powers had forced a war upon 
innocent and peaceful Germany ; that upon France, 
England, and Russia rested the blood-guiltiness ; that 
Germany fought a clean war of self-defence. 

The HohenzoUern Government had regimented, drilled, 
and corrupted not only the schools, the churches, and Ger- 
man science, but had also hired and suborned the German 
Press. Independent scientific thought and independent 
journaUsm, if in opposition to the Government and its aims, 
were not allowed to exist. Dr. Muehlon wrote in his diary 
on the 25th of September 1914 i 

" The state of siege under which we are living suddenly 
brings to the front all the venal scoundrels who lend the 
Government their pens for every deed of shame, as bravos 
hire their stilettos. The pick of the infamous writers 
belong to three species. They consist, firstly, of those 
offensively stupid retired officers who could not be utilised 
as soldiers even in time of war ; secondly, of clerical digni- 
taries who, with cold soul and kindly smile, trumpet forth 
each bit of baseness as an heroic feat of German Protes- 
tantism ; and, thirdly — the worst of all — of the countless 
university professors of the modern type — men overloaded 
with titles and distinctions — who swim with every patriotic 
stream, creatures who have been bought or have stolen 



26 THE RISE OF GERMANY 

their way in, who outside their special department seek no 
truth and thoroughness but the fame of the day. This 
highly esteemed scum of the three fashionable Prussian 
circles tries to make history by lying, tries to create 
* archives ' and ' data ' by impudent assertion." 



The HohenzoUern cult and the cult of unrestricted vio- 
lencfe and of aggressive war were made the universal faith. 
The German people were dehberately miseducated, misin- 
formed, and misled from the cradle to the grave. Even the 
arts were made subservient to the dynastic idea of conquest, 
to the worship of brute force. German music, German 
architecture, German painting, Grerman scuplture aban- 
doned the cult of the beautiful for that of the forceful, of 
the shapeless, of the imposing, of the gigantic, of the over- 
whelming. Religion itself came to be considered simply 
as a pohtical and military asset. Many Germans beheved 
that the gentle teachings of Christ were unfavourable to the 
worship of power and of military success, to the Hohen- 
zoUern idea, and that Christianity should be thrown on 
the scrap-heap, as being no longer in accordance with the 
spirit of the times. The result was that numerous ethical 
and pseudo-rehgious societies arose throughout Germany 
which preached that Christianity was a worn-out Oriental 
faith which was quite out of place in a Germanic world. 
These societies aimed at increasing the warlike spirit of the 
people by purifying and energising the race and by weeding 
out the mild Christian idea, which was supposed to^ enfeeble 
the national fighting spirit and the will to victory. Turn- 
ing their backs upon Christianity, many intellectual Germans 
advocated the creation of a new, of a German, reUgion. 
Many asserted that the ancient Germans had evolved the 
highest form of religion in their primeval forests, and de- 
manded that the worship of the merciless heathen gods of 
battle, of Wotan and Thor, should be revived. Wotan and 
Thor were once more to lead the nation. Pseudo-rehgious 
organisations tried to renew and to popularise the worship 
of the ancient tribal gods. Part of the Germans had 



THE RISE OF GERMANY 27 

become utterly materialistic, part had become frankly 
pagan. Wotan worship was spreading apace. 

It has often been stated that Germany's frenzied attack 
upon the world was caused by the example and teaching 
of Bismarck. That is scarcely correct. Bismarck blended 
in his policy daring with wisdom and caution. Therefore 
he was successful in aU his undertakings. Unfortunately 
he had given to the German people a Constitution in which 
the King-Emperor was as all-powerful as were the petty 
HohenzoUern rulers in the old feudal days. The King- 
Emperor's absolute authority could not endanger the 
country as long as the sovereignty was possessed by a ruler 
of the unemotional caution and carefulness of WiUiam I., 
who allowed himself to be directed by the practical wisdom 
and experience of his great Chancellor. The advent of the 
impetuous, headstrong, vain, impulsive, short-sighted, and 
irresponsible WiUiam II. endangered the future of the 
Empire. Bismarck, clearly recognising that Germany 
could remain great only if she pursued a peaceful policy, 
that the new Emperor might by his recklessness involve 
Germany in ruin, wrote in his Memoirs, his political testa- 
ment : 

" In the future not only sufficient miUtary equipment, 
but also a correct political eye, will be required to guide the 
German ship of State through the currents of coalition, to 
which, in consequence of our geographical position and our 
previous history, we are exposed. 

" We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling 
among the nations which has been called forth through 
our growth to the position of a real Great Power, by the 
honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so con- 
vince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is 
more useful and less partisan, and also less harmful for the 
freedom of other nations, than would be the hegemony of 
France, Russia, or England. 

" In order to produce this confidence it is, above every- 
thing, necessary that we should act honourably and openly, 
and be easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward 
events." 



28 THE RISE OF GERMANY 

Bismarck foresaw, and frequently foretold to his inti- 
mates, that the rashness, aggressiveness, and megalomania 
of William II. were likely to involve Germany in ruin, and 
many passages in his Memoirs unmistakably hint at that 
danger. Germany's downfall can therefore scarcely be 
ascribed to Bismarck's policy and example. 

Prusso-Germany was not a national, but a dynastic 
State. It was the State of the Hohenzollerns. Hence 
many of the HohenzoUern rulers were able to imprint their 
personal character upon their submissive and docile sub- 
jects. Under the government of the cautious, courteous, 
and reserved William I. the German nation had also acted 
cautiously and soberly. Under the government of a 
blatant, vain, and boastful megalomaniac the whole nation 
fell into a megalomaniacal frenzy, for William II. was faith- 
fully supported in his histrionic extravagances by his 
abject courtiers and by the bureaucratic, miUtary, profes- 
sorial, ecclesiastical, educational, and journaHstic leaders 
of Germany, who thirsted for recognition and promotion, 
for place and power, and who were only too willing to be 
the tools of the Emperor and of his Government. Thus 
the vanity, boastfulness, and megalomania of the last of the 
HohenzoUern rulers infected and morbidly affected the 
whole nation. 

Since the early days the Hohenzollerns have claimed 
infallibility for themselves and for their government. The 
people were taught, especially in the time of Frederick the 
Great, that their ruler, his bureaucracy, and his miUtary 
advisers could not err. The gigantic and universal suc- 
cesses of Prusso-Germany in Bismarck's time had strength- 
ened the belief of the people in the wisdom and infallibility 
of its appointed rulers. A child-Hke faith that German 
diplomats and generals could not err, that the war was 
being fought " according to plan," that Germany was 
bound to triumph, that the German people and the 
German Army were irresistible and unconquerable, pre- 
vailed throughout the country up to the autumn of 1918, 
and the mihtary authorities maintained their reputation of 



THE RISE OF GERMANY 29 

invincibility almost to the end by mendacious bulletins 
and by an equally mendacious Press. The faith in 
victory remained general in Germany up to the day when 
the news of Bulgaria's downfall and unconditional sur- 
render fell like a thunderbolt. Then the scales dropped 
from the eyes of the people. They were not prepared 
for failure, and still less for utter defeat and disaster. 
The shock was too great to be borne. They became 
a prey to despair. The strength of the nation and of 
its army was suddenly broken. 

The Prussians were supposed to be the most loyal of 
subjects. The Hohenzollerns were beheved to be the most 
firmly-rooted dynasty in the world. The unexpected and 
unexampled defeat of Germany has destroyed five hundred 
years of dynastic endeavour and of almost unparalleled 
dynastic success. It has destroyed the HohenzoUern 
legend and the HohenzoUern creed. WilHam II. has pulled 
down the mighty fabric which his ancestors had laboriously 
reared since the day when they settled in Brandenburg. 
He has destroyed the life-work of Bismarck, of Frederick- 
the Great, of Frederick WilUam I., and of the Great Elector. 
Germany's faith in the HohenzoUern dynasty and in their 
traditional policy has been destroyed, probably for aU time. 
The future of Germany is dark. The people have had a 
terrible awakening. Their dream of power and of domina- 
tion is gone. The Great War wiU leave them permanently 
impoverished. Their miUtary history may be at an end, 
for wealth is power. The greatest resources of Imperial 
Germany were its mineral riches. Half of Germany's coal 
will faU to Poland. PracticaUy all its iron ore will fall to 
France. The war wiU leave the country without aUies, 
without friends, without colonies, with vastly diminished 
resources, and with a gigantic war debt. In addition, Ger- 
many will have to make good the colossal values which her 
soldiers have destroyed in other countries. The German 
people wiU be crippled for decades and perhaps for cen- 
turies. Militarism may become for them an impossible 
luxury. Poverty and dissatisfaction may become wide- 



30 THE RISE OF GERMANY 

spread and permanent. The population may become 
stagnant and perhaps retrogressive, for wealth determines 
population. Moreover, a nation which has been herded 
like sheep for centuries does not easily and quickly learn 
the art of governing itself. Centuries of mechanical obedi- 
ence, of Kadavergehorsam, may have destroyed not only the 
conscience and wiU of the people, but even their mind and 
their soul. It is difficult to convert a servile race into a 
race of freemen. Besides, grave difficulties are bound to 
arise between the harsh and backward Prussian East and 
the advanced and comparatively gentle non-Prussian South 
and West of Grermany. The Prussians are hated in the 
South and West of Germany. The non-Prussian Germans 
see in the Prussians the cause of their downfall, their task- 
masters, and their enemies. Germany may split up along 
racial lines. Possibly it will never recover from its defeat. 



CHAPTER III 

WILLIAM II. — HIS CHARACTER, POLICY, AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS ^ 

Ever since his coronation in 1890 William II. was the 
most-talked-about figure on the stage of the world. Very 
likely more columns of the international press were filled 
with accounts of his doings and sayings than with those of 
all other sovereigns taken together. WiUiam II. was not 
only an emperor and a king, but also an active states- 
man, administrator, and poUtician, a commanding general 
and admiral, a painter and a composer, a bustling stage- 
manager, a conductor of an orchestra, and a sportsman. 
The world heard him preach sermons, and give lectures 
on naval matters and on commerce, on yachting and on 
socialism, on agriculture and on new art, on archaeology 
and on boat-building, on education, on theology, and on 
countless other subjects. In consequence of his numerous 
accompUshments and his feverish activity, he had come 
to be considered to be either a genius of infinite range 
and wonderful intelligence, or a restless, many-sided, over- 
ambitious, over-enthusiastic, and exceedingly vain and con- 
ceited charlatan. 

WilMam II. was distinctly a talented man, endowed by 
nature with a very active brain, rapid comprehension, a 
retentive memory, and a fertile imagination. These charac- 
teristics showed themselves in his earliest childhood. For 
instance, once, when his governess, before inflicting bodily 
chastisement, solemnly assured the little prince that his 
punishment would hurt her more than it would hurt him, 

1 From the Fortnightly Review, November 1902. 
31 



32 WILLIAM II. 

little William at once inquired whether it would hurt her 
in that place where it would hurt him. 

The Grerman Emperor was very highly strung, nervous, 
and irritable ; impetuous to rashness, swayed by sudden 
impulses, possessed of unbounded self-confidence, and 
imbued with that fervent belief in himself, in his divine 
mission, and in the special protection of Providence, which 
is usually found in great men of the first order, such as 
Alexander and Caesar, Cromwell and Napoleon. Having a 
considerable gift of speech, it is only natural that his utter- 
ances were never commonplace, but highly dramatic, 
strenuous, and emphatic. 

As Frederick the Great treated the " Unterthanen- 
Verstand " with sublime contempt, administered at the 
same time all the great offices of State in peace, commanded 
the armies in war, and whiled away his spare time with his 
flute and philosophy, with writing poetry and history, 
composing and sketching, thinking himself great in aU these 
subjects, to the amusement of Voltaire, even so WiUiam II. 
felt capable not only of ruling Prussia and the German 
Empire, so to say, single-handed, but also of directing 
its commerce and education, its music and art — ^in short, 
the whole machinery of the empire, and the whole intelli- 
gence and activity of the nation. Frederick the Great was 
the Emperor's ideal and model, and there was some resem- 
blance between William II. and his great ancestor. Bis- 
marck once remarked of the then Prince William : "In him 
there is something of Frederick the Great, and he is also 
able to become as despotic. W^hat a blessing that we have 
a parliamentary government ! " 

Bismarck had prophesied that the Emperor would be his 
own Chancellor. Nevertheless, he was unwise enough not 
to resign when the old Emperor died. Moltke was wiser. 
He resigned six weeks after the new Emperor's advent. 

Frederick the Great was a poet, an administrator, a 
philosopher, and an author, but he was essentially a soldier. 
In him the ambition to enlarge his dominions, which has 
been characteristic of all the HohenzoUerns, was particularly 



WILLIAM II. 33 

strongly developed, and he succeeded in nearly doubling 
the territory under his sway, and in elevating Prussia to the 
rank of a Great Power. William II., whose interests and 
pursuits were far more multifarious than even those of 
Frederick the Great, was also principally a soldier, and his 
desire to increase the territory of his country was more than 
an ambition with him ; it was a violent passion, as it was 
with Frederick the Great. 

The Emperor was a soldier by nature. Nowhere did he 
feel more at home than among the officers of his army and 
navy. He visited their mess-rooms very frequently, not as 
an emperor, but as a comrade, and stayed for hours with 
them, talking, jesting, and laughing. He did not mix with 
civilians in a similarly cordial and unceremonious way. 
His military education, as well as his inborn military in- 
clinations, together with his love for Frederickian traditions, 
not only coloured his political views and ambitions and 
influenced his ideas of government, but they also tinged 
his public utterances, which therefore usually took the form 
of Imperial commands. Consequently, his frequent pro- 
nouncements on art and education, religion, socialism, etc., 
were not only of startling originality, but of a stiU more 
startling vigour, especially as he never hesitated to fling 
the whole weight of his Imperial authority into the balance 
in order to enforce his private views upon an unwilling 
section of the community or upon the whole nation. 

The former rulers of Grermany stood, on principle, above 
the political parties. William II. cheerfully descended into 
the party arena, and joined the fray with the greatest 
vigour, and, sometimes, with very unfortunate results. 
Utterances such as the following were typical for him : 

" For me, every Social Democrat is synonymous with 
enemy of the nation and of the Fatherland." 

This was addressed to the largest German party in his 
speech of the 14th of May 1889. 

Suprema lex regis voluntas, written as a demonstration to 



34 WILLIAM II. 

parliamentary and popular opposition in the Golden Book 
at Munich. 

Sic volo sic jubeo, written under his portrait given to the 
Minister of Public Worship and Education. 

" Only one is master in the country. That am I. Who 
opposes me I shall crush to pieces." 

These sayings sound especially strange if we remember 
that Germany was supposed to be a constitutional monarchy, 
and that the " crushing to pieces " of German subjects could 
only be effected by the independent law courts. These 
utterances, and many more of similar' tone, which caused 
much speculation in other countries, and consternation in 
Germany, did not so much spring from the sudden impulse 
of a passionate mind as from the Emperor's vanity and 
conceit, from his deep-rooted conviction of his own genius, 
and from a mystical belief in the absolute monarchical power 
by divine right, vested by Providence in the German Emperor. 

Under the Imperial Constitution of 1871 the powers of 
the German Emperor were extremely great. The Con- 
stitution said : 

" . . . . The Emperor can declare war and conclude 
peace, make alliances and other treaties, and nominate and 
receive ambassadors. (Art. 11.) 

" The Emperor can call, open, adjourn, and dissolve the 
Federal Coimcil and the Imperial Diet. (Art. 12.) 

" The Emperor can issue and promulgate laws, and super- 
vises their execution. The Imperial enactments . . . require 
the counter-signature of the Chancellor, who thereby assumes 
the responsibility for them. (Art. 17.) 

" The Emperor nominates officials . . . and orders their 
dismissal." (Art. 18.) 

Besides appointing all Imperial officials, the Emperor ap- 
pointed all officers of the German Navy and of the Prussian 
Army, as weU as the highest officers of the armies belonging 
to the other German States included in the Empire, 

Compared with the power of the British monarch, the 
powers of the German Emperor with regard to foreign and 
home politics were almost boundless. Nevertheless, Wil- 



WILLIAM II. 35 

liam II. was not satisfied with his constitutional power, 
so he increased it at the cost of his Chancellor, of his Ministers, 
and of the Imperial Diet. Imperial decrees were issued 
by the Emperor without the counter-signature of the 
Chancellor, required by Article 17 of the Constitution. 
Besides, it should not be forgotten that the counter-signature 
of the German Chancellor, who by counter-signing assumed 
the responsibility for the Emperor's acts, became a mere 
formality when the Chancellor was not an experienced and 
independent official, but simply an obedient tool appointed 
by the Emperor whose duty it was to put the Imperial will 
on paper. 

In Bismarck's time the actual administration of the 
country was in the hands of responsible experts, and, what 
was more important, German policy was directed by the 
wise foresight, unrivalled experience, calm deliberation, and 
firmness of purpose of a great statesman. Though Bis- 
marck was generally believed to be all-powerful, if not 
tyrannical, a belief that stood him in good stead, his position 
was much less commanding than is generally known. His 
plans had to be submitted to the Emperor, who, in his turn, 
used to talk the matter over with his wife. The old Emperor 
was the soul of honour, conservative, cautious, and somewhat 
slow to move. The Empress was pious and peace-loving, 
with a distinct leaning towards Liberalism. Consequently, 
Bismarck's boldness and daring in foreign affairs were often 
tempered by the Emperor's wisdom and caution, and the 
influence of the Empress over her husband made for modera- 
tion in home affairs. The old Emperor acted as a brake 
upon Bismarck, and the Empress as a brake upon her 
husband. William I. was to Bismarck what the House of 
Lords is to a Liberal House of Commons, and the com- 
bination of Bismarck, the Emperor, and his wife was an 
ideal one for foreign policy, ensuring the even continuance 
of a vigorous, wise, discreet, and successful policy. 

While Bismarck was in office German foreign and domestic 
policy ran an even course, German policy was understand- 
able abroad. Bismarck did not embark upon many risky 



36 WILLIAM II. 

enterprises at once, but concentrated his master-mind upon 
a few really important questions. His policy was at the 
same time great and simple, as was his character. William 
II. had not the commanding talent of a Bismarck for foreign 
policy, nor was he subject to the restraining influences 
which moderated the more adventurous plans of the great 
Chancellor. Furthermore, William II. took as much 
interest in the direction of the army and navy, of the national 
administration, of shipping and commerce, of education, 
art, sport, and countless other matters, as in the direction 
of foreign poUtics. Consequently, he had not sufficient 
leisure to concentrate his mind upon anything. Hence 
German foreign policy became fitful, enigmatic, and unstable, 
a replica of the Emperor's character. 

Bismarck's diplomatic activity after the Franco-German 
War was chiefly directed towards two great objects — the 
maintenance of the Triple Alliance and the prevention of 
an aUiance between France and Russia. As long as Bis- 
marck was in oflfice, France and Russia were kept asunder. 
Germany was the strongest and most respected Power on 
the Continent, and its arbiter. Soon after Bismarck's 
dismissal Germany ceased to be the first Power on the 
Continent. Russia, who had been a reliable friend to 
Germany until WiUiam II. came to the throne, was estranged 
by the Emperor. The traditional good relations between 
Russia and Germany, which had proved so valuable to her 
in 1870, came to an end. Only fifteen months after Bis- 
marck's dismissal, in July 1891, the rejoicings occasioned 
by the visit of the French Fleet at Cronstadt proclaimed to 
the world that Wilham II. had not only been unable to 
continue the skilful isolation of France and to enjoy the 
friendship of Russia, but that the Emperor had driven these 
Powers into one another's arms by sheer bad diplomacy. 
The work of which Bismarck was even more proud than of 
the fashioning of the Triple Alliance, the keeping apart of 
France and Russia, had been rapidly destroyed. 

After Bismarck's dismissal independent, able Ministers 
were replaced by time-servers and figureheads whose power 



WILLIAM II. 37 

was extremely circumscribed. From a powerful, impersonal, 
and therefore national ministerial policy by experienced 
men, tempered by the moderation of a wise and cautious 
ruler, German foreign and domestic policy became the 
personal uncontrolled policy of a talented, vigorous, im- 
pulsive, very self-satisfied and highly self-conscious monarch, 
and was tinged by accidents of his health, and by his personal 
feelings, moods, and prejudices. 

The Emperor treated his Ministers not as experienced 
and independent chiefs of the Departments of State, entitled 
to opinions of their own, but as the executors of his will, 
and he removed them as soon as they did not succeed in 
fulfilling his wishes. His Ministers were changed with 
surprising rapidity. Continuity of policy in foreign and 
home affairs became impossible. Projects of great import- 
ance were hurriedly brought forward and dropped in nervous 
haste, and the suddenness with which the highest officials 
were replaced taught them that it was not safe to oppose 
or to criticise the wishes of the Emperor, that it was wisest 
for them to execute his wishes and his whims without 
question. Thus the high offices were filled with place- 
hunters and spineless nonentities. 

The German Parliament was already in Bismarck's time 
little more than a money- voting and law-assenting machine 
and a general taMng-shop, possessing hardly any influence, 
and no control whatever, over the administration and policy 
of the Government. The degradation became complete 
under William II. 

The Emperor interfered not only in matters of State, 
but in minor matters as weU, as the following anecdote, told 
by a prominent German architect, will show : Drawings for 
a new church in BerUn were submitted to the Emperor for 
assent or correction. The Emperor, intending to make a 
marginal remark with regard to the cross on the top of the 
steeple, put a letter for reference above the cross, and drew 
a straight line from the letter down to the cross. Then he 
changed his mind, and crossed the letter vigorously through. 
When the architect received back his plans he studied 



38 WILLIAM II. 

carefully the Emperor's corrections, but mistook the crossed- 
through letter for a star. EJiowing better than to ask 
questions, he built the church, and put a big star on a huge 
iron pole high above the top of the cross. This strange 
excrescence was in existence a few years ago, and may still 
be visible. For similar reasons many monuments and 
public buildings in Berlin and other parts of Germany are 
of astonishing ugliness. 

Blind obedience became the watchword in official circles 
throughout the Empire, and even in professorial appoint- 
ments by the nominally independent universities and in 
judicial decisions by nominally independent judges a desire 
to please the Emperor, a desire to please even the most 
unreasonable Imperial wishes, became painfully apparent. 
As the Emperor, apart from the powers already cited, could 
influence those whom he wished to influence by bestowing 
titles and decorations, and by social preferment, abject 
flattery became rife in his surroundings and throughout 
the empire. Examples of such flattery on the part of the 
highest dignitaries of the empire were fitly described in 
Germany under the name of " Byzantinism." 

The domestic policy of the Emperor was an unfortunate 
one. His anti-PoUsh policy infuriated the Poles. The lack 
of toleration which became characteristic of German home 
policy drove the Liberal elements of Germany into the 
ranks of the Social Democratic Party, which came to include 
numerous manufacturers, merchants, bankers, professional 
men, etc. During the reign of William II. Social Democracy 
became by far the strongest party in the empire. The 
following figures show the numbers of Social Democratic 
votes polled at the various general elections : 





Total of 


Social Democratic 


Percentage of Social 




Votes polled. 


Votes. 


Democratic Votes. 


1887 . 


7,540,900 


763,100 


10 '11 per cent. 


1888 . 


(A< 


jcession of William II.) 


1890 . 


7,228,500 


1,427,300 


19-74 


1893 . 


7,674,000 


1,786,700 


23-30 


1898 . 


7,757,700 


2,107,076 


27-18 


1903 . 


9,495,586 


3,010,771 


31-71 


1907 . 


11,262,800 


3,259,000 


28-94 


1912 . 


12,206,808 


4,250,329 


34-82 



WILLIAM II. 39 

It was only natural that Social Democracy grew by 
leaps and bounds, trebling its votes in twenty years. The 
Emperor began his reign as the " Arbeiter-Kaiser," called 
an international congress for the benefit of the workers, and 
received their deputations. Then turned round and pro- 
claimed, "For me every Social Democrat is synonymous 
with enemy of the nation and of the Fatherland." Lastly, 
he had a Bill brought before the Reichstag, upon his per- 
sonal initiative, making incitement to strikes a felony 
punishable with penal servitude, from three to five years. 
If anything was calculated to shake the confidence of the 
German workers in their Kaiser and to increase Social 
Democracy it was the Emperor's untimely, impulsive, and 
iU-advised meddling and the " Penal Servitude BiU." 

As the Emperor had not succeeded in increasing Ger- 
many's territories by the arts and stratagems of diplomacy, 
he turned towards his armed forces and immensely strength- 
ened them. A comparison of Germany's armed strength 
in 1888, the year of the Emperor's accession, and its strength 
in 1914 is therefore interesting : 

Peace Strength of the German Army 

1888 .... 491,726 men 84,091 horses 

1914 .... 800,046 ,, 160,092 „ 

The great increase of the peace army was small if com- 
pared with the increase in its war strength. 

The following was the strength of the German Navy at 
the beginning of the Emperor's reign and in 1914 : 

1888 . . 189,136 tons 182,470 horse-power 15,573 men 

1914 . . 1,041,010 ,, 1,832,840 ,, ,, 79,357 „ 

The Emperor was uniformly unsuccessful in his foreign 
pohcy and in his domestic policy. Being rather a soldier 
than a diplomat, and being aware that the greatness of 
Germany was won on the field of battle, William II, natur- 
ally turned in his political disappointments towards the 
ultima ratio regis. When his campaign against the Social 
4 



40 WILLIAM II. 

Democrats had failed, he addressed the officers of the Berlin 
garrison, and admonished them to stand by him and to 
shoot the malcontents in case he commanded them to do 
so, as the Prussian soldiers shot the BerHn revolutionaries 
in 1848. Again, when his attempts at seizing the Philip- 
pines and his pro-Kruger campaign had failed, he turned 
towards his fleet. On the 9th of October 1899 the Boers 
issued their ultimatum ; nine days later, on the 18th of 
October, the Emperor made the celebrated speech in 
Hamburg containing the winged words, " Bitter not ist 
uns eine starke Deutsche Flotte." German colonial aspira- 
tions in Africa had been foiled by British diplomacy, and 
the speech mentioned was the starting-point of the violent 
anti-British agitation in Germany which culminated in 
the passing of a Bill authorising the construction of a 
fleet, intended, according to its preamble, to be so strong 
as to be able to encounter successfully the most powerful 
enemy on the seas. 

While the German Emperor was showering the most 
assiduous attentions upon England and America, as well 
as upon France and Russia, and while peace was in his 
mouth, a huge fleet was being built with the greatest pos- 
sible dispatch and his army was increased with the utmost 
rapidity. 

The German Emperor possessed that abnormal versa- 
tility and flexibility of mind which is sometimes described 
with a different name. First he sat at Bismarck's feet as 
his admiring disciple. Then he dismissed his great master 
without ceremony, and completely changed the Bismarckian 
foreign and domestic policy of Germany. First he gave 
Caprivi a free hand. Then he ruled alone. First he took 
up the cause of the working men, and then he threw them 
over. First he was anti-colonial, and gave away the best 
German colonies in exchange for the rock of Hehgoland. 
Then he strained every nerve to acquire colonies. First 
he provoked France, and then he flattered her. First he 
flirted with the Poles, and then forbade Polish school- 
children to say even their prayers in their own language- 



WILLIAM II. 41 

At the end of this chapter I wrote, when it appeared as 
an article in the Fortnightly' Review in November 1902 : 

" In view of the Emperor's rapid and alarmingly fre- 
quent changes of mood, and the equally rapid and kaleido- 
scopic changes of his pohcy, in view of the bitterness which 
must have been engendered in his mind by the failure of 
his attempts at territorial aggrandisement and domestic 
legislation, and in view of the nearly absolute control which 
the German Emperor exercises, perhaps not de jure, but 
certainly de facto, over the foreign policy of Germany and 
over her army and navy, it appears not unHkely that 
WilUam II. may some day act against some ' friendly ' 
Power with the same startHng rapidity with which his great 
ancestor, Frederick the Great, acted against Austria, when 
he flung his armies into Silesia without any warning and 
without any cause. 

" It has been said that Great Britain has nothing to 
fear from Germany, because of the family ties which con- 
nect the Emperor with the British dynasty. Those who 
beheve that sentimental considerations of a purely personal 
kind will be allowed to stand in the way of the Emperor's 
poHcy can hardly be acquainted with the diplomatic steps 
which WilUam II. took against Great Britain when he 
dispatched his telegram to Mr. Kruger. They should also 
remember that the German Emperor placed himself un- 
reservedly on the side of the Turks in the Grseco -Turkish 
War, notwithstanding the fact that his own sister was the 
wife of the heir to the Greek throne. 

" In view of the character of the German Emperor, his 
well-known ambitions and his enormous power, it would 
seem that those nations at the cost of which Germany 
could possibly increase her territory should ever be watch- 
ful, and should ever be prepared against sudden surprises. 
They would do well to study the pan-German manifestoes, 
which, though they are of course disavowed and discredited 
in official circles, give certainly some indication of Ger- 
many's poUtical aspirations. We find in them recommenda- 
tions for the ' alUance or absorption ' of ' Germanic ' 
Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark, for the incorporation 
of the western half of Austria -Hungary, creating a Ger- 
man Empire stretching across Europe from the Baltic down 
to Trieste, and for the acquisition of colonies in a temperate 



42 WILLIAM II. 

zone in Asia Minor, South Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, 
or ' wherever else opportunity should offer.' How many 
of these projects will be accompHshed within the Emperor's 
lifetime ? 

" The theory has often been advanced that the time of 
the personal poHcy of kings and emperors is gone, never to 
return. The future may disprove that theory, and may 
prove the German Emperor a political factor of the greatest 
magnitude, and of unexpected influence upon the history 
of Europe and of the world." 

My forecast came true twelve years after it had been 
made. WilUam II. was not a ruler of men, but merely a 
vain, conceited, many-sided, and incapable crowned amateur, 
who in a busy and strenuous life achieved nothing except 
the ruin of his country, of his dynasty, of his allies, and of the 
minor sovereigns of Germany. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRUSSO-GERMANY * 

Germany, as known to the older generation, was a country 
peopled with philosophers, poets, composers, slow and 
sleepy officials, and backward peasants ; it was an sesthe- 
tical, sentimental, day-dreaming land. The Germany of 
1914 was matter-of-fact, hard-headed, calculating, cunning, 
business-like, totally devoid of sentimentality and even of 
sentiment, and very up-to-date. But modern Germany 
and old Germany were two different countries. New Ger- 
many was an enlarged Prussia. Old Germany continued 
to vegetate and to dream dreams under the name and 
under the banner of Austria. It should not be forgotten 
that those Germans who used to be considered typical 
representatives of Germany, such as Goethe, Schiller, 
Lessing, Wieland, Jean Paul, Schlegel, Uhland, Lenau, 
Hegel, Fichte, Beethoven, Mozart, Haydn, belonged to 
old Germany and were non-Prussians. 

Five hundred years ago the country where the foundation 
of Prussia was laid was a wilderness infested with robber- 
knights. With fire and sword the Hohenzollerns reduced 
the rebellious knights and the independent cities of Bran- 
denburg-Prussia to obedience, and created an absolutely 
centralised State ruled by the sword. It remained miUtary 
in character, partly because the population was composed 
of lawless and reckless adventurers and criminals from 
everywhere, partly because the State was ever threatened 
by the neighbouring Slavs and by the armies of then power- 
ful Poland. Thus, up to a comparatively recent time, 

* From the Fortnightly Review, December 1905. 
43 



44 



GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 



savagery and arbitrary rule prevailed in Prussia. In 1650 
London had 500,000 inhabitants, Paris had 400,000 in- 
habitants, Amsterdam had 300,000 inhabitants, whilst 
Berlin was a village of 10,000 inhabitants. Up to a very 
recent time Prussia was a semi-barbarous State. 

Prussia, like Rome, was founded by a band of needy 
and warlike adventurers. Both States were artificial crea- 
tions, both could maintain themselves only by force of 
arms and extend their frontiers only by wars of aggression, 
and the character of both States may be read in the records 
of their early history. By the force of events and by the 
will of her masterful rulers Prussia grew up. For centuries 
she was a nation in arms. This may be seen from 
the following figures, which more clearly illustrate the 
history of Prussia than would a lengthy account : 





Square 

Kilometres of 

Prussia. 


Inhabitants 
of Prussia. 


Number of 
Soldiers In Stand- 
ing Army during 
Peace Time. 


Percentage 
of Soldiers 
to Popu- 
lation. 


1688 


113,000 


1,500,000 


38,000 


2-5 


1740 


121,000 


2,250,000 


80,000 


3-6 


1786 


199,000 


5,500,000 


195,000 


3-6 


1865 


275,500 


18,800,000 


210,000 


M 


1867 


347,500 


23,600,000 


260,000 


M 


1914 (Germany) 


541,000 


67,000,000 


800,646 


1-2 



Between 1688 and 1914 the population of Great Britain 
has grown fivefold. During the same period the territory 
ruled by the HohenzoUerns has grown fivefold in size and 
its population has increased no less than forty-fold. In 
1688 Great Britain had five times more inhabitants than 
had Prussia, but in 1914 Germany had 50 per cent, more 
inhabitants than Great Britain. These few figures prove 
how successful had been the policy of the HohenzoUerns, 
and in view of their success it is only natural that modern 
Germany closely followed Prussia's political methods and 
traditions. The foregoing table shows also that the mar- 
vellous rapidity with which Prusso-Germany grew was due 
to the strength of her army. Machtpolitik, the poUcy of 
force, the policy of the mailed fist, was always Prussia's 
favoured poHcy ; it had been exceedingly effective, and it 



GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 45 

had, therefore, not unnaturally, become Prusso-Germany's 
policy as well. 

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the little 
State of Prussia used to maintain a much larger army 
than Austria, France, and other great, densely populated, 
and wealthy States. Her army was, as a rule, exceedingly 
well drilled and absolutely ready for war, and by her 
army and by her not over-scrupulous diplomacy Prussia 
succeeded in aggrandising herself at the cost of her neigh- 
bours. 

Up to the death of King Frederick William I. Prussia's 
diplomacy was simple, crude, and clumsy, though energetic. 
Frederick William's successor, Frederick the Great, opened 
a new era in Prussia's foreign policy, for that monarch gave 
to the diplomacy of his country a new character.^ The main 
principle of Frederick the Great's foreign policy was to act 
with startling rapidity against an unprepared and unsus- 
pecting opponent. In his Expose du Gouvernement Prussien, 
des Principes sur lesquels il route, avec quelques Reflexions 
Politiques, which was written either in 1775 or 1776, he 
advised his successor as follows : " Constant attention must 
be paid to hiding, as far as possible, one's plans and am- 
bitions. . . . Secrecy is an indispensable virtue in politics 
as well as in the art of war." 

During the year before he came to the throne, Frederick 
the Great wrote his celebrated book, the Anti-Machiavel, 
in order to confute Machiavelli's Prince, a book which, 
according to Frederick's preface, was one of the most 
monstrous and most poisonous compositions which had 
ever been penned. Frederick dedicated the Anti-Machiavel 
to his brother sovereigns. At the end of chapter vi. Frede- 
rick emphatically proclaimed, " Let Caesar Borgia be the 
ideal of Machiavel's admirers, my ideal is Marcus Aurelius." 

The Anti-Machiavel, which was published in 1740, the 
year in which Frederick ascended the throne, seemed to be 

1 A very full account of the policy of Frederick the Great and of Bis- 
marck will be found in my book The Foundations of Germany, John Murray, 
London. 



46 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 

a political pronunciamento of the highest importance and 
the political programme of the King, and very likely it 
was meant to appear as such in the eyes of the world and to 
impress foreign rulers with Frederick's love of peace. How- 
ever, in December of the very year during which the Anti- 
Machiavel had appeared and had proclaimed that Frederick 
meant to be a prince of peace, the King, under the shallowest 
of pretexts and without a declaration of war, invaded 
Silesia and wrested it from Austria, " because," as he 
frankly confessed in his Memoirs, " that act brought prestige, 
and added strength, to Prussia." 

Marcus Aurelius was Frederick's ideal only in his Anti- 
Machiavel. In one of his testaments Frederick the Great 
showed himself an admirer and disciple of Machiavel, for 
we read in that document : "A war is a good war when it 
is undertaken for increasing the prestige of the State, for 
maintaining its security, for assisting one's allies, or for 
frustrating the ambitious plans of a monarch who is bent 
on conquests which may be harmful to one's interests." 
In other words, every advantageous war is a good war. 

In 1741 Sweden declared war against Russia. Frederick 
assured Russia on his word of honour that he had not 
instigated that war, but his assurances were unavailing, and 
Brakel, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, warned his 
Government " not to believe the King, who was consumed 
with ambitious projects and who would not keep the peace 
as long as he was alive." It was Frederick's settled policy 
to foment wars among his powerful neighbours. This policy 
was formulated in the following words by Frederick the 
Great in his Expose du Gouvernement Prussien, which was 
written for the guidance of his successors : "If possible the 
Powers of Europe should be made envious against one 
another in order to give occasion for a coup when opportunity 
offers." 

Frederick the Great's attitude towards Russia furnishes 
us with the key to Germany's historic and traditional pohcy 
towards her Eastern neighbour. In Frederick the Great's 
Histoire de mon Temps we read ; 



GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 47 

" Of all neighbours of Prussia the Russian Empire is the 
most dangerous, both by its power and its geographical 
position, and those who will rule Prussia after me should 
cultivate the friendship of those barbarians, because they 
are able to ruin Prussia altogether through the immense 
number of their mounted troops, whilst one cannot repay 
them for the damage which they may do because of the 
poverty of that part of Russia which is nearest to Prussia 
and through which one has to pass in order to get into the 
Ukraine." 

Russia was dangerous to Prussia, and she possessed 
nothing worth the taking. A war with Russia, even if 
victorious, was therefore bound to be very unprofitable. 
Hence it was in Prussia's interest to make Russia harmless 
either by peaceful means or by involving her in wars with 
other countries. 

The easiest way to neutralise a powerful country and a 
possible future enemy seemed to the King an alliance with 
that very State. Therefore we read in his Expose du 
Oouvernement Prussien : 

" One of the first political principles is to endeavour to 
become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may 
become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we 
have an alliance with Russia, and thus we have our back 
free as long as the alliance lasts." 

In another part of his writings Frederick advised his suc- 
cessors : " Before engaging in a war to the south or west of 
the kingdom every Prussian prince should secure at any 
cost the neutrality of Russia if he be unable to obtain her 
active support." 

According to Frederick's advice, alliances were to be 
formed by Prussia, not so much for the defence of Prussia's 
possessions as for their extension. Alliances were to be 
considered as engagements which were to serve rather for 
Prussia's benefit than for the mutual advantage of the allies, 
and were to be instruments which were to serve more for 
aggrandisement than for preservation and for defence. 

Frederick's views as to the sanctity of a ruler's obUgations 



48 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 

under a treaty of alliance are exceedingly interesting. As 
the views of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck with 
regard to a nation's duties under a treaty of alliance coin- 
cided, and as these views considerably differ from the 
English conception as to the sanctity of treaty bonds, it is 
worth while quoting Frederick's views as to the binding force 
of treaties which he expressed in his Memoirs as follows : 

" If the ruler is obliged to sacrifice his own person for the 
welfare of his subjects, he is all the more obliged to sacrifice 
engagements the continuation of which would be harmful to 
his country. Examples of broken treaties are frequent. . . . 

" It is clear to me that a private person must scrupulously 
keep his word even if he has given it rashly. If he fails to do 
so, the law will be set into motion, and after all only an 
individual suffers. But to what tribunal can a sovereign 
appeal if another ruler breaks his engagements ? The word 
of a private man involves but an individual ; that of a 
sovereign involves, and may mean misery for, whole nations. 
Therefore the problem may be summed up thus : Is it better 
that a nation should perish or that a sovereign should break 
his treaty ? Who would be so imbecile as to hesitate how 
to decide ? " 

The foregoing explanation reminds of Bismarck's cynical 
remark recorded by Busch : " What are alliances ? Alli- 
ances are when one has to." 

On the 6th of December 1772 Frederick the Great wrote 
to Voltaire, " The world is governed only by skill and 
trickery," and one is amazed at the skill and trickery 
with which, during many years of laborious, most intricate, 
and unceasing diplomatic negotiations, Frederick II. en- 
deavoured to involve Russia and Austria, his strongest 
neighbours, in war with one another. Sometimes Poland 
was the object which was to serve Frederick's policy, some- 
times Turkey. In coimtless letters Frederick never tired 
pointing out that Russia's advance meant a frightful danger 
to Austria. On the 3rd of September 1770 Frederick met 
Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Prime Minister, at Neustadt, 
and impressed upon him that " Austria can on no account 
allow Russia to cross the Danube. ... I am aware that, it 



GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 49 

the Russians cross the Danube, you would be unable pas- 
sively to look on. . . , Could you not persuade France to 
make a declaration to you that, if you were to break with 
Russia and to make war against her if the Russians should 
cross the Danube, France would send 100,000 men to help 
you ? You would confide the news to me and I would 
make use of it." 

In these attempts to commit Austria against Russia 
we have the model which served Bismarck in 1866. At 
the time of the Austro-Prussian War Napoleon III. en- 
deavoured as an offset to Prussia's conquests to obtain some 
territorial compensation for France on the left border of 
the Rhine. Bismarck, unwilling to let it come to a rupture 
between Prussia and France at that awkward moment when 
hostilities had not yet ceased, proposed to Napoleon that 
he should take Belgium, as he, Bismarck, had frequently 
advised the Emperor in former years. Napoleon fell into 
Bismarck's trap, and Benedetti handed at Bismarck's 
request a draft agreement to Bismarck which was to be 
placed before the King of Prussia. As soon as Benedetti 
had given to Bismarck that compromising document, it was 
sent to Russia to be shown to the Tsar, and Bismarck 
explained to Benedetti that the delay in deciding upon it 
was caused by the hesitation of the King of Prussia. By 
this trick Bismarck succeeded in convincing the Tsar that 
France was a disturber of the peace, and in securing Russia's 
support in the subsequent war against France. 

Frederick's skill and trickery was not confined to his 
unceasing attempts to create war among his neighbours. 
The division of Poland was Frederick's work, but he knew 
how to put the odium of that transaction on the shoulders 
of Russia, who, apparently, took the initiative. Austria 
had intended to keep aloof from the partition of Poland, and 
a short-sighted Prussian statesman would have endeavoured 
to take advantage of Austria's disinclination to participate 
in that shameful transaction in order to secure a larger 
portion of Polish territory for Prussia. However, Frederick 
looked farther ahead. He wished to induce Austria to assist 



50 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 

in the spoliation of Poland. On the 16th of February 1772 
Frederick wrote to Sohns : "If Austria gets no part of 
Poland all the hatred of the Poles will be turned against us. 
They would then regard the Austrians as their sole pro- 
tectors, and the latter would gain so much prestige and 
influence with them that they would have thousands of 
opportunities for intrigues of all kinds in that country.'' 
In these words we find the reasons which caused Frederick 
to work upon Austria for years until he at last succeeded 
in persuading her against her will that it would be in her 
own interest if she took part in the division of Poland. By 
giving Austria a part of Poland Frederick made his own 
share of the plunder smaller but more secure. At the same 
time he weakened Austria by furnishing her with a dis- 
affected province and a cause of friction with Russia, for 
those parts of Poland which fell to Austria were coveted by 
the Russians. The partition of Poland bound the three 
confederates in that crime to one another. Thus Frederick 
succeeded in creating a situation which allowed Prussia to 
aggrandise herself easily at the cost of the minor German 
States and of France. 

Bismarck's political successes were founded on, and made 
possible by, the partition of Poland which had made Russia 
Prussia's traditional friend and ally. He imitated Frede- 
rick's policy when, in 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, he 
estranged Italy and France by securing for France Tunis, 
upon which Italy had the strongest claim, and when he 
estranged Russia and Austria-Hungary by giving Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to Austria, while Russia returned from the 
Congress empty-handed. Owing to this arrangement, Aus- 
tria and Russia and France and Italy were set against one 
another. For their own safety Austria and Italy had to 
seek Germany's support. Thus the Triple Alliance was 
made a necessity. 

Frederick the Great had said in his Expose : " All far-off 
acquisitions are a burden to the State. A village on the 
frontier is worth more than a principality two hundred and 
fifty miles away." Bearing in mind the wisdom of Frede- 



GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 51 

rick's maxim, Bismarck refused to embark in risky but 
dazzling adventures which appealed to the imagination, and 
which were suggested to him by the representatives of old 
Germany, South German professors, and cosmopolitan 
philanthropists who, fifty years ago, agitated in favour of 
making Germany a sea Power. Not heeding their recom- 
mendations, Bismarck kept in mind " the village on the 
frontier." Believing that he ought first to settle the business 
nearest at hand, he intended, before embarking on the sea, 
to make Prussia the strongest Power on the Continent of 
Europe. Nor was Bismarck wilUng to foUow the policy 
recommended to him by the German Liberals, who, guided 
by the declamation and the rhetoric fireworks of Mr. Cobden, 
Mr. Bright, and other distinguished Englishmen, preached 
disarmament, the weakening of the executive of government, 
the establishment of a universal brotherhood among nations 
in a universal commonwealth of commerce and the universal 
freedom of trade. Believing that the Millennium was not 
yet at hand, Bismarck refused to be guided by the some- 
what hazy sentiments of unpractical, though large-hearted, 
enthusiasts, and resolved to rely on the old Prussian 
political traditions and methods, which he summed up in the 
words " Blood and iron." He meant to raise Prussia to 
further greatness not by a sentimental policy of drift, but 
by vigorous action and by the sword. 

Immediately on coming into power Bismarck doubled 
the Prussian Army, and, bearing in mind Frederick's advice 
to aUy Prussia with her most dangerous neighbour, her 
future antagonist, he induced Austria in 1864 to enter, in 
alliance with Prussia, upon a common campaign against 
Denmark, who was deprived of Schleswig-Holstein with the 
harbour of Kiel, and of more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. 
Thus Bismarck brought Prussia back to her traditional 
policy of conquest and reopened the war-era in Europe. 
Two years later, after having secured Napoleon III.'s 
benevolent neutrality in return for vague promises that 
France should have Belgium, Bismarck attacked Austria, 
Prussia's ally in the Danish campaign of 1864, being 



52 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 

determined to humble Austria and to secure for Prussia 
the leadership of the German States. 

Having secured Russia's support, Bismarck turned 
against France, who, by her benevolent attitude towards 
Prussia during the Austro -Prussian War, had assisted 
materially in Prussia's aggrandisement, exactly as Austria 
had done in 1864. Through Bismarck's skilful manage- 
ment of the Spanish question — the alteration in the text 
of the Ems telegram was merely a minor incident — ^war 
broke out between France and Prussia in 1870, and, after 
a victorious campaign, in which the South German States 
had to join, the German Empire was erected on the ruins 
of France. The South German States became amalga- 
mated with Prussia. Thus Prussia became almost synony- 
mous with the German Empire. The King of Prussia 
became the monarch of Germany, which, as WilHam I. 
somewhat contemptuously, though very truly, said, was 
merely "an enlarged Prussia." 

Having raised Prussia to greatness, Bismarck, hke 
Frederick the Great, endeavoured to weaken his most 
powerful neighbour, Russia, who, at the outbreak of the 
Franco-German War, had announced that she would assist 
Germany if another Power should assist France. Thus 
Russia had kept Austria, Italy, and Denmark at bay, who 
were willing to help France, and had enabled Prussia to 
defeat France and to raise herself to further greatness. 
Encouraged, incited, and almost pushed by Bismarck, Russia 
made war upon Turkey in 1877. This war utterly crippled 
her strength, and, thanks to Bismarck's manipulation at the 
Congress of Berlin, she was deprived of the fruits of her 
victory, which she had expected Grcrmany would, in grati- 
tude for her past services, assist in securing for her. 

When Bismarck had established Germany's greatness 
and had secured her paramountcy on the Continent of 
Europe by weakening all her neighbours by creating dis- 
cord between all European Great Powers, he thought that 
the time had come for Germany to seek expansion in other 
continents. He, not William II., originated Germany's 



GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 53 

world policy. Already in 1876 Bismarck had contemplated 
acquiring a large part of South Africa with the help of 
the Boers, According to the very rehable Poschinger, 
Santa Lucia Bay was to be acquired by Germany, and 
German merchants were found ready to build a railway 
from that harbour to Pretoria, and to run a line of ships 
to Santa Lucia Bay, whereto, by specially cheap fares, 
a great stream of German emigrants was to be directed. 
Thus a German South Africa was to be founded. The 
sum of 100,000,000 marks (£5,000,000) was thought to be 
sufficient for financing that enterprise, and German busi- 
ness men were willing to find that sum, provided 5 per 
cent, interest on that sum was given them by the State 
during ten years. At that time Germany was financially 
exhausted through a violent Stock Exchange crisis, and 
Free Trade had crippled her manufacturing industries. 
Therefore this project had to be abandoned for lack of 
funds. In 1884 Bismarck made another and more deter- 
mined attempt at acquiring Santa Lucia Bay, but this 
second attempt miscarried through the incapacity of his 
son, to whom the negotiations had been entrusted. 

Since the time when Prussia and Germany were given 
Parliaments, Prusso-G«rman poHcy was no longer exclu- 
sively shaped by the ruler and his trusted minister, but 
it was influenced to some considerable extent by the will 
and by the wishes of the people. Consequently, if we wish 
to understand the foreign policy of Germany, we must not 
only consider the attitude of the actual pohtical leaders 
and the influence of those poUtical traditions which have 
become the leading political axioms of State, but also the 
views of the very influential German professors. 

The German university professors have played a very 
important part in the foreign policy of Germany. There 
were twenty-three universities in Germany, in which more 
than four thousand professors taught more than eighty 
thousand students. These four thousand university pro- 
fessors not only formed the minds of the professional men 
and of the future high and low officials, and thus influenced 



54 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 

cultured public opinion in the making, but they also wrote 
much for the newspapers. The views of the German pro- 
fessors carried very great weight with the public, and thus 
they profoundly influenced not only the cultured circles but 
the whole nation. 

None of the German university professors has exercised 
a greater influence upon the shaping and the development 
of Germany's foreign policy than Professor von Treitschke, 
the historian, who, during about thirty years, enjoyed the 
greatest authority in the lecture room and with the Press 
in matters political. No German professor of his time had 
a greater weight and a more lasting influence with the 
German patriots. Therefore we must take note of his 
leading views and of the poHtical doctrines which he 
inculcated. 

Treitschke gazed ahead towards the time when his 
dream of a Greater Germany, whose dominions would ex- 
tend beyond the seas, would be realised ; when Germany 
would be able to enter upon a world-embracing pohcy ; 
when, after having acquired the harbours of HoUand and 
built an enormous fleet, she would be able to measure her 
strength with that of the Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
claim of the Pan-Germans to the possession of the whole 
Rhine was not of recent origin. It was based on Treitschke 's 
claim which he formulated in his book, Politik, as follows : 

" Germany, whom Nature has treated in a stepmotherly 
manner, will be happy when she has received her due and 
possesses the Rhine in its entirety. ... It is a resource of 
the utmost value. By our fault its most valuable part has 
come into the hands of strangers, and it is an indispensable 
task for German policy to regain the mouths of that river. 
A purely political union with HoUand is unnecessary, be- 
cause the Dutch have grown into an independent nation, 
but an economic union with them is indispensable. We 
are too modest if we fear to state that the entrance of 
Holland into our customs system is as necessary for us as 
is our daily bread, but apparently we are afraid to pro- 
nounce the most natural demands which a nation can 
formulate." 



GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 65 

In view of Grermany's dearth of habours the acquisition 
of the Netherlands was considered the first step towards 
entering upon a world-embracing pohcy and acquiring a 
predominant position not only in Europe but in the world 
across the ocean. It was clear to Treitschke that Germany 
could acquire such a position only after England had been 
crushed and after the rule of the sea had been wrested 
from her. Then, and then only, would Germany find a free 
field for her energy in every quarter of the world. This 
was his view, and he explained the nature of the future 
relations between Germany and this country with his usual 
candour at every occasion. The pohcy which he recom- 
mended towards England, and his opinion of her, may be 
seen from the following characteristic extract from his 
paper, Die Tiirkei und die Grossmdchte, published on the 
20th of June 1876 : 

" Whatever one may think of British Hberty, England of 
to-day is no doubt a Power for action in the society of 
nations, but her power is clearly an anachronism. It was 
created in the olden time when the world's wars were 
decided by naval battles and by hired mercenaries, and 
when it was considered good pohcy to rob weU-situated 
fortresses and naval ports without any regard to their 
ownership and history. In this century of national States 
and of armed nations a cosmopohtan trading Power such 
as England can no longer maintain itself for any length of 
time. The day will come and must come when Gibraltar 
wiU belong to the Spaniards, Malta to the Itahans, Heligo- 
land to the Germans, and the Mediterranean to the nations 
who five on the Mediterranean, . . . England is to-day the 
shameless representative of barbarism in International Law 
Hers is the blame, if naval wars still bear the character 
of privileged piracy." 

Treitschke detested England, wished to see her crushed, 
and hoped to see a huge German World Empire arise on 
the ruins of Anglo-Saxondom. Decades would have to 
pass by until Germany would be strong enough to destroy 
the Anglo-Saxons. Meanwhile the most pressing need of 
Germany seemed to Treitschke the acquisition of large 
5 



66 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 

colonies situated in a temperate zone whereto a stream of 
German emigrants might be directed. In Deutsche Kdmpfe 
we read : 

" In the South of Africa circumstances are decidedly 
favouring us. English colonial poHcy, which has been suc- 
cessful everywhere else, has not had a lucky hand at the 
Cape of Good Hope. The civilisation which exists there 
is Teutonic, is Dutch. The policy of England in South 
Airica, which vacillates between weakness and brutality, 
has created a deadly and unextinguishable hatred against 
her among the Dutch Boers. ... If our Empire has the 
courage to foUow an independent colonial pohcy with 
determination, a collision of our interests and those of 
England is unavoidable. It was natural and logical that 
the new Great Power of Central Europe had to settle affairs 
with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with 
Austria -Hungary, with France, and with Russia. The last 
settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be 
the lengthiest and the most difficult one." 

Having taken note of the world-embracing poHtical 
measures which Treitschke advocated, let us now consider 
the leading maxims of his poHtical philosophy. Treitschke 
lectured not only on history but on poHcy as well. The 
poHtical theories which he taught were of very great im- 
portance in developing the poHtical mind and the poHtical 
conscience of modern Germany. It would lead too far 
to describe Treitschke 's system of poHcy. It must suffice to 
say that his system is an elaboration of the poHtical teach- 
ings of MachiaveUi and the glorification of the poHtical 
methods which have been adopted with such marveUous 
success by Frederick the Great and by Bismarck. We 
read in the beginning of his book Politik : 

" It wiU always redound to the glory of MachiavelH that 
he has placed the State on a soHd foundation, and that he 
has freed the State and its moraHty from the moral pre- 
cepts taught by the Church, but especially because he has 
been the first to teach : ' The State is Power.' " 

Starting from the fundamental conception that " The State 
is Power," that it is not a moral agent, but merely power, 



GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 57 

Treitschke logically arrived at the following conclusion 
regarding the sacredness of treaties : " Every State re- 
serves to itself the right of judging as to the extent of its 
treaty obligations." 

If we bear in mind Treitschke 's teaching, can we wonder 
that Treitschke 's pupils gave such a peculiar interpretation 
to the treaties signed by Germany ? Seeing in the State 
not a moral representative of the nation, but merely power 
personified, Treitschke was the most determined opponent 
to international arbitration, for we read in his book Politik : 

" The institution of international and permanent courts 
of arbitration is incompatible with the very nature of the 
State. Only in a question of secondary or tertiary import- 
ance would it be possible to obey the ruHng of such a 
court. For vital questions there exists no impartial foreign 
power, and to the end of history arms will give the final 
decision. Herein lies the sacredness of war." 

Treitschke died in 1896, but his work survived him. 
The seed which he had sown broadcast in countless lectures, 
books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles bore fruit. Thus 
he helped in opening an era of universal political unscrupu- 
lousness in Germany and in creating a mighty popular 
movement towards expansion oversea, with the object of 
destroying the power of Anglo-Saxondom. 

Bismarck's successors continued Bismarck's pohcy, and 
had to improve upon it. Though Bismarck ostensibly was 
Russia's friend, he had strengthened Turkey against Russia 
by providing her with arms, with money, with railways, 
and with officers. Bismarck's successors continued that 
pohcy and extended it towards England as well. In Egypt 
and in China Germany's agents intrigued against Great 
Britain. The South African War would never have broken 
out had Germany not deluded the Boers into the behef that, 
as the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs de- 
clared to England in writing, " the independence of the 
Transvaal RepubUc is a German interest," and had she not 
lavishly suppUed the Boers with arms and ammunition. 

Germany unceasingly tried to create an effective counter- 



58 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 

poise against Great Britain. Bismarck encouraged Anglo- 
Russian differences in Asia and set France and England 
against one another over Egypt. He encouraged Russia and 
France in their anti-British attitude, and his successors 
continued Bismarck's poHcy, Germany's Venezuela poHcy 
aimed at setting the United States against England. When 
the United States took umbrage at the Anglo-German 
Venezuela expedition and Great Britain wished to with- 
draw, Germany insisted that it should be carried through, 
arguing that some show of energy on the part of the strongest 
naval and of the strongest military Power would cause 
the United States to cUmb down and teach them to be 
modest for at least thirty years. Happily British diplo- 
macy did not stumble into the trap, and saw the point of 
the argument, which was similar to that of Frederick the 
Great when he told the Austrians that they could not 
allow the Russians to cross the Danube, and that they 
should oppose their crossing in alliance with France. 

Some years ago the movement towards the unification 
of the British Empire began to take shape. Canada offered 
preferential fiscal treatment to the Mother Country. Other 
colonies were inclined to foUow. Mr. Chamberlain cordially 
responded to the advances made, and began to work for a 
British Imperial Fiscal Union. Treitschke and his followers 
had frequently declared that the British Empire was an 
empire only in name, that it would gradually faU to pieces, 
that the United States would have a similar fate. Germany 
resolved to kill the movement towards Imperial Unification, 
and declared commercial war against Canada. As the 
penalising of Canada's exports failed to have the desired 
effect, further measures were threatened. On the 29th 
of June 1903 Lord Lansdowne made the following extra- 
ordinary statement in the House of Lords : 

" The position between Germany and Canada with which - 
we were threatened is not one which His Majesty's Govern- 
ment could regard as other than a serious position. It is 
not merely that we foimd that Canada was liable to be 
made to suffer in consequence of the preferential treatment 



GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 59 

which the Canadian Government had accorded to us, but 
it was actually adumbrated in an official document that if 
other colonies acted in the same manner as Canada, the 
result might be that we, the Mother Country, would find 
ourselves deprived of most-favoured-nation treatment." 

Not satisfied with crippling British industries and trade, 
Germany tried to oppose the political unification of the 
Empire by threats. 



CHAPTER V 

THE WAR MACHINE OF PRUSSO-GERMANY — ITS CREATION 
AND ITS DESTRUCTION ^ 

All the great empires which the world has seen, with 
perhaps one solitary exception, that of the Chinese Empire, 
have become great by force ; and aU the great empires 
which have declined, or which have disappeared from the 
world's stage, have been diminished or destroyed by force. 
Diplomacy is fond of euphemisms, and diplomats like to 
speak of gradual expansion by allowing free play to the 
national forces and to the forces of Nature. They speak 
of creating protectorates, of mapping out spheres of interest, 
etc., when they are in reality bent on the aggrandisement 
of the nation by force. Hence it comes that countries are 
permanently and forcibly taken from their rightful owners 
by what diplomats are pleased to call temporary occupation, 
by peaceful penetration, by lease, by loan, etc. However, 
notwithstanding all these conventional euphemisms and 
diplomatic fictions, and notwithstanding the fact that the 
foreign policy of all countries is always ostensibly guided 
by the noblest motives, such as justice and humanity, the 
fact remains that hitherto all policy has been based on force. 
The territories which are possessed by modern States are 
held by right of conquest — that is, by that right which 
springs from the possession of superior force. 

Even the cleverest diplomat will prove unsuccessful unless 
his words are backed with adequate force. The diplomatic 
ability and success of Frederick the Great, Napoleon I., 
TaUeyrand, Metternich, Pahnerston, Bismarck, etc., con- 

^ From the Nineteenth Century and After, October 1902. 
60 



THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 61 

sisted largely, if not principally, in the superior material 
force which these men were able to wield. Owing to the 
fact that their diplomacy was backed by sufficient force, 
they were exceedingly successful in their policy. The 
fact that foreign policy is based upon force was nowhere 
more clearly understood than in Prussia. 

For two hundred and fifty years, since the time of the 
Great Elector, Prussia has been always proportionately by 
far the strongest military power in Europe. At the death 
of Frederick William I., Prussia, which then had only about 
3,000,000 inhabitants, had a standing army of 80,000 
soldiers ; at the death of Frederick the Great, Prussia had 
5,500,000 inhabitants and an army of no less than 195,000 
soldiers. Modern Germany had in 1914 a population of 
67,000,000 inhabitants and a standing army of 801,000 men, 
but if the proportion of soldiers to the total population 
had, in 1914, been as great as it was at the time of Frederick 
WiUiam I. or Frederick the Great, she would have had 
before the Great War a standing force of more than 2,000,000 
men. 

Germany was a nation in arms. Every able-bodied man 
had to serve in the army, and the number of men enrolled 
year by year amounted to about 350,000. The army on a 
war footing was made up of a number of these levies, and 
it could be made greater or smaller at will by calling out a 
greater or lesser number of such yearly levies which were 
called Reserves, Landwehr, Landsturm. The number of 
men yearly enrolled had of late greatly increased, in accord- 
ance with the increase in the peace strength of the army. 

The Prusso-German Army has gone through varjdng 
vicissitudes. Under Frederick the Great it proved itself 
to be the first army in Europe. Twenty years after Frede- 
rick's death, it was found to be quite worthless against 
Napoleon I., and it fell to pieces at Jena and Auerstadt. 
After the fatal year 1806, the Prussian Army was rapidly 
reorganised and reformed by Scharnhorst and his able 
co-workers, and later on it was again reorganised and 
remodelled by Roon and Moltke. It is worth while to 



62 THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 

inquire why Frederick the Great's incomparable army so 
rapidly decayed after his death, and how the rotten army 
of 1806 was rapidly and thoroughly reformed. 

The army with which Frederick the Great had successfully 
fought the united forces of nearly the whole Continent 
during the Seven Years' War was organised upon an utterly 
bad, wrong, and unhealthy basis. Only noblemen could 
become officers, advancement went by length of service, 
obedience was absolute and blind, restricting all initiative 
among officers as well as among the rank and file. Detailed 
regulations made thinking unnecessary, and had to be 
carried out to the letter without question. The whole 
military organisation of Prussia was absolutely centralised 
-in Frederick the Great, who attended to its smallest details. 
If a foreigner wished to witness a parade, he had to appeal 
to the King. But what the army lacked in a practical 
common-sense organisation, in individuality, and in initia- 
tive, which qualities alone can make an army a healthy 
living organism, was amply made up for by the Bang's 
immense personal capacity. He ruled the army with a 
hand of iron, and knew how to manage it, notwithstanding 
its fundamental unsoundness. He inspected his troops very 
frequently, his sharp eyes saw everything, and every officer 
who did not come up to the King's expectations was im- 
mediately dismissed. He knew the capacity of every 
officer, foresaw all and prepared all. His detailed regula- 
tions were to the point, his magazines were well filled, all 
was ready for war, and his army remained up to his death 
by far the first in Europe. Yet, but twenty years after his 
death, it was easily smashed by Napoleon I. at Jena and 
Auerstadt. When the great King was dead the faulty 
system remained, and no personality arose either to fill his 
place in that perverted system or to reform it root and 
branch. With the death of Frederick the Great the huge 
Prussian Army became a body without a soul, imposing to 
look upon by reason of its size, but deficient in every other 
qualification. Therefore it was predestined to fall. 

Lacking the necessary understanding and energy, his 



THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 63 

two successors, Frederick William II. and Frederick William 
III., were contented to administer the army according to 
Frederickian tradition, in the spirit of precedent. They 
would have considered it a crime to introduce any reform 
into the army, and blasphemy to doubt its proved ex- 
cellence. The warnings and entreaties of sagacious patriots 
to modernise the army fell on deaf ears. The whole interest 
of Frederick WiUiam III. with regard to military matters 
was concentrated upon parades and drills, the buttons and 
laces of uniforms, the shape of shakos and helmets, and 
similar futilities, in which, as Napoleon remarked, he was 
a greater expert than any army tailor. 

Only after Prussia's terrible defeat, and the loss of half 
her territory in 1806, did the King and his advisers wake 
up and begin to inquire seriously into the state of the army. 
Progressive military men, among them the future Field- 
Marshal Gneisenau, the intellectual leader of Bliicher's 
army and his Chief of Staff, attributed the collapse of the 
army largely to the neglect of preparations for war in time 
of peace, to its occupation with futile drill exercises cal- 
culated only for show on the parade-ground, to the neglect 
of warlike manoeuvres and of target-shooting, to the in- 
feriority of the Prussian arms as compared with the arma- 
ment of the French in guns and rifles, to the slavish copying 
of various institutions existing in foreign armies, which were 
quite unsuitable to the needs of Prussia, to the blind conceit 
of officers and of the nation in the invincibility of the army, 
and to the incapacity of generals who were automatically 
promoted by length of service, and not by merit, who had 
partly become imbecile with old age. 

A commission for the reorganisation of the army was 
called, which did not consist of fossilised generals, or of 
civilians unacquainted with war and with the military 
needs of the nation, but of a select few of the ablest young 
officers who had proved their value in the field, and who 
were sure neither to be doctrinaires nor to be unduly bound 
by tradition and text-books. This commission consisted of 
two major-generals, four lieutenant-colonels, and one major. 



64 THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 

It did not dazzle the nation with an imposing array of titles, 
but it was destined to accomplish great things, for among 
its members were men like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grol- 
mann, and Boyen. The members of this commission were 
yomig men. Scharnhorst, the oldest commissioner, was 
fifty-two years old; Grolmann, the yomigest, was only 
twenty-nine years old. Their recommendations were thor- 
ough and to the point. Soldiering was to be taken seriously 
by the oJBficers. The army was to lose its character of a 
Society institution, it was to be democratised, and was to 
be managed on business principles. Among the recom- 
mendations of the committee the following were the most 
important : 

" Advancement shaU take place, without regard to the 
years of service, solely by merit. In case it is found neces- 
sary, the youngest general is to command all others. Age 
or length of service is to have no influence upon appoint- 
ments. Few generals are to be made in peace, and brigades 
are to be largely commanded by staff officers in war, so 
that those who prove themselves the worthiest on active 
service may be advanced to generalship. In peace a claim 
to officer's position can only rest upon military knowledge 
and education, and in war upon conspicuous bravery, 
activity, and circumspection. Therefore aU individuals in 
the whole nation who possess these qualifications have a 
claim to the highest command. 

"In giving only to the nobihty those privileges, all 
talent and abihty in the other classes of the nation was lost 
to the army, and the nobility did not consider itself under 
the obHgation to take soldiering seriously, and acquire mili- 
tary knowledge, as good birth and a long life were bound 
to advance well-born individuals to the most exalted mili- 
tary commands, without either merit or exertion on their 
part. 

" This is the reason why our officers were so behindhand 
in knowledge and education as compared with men of other 
professions in Prussia. For these reasons the army had 
become a State within the State, instead of being the union 
of all moral and physical forces of the nation. Advancement 
by years of service had killed all ambition and emulation 
among officers, for a good robust constitution alone granted 



THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 66 

all that could be desired. True merit and talent proved 
in free competition among officers was lost to the State, 
and the deserved advancement of military genius became 
impossible." 



Besides, the commission insisted on the decentralisation 
of the administrative machinery of the army. Each corps 
was to be made independent, but was to be fully responsible, 
and everything required for mobilisation, arms, stores, 
horses, commissariat, etc., was to be kept at the head- 
quarters of each corps or division in order to faciHtate rapid 
and smooth mobiUsation in case of war. The endless train 
of baggage, which had so greatly hampered the movements 
of the Prussian Ajmy when opposed to the mobile troops 
of Napoleon, was to be diminished, new arms were to be 
introduced, up-to-date tactics were to take the place of 
obsolete barrack-square driUs, and the soldier was to be 
treated better in peace time in order to make soldiering 
more attractive. 

Largely owing to the measures taken upon these recom- 
mendations, without overmuch regard to the obstinate 
resistance of the tradition-bound generals of the old school, 
Prussia, which Napoleon believed crippled for ever, was 
able seven years later to meet the French Army in the field 
with conspicuous success. 

Since the time of Napoleon I. the art and science of war 
had made enormous progress. A new era opened with the 
advent of the prince of miUtary scientists, the " Schlach- 
tendenker," Moltke, who elevated the art of war to the 
level of an exact science. Let us see what Moltke did. 

Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. used to make 
elaborate preparations for war, but their preparations were 
clumsy and superficial if compared with the minute study 
and the detailed preparations for war made by Moltke. 
As Napoleon concentrated the fire of hundreds of guns on 
that point of the enemy's position which to him was of 
the greatest importance and battered it in, even so Moltke 
concentrated the organised intelhgence of hundreds of the 



66 THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 

best brains in his army on the one point which to him was 
the most valuable one. Moltke's chief aim was to surprise 
the enemy by the unparalleled celerity of the mobiUsation 
of his army, to fall upon him while he was still unprepared, 
and to smash him before an attack was expected. With 
this end in view he re-created the Prussian Greneral Staff, 
and made it the active brain of the army. 

Moltke, like most great commanders, did not lay down 
his principles for the conduct of war in the shape of a book. 
He evidently did not believe in taking the world and pos- 
sible enemies of his country into his confidence. We must 
therefore look to his campaigns and to the oflScial accounts 
of his wars for his guiding principles. In the introduction 
to the history of the Eranco-Grerman War, edited by the 
historical department of the General Staff, over which 
Moltke presided, occurs the celebrated passage : 

" One of the principal duties of the General Staff is to 
work out during peace in the most minute way plans for 
the concentration and the transport of troops, with a view 
to meet all possible eventualities to which war may give 
rise. 

" When an army first takes the field the most multi- 
farious considerations — apolitical, geographical, as well as 
miHtary — ^have to be borne in mind. Mistakes in the 
original concentration of armies can hardly ever be made 
good in the whole course of a campaign. All these arrange- 
ments can be considered a long time beforehand, and — 
assuming the troops are ready for war and the transport 
service properly organised — ^must lead to the exact result 
which has been contemplated." 

How Moltke acted upon the principle of " working out 
all possible eventualities of war in the most minute way " 
may be seen from a few examples. Every reservist and 
every miHtiaman possessed written or printed instructions 
which told him exactly to which place he had to go for 
enrolment in case of war. When he arrived at his place 
of enrolment, his complete outfit for war, measured to his 
person in peace, would be found waiting for him. Every 
commander throughout the empire had complete general 



THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 67 

instructions what to do in the case of war. The confidential 
particular instructions regarding the final disposition and 
direction of troops, transport, etc., towards the frontier, 
were also in the possession of each commander, contained 
in sealed envelopes, which were only to be opened on the 
receipt of the order to mobilise. The military stores were 
placed where they were wanted in case of war, in order to 
avoid loss of time and congestion of railways in forwarding 
them. A special department of the General Staff, con- 
sisting of about twenty officers, studied the means of trans- 
port, the capacities of the railways, and the number of 
trucks and engines required for the conveyance of each 
unit, and drew up a complete programme for the dispatch 
of the countless trains required in case of war, upon which 
programme the confidential sealed instructions were founded. 
Consequently the transport of a million men or more, with 
their horses, guns, stores, and baggage, to any frontier 
could take place smoothly and rapidly without a hitch. 
The arrival of each corps at the point where it would be 
required was calculable, so to say, to the minute, and 
every now and then the whole enormous arrangement of 
time-tables had to be recast in order to allow for the con- 
veyance of additional troops or stores, or for the use of an 
additional piece of railway recently completed. Further- 
more, the detailed plans for any and every campaign in 
which Prussia could possibly be involved were always kept 
ready in time of peace, and were frequently changed and 
brought up to date. For instance, Moltke's first plan of 
campaign in case of a war with France was dated 1857, 
and his final dispositions, which were exactly carried out 
in 1870, were made in winter, 1868. 

However, not only were the resources of Germany studied 
" in the most minute way " by Moltke and his staff, but 
also those of all possible enemies. As a matter of fact, he 
knew more about the strength and armaments of the 
French Army, the time required for its mobilisation, the 
configuration of the French frontier provinces, the capacity 
of the French railways for transport, etc., than did any 



68 THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 

man in the French War Office. In other words, Moltke 
created an organisation which, by means of most minute 
studies and the painstaking collection and comparison of 
countless exact data, made war no longer the risky vague 
encounter with hostile elements of uncertain strength, at 
an uncertain time, and in an uncertain and unknown 
country, as it had formerly been, but made war an en- 
counter with certainties, and with clearly defined calculable 
chances. 

How weU Germany was prepared for the war of 1870-71 
may be seen from the fact that we read in the Denkwiir- 
digheiten of the then Prussian Minister of War, Count 
Roon : 

*' Roon has frequently said that the two weeks following 
the memorable night of the mobihsation have perhaps been 
the idlest and the freest from care during his career. As a 
matter of fact, the mobihsation machine worked with such 
exemplary exactitude, and so completely without friction, 
that Roon and the War Office had not to reply to one 
inquiry of the commanding generals or of other com- 
manders. This was the case though the order for mobihsa- 
tion was given without any previous warning, and though 
many commanding generals and Staff officers were on their 
summer hohday, and a good number of them were even 
abroad." 

Napoleon III. was vaguely aware of the numerical 
inferiority of his army, as compared with the troops of 
Germany. Consequently his idea had been to act with the 
Hghtning rapidity and energy of his great ancestor, to 
throw himself upon the south of Germany before Germany 
was ready, carry the Southern States with him, and then 
march against Prussia, strengthened by the accession of 
the South German contingents. The plan was well con- 
ceived, and might have succeeded if Napoleon III. had 
calculated, not guessed, how long it would take France 
and Germany to mobihse their armies, and if he had pre- 
pared everything in peace time for such a rapid stroke 
in the complete manner of the Prussian G^neralstab. But 



THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 69 

in view of the preparedness of Prussia, and of France's 
unpreparedness, this plan of campaign collapsed. The 
Prussian Generalstab knew better than Napoleon III. 
what France was able to do. In Moltke's memoir of 1868 
we find the time necessary for the mobihsation of the French 
Army correctly given. While France wanted three weeks 
to complete the mobihsation of her army, Grermany took 
only eleven days. Consequently Napoleon's brilhant plan 
of campaign, which looked as fine on paper as did his army, 
miscarried, for the well-schooled and perfectly-equipped 
German army corps feU into their places with mathematical 
precision, and with incredible rapidity crossed the frontier 
in overwhelming numbers long before the French were ready 
for their contemplated dash into the south of Germany. 

Germany's victory over France was less due to superior 
strategy or to superior tactics than to her great superiority 
in methodic preparatory organisation. The victory of 
1870-71 was a triumph of German organisation, and if we 
study the history of the collapse of the French Army in 
1870 in detail, and try to deduce the principal causes of 
the success of the German Army, we arrive at the conclusion 
that highly-organised foresight, fore-study, and fore-cal- 
culation, represented by the Prussian Generalstab, led the 
Germans to victory, and that the absence of these quahties 
caused the defeat of the French. 

The Prussian Generalstab did not only directly prepare 
for war in the manner already described, but it also prepared 
indirectly for war by studying strategy and the innovations 
introduced into the tactics of other nations, studying new 
arms and equipments, investigating everything and adopting 
what was useful, educating officers in regular courses under 
Moltke's personal supervision, surveying the country, etc. 
In short, the Greneralstab served as the intellectual centre 
of the army, as the clearing-house of most valuable in- 
formation. It was the highest supervising, inspecting, 
inventing, and organising authority. It was an organism 
which enabled Moltke to hold all the threads of the army 
in his hand, and make it obey the sUghtest pressure. 



7(y THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 

Ruled by the Generalstab, the German Army was no 
longer a clumsy and soulless military machine as it had 
been in 1806, but became a living, sensitive, and intelligent 
organism. In order to perpetuate his work, Moltke im- 
planted firmly his spirit of thoroughness and his strategical 
ideas into the Greneralstab, being its chief during thirty-one 
years. Moltke not only served as an example to his officers, 
and created a school of independent military thinkers in 
Germany, but his principles of minute comprehensive 
inquiry and of careful foresight were also applied to com- 
merce and industry ; they helped in making Germany 
surprisingly successful in the more peaceful arts. 

The efficiency of the Prusso-German Army depended upon 
its direction. WiUiam I. left it to Moltke. WiUiam II. 
meant to direct the army in person. Court favourites took 
the place of experienced soldiers. As his own Chancellor 
the Emperor destroyed the life-work of Bismarck, and as 
his own Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff 
he destroyed the life-work of Moltke. Germany requested 
the Allies for an armistice because her army had become 
completely demoralised, and demanded peace practically at 
any price ! The Vossische Zeitung stated on the 7th of 
November 1918, in an article signed by "an officer at .the 
front " : 

" The German corps of officers has been brought up in 
loyalty and rigid obedience, and, as long as the Kaiser does 
not voluntarily proclaim an urgent desire to abdicate, 
opinions to the contrary must not be expressed, and so 
people may think that all the officers stand behind the 
Kaiser. But even if it really were so, the officers, and 
especially the higher officers, are not the army. Our army 
has long ceased to be a real unit, and it has long been absurd 
for the leaders to speak in the name of the army. . . . 

" For a long time past there have been practically no 
regular officers left at the front. The real army is so war- 
weary, has been through such indescribable things, and has 
achieved such wonderful things without any thanks except 
in empty words, that its feelings are blunted towards the 
question whether the Kaiser stays or goes. This army 



THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 71 

wants peace. The best parts of it want peace in honour, 
but men and officers will not be willing to continue the war 
for another day for sake of the Kaiser. 

" This army must be asked its opinion. Hitherto it has 
kept silent, fought and sufiEered, but much discontent, and 
much just discontent, has accumulated in it, and the leaders, 
who in the course of years have lost touch with the army, 
must not deceive themselves. In the end these 7,000,000 
or 9,000,000 men in arms are the decisive factor for the 
internal development and the whole future of Germany. 
This army must be heard ; its just wishes must find satis- 
faction. This they have deserved of us and of Germany. 
If those who have led the army hitherto are unable or 
unwilling, it is the duty and the highest responsibility of the 
new Grovernment to discover the facts through a civilian 
War Secretary — if only in order to secure an orderly de- 
mobilisation. 

" All these questions are at least as important as the 
question whether the generals and the staffs are opposed to 
an abdication of the Kaiser. Everybody who for years has 
fought for his country and his Kaiser, who in the first years 
of war and in the intoxication of victory was honoured as 
the highest symbol of the German people and army, must 
be extremely reluctant to advocate abdication, but at 
bottom he is moved to it by the same duty and courage 
which urged him forward against enemy machine-guns. 
The individual can go under ; the people must live. This 
applies to the ruler as much as to the least of his citizens." 



CHAPTER VI 

THE IMPERIAL GERMAN NAVY AND ITS PLANNED 
OVERSEA OPERATIONS ^ 

The navy of Imperial Germany was constructed rather for 
military than for naval purposes. It was to serve as an 
instrument of conquest which was to be effected by opera- 
tions oversea after the defeat of the English and American 
Fleets. The true purpose of the German Fleet was clearly 
expressed in a very interesting pamphlet entitled Operationen 
iiher See, by von Edelsheim, a member of the German 
General Staff, from which I would give the following ex- 
tracts : - 

" Moltke declared that landings and operations with 
landed troops were enterprises of subordinate importance ; 
but the military commanders of the future will have to count 
the preparation for, and the execution of, wars oversea 
among their most important tasks. There is no State in 
the whole world which possesses better forces and greater 
means than Germany for the enterprise of war by landing. 
In the first place the excellence and the readiness of our 
army, and the celerity with which large masses of troops 
can be mobilised, are not equalled by any other great Power ; 
in the second place, Germany disposes of the second largest 
commercial marine in the world, and has in the rapid large 
steamers of her shipping companies a splendid transport 
fleet, the excellence of which is not exceeded even by that 
of England herself ; in the last place, the increase and 
strengthening of our navy which is at present taking place 
will guarantee increased security to the transport of our 
troops oversea. These factors, which are peculiarly favour- 
able for Germany's power, open a large field for our world 

^ From the National Review, April 1905. 

72 



GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 73 

policy, and render it possible for us to make our strong 
military forces also useful for the greatness of the Empire, 
and to conquer by the development of German power over- 
sea the same feared and esteemed position in the world 
which our victories of the last decennia have earned for us 
in Central Europe. 

" A further stimulus in this direction is to be found in the 
fact that our navy wiU not be able at once to attain such 
development that it can alone solve all tasks which may 
have to be solved in an energetic world policy. Therefore 
it is desirable that the strength of our army should be made 
visible and available oversea to such nations as have so 
far looked at Germany as a State by which they cannot 
be reached. Thus we must consider not only landings in 
conjunction with territorial wars, but also operations against 
States which we can reach only by sea. 

" Operations oversea must not be improvised, because 
there is hope for their success only when the whole compli- 
cated mechanism down to the smallest details has been 
prepared in time. 

" The possibility of utilising favourable situations and 
favourable times for undertaking operations oversea is one 
of the most important conditions for their success. When 
the landing has been effected in such a way that the opponent 
has been taken by surprise, even a strong country will hardly 
succeed in concentrating sufficient forces in time wherewith 
to meet the invader. The preparations for landing opera- 
tions must therefore be furthered in time of peace to such 
an extent that in time of war we feel sure of having the 
advantage of surprising the enemy by our celerity in 
mobilising and transporting our troops. 

" The aim of our operations must be kept entirely secret, 
and attempts should be made to deceive the enemy at least 
with regard to the purpose for which the first preparations 
are undertaken. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and the 
manner in which it was commenced may be considered still 
to-day as a model. 

" A landing on the coast of the enemy is only possible if 
the assailant has forces superior to those which the defender 
can collect at the decisive moment in order to prevent a 
landing. If a landing has taken place, even a victorious 
naval battle is useless to the defender unless he disposes of 
armies sufficiently strong to meet the invader with success. 



74 GERIVIAN NAVAL AIMS 

Therefore it is absolutely necessary that the strength of our 
Grerman Navy should be developed so far that the security 
of the troops during a possible crossing is certain, and that 
it is able to defeat, or at least to detain, any hostile fleet 
which the opponent may collect at the moment when the 
landing operation is contemplated. Therefore the way for 
a transport of troops oversea should usually be opened by 
an operation of the fleet, and the fact that a landing becomes 
absolutely impossible if the battle on sea has an unfavourable 
issue for us has to be taken into account. Thus the principle 
may be deduced that all men-of-war which can be used 
should be used for operations oversea in order to open the 
way for a fleet of transports. 

" For operations oversea a detailed plan of mobilisation 
must be drawn up in exactly the same way as is done for 
operations on land. The troops which are to be mobilised 
must be determined in peace, their transport by railway, 
their harbour of embarkation and the preparation for 
embarkation must be prepared in order to ensure the greatest 
possible celerity. As we have seen in the foregoing, it is 
before aU necessary to proceed with a surprising quickness 
which alone can assure us success. 

" If the opponent disposes of considerable forces a simul- 
taneous landing at several spots seems questionable, ... If 
several places of debarkation are chosen, the protection of 
these places towards the sea requires many ships of war ; 
the scouting towards the land is made more di£Bcult, and 
the enemy will easier be able to attack in superior numbers 
the separate parts of the landing troops. Lastly, the unity 
of command at the beginning of the operations wiU meet 
with great difficulties, and time and means will be missing 
to obviate these difficulties. Therefore it is recommendable, 
if it is at all possible, to select only one spot of debarkation 
and to bring up the transport fleet as closely as possible to 
the coast. 

" For a debarkation a harbour is naturally best. Less 
favourable but still advantageous is a closed, protected 
bay ; least favourable is the open coast. On the other 
hand, a landing on the open coast wiU find the least resistance 
on the part of the enemy, because it can be executed with 
the greatest chance of surprise. If the point of landing 
selected is close to a bay or to a harbour, the first task of the 
troops which are landing will be to take possession of such 



GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 75 

a place, in order to enable the fleet of transports to disembark 
the majority of the troops, horses, and material at that spot. 
The possession of a harbour will greatly accelerate these 
operations and increase the security of the disembarkation 
against a hostile attack from sea and land. If such a coup 
does not succeed, the landing of the whole expeditionary 
army must immediately take place by boats on the coast 
without loss of time, and all preparations must be made for 
such a possibility. Every transport must have with it a 
sufficient quantity of material for disembarkation, in order 
to be able to land everything on the open shore. It is 
impossible to land in the face of strong fortifications or of 
a strong hostile force ; the Russian landing manoeuvres 
which have been made have fully proved that. 

" The best security for landing by boats is always afforded 
by the surprise. Therefore it is impossible to explore a 
point of landing by ships sent in advance, which would only 
show the opponent which the probable point of landing 
would be, and he would therefore be enabled to take his 
measures in time. Such proceedings can only be used in 
order to deceive the enemy. The exploration of the possible 
points of landing must have taken place already before the 
beginning of the operations. 

" The weU-known naval author Mahan recognises that 
the offensive is characteristic of landing operations. The 
history of war teaches how the success of well-executed 
landings, such as those at Aboukir or Cape Breton, have 
been partly marred by over-great caution of the landed 
troops, because it was not recognised by the commanders 
that energy and celerity in execution wiU counterbalance 
all strategical disadvantages to such an operation. Quick 
and energetic operations with closely concentrated forces on 
the line of the smallest resistance are absolutely necessary 
for the success of landing operations. 

" Napoleon's campaign in Egypt proves that an army 
may subsist for years, even in a country possessing poor 
resources, when the connection with the home country is 
cut off. Such independence is greatly facilitated in a civil- 
ised, thickly-peopled, and rich country, as it will then be 
much easier to get aU that is required in the way of food, 
horses, material, etc., from local sources, and even ammuni- 
tion may be manufactured in the enemy's country. 

" An expeditionary army must economise to the greatest 



76 GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 

extent its forces. Bloody victories may act like defeats on 
them. Therefore, attacks on fortifications must be avoided 
if they are avoidable. The chief thing is always the surpris- 
ing celerity of the operations, and in order to attain the 
main object aimed at all forces must be used with the 
greatest energy and with an absolute lack of all consideration. 
" At present the view prevails in our military circles that 
operations oversea in connection with territorial wars are 
worthless, and are even harmful, as greater success appears 
likely by using those troops on land which might be used 
as an expeditionary force. 

Operations against England 

" A conflict with England must be considered by Germany, 
for a powerful progressive German trade forms for the 
power of England at least as great a danger as the progress 
of Russia towards India. In a purely naval war with 
England we could count on success only at the beginning 
of operations, but soon England would be able to bring to 
the field such enormous naval forces that we should be 
limited to the defensive and could hardly count on a for- 
tunate issue of such operations. Even if we conclude an 
alliance with Russia we might harm England permanently, 
but we would not be able to directly threaten that State, 
Only an alliance with France could menace England, but 
owing to her geographical position and the great loss of time 
which is occasioned by every operation initiated by aUies, 
England would always be able to bring into the field a 
maritime superiority even against that alliance unless she 
be taken by surprise. 

" England's weakness Mes in that factor which constitutes 
our strength, the army. The Enghsh Army corresponds 
neither in quantity nor quahty with England's position as 
a Great Power, and does not even correspond with the size 
of the country, for England feels convinced that the invasion 
of her territory can be prevented by the fleet. That con- 
viction is, however, not at aU justified . . , for though England 
can collect immense fleets after some time, those of her 
naval forces which are ready for war during the very first 
days are not so overwhelming. Consequently an opponent 
who is considerably weaker on the sea, and who concentrates 
his forces and keeps them in a state of readiness, can expect 
a temporary success. Therefore, in case a war with England 



GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 77 

should be threatening, Germany should endeavour to throw 
part of her army on the English coast, and thus to shift the 
decision from the sea on to the enemy's country. As our 
troops are far superior to the English troops, England's 
enormous naval power would not have the slightest influence 
upon the final decision. 

" The army of England consists of the field army, the 
reserve, the miHtia, the volunteers, and the yeomanry. In 
case of an invasion by surprise, we need only consider of 
these the field army with its reserve. The miUtia requires 
so much time for concentration and equipment that only a 
small fraction will be able to assist the field army in the first 
and decisive struggle. The volunteers and the yeomanry 
cannot in a short time bring into the field any considerable 
forces useful for war. Besides, we must remember their 
small military value, owing to which they would not be 
serious opponents to our well-trained troops. The English 
field army consists nominally of three army corps, each 
composed of three divisions. Of these corps half the third 
is composed of militia. Therefore it has either to be com- 
pleted from the militia and will then come too late for action 
in the first decisive battles, or it will march in its peace 
strength and can then not be much stronger than a division. 
Of the second army corps two divisions and one brigade of 
cavalry are quartered in Ireland, of which at any rate the 
larger part will remain there in order to prevent a rising of 
the Irish, to whom the German invasion would bring the 
liberty they long for. Immediately ready for war are 
therefore only : 

Three divisions of the first army corps. 
About two divisions of the second army corps, 
About one combined division of the third army corps 
and three brigades of cavalry. 

" As the mobilised strength of an English division amounts 
in round numbers only to 10,000 men, whilst that of a Ger- 
man division amounts to 16,000 men, four German divisions 
and one cavalry division would already possess a superiority 
over the British field army. However, we are able to ship 
in the shortest time six infantry divisions, or five infantry 
and one cavalry division, to England. How such an opera- 
tion against England oversea should be conducted can of 
course not be described in this place. 



78 GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 

" If the weather be fair, the transport from our North 
Sea harbours should be efiected in little more than thirty 
hours. The English coast offers extensive stretches which 
are suitable for landing troops. The country contains such 
great resources that the army of invasion could permanently 
live on these resources. On the other hand, the extent of 
the island is so small that the English would never succeed 
in vanquishing any army of invasion, once it had been 
victorious. It is unhkely that such a war would be long 
drawn out, or that considerable reserves would be required. 
The material is largely renewable in the country itself. 
Therefore we may without hesitation maintain that it wiU 
be unnecessary to keep open communications with our own 
country. 

" The first object to be aimed at in invading England 
would be the EngKsh field army ; the second would be 
London. However, in all probabihty both objects would 
be attained simultaneously, as in view of the small value of 
the volunteers the whole field army would be required for 
the defence of the fortifications of London. It would ob- 
viously be impossible to let the capital fall into the hands 
of an invader, especially in view of the pressure of public 
opinion. But if London is taken by an army of invasion, 
one or the other naval harbours wiU also have to be occupied, 
in order to create a base for suppHes and for further opera- 
tions which we are justified to thmk wiU lead to the conquest 
of England. 

Operations against the United States 

" Operations against the United States of North America 
would have to be conducted in a different manner. During 
the last years political friction with that State, especially 
friction arising from commercial causes, has not been 
lacking, and the diflSculties that have arisen have mostly 
been settled by our giving way. As this obliging attitude 
has its limits, we have to ask ourselves what force we can 
possibly bring to bear in order to meet the attacks of the 
United States against our interests and to impose our will. 
Our fleet will probably be able to defeat the naval forces of 
the United States, which are distributed over two oceans 
and over long distances. But it would be a mistake to 
suppose that the defeat of their fleet will force the United 
States with its immense resources into concluding peace. 



GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 79 

" In view of the small number of American merchant-men, 
in view of the small value of the American colonies which 
are not even pacified, in view of the excellent fortifications 
with which the great American seaports are provided, and 
which cannot be taken except with very heavy losses, and 
in view of the large number of American seaports, all of 
which we cannot blockade at the same time, our fleet has 
no means to force that opponent through successful maritime 
operations to conclude a peace on our terms. 

" The possibihty must be taken into account that the 
fleet of the United States will at first not venture into 
battle, but that it will withdraw into fortified harbours, in 
order to wait for a favourable opportunity of achieving 
minor successes. Therefore it is clear that naval action 
alone will not be decisive against the United States, but 
that combined action of navy and army will be required. 
Considering the great extent of the United States, the 
conquest of the country by an army of invasion is not 
possible. But there is every reason to beheve that vic- 
torious enterprises on the Atlantic coast, and the conquest 
of the most important arteries through which imports and 
exports pass, will create such an unbearable state of affairs 
in the whole country that the Government will readily offer 
acceptable conditions in order to obtain peace. 

" If Grermany begins preparing a fleet of transports and 
troops for landing purposes at the moment when the battle 
fleet steams out of our harbours, we may conclude that 
operations on American soil can begin after about four 
weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the United States 
will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army 
equivalent to our own. 

" At present the regular army of the United States 
amounts to 65,000 men, of whom only about 30,000 could 
be disposed of. Of these at least 10,000 are required for 
watching the Indian territories and for guarding the fortifica- 
tions on the seacoast. Therefore only about 20,000 men 
of the regular army are ready for war. Besides, about 
100,000 mihtia are in existence, of whom the larger part did 
not come up when they were called out during the last war. 
Lastly, the mihtia is not efficient ; it is partly armed with 
muzzle-loaders, and its training is worse than its armament. 

"As an operation by surprise against America is im- 
possible, on account of the length of time during which the 



80 GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 

transports are on the way, the landing can be effected only 
by surprise. Nevertheless, stress must be laid on the fact 
that the rapidity of the invasion will considerably facihtate 
victory against the United States, owing to the absence of 
methodical preparation for mobiUsation, owing to the in- 
experience of the personnel, and owing to the weakness of 
the regular army, 

" In order to occupy permanently a considerable part of 
the United States and to protect our lines of operation, so 
as to enable us to fight successfully against all forces which 
that country, in the course of time, can oppose to us, con- 
siderable forces would be required. Such an operation 
would be greatly hampered by the fact that it would require 
a second passage of the transport fleet in order to ship the 
necessary troops that long distance. However, it seems 
questionable whether it would be advantageous to occupy 
a great stretch of country for a considerable time. The 
Americans will not feel inclined to conclude peace because 
one or two provinces are occupied by an army of invasion, 
but because of the enormous material losses which the whole 
country wiU suffer if the Atlantic harbour towns, in which 
the threads of the whole prosperity of the United States 
are concentrated, are torn away from them one after the 
other. 

" Therefore the task of the fleet would be to undertake 
a series of large landing operations, through which we are 
able to take several of these important and wealthy towns 
within a brief space of time. By interrupting their com- 
munications, by destroying all buildings serving the State, 
commerce, and the defence, by taking away all material 
for war and transport, and, lastly, by levying heavy con- 
tributions, we should be able to inflict damage on the 
United States. 

" For such enterprises a smaller military force wiU suffice. 
Nevertheless, the American defence wiU find it difficult to 
undertake a successful enterprise against that kind of 
warfare. Though an extremely well-developed railway 
system enables them to concentrate troops within a short 
time on the different points on the coast, the concentration 
of the troops and the time which is lost until it is recognised 
which of the many threatened points of landing wiU reaUy 
be utilised wiU, as a rule, make it possible for the army of 
invasion to carry out its operation with success under the 



GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 81 

co-operation of the fleet at the point chosen. The corps 
landed can either take the offensive against gathering hostile 
forces or withdraw to the transports in order to land at 
another place. 

" It should be pointed out that Germany is the only 
Great Power which is able to tackle the United States 
single-handed. England could be victorious on sea, but 
would not be able to protect Canada, where the Americans 
could find consolation for their defeats on sea. Of the other 
Great Powers, none possess a fleet of transports required 
for such an operation." 



CHAPTER VII 

prusso-germany's world policy and its policy 
towards the anglo-saxon states ^ 

Up to 1870 the ambitions of the Grermans were for national 
unity and for a leading role among the Continental nations. 
When this object had been achieved by Bismarck's genius, 
and when the fabric of the German Empire had been con- 
soHdated and strengthened, the German horizon was rapidly 
enlarged. Though not unmindful of her exposed Con- 
tinental position and of the possibility of seeing her empire 
expanding east, south, and west, Germany resolved to 
become a great colonial Power. 

Many decades back some of the greatest Gterman thinkers, 
among them Treitschke, Schliemann, Roscher, List, Droysen, 
pointed out that the problem of disposing of Germany's 
surplus population in a temperate zone was an urgent one, 
but at the time when these men wrote and spoke Germany 
was still divided against herself and was powerless and poor. 
She then possessed neither a navy nor a merchant marine 
worthy the name, nor manufacturing industries, nor foreign 
commerce, and for some thirty years the agitation for 
colonies was restricted to the Universities, being ignored, 
or even discountenanced, in official and in commercial 
circles. Nothing illustrates the attitude of the German 
people and Government in those times better than the 
acquisition, in 1848, of a small fleet paid for largely by 
the voluntary contributions of colonial enthusiasts, and its 
subsequent sale by auction, in 1852, by the Government. 

During the last few decades, but especially since Germany's 
consolidation in 1871, the population of the empire increased 

1 From the Fortnightly Review, March 1903. 
82 



GERMANY'S ; WORLD POLICY 83 

with wonderful rapidity. The population of Grermany 
within her Umits of 1914 has risen as follows : 

Averftge Increase 
Qerman popalatioa. per annam. 

1840 32,800,000 — 

1850 35,400,000 260,000 

1860 37,700,000 230,000 

1870 40,800,000 310,000 

1880 45,200,000 440,000 

1890 49,400,000 420,000 

1900 56,300,000 690,000 

1913 67,000,000 850,000 

German emigration, which accounted for the loss of 220,000 
citizens in 1881, had sunk to only 18,545 in 1912, but this 
sHght loss in population was more than counterbalanced 
during recent years by a large immigration into Germany 
from Austria, Russia, and Italy. Professor SchmoUer 
estimated that the German population would amount to 
104,000,000 in 1965, Hiibbe-Schleiden prophesied that it 
would rise to 150,000,000 in 1980, and Leroy-Beaulieu, the 
first French authority on these things, had estimated that 
it would be 200,000,000 within a century. Germany was 
loth to strengthen foreign nations with her emigration. The 
former German colonies did not offer a sufficient outlet for 
the emigration of white men. Consequently the resolution 
had arisen to acquire territories in a temperate zone whenever 
and wherever possible. 

The rooted conviction that Germany must possess colonies 
almost at any price, which had emanated from professorial 
circles, gradually pervaded in the end the whole nation 
from the highest to the lowest. 

The German politicians and bureaucrats, who had no 
experience in colonial policy, who often lacked sympathy, 
understanding, enterprise, and imagination regarding co- 
lonial matters, and who viewed the turbulent clamour for 
colonies of the professor-led multitude with the hearty 
dislike with which the initiative of the people was frequently 
viewed by official Germany, quickly became the most 
enthusiastic and the most uncompromising of colonial 
fanatics when William II. lent his unreserved support to 



84 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

the colonial movement and gave it its anti-Anglo-Saxon 
character. 

Astonishment was frequently expressed at the peculiar 
means by which Grermany tried to acquire colonies, but 
those who are well acquainted with the character of official 
and unofficial Germany could not wonder. Modern Ger- 
many owed her greatness to the sword, and her national 
character had nothing in common with the better-known 
character of the Germany of the past. 

In old Germany the centre of gravity lay in the more 
easy-going south. Her character resembled that of Austria. 
Modern Germany had been conquered by the East Prussian 
nobility, the descendants of those hardy knights of the 
Teutonic Order, who had wrested East Prussia from the 
Slavs in countless battles, and converted the independent 
heathen inhabitants into obedient Christian serfs. The 
East Prussian nobility ruled the aboriginal inhabitants of 
Prussia with the greatest harshness, and various mediaeval 
institutions — for example, serfdom — prevailed in Prussia 
even in the eighteenth century. Though serfdom in Prussia 
was nominally abolished in 1807, its last remnants continued 
to exist until a short time ago. Even recently the down- 
trodden peasant in East Prussia humbly kissed the hands 
of the squire and of his children and the hem of his wife's 
garment, and submitted to correction by the whip. East 
Prussia, with her arrogant nobility and submissive peasantry, 
strongly resembled her neighbour Russia, in which country 
also the nobility and the Government established themselves 
by force. In East Prussia, as in Russia, the nobility was 
wasteful, the estates were encumbered with mortgages, the 
peasantry was ignorant, poor, and hard- worked, manu- 
facturing industries were practically non-existent, and the 
only way to acquire money known to the noblemen was 
by force or by craft, not by industry. The descendants of 
the valorous Teutonic knights did not introduce industries 
on their estates or up-to-date methods into agriculture, as 
will be shown in another chapter, but tried to obtain 
from the Government high protective tarifiEs and other 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 85 

favours through their representatives in the Reichstag, the 
Agrarians. 

The best example of the new German spirit was afforded 
by Bismarck, who was a typical East Prussian in his policy 
and in his methods. His appearance and his personality 
suggested that he had a considerable amount of Slav blood 
in him. At all events, Slavs and Slav methods were most 
sympathetic to him, and nowhere did he feel more at home 
than amongst the Russians in Russia. Bismarck's political 
methods, which at first shocked German sentimentalism, 
had made her great, and, owing to the assiduous and some- 
what uncritical Bismarck cult which was carried on in that 
country, these methods became in German eyes the natural 
and classical methods of German statecraft and diplomacy. 

The East Prussian squires were always treated as the 
chief piUars of the throne, and they occupied the most 
important official positions in Prussia and in Grermany. 
Consequently, it was only natural that, when the question of 
acquiring colonial possessions came to the front, Prusso- 
Grerman officialdom turned instinctively to those means 
which had proved so eminently successful in the past imder 
Bismarck. It did so the more readily as to the Prusso- 
German official, who had grown up in feudalistic ideas, the 
liberal Anglo-Saxon institutions were as hateful as they were 
to the Russian official, for the spreading of the Democratic 
idea threatened to subvert the reign by caste and to destroy 
the privileged position of the nobility and the bureaucracy. 
To the German or Russian patriot, who looked back upon 
the glorious expansion of his country by conquest from the 
small beginnings made by the HohenzoUerns and the Ruriks, 
the continued growth of his country by conquest seemed as 
natural and as legitimate as expansion by peaceful means 
appears to the Anglo-Saxons. To him the sword was not 
the ultima ratio Regis, but an ordinary implement. 

The anti-British movement in Germany was not a spon- 
taneous outburst of irresponsible popular opinion, but an 
agitation which was kindled and fanned by the Government. 
The anti-British, as weU as the anti- American, movement 



86 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

emanated from the Government and those near it, and it 
was assisted bv the inteUectual leaders of the nation. 

In consideriiis the opinions expressed by leading Germans 
on German coloJiial expansion and on Anglo-Saxon countries, 
the fact that those opinions were by no means merely the 
private opmions of irresponsible private citizens should 
never be lost sight of. The rigorous disciphne which 
Imperial Germany enforced on her citizens was doubly 
ric^orous in respect of officials and officers, both on active 
service and on the retired list. An opinion unfavourable 
to the Government or to a measure taken by the Govern- 
ment even thoucrh privately expressed by an official or 
an officer, would, if reported to his superior, bring on hkn 
severe "disciplinarv^' pimishment, or even dismissal. The 
Government could also bring considerable pressure to bear 
upon the nominaUv mdependent University professors, who 
thirst after preferment by the State, titles, and decorations. 
Consequentlv, it may be said that the pubhcly-expressed 
opmions of kcting and retired officials and officers, and of 
the University professors, with regard to German colomal 
poUcy and Anglo-Saxon nations were approved of and 
endorsed bv the Government. 

German professors have in the past played a great part 
in German history. Professor Luther brought about the 
Reformation. The renascence of Prussia after her collapse 
in 1806-1S07 was largely due to the patriotic actmty of 
the German professors, among whom Professors Arndt, 
Fichte ?nd Niebuhr were most prominent, and the unihca- 
tion of the German Emph^e was the ideal and corstant 
thoucrht of the professors long before the advent of Bismarck, 
though thev intended to attain it by methods less vigorous 
than those of blood and iron. The old national Parhament 
of Frankfort and the German Fleet of 1848 are witnesses to 
their aims. Therefore professorial utterances on matters of 
poUcy could not be dismissed as being only " irresponsible 

professors' talk." • 4. > 

German politicians and German colomal enthusiasts 
thought very highly of the value of tropical colomes, but 



GERiMXY'S WORLD POLICY 87 

the acquLsition of settlement colonies in a temperate zone 
was their principal aim and ambition, becaiLse these would 
afford an outlet to the Grerman surplus population. Seeing 
that most habitable and thinly-populated lands oversea 
were in Anglo-Saxon hands, official and unofficial Germany 
had been seriously considering the question whether it 
would be possible to wrest suitable territories from Great 
Britain or America. Li making their plans for colonial 
expansion and surveying their chances against the Anglo- 
Saxon countries, the Germans had come to the conclusion 
that Great Britain was a senile, declining nation, and that 
the United States were a young and vigorous nation, whose 
political future and military potentialities seemed unlimited 
unless, indeed, their progress was arrested by force. The 
plans of the colonial enthusiasts, and of official Germany 
as well, were shaped in accordance with these views. 

The official and semi-official publications of Germany 
were of course very careful not to reveal Germany's ultimate 
aims as a world Power, which could only be gauged from the 
opinions and hopes expressed by persons moving in weU- 
informed circles. Those ultimate aims which were in every- 
body's mouth were expressed with delightful candour in a 
pamphlet. Die Abrechnung mil England, by C. Eisenhart, 
Munich, 1900. In this book it was shown how (Germany 
mth the help of her new fleet, first destroys the navy of 
Japan and gains a footing in the East ; how afterwards, 
while Great Britain is crippling Russia in Asia for the 
convenience of Germany, she destroys the British Fleet ; 
and, lastly, how the " insolence " of the United States is 
punished by their complete defeat, Germany's victories 
resulting in the acquisition of the best Anglo-Saxon posses- 
sions, including Australia, and in Germany's paramountcy 
over Anglo-Saxondom the world over. To this writer, as 
to many others, German world policy was synonymous with 
Grerman world supremacy and German domination over the 
entire globe. Another candid writer, who, however, either 
did not see as far as ^Ir. Eisenhart, or who did not care to 
make known to the world the whole of his views, from 
7 



88 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

political considerations, said in his book, Deutschktnd beim 
Beginn des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, Berlin, 1900 : 

" We consider a great war with England in the twentieth 
century as quite inevitable, and must strain every fibre in 
order to be prepared to fight that war single-handed. The 
experience of all time shows that colonial empires are more 
fragile and less enduring than continental empires. We do 
not require a fleet against France or Russia, let them even 
ravage our coasts in case of a war. We require a fleet only 
against England.'^ 

In a similar strain the Koloniale Zeitschrift wrote on the 
18th of January 1900 : 

" The old century saw a German Europe ; the new one 
shall see a German world. To attain that consummation 
two duties are required from the present German generation — 
to keep its own counsel and to create a strong naval force." 

Again, on the 28th of March 1900, the same journal 
said : 

" The nineteenth century was not the German century ; 
it was the Prussian century. In the history of the world 
the twentieth century will be caUed the German century." 

In a leading article entitled " German World Policy," the 
Deutsches Wochenblatt wrote on the 1st of February 1899 : 

" It can hardly be doubted that at the outbreak of the 
next great war Russia will take Constantinople. ... It is 
possible that a general war against England will come before 
the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. ... If Russia 
attracts to herself the Slavonic peoples round the Danube, 
our way via Salonika towards Asia Minor and Suez will be 
lost for aU time. . . . Our motto should be : With the whole 
Continent against England ; with Austria against Russia 
when the time comes." 

" Teutonicus " wrote in the same journal on the 19th of 
August 1899: 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 89 

" Our adversaries in a naval war would probably be our 
Samoa partners (the United States and Great Britain). . . . 
Now, as ever, the existence of our fleet depends upon the 
goodwill of England, Therefore, it is clear that the North 
Sea will be the theatre of war where our fate will be decided, 
whether we fight for our interest in the China Seas or on the 
eastern coast of America. Consequently, in a future naval 
war, our North Sea fleet and our army of embarkation would 
be mobilised at the moment when the Enghsh Mediterranean 
fleet should effect a suspicious movement." 

These utterances were more than the bombastic rodo- 
montades of fantastical sensation-mongers, for the authors 
of them had palpably taken their cue from the no less 
unmistakable though slightly more diplomatically expressed 
utterances of the Emperor, who set the ball roUing and gave 
to the colonial movement its aggressive character by pointing 
out that German colonial ambitions could only be satisfied 
after Germany had secured the supremacy on the ocean — that 
is, at the cost of Anglo-Saxon countries. As far back as the 
24th of April 1897 William II. said in Cologne at a banquet : 

" Neptune with the trident is a symbol for us that we have 
new tasks to fulfil since the empire has been welded together. 
Everywhere we have to protect German citizens ; every- 
where we have to maintain German honour : that trident 
must be in our fist ! " 

On other occasions he coined the winged words : 

" Our future lies upon the water." " Without the consent 
of Germany's ruler nothing must happen in any part of the 
world." " May our Fatherland be as powerful, as closely 
united, and as authoritative as was the Roman Empire of 
old, in order that the old Civis Romanus sum be replaced 
by ' I am a German citizen ' ! " 

On the 18th of October 1899 William II, made a speech 
in which he said : 

" We are in bitter need of a strong German navy. ... If 
the increase demanded during the first years of my reign 
had not been continually refused to me in spite of my 



90 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

pressing entreaties and warnings, for which I have even 
experienced derision and ridicule, how differently should we 
be able to further our flourishing commerce and our interests 
oversea." 

It can hardly be doubted that the Emperor's bitterness 
at his inability to " further our interests oversea " was 
caused by the political situation in South Africa. At the 
time when he was speaking the Boer ultimatum had been 
dispatched only nine days, and a strong German fleet, had 
it then existed, might no doubt have been able to further 
" the German interest in the Transvaal as an independent 
State." On the 1st of January 1900 the Emperor WiUiam 
announced in a speech his determination to possess an 
overwhelmingly strong navy, in the following words : 

" As my grandfather reorganised the army, so shall I 
reorganise my navy, without flinching and in the same way, 
so that it will stand on the same level as my army, and that, 
with its help, the Grerman Empire shall reach the place 
which it has not yet attained." 

It may be objected that these and similar utterances of 
WiUiam II. were the spontaneous and ill-considered private 
opinions of a private man who happened to be the head of 
the State, not pronunciamientos deliberately launched by 
the head of the Empire ; that they were in fact not sanc- 
tioned by the official representatives of German policy, 
and, therefore, devoid of political significance. People who 
express such views are evidently ignorant of the far-reaching, 
nay, almost unlimited, pohtical power which was vested in 
the German Emperor imder the Imperial Constitution, and 
are not aware that William II. was his own ChanceUor. 

Similar views to those pronounced by the German Em- 
peror were also uttered by his responsible Ministers. For 
instance, on the day of the disaster at Magersfontein, the 
11th of December 1899, the then Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Prince Biilow, said in the Reichstag in 
support of an immensely increased naval programme : 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 91 

" The necessity to strengthen our fleet arises out of the 
present state of the world and out of the circumstances of 
our oversea policy. Only two years ago no one would 
have been able to foresee in which way things would start 
moving. It is urgent to define the attitude which we have 
to take up in view of what is happening. . . . We must create 
a fleet strong enough to exclude attack from any Power." 

Again, a fortnight after the disaster of Spion Kop, Admiral 
Tirpitz, the Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy, spoke 
thus : 

" We do not know what adversary we may have to face. 
We must therefore arm ourselves, with a view to meeting 
the most dangerous naval conflict 'possible.'''' 

Prince Biilow said on the 12th of June 1900 : 

"It is necessary that Germany should be strong enough 
at sea to maintain German peace, German honour, and 
German prosperity all the world over." 

In all these official speeches a distinct hint was conveyed 
as to the probability of a conflict with Great Britain, from 
whom the supremacy at sea was to be wrested, and the regret 
was guardedly expressed that Germany could not turn the 
British difficulties and disasters in South Africa to account, 
owing to the weakness of her fleet. 

That the German Emperor's phrase, " That trident must 
be in our fist," was not merely a metaphor spontaneously 
born from banquet-heated enthusiasm, but the deliberate 
statement of a well-considered policy, may be seen from the 
dry, matter-of-fact preamble to the German Navy Bill of 
1900, which said : 

" Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war 
against the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threaten- 
ing the supremacy of that Power.''' 

Some years afterwards Mr. Bassermann, the leader of the 
Liberal Party in the German Reichstag, thought it necessary 
to endorse, on behalf of his party, the official utterances 



92 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

quoted in the foregoing, and said at the Liberal Party 
Congress on the 13th of October 1903 : 

" In our attitude towards England we must keep cool, 
and, until we have a strong fleet, it would be a mistake to 
let ourselves be drawn into a hostile policy towards her. . . . 
The development of the United States of North America 
and their desire for expansion is likewise a lesson for us not 
to be forgetful of our armaments, especially at sea." 

Bearing in mind the dependence of Grerman public opinion 
upon the views of the Emperor and his Government, it need 
hardly be asserted that the o£B.cial and authoritative utter- 
ances cited above were carefully weighed and well considered, 
and that official statements such as these were responsible 
for the less veiled, but more forcible, views expressed in 
Die Abrechnung mit England, Deutschland heim Beginn des 
Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts , the Koloniale Zeitschrift, the 
Deutsches Wochenblatt, and hosts of others, and that the 
violent anti-British campaign had little or nothing to do 
with German sympathy with the Boers. 

Some years before the War M. E. Lockroy, a man of great 
ability and of sound judgment, who three times had been 
Minister of Marine in France, visited Germany and was 
allowed to inspect the German Fleet and dockyards, even 
to the smallest details. That this permission was granted 
to Germany's " hereditary enemy " seems astonishing, 
unless we bear in mind that the numerous advances to 
France made by the Emperor William II. and his Govern- 
ment aimed less at ensuring the peace of Europe, or at 
breaking up the alliance with Russia, than at securing the 
assistance of the French Fleet for the overthrow of Great 
Britain. That view was repeatedly expressed in Die Grenz- 
boten, by far the most influential political weekly in Germany, 
which very frequently spoke with the authority of the Ger- 
man Foreign Office. In view of the close relations existing 
between that journal and the German Foreign Office, the 
views expressed in it are of exceptional weight and interest, 
and they will consequently be occasionally cited hereafter. 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 93 

On the 5th of October 1899 an article appeared ui Die 
Grenzboten, which said : 

" All differences between France and Germany benefit 
only the nearly all-powerful enemy of the world. As long 
as the French keep one eye fixed on Alsace-Lorraine, it is 
no good that they occasionally look at England with the other 
eye. Only when the German Fleet has a strength commen- 
surate with her sea interests will the French seek our friend- 
ship instead of being humihated by their hereditary enemy." 

M. Lockroy, who might have become an important factor 
in favour of a Franco-German alliance, in the event of his 
returning subsequently to the Cabinet, seems not to have 
been left in the dark about Germany's ambitions by his official 
German hosts, for in his Lettres sur la Marine Allemande, 
which appeared in 1901 , he summed up his impressions about 
the purpose of the German Navy in the following way : 

" Germany will be a great naval power in spite of her 
geographical position and history. Her claim to rule the 
waves will bring on a war with Great Britain earlier or later. 
That war will be one of the most terrible conflicts of the 
twentieth century. What its result will be no one can 
foretell, but so much is sure, that Germany does everything 
that human forethought and the patience and energy of a 
nation can suggest." 

His words confirm the existence of the wish of German 
diplomacy to form an anti-British alliance with France, a 
wish which was hinted at in 1899 in Die Grenzboten and in 
many other inspired journals. This wish dictated also the 
numerous personal advances made by WiUiam II. to in- 
dividual Frenchmen and the advances made by German 
diplomacy. 

The views of the most distinguished and most respected 
German professors with regard to Germany's poUcy of 
colonial expansion at Anglo-Saxon cost coincided with 
those expressed in Die Abrechnung mit England and similar 
publications. They breathed the fiercest hatred against 
Anglo-Saxon countries, especially against Great Britain, 
the more immediate object of Germany's attention. 



94 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

Count Du Moulin- Eckart, professor of history at Munich, 
wrote in his book Englische Politik und die Mdchte : 

" Our present relations with England are similar to our 
former relations with Austria. To both nations we are 
related by race, by both we have been hampered in our 
progress, and by both we have been deceived times without 
number. Time will show whether co-operation with Eng- 
land is possible. If it be impossible, a war will become 
necessary, and then : Hail thee, Germany ! May the 
genius of a Bismarck grant us then a second Koniggratz ! " 

The late Professor Schmoller, a most prominent lecturer 
on political economy at the Berlin University, a member 
of the Prussian Privy Council and of the Prussian Upper 
Chamber, gave a lecture in Berhn, Strasbourg, and Hanover, 
which was largely circulated in print, in which he said : 

" In various States, arrogant, reckless, cold-blooded daring 
bullies (Gewaltmenschen), men who possess the morals of a 
captain of pirates, as Professor Brentano called them so 
justly the other day, push themselves more and more forward 
and into the Government. . . . We must not forget that it 
is in the freest States, England and North America, where 
the tendencies of conquest. Imperial schemes, and hatred 
against new economic competitors are growing up amongst 
the masses. The leaders of these agitations are great 
speculators, who have the morals of a pirate, and who are 
at the same time party leaders and Ministers of State. . . . 
The conquest of Cuba and the Philippines by the United 
States alters their political and economical basis. Their 
tendency to exclude Europe from the North and South 
American markets must needs lead to new great conflicts. 
It must also not be forgotten how England tried to wreck 
our Zollverein, how she tried to prevent us from conquering 
Schleswig-Holstein, and how anti- German she was in 1870. 
. . . These bullies (Gewaltmenschen), these pirates and 
speculators a la Cecil Rhodes, act like poison within their 
State. They buy the press, corrupt ministers and the 
aristocracy, and bring on wars for the benefit of a bankrupt 
company or for the gain of filthy lucre. Where they govern 
modesty and decency disappear, as do honesty and respect 
for justice. Legitimate business cannot maintain itself, and 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 95 

all classes of society are exploited and ill-used by a small 
circle of capitalistic magnates, stock-jobbers, and specu- 
lators. . . . We mean to extend our trade and industries far 
enough to enable us to live and sustain a growing population. 
We mean to defend our colonies, and, if possible, to acquire 
somewhere agricultural colonies. We mean to prevent 
extravagant mercantilism everywhere, and to prevent the 
division of the earth among the three world powers, which 
would exclude all other countries and destroy their trade. 
In order to attain this modest aim we require to-day so badly 
a large fleet. The German Empire must become the centre 
of a coahtion of States, chiefly in order to be able to hold 
the balance in the death-struggle between Russia and 
England, but that is only possible if we possess a stronger 
fleet than that of to-day. . . . We must wish that at any 
price a German country, peopled by twenty to thirty million 
Germans, should grow up in Southern Brazil. Without the 
possibiUty of energetic proceedings on the part of Germany 
our future over there is threatened. . . . We do not mean 
to press for an economic alliance with Holland, but if the 
Dutch are wise, if they do not want to lose their colonies 
some day, as Spain did, they will hasten to seek our alliance." 

Another distinguished professor of political economy, 
Professor Dr. von Schaffle, wrote in the Milnchener Allge- 
meine Zeitung on the 4th of February 1898 : 

" The progress of our sea commerce has become so immense 
that Germany must be prepared for anything on the part of 
her rivals. Let us not deceive ourselves. The English, if 
they can summon up the necessary courage, will try at the 
first opportunity to give the deathblow to our commerce 
oversea and to our export industries. The Transvaal 
quarrel has made evident what we have to expect. Cecil 
Rhodes, Chamberlain, and their accomplices are, in this 
respect, only types of the thought and intentions of present- 
day England towards new Germany. Great Britain will 
move heaven and hell against the sea commerce of the new 
Grerman Empire as soon as she can." 

Another eminent scientist, the professor of political 
economy, Von Schulze-Gaevernitz, wrote in the Nation, 
the 5th of March 1898 : 



96 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

" In order to strengthen the sensible and peaceable 
elements in England, and to confine commercial envy within 
harmless bounds, we require the defence of a fleet. . . . 
The British Cape to Cairo idea is opposed to French and 
German interests, but German vital interests would be 
affected by British control of the still undivided portion of 
the world, especially of China and of Turkey." 

Then, referring to the rapid colonial expansion of Great 
Britain during the last decade, he significantly added : 
" But should in future the day of liquidation arrive, Ger- 
many must have the power to participate in it." 

Professor Mommsen, probably the greatest historian of 
modern times, wrote, regarding England, in the North 
American Review for February 1900 : 

" The repetition of Jameson's Raid by the English 
Government (I won't say the English nation), dictated by 
banking and mining speculations, is the revelation of your 
moral and political corruption." 

The former Under-Secretary of State, professor of poli- 
tical economy Von Mayr-Strasbourg, wrote in the Miin- 
chener Allgemeine Zeitung : 

" Our national policy requires the firm backbone of a 
strong fleet in order to oppose with energy the brutal in- 
stincts of exporting countries, especially of those which 
export agricultural produce. Our commercial policy re- 
quires it in order to give to our home industries the certainty 
of the continued supply of raw material and of open markets 
for their exports." 

Hans Delbriick, the distinguished professor of history at 
Berlin, wrote in the North American Review of January 
1900: 

" England insists upon being the only great commercial 
and colonial power in the world, and is only willing to aUow 
other nations the favour of owning small fragments as 
enclaves wedged in helplessly between her possessions. This 
it is which we neither can nor intend to tolerate. . . . The 
good things of this world belong to all civilised nations in 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 97 

common. As England is not expected to give way peace- 
ably, and as her great naval power cannot be overwhelmed 
by a single State, the best remedy would be the alliance 
against her of all her rivals together, especially of Russia, 
France, and Grermany. . . . Such is the state of public 
opinion in Germany. There is only one person in the whole 
country who thinks otherwise, and that is the Kaiser." 

From the foregoing small but representative selection of 
opinions expressed by the elite of the German professors, 
which might easily be increased sufficiently to fill a volume, 
the nature- of Germany's colonial ambitions and the cause 
of her fanatical hatred of Anglo-Saxondom should be 
sufficiently clear. 

The last phrase of Professor Delbriick, " There is only 
one person in the country who thinks otherwise, and that 
is the Kaiser," seemed quite true at the time when it was 
written, for the combined agitation by the official classes, 
the Universities, the entire German press, and the Protes- 
tant clergy, had roused Germany to a frenzy of hatred ; 
and though the " poor Boers " were constantly in the 
mouth of the multitude, the utterances of the leaders, like 
those cited, make it clear that the clashing of German 
colonial ambitions and Anglo-Saxon interests, not German 
sympathy with the Boers, was at the bottom of the anti- 
British propaganda. 

Owing to the rule of democracy, Anglo-Saxon diplomacy 
works in the full glare of publicity, and cannot pursue a 
far-seeing, secret, or unscrupulous policy, but is forced to 
take short views and to act honestly ; while German as well 
as Russian Cabinet policy was able to work with infinite 
patience and in absolute secrecy, because it was unham- 
pered by popular control. An example will illustrate this 
point. Between 1860 and 1863 an expedition, sent out by 
the Prussian Government, and accompanied by the cele- 
brated geographer, Freiherr von Richthofen, explored 
China, Japan, and Siam. After the most painstaking in- 
vestigation of the Chinese coast and mainland, Freiherr 
von Richthofen came to the conclusion that Kiau-chow 



98 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

was in every respect by far the most valuable harbour of 
China, and when, in 1897, more than thirty years after his 
survey, two German missionaries were murdered in China, 
Germany immediately occupied Kiau-chow, which port was 
certainly not selected by coincidence. 

On the 5th of May 1898, a few days after the outbreak 
of the Spanish-American War, Die Grenzboten, the most 
influential political weekly, which was frequently inspired 
by the Government, wrote, probably not without official 
sanction : 

" The number of Germans in the United States amounts 
to nearly twenty millions, but many of them have lost their 
native language or their German names. Nevertheless, 
German blood flows in their veins, and it is only required 
to gather them together under their former nationality in 
order to bring them back into the lap of their mother 
Germania. The German volunteers will, of course, have 
to pay the heaviest blood tax in the war, as they alone form 
the warlike element of the army. The promiscuous mob of 
Englishmen, half-breeds, Irish, and negroes is too incoherent 
and too unmilitary to show any soldierly qualities. Never- 
theless, Germanism has to take a back seat in the army, 
and generals' positions are almost exclusively in the hands 
of Englishmen. 

" We have to consider that more than ^three million 
Germans live as foreigners in the United States who are 
not personally interested in that country. A skilful Ger- 
man national policy should be able to manipulate that 
German multitude against the shameless war-speculators." 

Had the issue of the Spanish-American War been un- 
favourable to the United States, or had the attempt at 
forming an anti- American coalition succeeded, the " skilful 
manipulation " from Berlin of the German vote " against 
the shameless war-speculators " might have been possible, 
and might have borne much fruit. Germany's miscalcula- 
tion as to the issue of the war, and as to the strength and 
leanings of the German- Americans, seems to have caused 
great disappointment in Berlin. This disappointment 
appears to have been responsible for the reckless provoca- 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 99 

tion which Admiral Dewey received from Admiral Diedrichs 
before Manila, and which might have resulted in hostilities 
between the American and German fleets, had it not been 
for the timely presence of the British squadron and the 
determined attitude of its admiral. 

During the South African War the clashing of German 
colonial ambitions and Anglo-Saxon interests became par- 
ticularly marked, because in Africa German colonial ambi- 
tions were clearly defined, and had become the ambitions 
of the nation and of the populace ; in the Spanish- American 
War they were vague and hazy, and exclusively the am- 
bitions of German diplomacy, for to the German masses 
the Spanish- American War had little significance. Already 
in 1884, at the beginning of her colonial career, Germany 
had attempted to gain a footing in Santa Lucia Bay, with 
an eye to the possibility of joining hands with the Boer 
republics close by, and of gaining, with their help, supremacy 
in Africa, but Bismarck's attempt failed through the in- 
capacity of his son, who conducted the negotiations in 
London. 

Undaunted by her first failure, Germany continued 
to believe that her best chance of acquiring settlement 
colonies lay in South Africa, and worked patiently and in 
silence for the attainment of her ambition. The Jameson 
Raid gave her a rude awakening. She feared the absorp- 
tion of the Boer republics by Great Britain before Germany 
and the Boers were ready to co-operate. In his anxiety to 
maintain his hold upon South Africa, the German Emperor 
sent his celebrated telegram to Mr. liruger, thus prema- 
turely revealing Germany's innermost ambitions. The 
existence of these ambitions was stiU further proved by 
Baron Marschall von Bieberstein's official declaration that 
" the continued independence of the Boer republics is a 
German interest." 

By the Emperor's impetuousness, Germany's ultimate 
aims regarding South Africa were clearly disclosed to Great 
Britain, a mistake which Bismarck would never have com- 
mitted, and the Ej^uger telegram and the attitude of the 



100 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

semi-official press left the German nation with the erroneous 
impression that the British Government had been behind 
Jameson, and that the Emperor's veto had, once and for 
aU, put an end to the aggressive plans of Great Britain. 
Thus misled, it was not unnatural that the Germans believed 
themselves to be the masters of the situation in South 
Africa, and that the German press constantly advocated 
the expulsion of Great Britain from that country. For 
instance, on the 4th of July 1895, a few months after the 
Jameson Raid, Die Grenzboten wrote : 

" For us the Boer States, with the coasts that are their 
due, signify a great possibility. Their absorption into the 
British Empire would mean the blocking up of our last road 
towards an independent agricultural colony in a temperate 
clime. WiU England obstruct our path ? If Germany 
shows determination. Never ! " 

After surveying the globe, official Germany had evidently 
come to the conclusion that South Africa would be an 
ideal colony, more desirable even than South Brazil, and 
that the most natural way to acquire it would be to wrest 
it out of. British hands with the help of the Boers. Die 
Grenzboten wrote on the 15th of April 1897 : 

" The possession of South Africa offers greater advantages 
in every respect than the possession of Southern Brazil. If 
we look at the map our German colonies look very good 
positions for attack." 

In a similar strain the Koloniales Jahrhuch for 1897 
wrote : 

" The importance of South Africa as a land which can 
receive an unlimited number of white immigrants must 
rouse us to the greatest exertions, in order to secure there 
supremacy to the Teuton race. The greater part of the 
population of South Africa is of Low German descent. We 
must constantly lay stress upon the Low German origin 
of the Boers, and we must, before all, stimulate their 
hatred against Anglo-Saxondom. . . . No doubt the Boers 
will, with characteristically German tenacity, retake their 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 101 

former possessions from the English by* combining slimness 
with force. In this attempt they can count upon the 
assistance of the German brother nation." 

These quotations contain an unmistakable programme 
and a very interesting forecast. 

As the idea that Germany was the heir-presumptive to 
South Africa was constantly discussed in the German press, 
that idea had sunk deeply into the German mind. The 
succession to that inheritance soon became with the masses 
an impending event to be looked forw^ard to. It was only 
a question of time when it would come to pass. In German 
eyes South Africa had become indispensable to Germany, 
it was already considered as a national asset, and in innumer- 
able lectures, books, and articles its resources and possi- 
bilities were discussed. 

While dispatches regarding the suzerainty of the Trans- 
vaal were being exchanged between Great Britain and that 
country, the leading organs of the German press continued 
preaching the expulsion of the British from South Africa, 
an action calculated to strengthen the resistance of the 
Boers, and to make them look to Germany for protection. 
For instance, on the 16th of Jime 1898, when war between 
the Transvaal and Great Britain seemed unavoidable. Die 
Grenzboten wrote : 

" The existence of the Boer States makes it, perhaps, 
possible to regain the lost colony, including Delagoa Bay. 
Here in the north of Cape Colony a weU-considered German 
policy ,must be pursued, and the Emperor's telegram to 
Kruger has already demonstrated our firm wiU to return the 
Gladstonian ' hands ofE ' to the EngUsh. The possession of 
the natural harbour of Delagoa Bay is a vital condition for 
the Low Grerman States in South Africa. Without Low 
Germanism in South Africa our colonies are worth nothing 
as settlements. Our future is founded upon the victory of 
Low Germanism, and upon the expulsion of the English 
from South Africa, where, even in Cape Colony, they are 
still in the minority. The prosperity of our South African 
colonies, which singly are worth as little as Cameroon and 
Togo, depends upon the possibility of connecting those two 



102 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

colonies, whereby England will be confined to the south, 
and the dream of a great British colonial empire from the 
Cape to Cairo will vanish." 

If we look at the South African question from the Ger- 
man point of view, and remember how German diplomacy 
had plotted and laboured for the acquisition of South Africa 
for fifteen years and more, how the telegram and the speeches 
of William II. and the attitude and propaganda of the 
German press had created the universal belief in Germany 
that Great Britain could not move in South Africa without 
Germany's consent, and that Germany's influence there 
was paramount, we can understand with what dismay and 
exasperation the outbreak of the South African War and 
the prospect of seeing the Boer States absorbed by Great 
Britain was greeted by the German people. 

The disappointment felt in German official circles was 
no less keen, and, not unnaturally, the question suggested 
itself whether Great Britain's progress in South Africa 
could not be stopped by force. Remembering her failure 
to form a coalition against Great Britain in 1895, and 
against the United States in 1898, Germany found herself 
isolated and unable to save South Africa for herself. The 
large naval programme of 1898, providing for seventeen 
battleships, etc., coincided with the Spanish- American War. 
Similarly, the outbreak of the South African War coincided 
with the German Navy Bill of 1900, providing for a further 
huge increase. Smarting under the sense of her impotence 
against Great Britain, the Navy Bill of 1900 was brought 
forward, which was to provide a fleet of such strength that, 
according to the preamble of the Bill, " a war against the 
mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the 
supremacy of that Power." That fleet was to cost about 
£100,000,000. In spite of that staggering amount, the 
Navy Bill was rapidly passed, for its object to destroy 
the power of Great Britain was greeted with delight by the 
nation, and with hysterical jubilation by the masses. At 
last Great Britain was to be brought to her knees. 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 103 

The powerful Social Democratic Party did not prove an 
effective obstacle to the execution of Germany's colonial 
ambitions. Although the representatives of Labour ob- 
jected to the Navy Bill, they objected neither to the pro- 
spective humiHation of Great Britain nor to the acquisition 
of foreign markets by conquest. The following lines from 
the Sozialisiische Monatshefte for December 1899 faithfully 
depicted the opinion of the German Labour Party : 

" That Germany be armed to the teeth, possessing a 
strong fleet, is of the utmost importance to the working men. 
What damages our exports damages them also, and working 
men have the most pressing interest in securing prosperity 
for our export trade, be it even by force of arms. Owing to 
her development, Germany may perhaps be obliged to main- 
tain her position sword in hand. Only he who is under the 
protection of his guns can dominate the markets, and in 
the fight for markets German working men may come 
before the alternative either of perishing or of forcing their 
entrance into markets sword in hand." 

From this and many similar manifestations it is clear 
that no effective opposition against Germany's colonial 
ambitions came from the ranks of the Social Democratic 
Party. 

Germany's military and naval leaders thought that Ger- 
many's chances in case of a war with England were not 
unfavourable. A fair indication of the spirit and the 
intentions existing among the highest German officers may 
be found in a remarkable article contributed to the Deutsche 
Rundschau of March 1900, by General C. von der Goltz, an 
article which was aU the more remarkable as General von 
der Goltz was on active service. It should be added that 
von der Goltz was the reorganiser of the Turkish Army, 
and one of the most talented of German officers. He said : 

". . . We must contradict the opinion, which has so 
frequently been expressed, that a war between Germany and 
Great Britain is impossible. Great Britain is forced to dis- 
tribute her fleets over many seas in peace as weU as in war, 
and her home squadron is surprisingly weak in comparison 
8 



104 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 

with her fleets in the Mediterranean and in India, the Far 
East, Australia, the Red Sea, South Africa, the West Indies, 
and the Pacific. Li that necessary distribution of her 
strength lies Great Britain's weakness. Germany is in a 
better position. Her navy is small, but it can be kept 
together in Europe. Our colonies want no protection, for 
a victory in Europe would give us our colonies back at 
the conclusion of peace. With Great Britain matters are 
different. If India, Australia, or Canada should be lost in 
a war, they would remain lost for ever. . . . 

"... For the moment our fleet has only one-fifth the 
fighting value of the British Fleet, and Great Britain's 
superiority over us is striking, but when the projected in- 
crease of our fleet has been effected, the outlook for us will 
be bright. The British home squadron, with which we 
should have to deal, amounts to 43 battleships and 35 large 
cruisers. Even if that fleet should be increased in the 
future, it would no longer be an irresistible opponent to us. 
Numbers decide as little on the sea as they do on land ; 
numerical inferiority can be compensated for by greater 
efficiency. . . . 

" As places are not wanting where England's defences are 
weak, it would be a mistake to consider a landing in Eng- 
land as a chimera. The distance is short enough if an 
admiral of daring succeeds in securing supremacy on the 
sea for a short time. . . . 

" The material basis of our power is large enough to make 
it possible for us to destroy the present superiority of 
Great Britain, but Germany must prepare beforehand for 
what is to come, and must arm in time. Germany has 
arrived at one of the most critical moments in her history, 
and her fleet is too weak to fulfil the task for which it is 
intended. We must arm ourselves in time, with aU our 
might, and prepare ourselves for what is to come, without 
losing a day, for it is not possible to improvise victories on 
the sea, where the excellence of the material and the greatest 
skill in handling it are of supreme importance." 

When we consider the spirit of irreconcilable hostility 
against Anglo-Saxondom that pervaded the countless ex- 
pansionist manifestations in Germany, emanating from 
official and semi-official quarters, from professorial and 
mercantile circles, from the clergy and the proletariat, we 



GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 105 

cannot help being struck by the unanimity of hatred and 
by the unflinching determination of Grermany to erect a 
German world empire upon the ruins of Anglo-Saxondom, 
Nowhere was the celebrated word of Sir Walter Raleigh, 
" Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade ; who- 
soever commands the trade commands the riches of the 
world, and consequently the world itself," more frequently 
quoted and more thoroughly appreciated than in Germany. 
Germany had become great by the sword. She wished 
to walk in the steps of her greatest rulers, Frederick II, 
and Bismarck, but she disdained the advice of those most 
successful expansionists. Frederick the Great's counsel, 
" Secrecy is the soul of foreign politics," was as little 
heeded by her recent rulers as Bismarck's recommendation 
" not to meddle in the afifairs of foreign States unless one 
has also the power to accomplish one's intentions." By 
the foUy of her leaders Germany's plans were prematurely 
and immistakably revealed to the world, and if the Anglo- 
Saxon nations had been so blind as not to take the mea- 
sures necessary to frustrate those plans, of which they had 
received such ample and such long-dated warning, they 
would have fully deserved the fate of Spain and Holland. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION — 
GERMAN EVIDENCE ON THE SUBJECT * 

Anglo-German relations, which used to be satisfactory 
and cordial, had during the years preceding the War be- 
come more and more strained and embittered. During the 
Morocco crisis of 1911 the tension had increased to the 
breaking-point. The two countries prepared for war and 
their fleets for instant action. British and German sailors 
waited impatiently for the signal. Had a British and a 
German warship unexpectedly encountered one another, 
mutual distrust might have led to the charging and training 
of guns ; and if, through the loss of nerve on the part of 
an officer, through the misunderstanding of an order, or 
through an accident, a gun had gone ofif — and at such a 
moment of supreme tension guns are apt to go off in an 
imaccountable manner — a war to the death between Eng- 
land and Germany might have ensued. Hence Germans 
and Englishmen asked themselves : Why have Anglo- 
German relations become so strained and embittered ? Is 
Sir Edward — now Viscount — Grey to blame ? Can Anglo- 
German relations be improved ? What can be done to 
improve them ? 

Let us first of all consider the pre-war situation from the 
German point of view, relying exclusively upon German 
evidence. 

Before the War the world was told officially and semi- 
officially by Grerman statesmen, writers, and lecturers that 
Germany was a peaceful nation, which ever since the Franco- 
German War of 1870-1871 had kept the peace, that she 

^ From the Fortnightly Review, March 1912. 
106 



ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 107 

could not in any way be blamed for the Anglo-German ten- 
sion, that all was England's fault. Countless German Govern- 
ment officials, professors, and journalists asserted that Great 
Britain envied Germany for her economic success, and that 
she worked unceasuigly, both openly and secretly, for Ger- 
many's downfall, in order to rid herself of an inconvenient 
competitor. They asserted that Great Britain pursued to- 
wards Grermany that traditional policy of envy and plunder 
which caused her to attack and despoil one by one all the 
great industrial, commercial, and colonial nations of the 
past. In hundreds of books and newspapers and from 
thousands of platforms the Germans were informed that 
the leading principle of British statesmanship was the pro- 
motion of British trade by the destruction of Great Britain's 
commercial rivals, that Great Britain grudged Germany 
her " place in the sun," that she envied Germany her com- 
merce and her shipping, that British diplomats had cribbed 
and confined Germany with a network of hostile alliances, 
and that they perfidiously hampered and opposed Ger- 
many's progress in all parts of the world. 

The German description of British policy was a calumny 
and a fantastic distortion of history. Every one who is 
acquainted with British history is aware that during the 
last two centuries the principal aim of British policy has not 
been the pursuit of commercial aggrandisement and colonial 
expansion, but the maintenance of the balance of power 
on the Continent of Europe. Great Britaia fought all her 
greatest wars not for trade and colonies — for " plunder," 
as the Germans say — but for the preservation of the balance 
of power in Europe. For that great principle she fought 
the Spaniards under Philip II., the French under Louis XIV., 
Louis XV., Napoleon I., and the Russians in the Crimea ; 
and the eventual conquest of the Spanish and French 
colonies was, as Professor Seeley has shown, merely the 
accidental consequence, but not the cause, of her great wars 
against Spain and France. The great majority of Eng- 
land's wars were not wars of aggression, but wars of defence. 

The maintenance of the balance of power on the Con- 



108 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 

tinent of Europe was and is one of the greatest of British 
interests. It is clear that only a nation which has de- 
stroyed the balance of power on the Continent, and which 
has become supreme on the Continent, can hope success- 
fully to attack Great Britain. It is equally clear that no 
nation can maintain the mastery of the Continent of Europe 
as long as a strong and independent England exists on its 
flank. Hence a nation which strives for supremacy in 
Europe feels impelled to attack Great Britain earlier or 
later. History confirms this. AU the rulers, from Julius 
Caesar to Napoleon I. and to WiUiam II., who have striven 
to become supreme in Europe have made war upon Great 
Britain. National security is more important than a pro- 
fitable commerce and extensive colonies. A little considera- 
tion shows that Great Britain's island position is secure 
only as long as the balance of power on the Continent is 
maintained intact ; and the more evenly the balance of 
power on the Continent is adjusted, the greater is Great 
Britain's security from continental attack. Consequently 
the greatest and the most important task of British states- 
manship has been in the past not the promotion of trade 
and the acquisition of colonies, but the maintenance of the 
balance of power in Europe. Great Britain has been 
actuated in her foreign policy not by greed, but by the 
instinct of self-preservation. 

In the course of the last few decades British statesman- 
ship has been given another task, which has become even 
more important than the maintenance of the balance of 
power on the Continent of Europe. A century ago, when 
Great Britain fought Napoleon I., the British islands were 
practically self-supporting. In the 'fifties of last century 
Great Britain raised at home nine-tenths of the bread and 
meat which her people required. Before the War of 1914- 
1918 nine-tenths of the bread-corn and one-half of the 
meat which the British people required came from abroad. 
Philip II,, Louis XIV., Louis XV., Napoleon I. could hope 
to subdue England by the slow process of invasion and 
conquest ; now Great Britain can more easily and more 



ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 109 

rapidly be subdued by starvation. Occasionally the supply 
of wheat stored in Great Britain sufficed for less than a 
month. Even a short interruption of the grain imports 
would bring about a famine. No nation in the world pos- 
sesses a more precarious food supply than Great Britain, 
and none is more vitally dependent upon the free and un- 
hampered entrance of food-ships into her ports. As Great 
Britain has only sea frontiers, England can protect herself 
against the danger of being starved into surrender only 
if her fleet is strong enough to defend the freedom of the 
sea against any Power and against any possible combina- 
tion of Powers. Hence the possession of an unchallengeable 
supremacy of her navy is now more important to Great 
Britain than it has been at any time of her history, and 
the maintenance of British naval supremacy has become 
perhaps even more important a principle of British states- 
manship than the maintenance of the balance of power in 
Europe. The Germans themselves were aware that he who 
threatens Great Britain's naval supremacy threatens not 
only her trade and her colonies but her very life. In 1909 
a little book for the use in schools, entitled Die Flotte als 
notwendige Ergdnzung unserer natiormlen Wehrmacht, written 
by Adolf Schroeder, was published in Germany. In it we 
read : 

" Were it possible to cut off Great Britain's supply of 
food, in less than six weeks would the inhabitants die of 
starvation. Britons are fuUy aware of the danger, and all, 
from the noble lord to the labourer, are convinced that it is 
the most important duty of the State to keep open and secure 
the broad highway of the ocean on which British merchant- 
men import food and raw material and export British manu- 
factures. However, the security of the import and export 
trade in the case of a country which is entirely surrounded 
by the sea can be guaranteed only by a navy which is 
stronger than that of any other State. But the Briton 
requires more. He demands a fleet which, both ship for ship 
and by their combined number, should be superior to the com- 
bined fleets of the two most powerful nations which conceivably 
might make war upon his country. That conviction is 



110 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 

deeply rooted in the minds of all Britons, and all parties 
agree in this principle which is a question of the natioTial 

existence" 

The italics are in the original. The Conservative Kreuz 
Zeitung wrote on the 28th of January 1911 : 

" England must protect her enormous and indispensable 
imports of food against every disturbance, especially in case 
of war. Therefore the English Government is compelled 
to maintain a Navy strong enough to open all trade routes 
and, if possible, to blockade all hostile squadrons in their 
ports, ia order to protect the British Isles against the danger 
of starvation and of a panic affecting the prices of food- 
stufiEs." 

Captain Hartwig Schubert wrote in his pamphlet, Die 
Deutsche Schlachtflotte eine Gefahr fur Deutschland's Macht- 
stellung, published in 1911 : 

" Great Britain imports approximately five times as much 
bread-corn and flour as Germany. Whilst England can 
receive food only by sea, Germany can obtain it by land 
across the frontiers of Denmark, Russia, Austria, Switzer- 
land, France, Luxemburg, and HoUand. It follows that 
Grermany requires no navy for the protection of her food 
supply, whilst Great Britain can secure a sufficiency of 
foodstuffs only as long as she possesses a fleet which is 
strong enough to face any hostile combination of Powers." 

No British statesman could have given clearer and fairer 
statements proving Great Britain's need of the possession 
of a paramount navy than the three given in the foregoing. 
JMost thinking Germans agreed that Great Britain requires 
a fleet of unchallengeable power for the protection of her 
food supply. Therefore it must also have been clear to 
aU Germans that a nation which challenges British naval 
supremacy threatens Great Britain's very existence. Cap- 
tain Schubert (late of the German Army) wrote : 

" In the Franco-German War France had a superior fleet. 
Germany's victories on land compelled the French to land 
their sailors and to employ them for the defence of their 



ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 111 

country on land. In a future war with France and Russia 
we must strive to bring about the same result. A German, 
naval victory in a war against France and Russia would be 
unnecessary to us in case we are victorious on land. It 
would be worthless to us should we be defeated on land, 
because our land armies would be weakened by the men 
on board our ships. Besides, if defeated on land, we could 
not follow up a naval victory by the landing of armies in 
the enemy's country, for we should then have no land 
troops to spare. It is therefore clear that the Grerman 
Navy is built only for use against England." 

Captain Schubert's arguments were faultless and un- 
answerable. His statement that the German Navy was 
built only for use against England cannot be disproved. 

In an interview which Professor Hans Delbriick, one of 
the leading German professors, gave in December 1911 to 
the Daily Mail, he spoke of " Britain's long-standing and 
traditional political hostility to Germany." Germans are 
fond of asserting that Great Britain has " always " been 
hostile to Germany. This is one of their greatest grievances. 
However, that complaint also can be disproved out of 
German mouths. Herr Eduard Bernstein, one of the lead- 
ing SociaUst writers and a man of widely-recognised emi- 
nence, fairness, and honesty of purpose, published at the 
end of 1911 a pamphlet entitled Die Englische Gefahr und 
das Deutsche Volk, in which we read : 

" All that has been written as to England's hostility to- 
wards Germany before the foundation of the German Empire 
in 1870 is merely idle and mischievous talk and invention. 
England and Prussia and England and Austria were some- 
times friends and sometimes opposed to each other, but in 
their relations there was no fixed tendency and there could 
be none, because no important clashing interests existed 
between the British Empire and the two great German 
States. Even during the first years of the Grerman Empire 
there was no friction worth mentioning between Great 
Britain and Germany. 

li^/' During the struggle for Protection (in 1879 and after- 
wards) German Free Traders were piUoried as ' English 



112 ANGLO -GERMAN FRICTION 

agents.' The Protectionist literature of the period abounds 
with attacks upon England. ... In consequence of the 
Protectionist movement the instinct of self-preservation 
impelled England to secure markets for the future, and 
when in 1883 Germany began acquiring colonies she met 
with British resistance. However, one must recognise that 
that resistance was not the result of British illwill towards 
the Grerman nation, for that resistance was caused, or 
at least greatly increased, by Germany's introducing in 
economic matters the policy of the closed door. It is only 
fair to say that in many cases British resistance did not 
emanate from the British Government itself, but from the 
British colonies or from individual British colonists whose 
claims for protection the Government in London was 
bound at least formally to support. In several cases Ger- 
many recognised the existence of old and valid British 
claims. . . . When in 1888 the Emperor Frederick III. 
came to the throne the nationalist German press began 
a violent anti-British campaign, attacking the Empress 
Victoria, ' the Englishwoman.' 

" On the 7th of February 1896 (shortly after the Jameson 
Raid) the Foreign Secretary, Freiherr von MarschaU, de- 
clared in the Reichstag that the continued independence 
of the Boer Republics was a German interest. Now the 
publication of the correspondence of several of the Boer 
leaders has shown that the leading Boers aimed not only 
at the shaking off of England's paramountcy over the Boer 
States, but that they intended to drive England out of 
South Africa, and that they relied in this policy upon 
Grermany's support. Meanwhile Germany had begun to 
increase her fleet in feverish haste. In 1898 a Navy Bill 
was passed providing for nineteen battleships, eight armour- 
clads for coast defence, and forty-two cruisers at a cost of 
£20,000,000, and William II. declared in Hamburg : ' We 
are in bitter need of a strong German fleet.' Two years 
later, in 1900, came another Navy Bill which doubled the 
battle fleet provided by the BiU of 1898, and which increased 
the sum required for shipbuilding to £40,000,000. Can 
one wonder that the English were startled by our action ? 
Whilst Secretary of State Admiral Hollmann had declared 
in the Reichstag, ' The German coasts require no protection, 
they protect themselves,' the Emperor had loudly pro- 
claimed, ' The trident must be in our fist.' " 



•ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 113 

By the Navy Bill of 1898, the provisions of which were 
doubled by the Navy Bill of 1900, the building programme 
of the German Navy was firmly laid down up to the year 
1917. However, the year 1905 brought a second, the year 
1908 a third, and the year 1912 a fourth enlargement, and 
the moneys voted in respect of these five Navy BiUs greatly 
exceeded in the aggregate the sum of £250,000,000. The 
introduction to the Navy Bill of 1900 stated : " Grermany 
requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest 
naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy 
of that Power." Germany dehberately set to work to chal- 
lenge Great Britain's naval supremacy, and she proclaimed 
in 1900 that intention officially from the housetops. The 
original Navy Bills of 1898 and 1900, and their amendments 
of 1905, 1908, and 1912, were carried after a passionate 
anti-British campaign which was undoubtedly engineered 
by the Government. It has been shown in the foregoing 
that the possession of an u^jchaUengeable naval supremacy 
is a matter of life or death for Great Britain, and that most 
Germans who have given the matter a moment's thought 
agreed that Great Britain must have a navy which is 
stronger than that of any other Power, or of any probable 
combination of Powers. Consequently it is clear that by 
the naval policy which Germany had inaugurated in 1900 
she deliberately challenged not only Great Britain's posi- 
tion in the world, but her very existence as an independent 
nation. 

Most Germans who complained about British " in- 
trigues " asserted that King Edward VII. was Germany's 
greatest enemy, and that he was responsible for hedging 
Germany about with a network of alliances and under- 
standings. Yet a well-known and eminent German writer 
on foreign politics, the Councillor of Legation, Herr von 
Rath, wrote on the 3rd of November 1911 in Der Tag : 

" To-day it cannot be denied that England strove in the 
first instance for a political rapprochement with Germany, 
and that King Edward VII. pursued this plan as soon as he 



114 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 

had come to the throne. The strongest sea Power gravitated 
towards the strongest land Power, and nobody can deny 
nowadays that Germany rejected at that time the repeated 
advances of British Conservative statesmen, such as Mr. 
Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne, and the Duke of Devonshire." 

As a matter of fact. Great Britain's attempts to be on 
the best and the most intimate terms with Germany began 
long before King Edward VII. had come to the throne. 
Formerly Great Britain had followed the policy of " splen- 
did isolation." In the 'eighties of last century, when Bis- 
marck's policy of alliances divided Europe into two camps, 
British statesmen began to recognise the desirability of 
entering upon more intimate relations with one of the 
two groups of nations. EngUshmen and Germans are far 
more closely akin by race, national character, and religion 
than are Enghshmen and Frenchmen or Englishmen and 
Russians. Most Englishmen instinctively desired to march 
side by side with their German cousins. Besides, at that 
time there was constant friction in the colonial sphere 
between France and Great Britain and between Russia 
and Great Britain. Desiring to enter upon more intimate 
relations with Germany, British diplomacy began to settle 
aU outstanding differences between the two countries, so 
as to abolish all causes of friction and of dispute. With 
this object in view it concluded the Anglo-German Agree- 
ment of 1890, which defined the British and the German 
spheres of influence in East, West, and South- West Africa. 
This Agreement was followed by the Anglo- Congolese 
Agreement of 1894, and later by an Anglo-German under- 
standing regarding the Portuguese colonies in the event of 
their coming into the market. When in 1897 Germany 
occupied Kiao-chow, Great Britain supported her, and re- 
nounced aU intentions of connecting Wei-hai-wei by railway 
with the Shantung hinterland, thus giving to Germany the 
monopoly in the exploitation of that important and wealthy 
province. In 1899 Great Britain concluded with Germany 
the Samoa Agreement, according to which Great Britain 
retired altogether from Samoa, while Germany received 



ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 115 

the two most important islands of that group. In 1900 
Great Britain concluded with Germany an agreement defin- 
ing Anglo-German interests in China, the so-called Yangtse 
Agreement. The mere enumeration of these various agree- 
ments shows that during the decade 1890-1900 British 
diplomacy consistently strove to abohsh all differences 
with Germany in all parts of the world, with the object 
of bringing about an Anglo-German rapprochement. Un- 
fortunately all attempts of British diplomacy to win Ger- 
many's goodwill and all the advances made by British 
statesmen were rejected by Germany with scorn. Great 
Britain, her statesmen, and even her rulers, were treated 
by practically the whole semi-official press of Germany 
with contempt, insults, and ridicule, and justified complaints 
arose in responsible quarters that German statesmen were 
taking unfair advantage of Great Britain by the employ- 
ment of the most questionable diplomatic methods. 

When British statesmen discovered that they had wasted 
ten years in fruitless attempts at reconciling Germany, and 
that Germany had treated every British advance as a sign 
of cowardice on the part of a hateful enemy, and especially 
when they saw that, almost within sight of the British 
coast, an enormous fleet was being constructed, which, it 
was officially proclaimed, was intended to challenge the 
supremacy of " the mightiest naval Power," they recog- 
nised that it was vain to hope any longer for Germany's 
poHtical friendship, and they turned elsewhere. The 
Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes were brought 
about not by King Edward, but by Germany herself, by 
her anti-British policy. Germany herself forced Great 
Britain to enter into arrangements with Germany's oppo- 
nents. If, before 1914, Germany was hedged around by a 
net- work of ententes and alliances, she should accuse not 
the late King Edward, but only her own leaders. 

Many years ago WiUiam II. proclaimed, " Germany's 
future lies upon the sea." During more than twenty years 
Germany had striven to acquire colonies for her surplus 
population. The expansion of States is a natural move- 



116 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 

ment. Continental States, such as Germany, can expand 
on the land. Insular ones are compelled by nature to 
expand Oversea . Oversea colonies are a necessity to an 
over-populated State such as Great Britain, but they are 
not so much a necessity to Germany. During a consider- 
able number of years immigration into Germany has been 
far greater than emigration from Germany. At the census 
of 1907 it was found that no less than 1,342,292 foreigners 
were living in Germany, German agriculturists, mine- 
owners, and manufacturers complained constantly about a 
shortage of labour. Germany did not suffer from over- 
population. A nation can in safety embark upon a great 
transmaritime policy only if the motherland is secure, if it 
occupies an island like Great Britain or Japan, or if it 
possesses practically an insular position such as the United 
States. 

The greater part of the German colonies was acquired 
by Bismarck. However, although in Bismarck's time 
Germany's position in Europe was exceedingly strong, Bis- 
marck's principal care was to ensure Germany's security 
on the Continent of Europe, and he attached the greatest 
value to Great Britain's goodwill and support in view of 
the possibility of continental complications. Considering 
Germany's continental interests infinitely more important 
than her transoceanic ones, he absolutely refused to pursue 
a transmaritime and colonial policy in opposition to Eng- 
land, fearing that an anti-British pohcy would drive 
England into the arms of France and Russia. Even when 
diplomatic differences had arisen between the two coimtries, 
Bismarck wished to remain on cordial terms with Great 
Britain. On the 2nd of March 1884, for instance, he stated 
in the Reichstag with reference to an Anglo-German dispute : 

" I shall do everything in my power in order sine ira et 
studio, and in the most conciliatory manner, to settle this 
matter in accordance with that quiet and friendly inter- 
course which has at all times existed between England and 
Germany, a quiet and friendly intercourse which is most 
natural because neither Power possesses vital interests 



ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 117 

which conflict with the vital interests of the other Power. 
I can see only an error in the opinion that England envies 
us our modest attempts at colonising." 

He laid down at greater length his guiding principles in 
his intercourse with Great Britain on the 10th of January 
1885, when he stated in the Reichstag : 

" The last speaker has told us that we must either aban- 
don our colonial policy or increase our naval strength to 
such an extent that we need not fear any naval Power, or, 
to speak more clearly, that our navy should rival that of 
England herself. However, even if we should succeed in 
building up a navy as strong as that of England, we should 
stiU have to fear an aUiance of England and France. Those 
Powers are stronger than any single Power in Europe is 
or ever can be. It follows that the policy indicated by the 
last speaker is one which can never be striven after. 

" I would also ask the last speaker not to make any 
attempts either to disturb the peace between England and 
Germany or to diminish the confidence that peace between 
these two Powers will be maintained by hinting that some 
day we may find ourselves in an armed conflict with Eng- 
land. I absolutely deny that possibility. Such a possi- 
bility does not exist, and all the questions which are at 
present being discussed between England and Grermany 
are not of sufficient importance to justify a breach of the 
peace on either side of the North Sea. Besides, I really 
do not know what disputes might arise between England 
and Germany. There never have been disputes between the 
two countries. From my diplomatic experience I cannot 
see any reasons which can make hostilities possible between 
them unless a Cabinet of inconceivable character should be 
in power in England, a Cabinet which neither exists nor 
which is ever likely to exist, and which criminally attacks 
us." 

Four years later, on the 26th of January 1889, only a 
short time before his dismissal, he stated with reference to 
the Anglo-German Zanzibar dispute in the Reichstag : 

" I absolutely refuse to act towards the Sultan of Zanzibar 
in opposition to England. As soon as we have arrived at 
an understanding with England, we shaU take the necessary 



118 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 

measures in Zanzibar in agreement with England. I do 
not intend either actively to oppose England or even to 
take note of those steps which subordinate British indi- 
viduals have taken against us. In Zanzibar and in Samoa 
we act in perfect harmony with the British Government. 
We are marching hand m hand, and I am firmly resolved 
that our relations shall preserve their present character. 
English colonial interests compete with ours in numerous 
places, and subordinate colonial officials are occasionally 
hostile to German interests. Nevertheless we are acting in 
perfect unison with the British GtDvernment, we are abso- 
lutely united, and I am firmly resolved to preserve Anglo- 
German harmony and to continue working in co-operation 
with that country. 

" The preservation of Anglo- German goodwill is, after 
all, the most important thing. I see in England an old and 
traditional ally. No differences exist between England and 
Germany. If I speak of England as our aUy, I am not using 
a diplomatic term. We have no alliance with England. 
However, I wish to remain in close contact with England 
also in colonial questions. The two nations have marched 
side by side during at least 150 years, and if I should dis- 
cover that we might lose touch with England, I should 
act cautiously and endeavour to avoid losing England's 
goodwill." 

Modern Germany erected to Bismarck countless statues. 
Bismarck's speeches, Bismarck's letters, and Bismarck's 
memoirs were printed in hundreds of thousands of copies, 
and they stand on the bookshelves of the people by the 
side of SchiUer and Goethe. But modern Germany had 
forgotten, or she dehberately disregarded, Bismarck's 
policy and Bismarck's warnings. Through the shortsighted- 
ness of Bismarck's successors the bonds of the Triple 
Alliance were so much loosened that Germans themselves 
raised periodically the cry that they were isolated in a 
hostile world. Yet modern Germany needlessly increased 
the dangers which threatened her on the Continent stiU 
further by throwing Bismarck's warnings to the winds 
and antagonising Great Britain, who might have proved 
Germany's best and most valuable friend in her hour of need. 



ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION il9 

The reason that for years before the War Great Britain 
was no longer Germany's " old and traditional ally," as 
Bismarck called her, must be sought not in Great Britain's 
envy, but in the culpable mistakes of Germany's diplomacy. 
On the 8th of November 1911 the Frankfurter Zeitung 
published in the most prominent place an article from its 
London correspondent in which the causes of the Anglo- 
German differences in connection with the Morocco ques- 
tion were unsparingly exposed in the following words : 



" On the 15th of May the German Emperor came to 
England in order to attend the unveiUng of the national 
memorial to the late Queen. He was received by the 
people of London with the greatest cordiality. Five weeks 
later the German Crown Prince arrived in London to attend 
the Coronation, and he was greeted with the same universal 
goodwill. A week after King George's Coronation came the 
bomb of Agadir. Of course one may say : the fact that 
the Emperor was cordially received by the English people 
has nothing to do with diplomatic relations. Germany 
cannot regulate her political action by the visits of her 
Sovereign. Such arguments show a complete lack of 
understanding of the spirit of Western democracy. A 
foreign monarch comes to England. He drives during a 
week through London. He constantly takes off his grey 
top-hat to cheering crowds, and the man in the street says 
smilingly, ' JoUy fellow, isn't he ? ' Now the man in the 
street makes public opinion, and, after all, Mr. Lloyd 
George himself is a man in the street who has become a 
minister. 

" When the German Emperor arrived in London, the im- 
pression became general in England that Germany would 
remain quiet. If, at that time, the German Morocco poHcy 
was already mapped out, then the Imperial visits to England 
were a mistake. They brought us with the English people 
the regrettable reputation of perfidiousness (Untreue). Now 
the reproach of perfidiousness has adhered to German policy 
for some time. That is known to everybody who is in 
contact with international diplomacy. It is the irony of 
fate that the German diplomatic apparatus, which is exclu- 
sively served by men belonging to the best families of the 
9 



120 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 

aristocracy, does not at all enjoy the credit which is owed 
to gentlemen." 

Editorially the Frankfurter Zeitung wrote on the 29th of 
December 1911 : 

" The German Navy alone cannot have been the cause 
of the acute differences which exist between Great Britain 
and Germany. If we Germans strive for once to place 
ourselves without prejudice in the position of the British, 
we must confess that the distrust of Germany which pre- 
vails on the other side of the Channel is not without cause. 
If we Germans had had to hear certain utterances from the 
mouth of a foreign sovereign, we also would have been 
startled and would have thought it necessary to strengthen 
our defences. Now we can only say to the British that the 
monarchical utterances in question need not be taken too 
tragically, because we have learned by experience that 
big words are not followed by big deeds. We know now 
that the KJruger telegram, the Imperial call to arms against 
the Yellow Peril, the Emperor's speech at Damascus, his 
journey to Tangier and the dispatch of the Panther, were 
only dramatic gestures devoid of consequences. However, 
they have had the unfortunate effect of evoking hostility 
on the one side and high hopes on the other, which soon 
were converted into bitter disappointment, and people 
received the impression that German poUcy was either dan- 
gerous or unreliable. Of late things have improved because 
injudicious utterances from the highest quarter are no 
longer reported. Still the distrust of Germany remains, 
and we cannot be surprised at it. We tell the EngUsh un- 
ceasingly that the German nation is peaceful, and that it 
desires to live in harmony with England and all other 
nations. However, these assurances make no impression, 
for we are told : We are quite sure that the German people 
is peaceful, but the German people does not make German 
policy. German policy is made in a single, irresponsible, 
and incalculable quarter. Therefore the peaceful assur- 
ances of the German people have for us not a practical 
but merely a Platonic value. What can we reply to that 
argument ? " 

In Bismarck's time German diplomacy enjoyed a twofold 
distinction : it pursued a wise, sane, and far-seeing pohcy. 



ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 121 

and the diplomatic apparatus was faultlessly served by 
men of high ability. In the time of William II. German 
diplomacy failed in both respects, and the German people 
began to complain bitterly about the men in their diplo- 
matic service. Towards the end of December 1911 Mr. 
L. Raschdau, a former German ambassador, pubhshed in 
several German papers an article on German diplomacy, in 
which he stated that the German ambassadorial service 
had become defective because the diplomatic career had 
been reserved to members of the German aristocracy. 
On this point the Frankfurter Zeitung wrote editorially on 
the 29th of December 1911 : 

" The Emperor's advisers and assistants are not selected 
according to their talent and experience, but according to 
circumstances imconnected with their career and duties. 
One man is made an ambassador because he is an aristocrat 
and a man of wealth, another one because he has pleasing 
social talents, and the third is simply ' commanded ' to take 
up the post of Imperial Chancellor. The result of such a 
system, if one can call it a system, is naturally incapacity, 
amateurishness, and lack of success." 

In the foregoing pages it has been shown exclusively 
by means of reliable German evidence that Germany was 
responsible for the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-German 
relations previous to 1914, that Anglo-German relations 
had become what they were because, as the German wit- 
nesses quoted admitted, Germany had deliberately pursued 
an anti-British policy during a considerable number of 
years. It has furthermore been shown that Germany's 
colonial and transmaritime pohcy, with its strong anti- 
British bias, was disapproved of by Prince Bismarck, and 
that many thinking Germans were profoundly dissatisfied 
not only with the direction of Germany's foreign policy, 
but also with the men who occupied high positions in the 
German diplomatic service. 

Now we must ask ourselves : Why did Germany pursue 
towards Great Britain a policy which compromised her 
position in the world, which caused great disappointments 



122 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 

to her, and which in the end led to a national disaster ? 
The answer is simple. Before the Boer War, when Ger- 
many embarked upon her transoceanic and anti-British 
policy, Great Britain's power was much under-estimated 
in Germany. During many decades German university 
professors, schoolmasters, and publicists had taught the 
doctrine that Englishmen were too selfish and too cowardly 
to defend their country, that England, like Carthage, was 
bound to fall through lack of patriotism among the people 
and their reliance upon hired soldiers. They had taught 
that the principal characteristics of the people in the British 
colonies also was selfishness, that they lacked patriotism, 
that they would cling to the motherland only as long as 
the connection was profitable to them, that the dissolution 
of the British Empire was inevitable, that Canada and the 
other great British dominions would earlier or later follow 
the example of the United States and secede. Roscher, 
Treitschke, Schmoller, and many other eminent German 
writers propounded these views. Thus Germany's colonial 
and anti-British policy was based upon a false estimate of 
the character and the latent strength of Great Britain and 
her daughter States, and that false estimate was not revised 
when the colonies supported Great Britain in the Boer 
War in splendid loyalty with troops and money, when 
Canada initiated the system of inter imperial preferences 
and bore cheerfully Germany's fiscal hostility, when a 
number of imperial conferences and imperial defensive 
arrangements created the nucleus of an imperial army and 
navy and of an imperial organisation, when Australia and 
New Zealand introduced universal military service, and 
when Australia, New Zealand, and Canada began to build 
powerful squadrons of their own and voluntarily took a 
share in the Empire's burden of defence. 

In their endeavour to challenge British naval supremacy 
the Germans were encouraged by a singular misconception. 
They had been told by numerous writers on naval and 
political subjects that, while the British yards could pro- 
vide any number of warships, the British nation could not 



ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 123 

furnish enough sailors for manning them. On the 28th of 
October 1908 the Daily Telegraph had published an inter- 
view with the German Emperor in which he had declared 
that, in opposition to the majority of the German nation, 
he was a sincere friend of England. The Emperor's 
Anglophil utterances aroused the fury of the German 
Nationalist press, and, referring to that interview, the 
Allgemeine Evangelisclie Lutherische Kirchenzeitung , a lead- 
ing Protestant Church paper, wrote in November of the 
same year : 

" The Emperor labours strenuously with the object of 
gaining the goodwill of the British nation. That is not very 
inspiring for us, but that policy is necessary as long as we 
have to avoid a war with England, for which we are as yet 
not strong enough. Only since a short time has the German 
nation learned to understand the necessity of having a 
powerful fleet. And we must continue building ships in 
competition with England till the moment arrives when 
England may still possess many more ships than we Ger- 
mans have, but when the English can no longer find the 
men for navigating and fighting their fleet. Until that 
moment has arisen, it is madness to urge for war, and mean- 
while the Emperor tries to make up for the indiscretions of 
the German press by his advances to England." 

The Kirchenzeitung summed up in a few lines the policy 
which Germany had pursued towards Great Britain during 
more than a decade. Even in the best-informed circles of 
Germany the opinion was widely held that Great Britain 
could not find as many sailors as she required, probably 
because the British merchant marine was always short of 
British sailors and employed many thousands of Scan- 
dinavians, Lascars, etc. Only a short time before the War 
one of the most eminent and best-informed German pro- 
fessors told me that Great Britain experienced already the 
greatest difficulty in manning her fleet, and he looked at 
me with open-eyed astonishment when I told him that 
the British naval authorities could always obtain ten re- 
cruits for every single one they wanted. 



124 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 

Germany's anti-British policy was founded on a series of 
misconceptions and erroneous estimates. Herein lay the 
reason that her foreign policy was a gigantic mistake. The 
responsibiUty for the tension between England and Ger- 
many before the War lay not with the British Foreign 
Minister, but exclusively with the Germans themselves. 
Quos Deus vuU perdere, prius dementat. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE 

On the 1st and 2nd of September 1870 the great tragedy 
of Sedan was enacted. After a series of defeats, un- 
paralleled in the world's history, France emerged from the 
ordeal of the " Terrible Year" crushed, humiliated, reduced, 
and impoverished — the very shadow of her former self. 
Since then France had played a very inconspicuous role 
on the stage of Europe. She had come to be considered 
by many Germans as a dying country, as a parochial 
concern. 

So strongly was it assumed that le feu sacre de la revanche 
had died down that official and semi-official Germany 
thought the time had come for Franco-German co-opera- 
tion. Guided by the German Emperor, official and semi- 
official Germany bestowed graceful compliments upon dis- 
tinguished Frenchmen at every opportunity. French and 
German ships were seen side by side in Kiel Harbour at the 
occasion of the opening of the Baltic and North Sea Canal 
in 1895. In the Far East Russian, French, and German 
ships jointly demonstrated the Japanese out of Port Arthur, 
and M. E. Lockroy, France's ablest Minister of Marine, was 
allowed to minutely inspect the Grerman Navy and the 
Grerman Navy yards. France had, apparently, forgotten 
her defeats, the time for reconciliation seemed to have 
arrived. German writers began strongly to advocate a 
Franco-German poHtical alliance and a Central-European 
Customs Union. 

Later on Franco-German relations became somewhat 
overclouded. When, through the instrumentality of M. 

^ From the Fortnightly Review, September 1905. 
125 



126 GERMANY AND FRANCE 

Delcasse, France settled her differences with Great Britain, 
Italy, and Spain, and made an attempt to have again a policy 
of her own, the German Emperor intervened and forbade 
the execution of the Morocco bargain, which had been 
concluded between France and those Powers which could 
claim a special interest in Moroccan affairs. How serious 
and threatening the Morocco incident of 1905 was is 
apparent from the steps towards the mobilisation of her 
army which were taken by Germany at the time. As the 
German exports to Morocco amounted then, on an average, 
to a paltry £90,000 per annum, it was clear that the defence 
of Germany's " commercial interests " was merely a pre- 
text for Germany's action in Morocco. Her aim in creating 
the Moroccan crisis was not to foster Germany's exports 
to Morocco, but to detach France from Great Britain, 
and to attach her to Germany. 

French policy, although apparently most erratic and 
unstable of purpose, has, through centuries, constantly 
pursued the same aim. During centuries France has 
fought for two objects — for the preservation of the Balance 
of Power in Europe and for the possession of the Rhine 
frontier. To obtain these ends France has successively 
made war against the strongest Continental States which 
threatened to enslave the Continent and ultimately to 
engulf France. From the time, four centuries ago, when 
she opposed Charles V., the mightiest monarch of Christen- 
dom, who ruled. over Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Spain, down to the present time, France has been the 
champion of liberty on the Continent of Europe. When 
Charles V. ruled almost the whole Continent, Christian 
France allied herself with Turkey, the abhorred Infidel 
Power, who was considered to stand outside the pale of the 
comitas gentium, rightly thinking self-preservation the first 
law of political ethics and the first duty to herself. History 
repeats itself. When Germany had crushed France and 
when Bismarck had succeeded in raising all the Powers of 
Western Europe against France and in isolating her, France 
turned to Russia for support, notwithstanding the incom- 



GERMANY AND FRANCE 127 

patible differences which existed between the Western 
Republic and the Eastern autocracy, differences which 
made truly cordial relations impossible between them. 

During four centuries France and Germany have fought 
one another for supremacy in Europe. As long as Austria 
was the strongest State in Germany, France supported 
Austria's German enemies against her. Thus it was that 
France, up to 1866, encouraged Prussia to aggrandise her- 
self at Austria's cost, and that Bismarck, in crushing Austria, 
received Napoleon's sympathy and support. 

Since Bismarck's advent to power, or during about half 
a century, France had been the dupe of Prusso-Germany's 
policy. Napoleon III. received no gratitude for support- 
ing Prussia against Austria. On the contrary, even at the 
time when Napoleon was doing a priceless service to Bis- 
marck by supporting Prussia against Austria, Bismarck 
contemplated ruining France, and building up Germany's 
unity on the ruins of France. A fortnight before the out- 
break of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, when Austro- 
Prussian relations were strained to breaking-point, Bis- 
marck sent General Von Gabelenz to the Austrian Emperor 
in Vienna, and proposed to the Emperor that peace might 
be preserved among the Germanic nations by making a 
common onslaught on France, conquering Alsace, and 
creating a Greater Germany at the end of a victorious 
campaign. Thus the Prusso-Austrian differences were to 
be settled at the cost of France at the very moment when 
France was lending Bismarck her support in his anti- 
Austrian policy. Only through Austria's hesitation was 
France saved from destruction in 1866, but she became the 
victim of Bismarck's machinations four years later. 

In order to keep France in good humour during the 
Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck verbally promised France 
the Rhine as a reward for her support, but when France 
wished to have this promise given in writing, Bismarck 
skilfully drew out negotiations and delayed and procrasti- 
nated during the critical period of the war, until France's 
support had become superfluous and events had brought 



128 GERMANY AND FRANCE 

peace in sight. Before the conclusion of peace, France, 
who began to fear that Bismarck was playing her false, 
pressed for the territorial compensation which Bismarck 
had held in view, but her demands were met with derision, 
and the intimation that, in case of need, Bismarck would 
not hesitate to make peace at any price with Austria, and 
induce her to march together with Prussia against France. 
In that case Austria and Prussia would aggrandise them- 
selves at the expense of France. As a considerable part 
of the French Army was fighting in Mexico at that time, 
Napoleon was unable to prevent the undue strengthening of 
Prussia, and it became clear that the historic struggle for 
supremacy between France and Germany would soon have 
to be renewed. 

Since 1866 Bismarck had skilfully increased the bitter- 
ness which France, after having been deceived by Bismarck, 
naturally felt for Prussia, by inflicting a number of humilia- 
tions upon French diplomacy in the Luxemburg question, 
the Belgian question, etc., and by rousing the discontent 
of the excitable French masses against Prussia by means 
of bribed French newspapers. Bismarck required a Franco- 
German War, for only the enthusiasm created by such a 
war, which was likely to be immensely popular in Germany, 
where the remembrance of the first Napoleon was still 
kept alive, could make the unification of Germany possible. 
Since 1866 a Franco-Prussian War had become unavoidable, 
but French diplomacy was unskilful enough to walk into 
the Spanish trap which Bismarck skiKully had baited, and 
declared war against Prussia upon a pretext which, in the 
eyes of the world, put France in the wrong. The mistake 
of France's diplomacy was Bismarck's opportunity. On 
the ruins of France, and in accordance with Bismarck's 
programme, a united Germany was foimded, whose main 
object it was proclaimed to be to resist for all time the 
wanton aggression of Germany's hereditary enemy. The 
unity of Germany was cemented with French blood, and 
Thiers spoke truly when he said to Bismarck at Versailles, 
" C'est nous qui avons fait V union de V AUemagne.^^ 



GERMANY AND FRANCE 129 

By 1914 France had of course recovered from the enor- 
mous losses which the war had caused. Nevertheless, it 
had left indeUble traces upon the country. The enormous 
wastage of national capital and the enormously increased 
National Debt of the country, together with the necessity 
for France to re-create her army on the largest scale, and 
to maintain it, notwithstanding her shrunken resources in 
men and money, had made necessary a most oppressive 
taxation, which could be met only by the most rigid economy 
on the part of all individual taxpayers. Hence the Franco- 
German War led to a falling-ofF in the birth-rate of France, 
which was much smaller after the war than it had been 
before. It cannot be doubted that the stationariness of 
the population of France was greatly, and perhaps chiefly, 
caused by the after-effects of that unfortunate war. 

In view of the fact that the Franco-German War had 
inflicted decades of suffering upon all French families, it 
could hardly be expected that the masses of the French 
nation had become the friends and well- wishers of Germany. 
The small rentiers of France and the thrifty peasants, with 
all their love of peace and quiet, knew quite well that 
taxation in France would remain high as long as France 
was compelled to maintain her enormous army. Neverthe- 
less, they were determined not to expose themselves to 
the possibility of another disastrous defeat. Hence high 
taxation was borne without grumbling in the silent hope 
that a time would arrive when, in consequence of a victory 
over Germany, France might again be able to lighten her 
oppressive armour. 

The German newspapers spoke the truth when they 
asserted that the old spirit of revanche had died out in 
France. Revanche is not a policy but a sentiment, and 
France had learned, to her cost, how dangerous it is to be 
led by sentiment in matters political. It was not so much 
the aim of French policy to endeavour to weaken Germany as 
it was to strengthen France. France wished to live in peace 
and security with all her neighbours, Germany included, 
but at the same time she wished to be strong enough to 



130 



GERMANY AND FRANCE 



be able to hold her own in the world. Policy is, after all, 
based on force, and no policy can be successful which is not 
backed by sufficient military and naval strength. Therefore 
France had endeavoured to create and to maintain an army 
sufficiently strong to meet that of Germany, but she found 
her task from year to year more difficult, owing to the 
increasing discrepancy between her population and tliat of 
Germany, which is apparent from the following table : 









Population of Germany. 


Population of France 


1872 41,230,000 


36,103,000 


1876 . 






43,059,000 


36,906,000 


1881 






45,428,000 


37,672,000 


1886 






47,134,000 


38,219,000 


1891 






49,762,000 


38,343,000 


1896 . 






52,753,000 


38,518,000 


1901 






56,862,000 


38,962,000 


1914 (estimated) 






67,000,000 


39,600,000 



In 1914 the time seemed not to be far distant when France 
would no longer be able to rival Germany in the number 
of her soldiers, that France would automatically sink to a 
secondary rank among the Great Powers of Europe. Time 
was fighting on Germany's side. Therefore it was to the 
interest of Germany to maintain peace with France as long 
as possible, while it was to the interest of France to utilise 
the earliest opportunity that might offer for crushing 
Germany. 

Bismarck did not believe that the Peace of Frankfort 
would be a lasting one. He frequently foretold a renewal 
of the struggle, should opportunity favour France. For 
instance, he said in the Reichstag, on the 11th of January 
1887: 

" Has there ever been a French minority which could 
venture publicly and unconditionally to say : We renounce 
regaining Alsace-Lorraine. We shall not make war for 
Alsace-Lorraine, and we accept the Peace of Frankfort in 
the same spirit in which we accepted the Peace of Paris in 
1815 ? Is there a ministry in Paris which would have the 
courage to make such a declaration ? Why is there no such 



GERMANY AND FRANCE 131 

ministry ? For the French have hitherto not lacked courage. 
No such ministry exists, because such a policy is opposed to 
public sentiment in France. France is like an engine which 
is filled with steam up to the point of explosion, and a spark, 
a clumsy movement of the hand, may suffice to cause an 
explosion, to bring on war. However, the fire is so carefully 
tended and nursed that it seems at first sight not likely that 
it will ever be used for causing a conflagration in the neigh- 
bouring country. 

" If you study French history, you will find that the most 
important decisions have been taken in France not by the 
will of the people, but by the will of an energetic minority. 
Those people in France who contemplate war with Germany 
at present only prepare everything in order to be able to 
commence such a war with the maximum of force. Their 
task is to keep alive le feu sacre de la revanche, a task which 
Gambetta defined in the motto : ' Ne parlez jamais de la 
guerre, mais pensez-y toujours,* and that is to-day still the 
attitude of France. French people do not speak of the 
possibiUty of an aggressive war against Germany, but only 
of the fear of being attacked by Germany. 

" France will probably attack us as soon as she has 
reason to think that she is stronger than we are. As soon 
as France beUeves that she can defeat Germany, war with 
Germany is, I think, a certainty. The conviction that 
France is stronger than Germany may arise from the alli- 
ances which France may be able to conclude. I do not 
believe that such alliances will be concluded by France, and 
it is the task of German diplomacy either to prevent the 
conclusion of such alliances, or to counterbalance such 
alliances with counter-alliances." 

Convinced that France would seek to revenge her de- 
feat, Bismarck endeavoured to ruin her by severe condi- 
tions of peace. Although the Franco -German War had 
cost Germany only about £60,000,000, he exacted about 
£250,000,000 from the country, and was greatly disappointed 
that France easily paid that sum and recovered rapidly. 
Fearing France's revenge, Germany contemplated in 1875 
an attack upon France, and in February of that year Herr 
von Radowitz was sent to Russia to sound the Czar and to 
find out whether Russia would remain neutral in the event 



132 GERMANY AND FRANCE 

of the struggle between France and Germany being renewed. 
Happily for France, Germany's design miscarried, owing 
to the energetic opposition of Great Britain and Russia. 

Finding himself foiled in his design to ruin France before 
she had recovered from her defeat, Bismarck strove to 
isolate France, being of opinion, as he said in his Memoirs, 
that France would certainly aid Russia if a collision should 
take place between that country and Germany. Therefore 
he wrote, on the 20th of December 1872, to Count Arnim, 
the German Ambassador in Paris : " We do not want to be 
disturbed by France, but if France does not intend to keep 
the peace we must prevent her finding allies." With this 
object in view, Bismarck skilfully isolated France by 
bringing her into collision with Italy, Spain, and Great 
Britain. As long as Bismarck was in power the foreign 
poUcy of France was directed from Berlin, and France had 
not a friend, not a champion, in the wide world. She was 
almost an outcast among the nations. 

Bismarck carefully watched France's relations with 
foreign countries, and as soon as he thought that France 
was trying to pursue a policy of her own without consulting 
Berlin, and to improve her relations with a foreign country, 
he raised the spectre of war. In 1887, for instance, the 
Goblet Ministry was trying to settle the Egyptian question, 
and to arrive at an understanding with Great Britain . How- 
ever, before France was able to come to the desired arrange- 
ment, Bismarck used the ridiculous Schnabele incident on 
the Franco-German frontier for a violent war-agitation, 
compared with which the Morocco incident was child's- 
play. France dropped the contemplated arrangement with 
Great Britain, and on the 7th of May 1887 M. Goblet said 
at Havre : 

" For fifteen years we have been asking the country each 
year for £40,000,000, and now, when the country has been 
smitten on the one cheek, we can only advise her to turn the 
other cheek to the smiter." 

Soon after Bismarck had been dismissed by William II. 
France succeeded in concluding an alliance with Russia. 



GERMANY AND FRANCE 133 

Its conclusion was taken very philosophically at Berlin, 
for such an event was considered to be inevitable in view 
of the friction which had taken place between Russia and 
Germany after William II. had come to the throne. There- 
fore German diplomacy concentrated its efforts upon keep- 
ing the Anglo-French differences alive, and tried to forestall 
France by previously coming to an understanding with 
England. At that time Germany's most valuable colonies, 
including Zanzibar, were exchanged against the rock of 
HeUgoland, an exchange which was greeted with dismay 
by most Germans, for it was believed by them that that 
bargain was most unsatisfactory for Germany. Even in 
Great Britain people shook their heads at this exchange, 
the advantage of which to Germany could not be seen. 
Nevertheless, from the German point of view this exchange 
was a most excellent bargain, for France had been fore- 
stalled by it. Von Caprivi, the then Chancellor, did not 
even try to explain that Germany had received an adequate 
quid 'pro quo in giving up her best colonies, but simply stated 
in the Reichstag, in defending the exchange : " We meant, 
before all, to maintain our good understanding with Great 
Britain." 

It was Bismarck's poUcy not only to isolate France by 
embroihng her with all her neighbours and by discrediting 
her everywhere, but also to weaken her financial and military 
power by encouraging her to waste her military and finan- 
cial strength in unprofitable colonial adventures in every 
quarter of the world. France went to West Africa and to 
Tonkin at Bismarck's bidding, and she remained the tool of 
Germany until in the year 1898 M. Delcasse entered the 
French Foreign Office. 

When M. Delcass6 became Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs he found, with amazement, that the foreign policy 
of France was directed by Germany, and that, at the bidding 
of German statesmen, France had obediently embroiled 
herself with Italy over Tunis, with Spain over various ques- 
tions, and with Great Britain over Egypt. Notwithstanding 
the fact that it was his first task to settle the thankless 



134 GERMANY AND FRANCE 

Fashoda problem, M. Delcasse entered upon his duties with 
the firm determination to reconcile France with Italy and 
Spain, and especially with Great Britain, and no longer to 
oppose Great Britain in Germany's interests. In the 
beginning of November 1898, a few days after Colonel 
Marchand had been ordered back from Fashoda, M. Delcasse 
said in his study to a friend of mine : "I mean not to leave 
this fauteuil without having re-established good relations 
with Great Britain." Such a declaration required con- 
siderable moral courage at a time when Great Britain and 
France stood on the brink of war. 

When Germany saw that France was slipping from her 
control, that France was trying to pursue a national policy, 
and that she succeeded in making friends with Great Britain, 
Italy, and Spain, she tried for a long time to regain control 
over the foreign policy of France by personal advances to 
individual Frenchmen, by flattering France, by urging that 
the interests of France and Germany were identical, and by 
persistently extolUng the benefits and the necessity of a 
Franco-German alliance as the best guarantee for maintain- 
ing peace in Europe. However, notwithstanding Germany's 
advances, M. Delcasse remained passive and almost in- 
different, and observed a cautious reserve towards Germany. 
Nevertheless, Germany continued her advances until 
the battle of Mukden had shown that the Russian Army 
was no longer a factor upon the support of which France 
could reckon in case of war with Germany. Then, and 
then only, came the Morocco crisis and Germany's threat 
of war ! 

At no time were Germany's advances to France more 
assiduous than when Germany was trying to raise a coalition 
against England. At the outbreak of the Boer War the 
whole German Press entreated France to join hands with 
Germany and to assist in humbling Great Britain to the 
dust. On 5th of October 1899, three days after the 
mobiUsation of the Boer troops, an article appeared in Die 
Orenzboten, the leading journal of the semi-official press of 
Germany, in which it was said : 



GERMANY AND FRANCE 135 

" All differences between France and Germany benefit 
only the nearly all-powerful Enemy of the World. As long 
as the French keep one eye fixed on Alsace-Lorraine, it is 
no good that they occasionally look at England with the 
other eye. Only when the strength of the German Fleet 
is commensurate with her sea interest will the French seek 
our friendship, instead of being humiliated by their heredi- 
tary enemy." 

In this and numerous other articles France was entreated 
to crush England, her hereditary enemy, by joining a coali- 
tion of Continental Powers. 

France was under no illusion as to Germany's feelings 
towards her. Silently she had borne a latent state of 
war for decades. The French were to be rewarded for 
their patient patriotism. Heroic sufferings had steeled the 
national character and created a race of strong and earnest 
men. Besides, decades of military endeavour had given 
France an army which was to be the instrument for re- 
creating the country and regaining what she had lost. 



10 



CHAPTER X 

THE MOROCCO CRISIS OP 1911 * 

On the 2nd of July 1911 the German papers published the 
following official announcement : 

" The German firms interested in the south of Morocco 
have requested the Imperial Government, having regard 
to the dangers which threaten the important German 
interests in these parts in view of the possible spread of 
the disorders prevaiUng in other parts of Morocco, to take 
measures to protect the lives and property of Germans 
and German protegSs in this region. The Imperial Govern- 
ment, with this object in view, thereupon decided to send 
His Majesty's ship Panther, which happened to be in the 
neighbourhood, to the harbour of Agadir, and apprised the 
Powers of the fact. The influential Moors of the district 
have been simultaneously informed that no sort of un- 
friendly intention towards Morocco or its inhabitants is 
associated with the appearance of the German warship in 
the harbour." 

Thus ran the translation published in the Times of the 
3rd of July of that year. Ostensibly the German Govern- 
ment sent the Panther to Agadir in the south of Morocco 
" to protect important German interests in these parts " 
and " to protect the life and property of Germans and 
German protegia in this region." Yet it was known to all 
who had studied Moroccan affairs that Germany had no 
important commercial interests in that country, and that 
no German lives were endangered in or near Agadir, which 
happens to be the best harbour on the Atlantic coast of 

^ From the Fortnightly Review, August 1911. 
136 



THE MOROCCO CRISIS 137 

Morocco. However, the official communication carefully 
explained in its opening words that the warship was sent 
at the request of "the German firms interested in the 
south of Morocco." The onus of proof that German 
interests and German lives were actually threatened was 
therefore laid with skilful vagueness on unnamed, un- 
enumerated, and unspecified German firms, which, for all 
one knew, had their seat in Germany, and which conceiv- 
ably were previously asked by the Government to make a 
request for protection. By the wording of the communique 
the German Government had left open a loophole for escape. 
In case of need it could explain that " the German firms " 
had called for protection without sufficient cause, and that 
the ship would be withdrawn because, upon inquiry on the 
spot, it had been found that neither the property nor the 
lives of Germans and of German proteges in the south of 
Morocco were endangered. 

In Bismarck's time German diplomacy was dramatic 
and vigorous. Under the direction of William II. it became 
melodramatic and futile. For a second time within a few 
years it interfered with menacing suddenness in Morocco, 
but once more the stage-managing had been defective, and 
the dispatch of the Panther was to prove as unprofitable, 
and as little creditable, to German diplomacy as was the 
Emperor's personal demonstration at Tangier on the 31st of 
March 1905, when he promised his support to the Sultan. 

The Morocco crisis of 1905 almost led to war be- 
tween France and Germany. Germany had actually begun 
mobilising her army when France bowed to the demonstra- 
tion of force, giving Germany what is usually called a 
diplomatic victory. However, she lost nothing substantial 
by giving way, but Germany received in the following 
year a diplomatic defeat at Algeciras, whence she returned 
empty-handed, and she quietly withdrew for a time her 
loudly advertised claims upon Moroccan territory. 

It must have been clear even to the most credulous, the 
most unsuspecting, and the most uncritical that in 1905 
the German Emperor did not go to Tangier, and almost 



138 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 

make war upon France, for the love of the Sultan of Morocco, 
and that, in July 1911, Germany did not send the Panther 
to Agadir to protect German lives and property. German 
diplomacy had asserted from 1905 to 1911 that it was 
anxious to preserve the independence and the integrity of 
Morocco, and the open door for all nations, because of her 
important economic interests in that country. That was 
merely a diplomatic pretext, and it can scarcely be doubted 
that Germany desired to acquire Morocco, or at least the 
south of that country, and that she wished to defend its 
integrity and independence until she was ready and able 
to make it a colony of her own. 

On the 19th of January 1912, in the course of a lawsuit 
for libel which the Rheinisch-Westfdlische Zeitung brought 
against the Orenzboten, the editor of the former stated : 

" I demand that Mr. Class, the president of the Pan- 
Germanic League, be called. At my wish he put himself 
in contact with the Foreign Secretary, Herr von Kiderlen- 
Wachter. The Foreign Secretary invited Mr. Class to meet 
him at the Hotel Pfalzer Hof in Mannheim, and there they 
have conferred for hours. The Foreign Secretary stated to 
Herr Class : ' I support the policy of partitioning Morocco. 
The Pan -Germanic demand is absolutely justified. You can 
rely upon it that we shall stick to Morocco, and that you 
will be greatly pleased with the German Morocco policy. I 
am as much a Pan -German as you are.' Some time 
afterwards Mr. Class called upon the Foreign Secretary, but, 
failing to find him in, met Mr. Zimmermann, the Under- 
Secretary. It was the day of the dispatch of the Panther 
to Agadir. Herr Zimmermann told Herr Class that he 
could give him some cheering news : ' You come just in 
time. At this moment the Panther appears before Agadir. 
We shall retain Agadir, and we intend to seize the whole 
district and not to give up anything. After all, we abso- 
lutely require settlement colonies for our excess of births. 
Take care that no claims for compensation are raised in 
the Press. We do not want compensations. We want 
Morocco. France wishes to offer us the Congo.' " 

The foregoing extract, which is a careful translation, and 
which is taken from the report of the law-court proceedings 



THE MOROCCO CRISIS 139 

published in the Tdgliche Rundschau of the 20th of January 
1912, shows that, notwithstanding all official statements 
that Germanyhad never intended to seize Moroccan territory, 
statements which were made by the German Chancellor 
and the Foreign Secretary in December 1911, the German 
Government had actually intended to take a part of 
Morocco. 

Germany's interests in Morocco, as her interests in Asia 
Minor, South Africa, and Southern Brazil, were not of 
yesterday. Many decades ago the most farseeing and 
patriotic Germans recognised that colonies in the temperate 
zone, able to receive the German surplus population, were 
the greatest need of their country. Animated by this con- 
viction, many professors and other leaders of public opinion 
agitated for the creation of a large German fleet — -the first 
ships of the German Navy were built in the 'forties of the 
last century with moneys raised by voluntary private 
subscriptions ; others created important and purely German 
settlements in Santa Catherina, in Rio Grande do Sul, in 
the Cape Colony, and in Natal ; others explored, with or 
without Government assistance, uncivilised countries which 
they believed to be suitable for German colonisation and 
which had not yet been appropriated by the European 
Powers. Morocco was one of these, and it was explored in 
the 'sixties of last century by the Germans, Gerhard Rohlfs 
and von Maltzan, in the 'seventies by Noll, von Fritsch, 
Rein, and Koch, in the 'eighties by Lenz and Quedenfeld, 
and Professor Theobald Fischer travelled through that 
country in 1888, 1899, and 1901. Professor Fischer was 
considered to be the greatest German authority on that 
country. 

Prusso-Germany was the first country which introduced 
a system of compulsory and national education directed by 
the State. The education of the German citizen by the 
State did not end with the time when the child left 
school. It was continued during the rest of his or her 
life. Prominent among the great German State institu- 
tions for the education of the adult were the semi-official 



140 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 

Press and the semi-official literature in the form of books, 
the teachings of which were reinforced by the activity of a 
host of Government inspired professorial and non-profes- 
sorial lecturers, writers, and clergymen, who were let loose 
whenever their assistance was required. The larger half of 
the German Press of all parties, the Socialist papers excepted, 
was constantly inspired by the Government. Thus public 
opinion was created and constantly educated, and the more 
serious and thoughtful minds were provided with informa- 
tion by weighty semi-official books crammed with facts 
and arguments which were written, or inspired, by the 
Government departments. They served the same purpose 
as the " handbooks for speakers " and " campaign books " 
which are issued by the British party organisations at 
election time. In 1904^-1905 a large portion of the semi- 
official Press preached, in consequence of direct inspiration 
from the chief of the German Foreign Office, the doctrine 
that Germany required the south of Morocco, and in 1911 
one read again in papers which stood under Govern- 
ment influence demands for territorial "compensation" in 
Morocco. The prevailing official view of the value of 
Morocco to Germany may best be gauged from the very 
lengthy paper, " Morocco and its Relations to the German 
National Economy," published in the semi-official German 
Naval Year Book, Nauticus, for 1909, and I would quote 
from it the following important passages in their proper 
sequence : 

" Morocco is a kind of African peninsula, being isolated 
by the sea and separated from the African continent by vast 
mountains. The most important trade routes along the 
West Coast of Africa, from Europe to South America, and 
towards the future Panama Canal, pass its coast. The 
country occupies the corner of Africa, and the corner 
position of a continent is always a favourable world - 
strategical factor. By its geographical and world -strategical 
position Morocco is exceedingly favoured for commerce 
and war. Only lately, when the traffic on the trade 
routes through the Mediterranean along the northern 
shore, and through the Atlantic along the western shore, of 



THE MOROCCO CRISIS 141 

Morocco has become so active, the country has become 
important. It lies to-day in the centre of the world's 
traffic, 

" Morocco is separated from the African continent by 
high mountains, which separate it at the same time from the 
desert. These give it a favourable climate by catching the 
moisture which the wind brings from the Atlantic. Morocco 
slopes from the mountain ranges in the interior towards 
the Atlantic. Therefore the mountains act as an enor- 
mous reservoir to the lower-ljdng lands. The province of 
Sus is perhaps the most richly endowed part of Morocco. 
One can scarcely form an exaggerated idea of the fruitful- 
ness of a large part of the plains near the Atlantic coast. 
The rainfall is small, but owing to the abundance of water 
in the sub -soil, only a few feet below the ground, irrigation 
can easily and cheaply be provided which would make 
cotton-growing possible. 

" Marakesh, like Milan and Munich, is, owing to its 
position, a natural railway centre. Although animals are 
raised in the most primitive fashion, and although the 
prohibition to export them kills all enterprise, Morocco 
possesses, according to a French official expert, 40,000,000 
sheep, 11,000,000 goats, from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 cattle, 
4,000,000 donkeys and mules, and 600,000 horses. How- 
ever, these estimates are probably too large. Morocco is 
rich in minerals, especially in iron, copper, antimony, and 
salt. Mining used to flourish especially in the province 
of Sus. Morocco has about 8,000,000 inhabitants, and 
is able to maintain perhaps 40,000,000 people. In that 
healthy coimtry, which is nearly quite free from malaria, 
the living conditions for European emigrants are far more 
favourable than in Algeria. Morocco, situated within sight 
of Europe, and occupying an exceedingly important world- 
strategical position, possesses vast natural resources which 
have not yet been touched. Its conditions are mediaeval, 
but in view of the proximity of the over-populated States 
of Europe which require expansion, its exclusiveness cannot 
be preserved much longer. Morocco may become the 
granary and the ranch of Europe, and may provide it with 
fruit, oil, cotton, and ore. At present it has not a single 
mile of road or of railroad, and not a single bridge. Its 
waterfalls will provide power. Morocco is an important 
field for industrial activity." 



142 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 

It will be noticed that the semi-official year book con- 
sidered in the first place the great strategical value of 
Morocco, and only in the second place its great economic 
possibilities. It is also very interesting that it described 
the province of Sus as the richest part of Morocco for both 
agriculture and mining, and recognised in Marakesh its 
natural railway centre. Now, Agadir was not only the 
best harbour on the west coast, with 47 feet of water 
within 30 yards of the shore, but it was also not far from 
Marakesh, and was by far the best entrance gate to the 
province of Sus and to the Soudan. Owing to the depth 
and sheltered position of its harbour and to its geographical 
situation, Agadir was far more important than Mogador, 
which had 24,000 inhabitants. The latter had become a 
large port only because the Moroccan Government closed the 
port of Agadir in order to punish its citizens for a revolt. 
Monsieur de Segonzac, a leading French authority on 
Morocco, wrote in his book, Voyage au Maroc, published in 
1903, the year before the German Government had first 
taken an active interest in Morocco : 

" Agadir is believed to be the best harbour on the Moroccan 
coast. It is an open roadstead without obstacles, which 
is sheltered against the breakers and the wind from the 
open sea. I have been told that thirty metres from the 
coast the water is fifteen metres deep. On the day when 
the harbour of Agadir will be opened to European commerce 
Mogador will cease to exist." 

The greatest German authority on Morocco, Professor 
Fischer, who had devoted more than thirty years to the 
study of that country, and who had explored it on three 
journeys, saw, like the semi-official German Naval Year 
Book, in the land of the Moors a world-strategical position 
of the very greatest importance. He was naturally less 
reserved in his utterances than the Year Book, which was 
written throughout in the ponderous, stodgy, and imper- 
sonal style of official Germany, and I would quote from 
some of his writings the following most interesting opinions : 



THE MOROCCO CRISIS 143 

" Morocco occupies to-day a position of the very greatest 
importance. The most important trade routes pass by its 
coast : through the Mediterranean, to the rapidly develop- 
ing West Coast of Africa, to Central America with the 
Panama Canal, towards South America, which is rapidly 
becoming settled and which already is of the greatest im- 
portance for the food supply of Europe. The importance 
of the Moroccan harbours lies in their position, for thence 
many a vital nerve of the nations of Europe may be cut 
through. — [Die Seehdfen von Marokko.) 

" Morocco lies on the most important route of the world's 
trade. It takes part in commanding that route, and its 
ports on the Atlantic can become important bases for peace- 
ful and warlike enterprises on the West Coast of Africa and 
towards Central and South America. — {Geog.Zeitschrift,1901.) 

" In the hands of a European Power able to develop its 
rich resources, Morocco may become a source of strength 
of the first importance, able to cause a change in the balance 
of power in Europe. It is strange that Germany has no 
political interests in Morocco. Our position as a world 
Power and a commercial Power would be endangered 
should Morocco fall into the hands of France. It is Ger- 
many's task to maintain Morocco's independence. But 
should an alteration of the map become inevitable, Ger- 
many must have its part : El Haus and Sus. Our interests 
at the Straits of Gibraltar are guarded by the jealousies of 
France and Great Britain. — [Geog. Zeitschrift, 1903.) 

" After thirty years' occupation with Moroccan affairs, and 
after three journeys through that country, I have arrived at 
the conviction that the world-political position of Morocco is 
so great that that State which succeeds in taking it will, through 
its possession, receive such an enormous increase in power 
that all other States, especially Great Britain, Spain, and 
Germany, will feel it as an unbearable hardship. — [Die See- 
hdfen von Marokko.y 

The italics were in the original. 

Morocco looks small on the map, but it is, as the follow- 
ing figures show, a large country : 



Morocco .... 


. 219,000 square milea 


Algeria (limits of 1901) 


. 184,474 


Tunis .... 


. 45,779 


Germany in 1914 


. 208,780 


United Kingdom 


. 121,391 



144 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 

Morocco was almost as large as Algeria and Tunis com- 
bined, and was larger than Imperial Germany. Its superior 
size and climate, its vast agricultural and mineral resources, 
and its superior geographical and strategical position make 
it infinitely more valuable than Algeria. Besides, it is a 
natural fortress. Its fruitful plains and uplands along 
the Atlantic, which evoked the enthusiasm of Pomponius 
Mela 1900 years ago, are sheltered towards the north and 
west by the sea, and towards the east and south by the 
enormous ranges of the Atlas Mountains, the peaks of which 
rise up to 13,000 feet, and by the Sahara. Thus thinly- 
populated Morocco is an ideal country both for European 
settlement and for defence. Its world-strategical position, 
upon which the German Navy Year Book and Professor 
Fischer rightly dwelt, was very great, and its possession 
would have been of particular value to Germany, especially 
if she should wish to strike at France, Great Britain, or the 
United States. In 1914 the German Fleet was tied to the 
North Sea through the lack of coaling stations abroad. 
Agadir, or some other port on the west coast of Morocco, 
which could be reached in about a week by ships steaming 
from Wilhelmshaven round the north of Scotland, would 
have been a very convenient half-way house on the way to 
the West Indies and Panama in case of a German- American 
war ; it would have been the best possible base for cruisers, 
or liners converted into cruisers, told off to prey on British 
shipping, in case of an Anglo-German war ; it would have 
been an ideal position in case of a Franco-German war, or 
of Franco- German friction, by enabhug Germany to cause 
serious trouble in Algeria. Algeria had an army of occu- 
pation of 75,000 men, of whom 43,000 were Europeans. 
France intended, in case of a great European war, to bring 
over from Africa her European troops and some coloured 
troops as well, replacing the Algerian garrison with West 
African soldiers. The spirit of revolt was not yet dead in 
Algeria. The Germans in Morocco could have caused 
countless risings in the neighbouring Algeria in peace-time 
by encouraging the disaffected, and could possibly have 



THE MOROCCO CRISIS 145 

overthrown the French mobilisation scheme in Africa at the 
moment of the outbreak of war by bringing about a great 
revolt. As a matter of fact, a German settlement in Morocco 
would have made Algeria untenable for France. The 
assiduous advances which Germany made to the Moors 
soon after the Franco-German War were probably inspired 
by the wish of causing trouble to France in Algeria if the 
war should be renewed. 

I concluded an article, which I contributed to the Nine- 
teenth Century and After in August 1911, with the following 
emphatic warning : 

" In view of the great strategical importance of Morocco, 
its independence is no doubt very desirable for the peace 
of the world. On the 31st of March 1905 the German 
Emperor solemnly proclaimed at Tangiers : ' For Germany 
the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco and the indepen- 
dence of his comitry are beyond doubt. I shaU therefore 
always be ready to support these.' Great Britain can 
unreservedly endorse that unseMsh policy, and will no 
doubt assist Germany in preserving Morocco's independence 
against all comers. If, however, German diplomacy should 
have changed its mind since 1905, and if it should have 
arrived at the conviction that Morocco is not fit for self- 
government, and that it should henceforth be governed by 
Europeans under some scheme of partition, it seems perhaps 
fairest that Spain should receive the northern half and 
France the southern half of the country ; for the historical, 
economical, political, and geographical claims of these two 
nations to the possession of Morocco are infinitely stronger 
than are those of Germany, whose claim to the south of 
Morocco consists chiefly in the display and assertion of her 
armed force. Morocco is of little value to Germany, except 
as a means of terrorising and weakening France, as a means 
of threatening several of the most important British trade 
routes and Gibraltar, and as a means of setting Spain against 
France and Great Britain. In German hands Morocco 
would be a permanent danger to the peace of the world, 
and it cannot be doubted that the peaceful nations of the 
world ought to oppose Germany's occupation of that country. 
Even her own allies may not care to be embroiled with their 
neighbours over Morocco. Besides, it seems very doubtful 



146 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 

whether the enlargement of the German dominion in Africa 
would be desirable on humanitarian grounds. German 
colonisation has been a failure because the Germans do not 
know how to deal with the natives. German colonisation 
has been distinguished by the brutal misdeeds of countless 
officers and officials. The shameless plundering of the 
natives in German South-west Africa drove the Hereros 
into a rebellion which was suppressed by the extermination 
of the men, women, and children, of whom many thousands 
were driven into the waterless desert and condemned to 
slow death by thirst and starvation. 

" Germany has been trying to acquire Southern Morocco, 
and perhaps the French Congo as well, by methods which 
remind one of those employed by Louis XIV. of France. 
But Louis XIV. observed at least some appearance of legality 
in robbing the German Empire and the Spanish Netherlands 
of valuable territories in time of peace, by obtaining edicts 
justifying his violent proceedings by his Chambres de 
Reunion, Germany has gone farther than Louis XIV. Ger- 
many demanded the best part of Morocco and part of the 
French Congo as ' compensation ' without telling us what she 
required to be compensated for. That would apparently be 
explained only after the transfer had been made. German 
diplomacy has done an ill-service to the Empire. The 
position and prestige of a State, as of an individual, depend 
very largely on its reputation for honesty, straightforward- 
ness, reliability, and fair-dealing. As a friend and admirer 
of Germany, I regret that her diplomacy has laid Germany 
open to the gravest suspicions, and has destroyed the belief 
in her peacefulness and all that has been done during the 
last few years for improving Anglo-German relations. 

" War has been brought within the limits of vision. It 
is to be hoped that Germany will turn away from the very 
dangerous course upon which she has embarked, a course 
which in a very short time may bring her into a collision 
not only with France, but with several Great Powers ; and 
as the Triple Alliance is believed to be a purely defensive 
aUiance relating only to Europe, Germany may find her- 
self deserted by her allies in the hour of trouble. Let us 
hope that the Morocco crisis can be explained away as 
the mistake of a single man. Let us hope that Herr von 
Kiderlen-Waechter will be replaced without delay. That will 
solve and explain the crisis, and the Morocco incident will 



THE MOROCCO CRISIS 147 

soon be forgotten. Persistence on the dangerous and un- 
precedented course which Germany is steering at the present 
moment may imperil Germany's future, and may cost the 
Emperor his throne. The German nation is intensely loyal 
and patriotic, but it would never forgive a monarch who had 
driven the nation into a disastrous war without adequate 
reason." 

My forecast came true more than seven years after it 
had been made. 

Germany's Morocco policy failed, both in 1905 and in 1911, 
through the clumsiness of her diplomacy and because the 
Powers recognised Germany's aim. Thus her intervention 
in Morocco was merely a step towards her downfall. 



CHAPTER XI 

EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION IN GERMANY * 

During more than forty years the Emperor Frederick's 
winged word, " The Prussian schoolmaster has won the 
battle of Sadowa," had been dinned into the ears of EngHsh- 
men. They were so often told that Germany owed her 
great political, and especially her still greater economic, 
success to her excellent education, that they set about to 
copy the educational system of Germany, although it was 
probably quite unsuitable for them. England and America 
were flooded with a constantly growing stream of books 
in praise of German education, but up to 1914 I failed to 
discover a single book on the failure of German education, 
although such a book was very urgently required. I intend 
in the following pages to point out some of the shortcomings 
as well as some of the very important characteristics and 
factors of German education which have hitherto escaped 
observation. 

According to the latest statistics, Germany had before 
1914 some 60,000 elementary State schools, with about 
150,000 teachers, who instructed some 10,000,000 children ; 
she had more than 1,000 higher schools, where about 20,000 
teachers instructed more than 300,000 pupils, while at the 
numerous universities, polytechnics, and other technical 
high schools, about 6,000 professors and lecturers instructed 
some 100,000 students. If we include the professional 
private tutors we find that the army of German education- 
alists numbered about 300,000. These figures are truly 
astounding in their magnitude, and if "most educated " be 

1 From the Contemporary Review, October 1906. 
148 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 149 

synonymous with "best educated," the Germans should 
be the best-educated nation in the world. In fact, there 
are practically no uneducated people in Germany. Of the 
260,000 recruits who in 1905 joined the German Army, only 
82 men coming from the frontier districts, where, for obvious 
reasons, control is sometimes impossible, were unable to 
read and write. It may therefore be asserted that in Ger- 
many proper no uneducated people exist. 

The genesis of the national educational system and of 
the educational policy of Germany is a curious one. The 
German school is by its history not a social but a political 
institution. To make the revolution against the Roman 
Catholic Church successful, Luther found it necessary to 
oppose the powerful organisation of the Church which 
directed the mind of the German masses with a national 
and popular organisation powerful enough to oppose the 
Almighty Church, and able to agitate among the masses 
and to propagate the Protestant idea. The spiritual guid- 
ance and direction of the Church of Rome and its world -em- 
bracing organisation could be opposed only by a machine able 
to control the national mind of Germany in the Protestant 
interest, and to deprive the Roman Church of its supporters 
in the country. Hence Luther strenuously advocated the 
introduction of a national and Protestant education. Edu- 
cation was not to benefit the few, but to embrace all. 
Thus, through the revolt of Luther, and the necessity of 
strengthening struggling Protestantism against the Roman 
Catholic Church, the idea of a national, democratic, and 
compulsory education arose, and was taken up by the 
Protestant princes of Germany, who, as a rule, had become 
Protestant in order to spoHate the wealthy Roman Catholic 
Church. The assertion that a wave of idealistic sentiment 
and of religious zeal created Protestantism in Germany, 
that it was a pure and purely democratic movement, and 
that the spirit of benevolence and of democracy created the 
German school, is a fable, for schools and serfdom existed 
side by side in Germany up to the nineteenth century. In 
fact, in Germany, and especially in Prussia, school and 



150 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 

serfdom, education and tyranny, went hand in hand, and 
education was used by the Government as a means for 
keeping the people in a state of subjection and of mental 
servitude. 

Up to the thirteenth century, Prussia was inhabited by 
heathen savages, the ancient Prussialis, who were extirpated 
by the knights of the Teutonic Order, to whom that savage 
country had been granted, and when they had desolated it 
by fire and sword, Prussia was colonised not only from all 
parts of Germany but from all parts of Europe. Germans, 
Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Swiss, Poles, etc., were attracted 
by the early rulers of Prussia, partly to people the desolate 
land, partly to work for their feudal masters, and some sort 
of compulsory national education was evidently necessary 
to unify all these incongruous elements, and to obviate the 
danger of the country falling to pieces. Besides, a common 
language was absolutely necessary in matters of administra- 
tion. However, matters educational remained in a very 
chaotic state, until Frederick William I., one of the greatest 
rulers, and certainly the ablest and the most energetic 
administrator, of Prussia, resolved to convert the loosely- 
jointed, ill-organised, and promiscuously-peopled provinces 
of Prussia into a unified, firmly -welded centralised State. 
He meant to Germanise the^eople. Frederick William was 
a ruler who did not brook .6.elay. In 1713, the very year in 
which he came to the throne, he issued an edict which aimed 
at compulsory education in Prussia, and as rapidly as the 
scanty funds at his disposal allowed it, schools were built, 
teachers procured or trained, and education extended. In 
Lithuania alone, 1,105 new schools were erected, in order 
to convert the Slav inhabitants of that country into German - 
speaking Prussians, industrious, useful, and loyal citizens, 
and obedient soldiers. 

Frederick William's successor, Frederick the Great, 
vastly enlarged the territory of Prussia, adding to the 
country by his conquest of Silesia large districts inhabited 
by Austrians, and by the partition of Poland, of which 
Prussia received a considerable part, extensive provinces 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 151 

peopled with Poles. Modern Germany, Prusso -Germany, 
was a country which had sprung by conquest from the 
smallest beginning from which ever a great State has arisen, 
and the different nationalities which had been conquered 
and joined together could not be kneaded into a homo- 
geneous mass, and into a nation, except by compulsory 
education. Germany would have borne an aspect similar 
to that borne by Austria -Hungary, had not the rulers of 
Prussia vigorously Germanised their country by means of 
the schools and of compulsory education. The first twenty- 
three years of Frederick the Great's rule were years of war, 
but in 1763, the year in which the Seven Years' War, the 
struggle with Austria, and the great Prussian War period 
ended, he introduced the celebrated " Generallandschul- 
recht," the law of compulsory and general education for the 
whole of his dominions and all the multifarious nationalities 
dwelling in them. 

The educational organisation of Germany was an absolu- 
tist machine, though at first sight it bears a strongly demo- 
cratic appearance. In the character of Frederick the Great 
the will of the autocrat and the mind of the philosopher 
and democrat were curiously mingled. Though he treated, 
his subjects like beasts of burden, he frequently declared 
that a king should be the first servant of the State. In 
matters educational we find the same contradiction. While 
some of the edicts on education issued by the philosopher- 
king breathed the most enlightened Liberalism — an example 
will be given in the course of this chapter — a " Cabinet 
Ordre " of the 7th of September 1779, issued by the king- 
autocrat, laid down that " the people in the country are 
only to learn a little reading and writing, for if they are 
taught too much they will run to the towns in order to 
become clerks, etc." Frederick the Great and his successors 
did not wish to spread enlightenment among the masses 
by means of the schools, but intended to educate the people 
to be dutiful subjects to their king, hard-working peasants 
and labourers satisfied with their station, and reUable and 
patriotic soldiers, ready to sacrifice their lives for their 
11 



1S2 EDUCATION AND MtS-Ei)UCATiON 

country. For these reasons, the Prusso -German educa- 
tional establishment always bore a distinctly military 
character, and its first and principal object was to teach 
and to enforce discipline, to nationalise the people, and to 
create a strong sense of patriotism and of servility among 
them. That the elementary schools of Germany with their 
10,000,000 children were a most powerful, perhaps the most 
powerful, tool in the hands of the German Government, 
may be seen from the guiding regulations laid down in 1872 
by Dr. FaUc, the Prussian Minister of Education, for in 
them we read : 

" The object of the Prussian elementary school has always 
been to educate the growing generation to become pious, 
patriotic men and women who are able by means of the 
general education and training they receive to fill an honour- 
able position in civil society. In whatever way the relations 
of Church and State have been conceived, and whatever 
theological tendency was paramount at any period, the re- 
ligious and moral education of youth has at all times been 
considered the foremost purpose of the schools, and never 
have the administrative authorities of the State wavered in 
pursuing the high ideal to sow the seeds of patriotic, religious, 
and moral sentiment in the children, so that they will become 
citizens whose inner worth can secure the welfare and pre- 
servation of the State. 

" But side by side with this exalted ideal, the requirements 
of practical life have not been left out of sight. Children 
must learn at school how to perform duties, they are to be 
habituated to work, to take pleasure in their work, so as to 
become efficient workers. This has been the aim of popular 
education in Prussia since the earhest times, and to this day 
it is plainly understood by all administrative officers and 
teachers, and by the majority of parents, that it is the busi- 
ness of the elementary school not merely to teach reading, 
writing, and arithmetic, but to teach the citizens cheerfully 
to serve their God, their native country, and themselves." 

The Sunday schools in Great Britain had recently some 
8,000,000 scholars, while the Sunday schools of Germany 
had only some 800,000 scholars. These two figures indicate 
at a glance the fundamental difference between English and 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 153 

German education. While the leading feature in English 
and American schools is piety, the teaching of religion and 
the training of the character of the young, the leading 
feature of the German elementary schools was, and always 
has been, the teaching of a militant patriotism and mili- 
tarism. Moral and religious education was treated as a 
matter of secondary importance. Singing played a very 
large part in German education, and especially in elementary 
education, largely because singing assists splendidly in 
marching. Battles may be won by outmarching the enemy. 
Hence the very first songs which a German child learned 
were military songs, such as : 

I had a faithful comrade once, 

No better could there be, 
The drum was beat, the charge was led. 
Together to the strife we sped. 

And he kept step with me. 

A bullet came, etc., etc. 

Dawn of day, dawn of day [ 
To death thou showest me the way, 
For when the bugles loudly blow, 
Full soon shall I be lying low. 

With many a comrade true. 
Etc., etc. 

I have given all I am and have. 

My heart, my head, my hand, 
To you for which I like and love, 

My dear old Fatherland. 

Etc., etc. 

The Chinese child learns spelling from the Confucian 
classics, the German child learned spelling from tales illus- 
trating German military valour. While the English schools 
strive to elevate the child's character by instilling the civic 
virtues, the German schools strove almost exclusively to 
teach discipline and to arouse and to develop the military 
inclinations, or rather the spirit of Jingoism, giving little 
consideration to the training of character and practically 
none to the development of the civic virtues. The birth- 
day of the Emperor and the anniversary of the battle of 



154 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 

Sedan were the two great school festivals, not only in the 
elementary schools but in the higher schools as well, and 
they were celebrated with patriotic songs, recitations, 
speeches, etc. The " Hereditary Enemy " played a very 
large part in the elementary history books of Germany. 
No wonder, then, that the principal, and almost the only, 
game of German school-children consisted in playing at 
soldiers or at Frenchmen and Germans, or at Boers and 
EngUshmen. In Bismarck's words : 

" The mighty influence which the schools exercise in the 
education of the nation consists in this — that the German 
child, when handed over to the teacher, is like a blank sheet 
of paper, and all that is written upon it during the course 
of elementary education is written with indelible ink, and 
will last through life. The soul of a child is like wax. 
Therefore he who directs the school directs the country's, 
future." 

From the earUest time the Prussian Government raised 
in the young an aggressive military patriotism. The Ger- 
man elementary school was a branch establishment of the 
German barracks. 

In view of the rapid growth of the Social Democratic 
Party in Germany, particular stress was, during the last 
few decades, constantly laid upon the duty of the schools 
to combat the Social Democratic movement. In an order 
of the 1st of May 1889 William II. said : 

" I have for a long time been occupied with the thought 
of making use of the schools in their various grades for com- 
bating the spread of Socialistic and Communist ideas. . . . 
The school must endeavour to create in the young the 
conviction that the teachings of Social Democracy contra- 
vene not only the Divine command and Christian morals, 
but are moreover impracticable." 

However, the strenuous exertions of all the German 
schools to fight Socialism, by depicting it as being wicked, 
unpatriotic, and opposed to the Divine command, were 
perfectly fruitless. 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 155 

The aim of the German elementary schools was, accord- 
ing to Dr. Falk, firstly, to promote patriotism ; secondly, 
to foster religion and morality ; thirdly, to fit the young 
for practical life. The tree is known by its fruit, and educa- 
tion by its results. We have seen that the German elemen- 
tary schools largely failed in their first and principal aim. 
Let us now investigate the results of their religious, moral, 
and practical education. 

There were two great religions in Imperial Germany. 
The Roman Catholics, who formed one-third of the popu- 
lation, were pious, but their religiousness was not due to 
the influence of the State schools but to that of their Church, 
as may be seen from the fact that the Protestants of Ger- 
many, who form two- thirds of the population, were not 
at all religious. Protestantism was the State religion of 
Prussia, but all the endeavours of the Government to make 
the people religious were in vain. Church-going was not 
even a social obligation in the Protestant parts of Germany, 
where churches were few. Berlin was, according to the 
complaint of the Emperor William, the capital worst pro- 
vided with churches. Besides, the few Protestant churches 
in existence stood almost empty, if we deduct the soldiers 
and officers who had to attend. 

ReUgiousness and morality ought to manifest themselves 
in action, not merely in church-going. The fact that there 
were on an average every year about 180,000 illegitimate 
births in Germany, while there were only about 50,000 
illegitimate births in Great Britain, and the fact that there 
were every year about 12,000 suicides in Germany, as com- 
pared with only 3,000 suicides in Great Britain, seem to 
prove that the German schools ill-succeeded in fulfilling their 
second aim and object. Both Christianity and morality 
preach toleration. Yet toleration was in Germany con- 
spicuous by its absence. Roman Catholics were ill-treated 
by Protestants, and Jews by both. 

The third aim of the elementary schools of Germany 
was to prepare the young for practical life. As regards 
teaching, the German elementary schools compared favour- 



156 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 

ably with the British elementary schools, not in their com- 
pleteness, but in the wise limitation of their programmes. 
The German elementary schools taught chiefly homely and 
necessary subjects, the elements of knowledge, while the 
English elementary schools, having more ambitious aims, 
strove to give to the child of the people a knowledge more 
for show than for practical use, a smattering of everything, 
but often not a sufficient knowledge of the most necessary 
things, such as writing and spelling. The German child 
learned a few necessary things fairly well, the English child 
learned many things ill, most of which were unnecessary, 
if not positively harmful. The German elementary schools 
educated the young to be successful workers in their station, 
the English elementary schools endeavoured to convert 
the children of the poor into ladies and gentlemen able to 
discuss all the ologies. While German peasant children 
were satisfied to follow the occupation of their fathers, 
English country children learned to hate the country, sneer 
at the rural occupations, and desert the country for town, 
largely in consequence of the townified and totally un- 
suitable primary education which they received. It is a 
misfortune that the town often legislates for the country 
and determines its education. 

The German child learned in the primary school to obey, 
perhaps too slavishly to obey ; English Board School 
education, erring in the opposite direction, gave the child 
too much liberty, often allowed it to disobey, to be unruly. 
German school-children were made to be orderly, punctual, 
courteous, clean ; English Board School children were only 
too often allowed to be dirty, untidy, and rude to their 
teachers, and their teachers had hardly sufficient power to 
correct them when admonition had failed. The German 
teacher was an autocrat with a stick, who, it must be 
admitted, occasionally abused his authority and ill-treated 
the children ; the English teacher was only too often a 
meek man or woman of sorrows, who was ill-treated by the 
children. Discipline was the characteristic of the German 
school, lawlessness that of the Enghsh school. As regards 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 157 

order, discipline, and the sane limitation of learning, I think 
that the German elementary schools compared favourably 
with the English schools, but the German masses were quite 
as ignorant and as narrow-minded as the English masses, 
perhaps more so. 

Unfortunately, English Board Schools have assumed 
more and more the character of charity schools, where charity 
is somewhat indiscriminately distributed to all applicants. 
Hence most parents who can afford to do so send their 
children to private schools, and the Board Schools have 
become the preserve of the children of the poor, and centres 
and breeding-places of social dissatisfaction and revolt. 
In Germany, on the other hand, the children of the rich 
and poor had to mingle as freely in all the schools as in 
the army. The cause of the difference between the English 
and the German educational system is obvious. In Great 
Britain the children of the well-to-do used in the pre-Board 
School times to go to private schools, and the children of 
the poor to charity schools. As the Board Schools were 
unfortunately evolved out of the old charity schools, the 
elementary schools of the English nation were born with 
the pauper stigma attached to them. Hence they are still 
charity schools in the eyes of many people, and it is to 
be feared that a too open-handed, and therefore unwise, 
philanthropy is strengthening that impression . In Germany, 
on the other hand, where compulsory education for all was 
suddenly introduced, so to say on the same day, all children 
had from the first to go to the schools which the Govern- 
ment had provided, especially as the German Government 
distinctly discountenanced the creation of private schools 
which would have infringed upon the education monopoly 
of the State. Numerous large private schools and church 
and chapel schools similar to those existing in England 
are unknown in Germany. While there were in Germany 
before the War 60,000 elementary State schools with 
10,000,000 children, there were only 643 private elementary 
schools with 41,000 children. In other words, in Germany 
only one child out of every 250 went to a private school. 



158 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 

England has class schools and mass schools ; Germany had 
practically only one kind of school — national schools. In 
England education of a class type, or, rather, education 
differentiating absolutely between classes and masses, tends 
to keep classes and masses asunder. In Germany educa- 
tion of a democratic type caused classes and masses to 
commingle. 

The English Board School child receives his tuition, 
his books, and, if necessary, his meals, his boots, and his 
clothes gratis, and the child is thus encouraged to become 
a clamorous, rapacious, and unblushing sponger, relying on 
doles, not on work, for a living. Besides, things which one 
can get for nothing are not appreciated. Consequently 
English parents accept gratuitous education grumblingly, 
and they take often Kttle interest in the training of their 
children. The German parents, on the other hand, have, 
as a rule, to pay for the tuition of their children, for their 
books, etc., and the free gift of meals, boots, and clothes 
to school-children is very little known. Consequently, the 
thrifty German parents mean to get full value for their 
money, and take an interest in their children's education. 
An English child can fairly easily avoid going to school by 
the flimsiest of excuses, and parents often connive at the 
avoidance of school. Therefore school attendance is very 
irregular, and little work is done. In Germany, a rigorous 
supervision and drastic and immediate punishment of 
parents, masters, and others responsible for lack of attend- 
ance causes avoidance of school attendance to be rare. 

Education, as service in the army, is democratic in Ger- 
many, in so far as it is compulsory and equal for all. 
The children of rich and poor sit on the same bench. 
WiUiam II. was educated at the ordinary intermediate school 
of Cassel, sitting in the same room with the sons of pro- 
fessional men, petty tradesmen, and the like. While this 
indiscriminate mixing of the classes and masses in the ele- 
mentary and intermediate schools may, and probably does, 
lower the tone in the upper ranks of German society, it 
certainly tends to raise the masses. The unwashed sons of 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 159 

Grerman artisans feel uncomfortable in their grime when 
looking at their better-cared-for schoolfellows, and learn to 
wash themselves even without compulsion, for example is 
better than precept, while dirty Board School children feel 
quite comfortable, if exclusively surrounded by their more 
or less uncleanly mates. Besides, this mingling of the 
classes urges the children of the poor to become better off 
by hard work and thrift, and kindles ambition in them at 
their most important period of life, while the English School 
Board child is only too apt to herd with the herd, to learn 
to be improvident, and to rely more on the bounty of the 
rich and of the local authorities, who generously provide 
for all, than on his own exertions. The ideal of the 
EngHsh middle-class is to become gentlemen — that is, to 
live a life of ease without work, and the ideal of the poor 
to live a life of ease at the cost of the community, while 
the ideal of the German middle-class and lower-class is to 
become rich by work. Thus education provides a powerful 
stimulus for national activity in Germany, whilst class 
education in England' acts as an incentive to work as little 
as possible. 

The ambition of the children of the German poor often 
causes them to be the best scholars, and the spirit of 
emulation compels the children of the rich, who otherwise 
might be lazy, relying on their fathers' wealth and their 
assured prospects, to work much more energetically than 
they would do in schools where they need compete only 
with their social equals. Owing to the great educational 
opportunities given to the German poor and to the ambition 
awakened in them to get on, many of the leading scientists, 
medical men, lawyers. Government oflficials, etc., of Germany 
have risen from the very lowest social stratum. 

The mingUng of the classes in the lower and the higher 
schools of Germany is due partly to the influence of Luther 
already referred to but chiefly to that of Napoleon I. WTien 
both the professional army and the caste system of Prussia 
were defeated on the fields of Jena and Auerstadt, it became 
clear to Prussian patriots that the era of national armies 



160 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 

and of a national organisation of the State had arrived, that 
the time of class rule, of the " Klassenstaat," had gone by. 
The " Tugendbund," the Moral and Scientific League of 
Virtue, which was created after the disasters of 1806, strove 
to regenerate and to lift up the humiliated country by 
elevating the masses. Stein, Hardenberg, Fichte, Niebuhr, 
and the two Humboldts wished to bind rich and poor, 
classes and masses together for the defence of the country. 
With this object in view they strove to give to all equal 
educational opportunities and an equal intellectual and 
educational stake in the country. Napoleon's motto, 
La carriere ouverte aux talents, was adopted by Prussia. 
Notwithstanding the reactionary tendencies of later times, 
equality in education, which had sprung from the disastrous 
war of 1806-7, remained a characteristic of the Prusso- 
Grerman schools. Hence we do not find in Germany a 
desire to debar the children of the lower classes from a 
liberal education. 

The secondary schools of Imperial Germany were in the 
main cramming establishments of the worst type, and they 
were considered by parents and children as a great but 
unavoidable evil. Professional careers required, as a rule, 
nine years' preparatory study at the Gymnasium which 
German boys enter when nine years old, and between the 
ninth and the eighteenth year German boys studying at the 
Gymnasia were exclusively occupied with cramming. The 
Gymnasium is the classical school of Germany, in which 
Latin and Greek form the nucleus of tuition, and in those 
schools the dead languages, as well as the modern ones, 
were taught in the most pitiful manner. Nothing in litera- 
ture is more beautiful, and nothing can be more elevating 
and more beneficial for the development of the intellect 
and of taste, than the reading of the Greek and Latin classics 
either in the original or in translation ; but the Greek and 
Latin classics were not read but " translated," slowly dis- 
sected, and every fragment carefully exailained under the 
microscope, by the unfortunate scholar under the direction 
of dry-as-dust philologists. A brilliant speech of Cicero or 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 161 

Demosthenes, which must be read in a few hours in order 
to be appreciated, was slowly chewed, re-chewed, and again 
re-chewed during three months. The modern languages 
were taught in the same idiotic fashion, and even the master- 
pieces of German literature were not read and enjoyed, but 
pedantically pulled to pieces line by line and word by word, 
as if it were the aim of the German intermediate schools to 
convert the German nation into a race of philologists. Other 
subjects were similarly treated. History, for instance, was 
learned from handbooks which, in the smallest possible com- 
pass, gave the maximum of facts and dates, and in these 
no attempt was made to show the organic development of 
States and the causes and consequences of historical events. 
The German school-books of history were merely compendia 
of facts and dates, and were about as interesting as a railway 
time-table. During nine years, the unfortunate German 
boys were compelled to commit to memory an immense 
quantity of unconnected, unpalatable, and mostly useless 
information, presented in the most repelling form. 

It may be that nine years of continual cramming improves 
the memory of the pupils, but it seems more likely that the 
memory suffers by being overtaxed. On the other hand, the 
harm done by constant cramming, which is merely under- 
taken for the object of passing an examination, is incalcul- 
able. Since no attempt was made to develop the indepen- 
dent thinking power of the scholars, the unfortunate pupils 
became learned automatons, and though they had some 
knowledge of Latin and Greek and French and various 
sciences, they were usually not able to write German 
correctly. The German newspapers and books were atroci- 
ously written. Since the examination with which the nine 
years' torture ended had to be passed to enable the scholar 
to attend the university and to become a professional man, 
the insane tyranny of the Gymnasium had to be borne. 
When at last freedom dawned for the martyr, the first act 
of those, who after nine years' weary and almost useless 
labour had passed the concluding examination, often was 
to make a bonfire of their books. A German who had passed 



162 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 

the Abiturienten Examen endeavoured, as a rule, to forget 
as rapidly as possible all the useless stufiE which he had to 
learn during nine mis-spent years. 

In order to show that the foregoing statements are not 
exaggerated I would give two German opinions in support 
of them. In the Frankfurter Zeitung of the 14th of December 
1906, an article entitled " Education to Manliness " was 
pubUshed, in which we read : 

" Our schools do not form the character. That is the 
complaint which, more or less clearly formulated, may be 
found in all the books which advocate the reform of our 
education. Our German schools turn men into machines, 
educate them to submissiveness, to cowardice, to pettiness 
and pedantry, to much that is unlovely and pernicious, and 
they fail to form strong-minded, self-conscious men. And 
the State requires nothing more than men, manly men. In 
short, our German schools spoil the character of the child 
and his intelhgence by systematically shackling his mind, 
by cramming his brain, and by filHng it with dead matter. 
Thus the thinking power is killed, individuality is destroyed, 
and the mental horizon and the development of moral senti- 
ment are narrowed and repressed." 

In the preface of his book, Deutsche Schulerziehung, 
Professor W. Rein, one of the leading educational authorities 
of Germany, said : 

" It cannot be denied that our schools have achieved 
much. However, it was thought that the principal object of 
schools was to distribute knowledge so as to prepare youth 
for the labour of active life. Our schools were and are still 
in the main devoted to instilhng knowledge, and in that 
they have done much, but they have neglected the forma- 
tion of character. 

" In this respect the good English schools are no doubt 
ahead of the German schools, because the former strive not 
only to increase knowledge but also to raise men of char- 
acter, firmness, and energy ; and the history of England 
shows clearly to all those who have eyes to see what strong 
and energetic men who know what they are doing are able 
to achieve. Only a few German schools exist where work' 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 163 

Bhops, playing-fields, school-gardens, common walks, and 
excursions break the monotony of the study of dead books. 
" We require educators, not merely teachers. A teacher 
requires nothing but knowledge. An educator requires 
more." 

The authorities responsible for the programme of the 
German Gymnasium probably thought that that institution 
was most admirably adapted for preparing the young 
intelligence for successful professional or administrative 
careers, but they might have been enlightened by the broad- 
minded instructions of Frederick the Great, addressed to 
the professors of the Civil and Military Academy for Young 
Gentlemen, in which the Eang said : 

" The masters shall studiously endeavour not only to 
store the memories of the pupils with useful knowledge, but 
above all to create in them a certain agility of mind, which 
shall render them capable of applying themselves not to one 
study alone but to any that may be found expedient, in 
particular to the cultivation of their reason and to the form- 
ing of their judgment. To this end, it is necessary that the 
masters should accustom their pupils to form just and clear 
ideas of things." 

Frederick the Great wished the young intelligence of the 
nation to be liberally instructed in political matters, for he 
wrote in the same M^moire : 

" The preceptor will confine himself to giving his pupils 
an idea of the rights of citizens, the rights of the people, 
the rights of the monarch, and of that which is called Law. 
He will not fail to impress upon their minds that Law, being 
destitute of any actual sanctity for enforcing its observance, 
is a vain phantom that sovereigns do not fail to display 
in their instructions and manifestoes, though they often 
violate its principles in their own conduct." 

The broad-minded precepts of Frederick the Great were 
utterly forgotten. A highly-educated young German, who 
had spent twelve years at school, had as a rule not sufficient 
knowledge of the political affairs of his country to be able 



164 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 

to read the newspaper with profit, and he had, as a rule, no 
knowledge whatever of his rights. 

Germany had no less than 23 universities, at which 
almost 3,000 professors and lecturers taught about 66,000 
students. The number of the university students in Germany 
has been increasing at a most remarkable rate. In 1870-1, 
there were 12,256 university students in Germany ; in 1911, 
66,358 were counted in that country. In the short space of 
forty years the number of students in the German universi- 
ties had more than quintupled. However, it may be doubted 
whether it is a matter for congratulation that the German 
universities have been turning out an ever-growing army 
of unemployed doctors, lawyers, theologians, and teachers, 
who, by the pressure of their competition, have lowered the 
status of all professions and formed a huge learned, and 
therefore the more dangerous, proletariat. Although the 
German universities were leading in various directions, they 
were scarcely superior to the high schools of Great Britain 
in direct utility. I venture to affirm that the average 
British doctor, lawyer, clergyman, and schoolmaster is dis- 
tinctly superior to his German colleague. The superiority 
of the German universities, which was very great in the 
time when university teaching in Great Britain was at its 
lowest ebb, is a thing of the past. The chief effect of the 
activity of the German universities in creating a huge pro- 
letariat of unemployed professional men is that the output 
of books, mostly worthless, has enormously increased. 
During the last thirty years the number of new books pub- 
lished in Germany has in round figures increased from about 
10,000 to 30,000 per year. 

Although in 1914 Germany was no longer a model to Great 
Britain in elementary, intermediate, and university educa- 
tion, she was no doubt far ahead of England in technical 
education. Therefore the German technical high schools 
were far more popular with foreign students than the German 
universities. Before the War, of the students at the 
polytechnica, 20 per cent, were foreigners ; of the students 
at the forestry academies, 30 per cent, were foreigners ; of 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 165 

the students at the mining academies, almost 40 per cent, 
were foreigners ; of the students at the universities, only 
8 per cent, were foreigners. However, the efficiency of 
technical education in Germany has been very much exag- 
gerated. German technical education, like German general 
education, was rather extensive than intensive, rather showy 
than practical and thorough, and in not a few instances its 
efforts were misdirected. For instance, enormous exertions 
were made to advance architecture and the building trade, 
and no expenses were spared, but the results achieved were 
the reverse of satisfactory. The design of the public and 
private buildings which during the last decade or two were 
erected in Germany was as a rule laboured, unpleasing, or 
ugly, and the inner arrangements were often unpractical. 
The new Reichstag is a case in point. The numerous pre- 
tentious but ugly monuments erected in Berlin and else- 
where also testify to the fact that schools may give know- 
ledge but cannot give ability. There is a German proverb, 
Je gelehrter desto verkehrter, " The greatest fool is a learned 
fool." There is much truth in that saying. 

Germany had a huge number of technical schools of every 
grade. There were technical schools for apprentices, for 
artisans, for foremen, for managers, for directors of in- 
dustrial establishments, for merchants and bankers, etc., 
and every day additional technical schools were created. 
Besides, itinerant instructors visited the villages, which 
were too small to have technical schools of their own. In 
many instances technical education was compulsory. The 
thing was being overdone. Felisch wrote, " We pay for 
our greater theoretical knowledge with diminished practical 
ability," and Von Steinbeis complained, " Theoretical 
education has been given such a preponderance that even 
in our smallest workshops the pedantic spirit of the school 
penetrates the air, a spirit which is not exactly conducive 
to quick and efficient work, and which is absent in countries 
which have arrived at a higher stage of industrial de- 
velopment than Germany." Carl Roscher, speaking of the 
learned proletariat issuing from the Technical High Schools, 



166 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 

complained about the insufficient supply of practical workers 
of the better class, and was of opinion that, " compared 
with England and the United States, the education of our 
young engineers at the Technical High Schools costs too 
much money and too much time." In a lengthy report 
on Grerman technical education, published in 1902 by the 
United States Commissioner of Labour, we read with regard 
to the German Technical High Schools, " The education 
here received often exceeds the real needs of many branches 
of industry. Hence there may result a loss of time which 
could have been devoted to obtaining practical skill." 

Many similar opinions given by high authorities on tech- 
nical education could be quoted, which show that Charlotten- 
burg and the other Technical High Schools of Germany, at 
which an army of more than 12,000 students were trained, 
were not an unmixed blessing. It is not without cause that 
the best engineers in the world are the practically trained 
English and American engineers, although their theoretical 
knowledge may be small, if compared with that of their 
inferior German competitors. It can also not be admitted 
that the industrial success of Germany has been due to 
the general education of the masses of industrial workers. 
The fact that practically every man in Germany can read 
and write had little if anything to do with the progress 
of that country's industries. The Belgian industries were 
comparatively more flourishing than those of Germany ; 
yet in Belgium 10 per cent, of the recruits were unable to 
write. It should also not be forgotten that Great Britain 
had the best workmen in the world at the time when her 
workers were practically uneducated. 

German education had not a few excellent points, but 
in many respects it was exceedingly unsatisfactory. The 
chief practical value of the German schools consisted, in 
my opinion, not in the knowledge disseminated, but in 
the discipline instilled. Enghsh education, and especially 
English primary education, is apt to make men lazy and 
women flighty. German education, on the other hand, 
teaches the young to work, to obey, and before all to obey 



EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 167 

the authorities. German education, both civil and mili- 
tary, had, by its teaching of discipline, created a docile, 
perhaps a too docile, population of willing workers, who 
were easily led. Bagehot wrote : " The natural impulse 
of the English people is to resist authority." In Germany 
no similar spirit of instinctive and unreasoning resistance 
has been noticeable. Therefore national organisation and 
national co-operation in matters political and economic 
could easily be established in that country. It cannot too 
often and too loudly be asserted that Imperial Germany 
became great and powerful not through her education, but 
through her discipline. National co-operation, the co- 
ordination of all the national energies, is a mighty force, but 
co-ordination is impossible without subordination. Unfor- 
tunately the spirit of subordination seems to be incompatible 
with the spirit of Democracy. However, while individualism 
may create disorder, exaggerated drill is apt to produce 
in a nation an abject docility and servility which may ruin it. 

Germany owed her political and economic success cer- 
tainly not to the book knowledge which her citizens received 
in her schools, for the German schools, like all other schools, 
merely turned out a mob of semi-educated mediocrities 
possessed of an overworked and tortured memory and of an 
under-developed or an undeveloped intelligence. Germany, 
with all her schools and universities, and with her army of 
300,000 teachers, was a far less intelligent and far less cul- 
tured nation than the British nation. The general intelli- 
gence and culture of a nation may be measured by the 
Press, which reflects the national mind. Now I think that 
no educated German will contradict me if I state that the 
whole Press of Germany — dailies, weeklies, monthlies — was 
not only vastly inferior to the British Press, but was quite 
unworthy of the intelligence of a cultured nation. 

The foregoing pages, which were written in 1906, show 
that German education has been much overvalued and 
much misunderstood in Great Britain, and it seems to 
be a dangerous experiment to model British education on 
the more unsatisfactory part of German education, the 
12 



168 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 

dissemination of knowledge. After aU, great national 
institutions, such as Parliament, civil service, army, and 
schools, cannot mechanically be copied from other nations, 
because such institutions are not dead things, but living 
organisms which have slowly grown up from a deep historical 
and national foundation. National education and national 
armies must before all be national. They must be in accord- 
ance not only with the peculiar requirements of the country, 
but also with the peculiar character and spirit of its inhabi- 
tants. Those who wish to introduce the German educational 
system into Great Britain can make it a success only if 
they begin by changing the character of EngUshmen. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE FISCAL POLICY OF GERMANY AND ITS RESULTS ^ 

The close of the Napoleonic wars left Germany devas- 
tated, impoverished, and exhausted ; her commerce and her 
industries were destroyed. While the whole Continent had 
been ravaged and ruined by incessant wars and hostile 
invasions, British industries had flourished and prospered 
in internal peace. After the Napoleonic wars the Continent 
remained utterly exhausted for a long time ; its industries 
were shattered, its wealth had disappeared, and during the 
slow progress of its recuperation Great Britain conquered 
the commerce and industries of the world. 

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century. Great 
Britain was the merchant, manufacturer, carrier, banker, 
and engineer of the world. She ruled supreme in the realm 
of business. Two-thirds of the world's shipping flew the 
British flag, two-thirds of the coal produced in the world >^ 
was British ; Great Britain had more miles of railway than 
the whole Continent, and produced more cotton goods and 
more iron than all the countries of the world combined. 
Her coal mines were considered inexhaustible, and the 
coal possessed by other nations was believed to be of such 
inferior quality as to be almost useless for manufacturing 
purposes. She had practically the manufacturing monopoly 
of the world. The great German economist Friedrich 
List wrote in his Zollvereinshlatt : " England is a world in 
itself, a world which is superior to the whole rest of the 
world in power and wealth." 

Many British economists and merchants thought that 

* From the Nineteenth Century and After, August 1903. 
169 



170 ECONOMIC POLICY 

England's economic position was overwhelmingly strong 
and unassailable, that it would be impossible for other 
nations to compete with her in neutral markets or to 
protect with tariffs their own manufactures against the 
invasion of the British industries. During the reign of 
these intoxicating ideas of Great Britain's irresistible 
economic power, Cobden proclaimed that " Great Britain 
is, and always will remain, the workshop of the world." 
Great Britain threw away her fiscal weapons, opened her 
doors wide to all nations, and introduced Free Trade. 

While Great Britain was the undisputed mistress of the 
world's trade, industry, finance, and shipping, Germany 
V/^was a poor agricultural country. She had been impover- 
ished by her constant wars. She had neither colonies nor 
good coal, nor shipping, nor even a rich soil nor a climate 
favourable to agriculture. She was divided into a number 
of petty States which were jealous of one another, and 
which hampered one another's progress. Communications 
in the interior were bad, and her internal trade was ob- 
structed and undeveloped. Besides, she was burdened by 
militarism, and she possessed only one good harbour. 
According to the forecast of the British free traders, Ger- 
many was predestined to remain a poor agricultural country, 
exactly as Great Britain was predestined to remain a rich 
industrial nation. 

At that time arose in Germany "Fripdyj ^^h Ljst . a write r 
on politica l economy and a convinced believer in Protection. 
11'eTiad traveiredand seen the world, and had lived a long 
time in England and the United States. Consequently he 
spoke with greater practical knowledge on internatio aaJ 
affairs than the majority of political economists. His 
principal work. The National System of Political Economy, 
was published in 1840, and created some stir at the time. 
Like Cobden's doctrine of Free Trade, List's system of 
national Protection was hailed with enthusiasm by the 
business men of his country. It was viewed by the German 
Governments with suspicion and dislike. Embittered and 
disappointed by the lack of official appreciation and by the 



ECONOMIC POLICY 171 

persecution of the German Governments, List shot himself 
in 1846. After his death his system rapidly became as 
authoritative for German economic policy as the system 
of Adam Smith was for Great Britain. It became the 
text-book of the German statesmen. Consequently it will 
be interesting to consider some of List's more important 
views. 

At the time when Friedrich List wrote, Great Britain 
was wealthy and powerful, while Germany was poor and 
weak. List endeavoured to show how Great Britain had 
become wealthy, and how Germany also might acquire 
wealth, profiting from Great Britain's example. After in- 
vestigating the economic history of England, he summed 
up the result of his inquiry as follows : 

" The English, by a system of restrictions, privileges, 
and encouragements, have succeeded in transplanting on 
to their native soil the wealth, the talents, and the spirit 
of enterprise of foreigners. This policy was pursued with 
greater or lesser, with speedier or more tardy, success just 
in proportion as the measures adopted were more or less 
judiciously adapted to the object in view, and applied and 
pursued with more or less energy and perseverance. 

" It is true that for the increase in her power and in her 
productive capacity England is indebted not solely to her 
commercial restrictions, to her protective laws, and to her 
commercial treaties, but in a large measure also to her con- 
quests in science and in the arts. 

" How comes it that in these days one million of English 
operatives can perform the work of hundreds of millions ? 
It comes from the great demand for manufactured goods 
which by her wise and energetic policy England has created 
in foreign lands, and especially in her Colonies ; from the 
wise and powerful protection extended to her home indus- 
tries ; from the great rewards which by means of her patent 
laws she has offered to every new discovery ; and from the 
extraordinary facility for inland transport afforded by her 
public roads, canals, and railways. 

" England has for a long time monopoUsed the inventive 
genius of every nation. It is no more than fair that England, 
now that she has attained the culminating point of her 



172 ECONOMIC POLICY 

industrial growth and progress, should restore again to the 
nations of Continental Europe a portion of those productive 
forces which she originally derived from them." 

From these facts List drew the logical conclusion and 
applied it to Germany. He said : 

" Modern Grermany, lacking a system of vigorous and 
united commercial policy, exposed in her home markets 
to competition with a foreign manufacturing power in every 
way superior to her own, while excluded at the same time 
from foreign markets by arbitrary and often capricious 
restrictions, is very far indeed from making that progress 
in industry to which she is entitled by the degree of her 
culture. She cannot even maintain her previously acquired 
position, and is made a convenience of by that very nation, 
until at last the German States have resolved to secure 
their home markets for their own industries by the adoption 
of a united vigorous system of commercial poUcy. 

" We venture to assert that on the development of the 
German protective system depend the existence, the inde- 
pendence, and the future of German nationality. Only in 
the soil of general prosperity does the national spirit strike 
its roots and produce fine blossoms and rich fruits. Only 
from the unity of material interests does unity of purpose 
arise, and from both of these national power." 

The position of disunited Germany in 1840 strangely 
resembled the position of the scattered British Empire of 
1903, and if we insert in the last two paragraphs quoted 
the word " British Empire " for " Germany " List's words 
might easily be attributed to Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. 

By a curious coincidence List wrote in Germany when 
Cobden and his disciples preached their gospel in Great 
Britain. The British free traders, who, with their universal 
theory and their cosmopohtan views, ignored the existence 
of nations, naturally did not like to see a pronouncedly 
national system of political economy arise. List's book 
was vigorously attacked by Free Traders. The Edinburgh 
Review devoted, in July 1842, an article of no less than 
forty-two pages to his book, in which we find expressions of 
contempt such as " a pretended system," " his poor miscon- 



ECONOMIC POLICY 173 

ception of the doctrines which he tries to brand with the 
nickname of cosmopolitan economy," " his treatise is un- 
worthy of notice," " unworthy of grave criticism," etc. 
The writer of that article, however, did not confine himself 
to abuse, but " proved " to his own satisfaction that, whereas 
England was, and ever would remain, the workshop of the 
world, Germany was, and ever would remain, a poor 
agricultural country, and that all attempts to build up 
industries in Germany under the shelter of Protection were 
misdirected and would prove a failure. The writer said : 

" The manufactures in which our author exults are an 
evil to Germany. The labour and capital which that country 
has expended upon them have been forced from more 
profitable employments." 

The Edinburgh Review sapiently concluded : 

" In Continental countries they naturally reason thus : 
' England has protected her manufactures — England is 
rich ; if we protect our manufactures we shall be as rich as 
she is.' They forget that England has unrivalled natural 
capacities for manufacturing and commercial industry, and 
that no country with capacities distinctly inferior can ascend 
to an equal prosperity by any pohcy whatever." 

We have now heard the voice of the English and of the 
German prophet of the 'forties of the last century. Since 
then Germany has had almost uninterrupted Protection, 
and Great Britain almost uninterrupted Free Trade. Ger- 
many, which was then a country without experience in 
industry, finance, commerce, and shipping, without capital, 
without colonies, without good coal, with only one good 
harbour, a country weighed down by militarism, convulsed 
by three great wars and a revolution, and, according to Free 
Trade doctrines, " kept back " by Protection, became 
nevertheless so wealthy and powerful that before the War 
she competed with England in all foreign markets and even 
in the home market, that she had some of the swiftest ships 
on the ocean, that she was paramount in some of the most 
important industries, and that she could even afford to 



174 ECONOMIC POLICY 

emulate Great Britain's fleet after having created for herself 
the strongest army in the world. 

. Germany's progress under Protection was steady, con- 
tinuous, and rapid. Between 1850 and 1900 Germany's 
production of iron, her consumption of cotton, and her 
savings banks deposits have grown gigantically. In 1914 
her population had about four times the amount of savings 
in the savings banks which was to be found in the British 
savings banks. Sixty years ago the average wages of 
British workmen were, according to List, four times as high 
as the average wages of the German workmen. Before the 
War German wages and British wages were equally high in 
many instances. Hence German wages have under Pro- 
tection risen fourfold in many trades. From a poor debtor 
country, Germany had become a rich creditor country. 
Formerly she had to borrow money in foreign countries and 
on onerous terms. In 1914 German capital invested abroad 
amounted probably to about £2,000,000,000. 

In view of her triumphant economic progress, the economic 
policy and views of leading Germans should be of great 
interest. 

Free Trade has never had much influence in Germany, 
because Free Trade never flourishes in a struggling country. 
Free Trade is an excellent policy for industries of irresistible 
strength. Those industries which need not fear competi- 
tion, which feel assured of a free market abroad and at 
home, always favour Free Trade, while strugghng industries 
always favour Protection. In France the Gironde, with its 
matchless wines, is in favour of Free Trade. In the United 
States the cotton belt and the wheat districts are for Free 
Trade, while the industrial parts are for Protection. In 
Germany, where neither nature nor exertion had given 
to any industry an overwhelming power, the idea of Free 
Trade had never taken hold of the country or of any part 
of it. Jhering, the greatest German jurist of his time, 
expressed very happily the ideas of the leading circles in 
Germany on Free Trade when he wittily said : " It is a 
matter of course that the wolves demand freedom of action 



ECONOMIC POLICY 175 

for themselves, but if the sheep raise the same demand it 
only proves that they are sheep." The demand for Free 
Trade arose in Great Britain from the cotton industry, and 
List was not slow in pointing out the real cause of that 
demand. In his weekly paper, the Zollvereinsblatt, he drew 
attention to the fact that England was then practically the 
only cotton manufacturer in the world, that the British 
cotton industry was by far the most powerful exporting 
industry in the world, and that the demand of the British 
cotton manufacturers for Free Trade was as natural as 
for the other countries was resistance to that demand. 

A certain number of Free Traders existed in Germany, 
such as Prince-Smith, Wiss, Ascher, Michaelis, Wirth, 
Hiibner, Soetbeer, Braun, Bamberger, Bohmert, Emming- 
haus, Lammers, Meyer, Eras, Wolff. These men were 
mostly professors, journahsts, and authors. They were 
therefore never considered in their country as the spokes- 
men of the productive industries. It is interesting to note 
that the chief representative of Free Trade in Germany was 
Prince-Smith, an Enghshman, and by profession an author. 
In merchant and banking circles, especially in Hamburg, 
Free Trade found naturally more support, for the purely 
distributive business of the merchant and the banker is 
greatly hampered by irksome and often vexatious customs 
regulations. Besides, it is immaterial to merchants and 
bankers whether they trade in foreign goods and bills or in 
domestic ones, and unless patriotism is stronger than busi- 
ness instinct these two classes always incUne towards Free 
Trade. In consideration of these circumstances their plead- 
ings were ignored, and the German Government made up 
its mind to look chiefly after the interests of the productive 
industries, which were considered to be the only basis of a 
nation's wealth. 

Bismarck, when referring in the Reichstag to the German 
Free Traders, said : " They do not sow, neither do they 
spin — nevertheless they are clothed and fed," He delighted 
in describing them as people who pore all day long in their 
study over books and papers, and who are perfectly un- 



17« ECONOMIC POLICY 

acquainted with business life. His practical mind observed 
that the men who in later years directed the commercial 
policy of Great Britain were clergymen, like Adam Smith, 
Malthus, and the elder Mill, that Ricardo was a stockbroker, 
that Cobden went bankrupt, that Bright was a cotton manu- 
facturer, and therefore personally interested in the estabhsh- 
ment of Free Trade, and that Villiers was a lawyer. In 
private conversation his derision of these men knew no 
bounds. Nevertheless his standing instructions were that 
his unflattering remarks on these men and on " Professor " 
Gladstone should not get into the papers. 
I According to Bismarck's opinion Free Trade in England 
was a most excellent thing — ^for Germany — and he did not 
like to see that happy state of affairs altered. Therefore 
he wished neither to see the Free Traders of Great Britain, 
whose rule was such a blessing to his country, attacked by 
the German press nor Great Britain's belief in the panacea 
of Free Trade shaken. Nevertheless when the German 
Free Traders became too loud in their praise of British 
Free Trade, of which they had no practical knowledge, he 
had a pamphlet written on the Cobden Club by Lothar 
Bucher, his confidential assistant, in which he declared, 
" The Manchester Free Trade agitation is the most colossal 
and the most audacious campaign of poUtical and economic 
deception which the world has ever seen." 

While some of the minor pohtical economists of Germany 
were Free Traders, WiUielm Roscher, a leading economist, 
considered Free Trade as impracticable and unattainable. 
He wrote : 

" When the feeling that all mankind constitutes one 
family has abohshed all poUtical boundaries, and when 
universal righteousness and love have killed all national 
ambitions and jealousies, differences between nations will 
become of rare occurrence. However, arguments presup- 
posing such a state of affairs are not admissible before it has 
been clearly proved that such ideal conditions exist. It is 
so improbable that such an ideal state will ever be created, 
and universal ' philanthropy ' is something so suspicious, the 



ECONOMIC POLICY 177 

people are so unable to develop except when they constitute 
a nation, that I should look at the disappearance of national 
jealousies with concern. Nothing contributed more to the 
subjection of Greece by Macedon and Rome than the cos- 
mopolitanism of Greek philosophers." 

Professor von Treitschke, the historian, condemned Free 
Trade from the historian's point of view. He wrote in his 
Politih : 

" We have found it to be an erroneous idea that Protection 
is only necessary for young industries. Old industries, too, 
require protection against foreign competition. In this 
respect ancient Italy teaches us a terrible lesson. If pro- 
tective tariffs against Asiatic and African bread stuSs had 
been introduced in time, the old Italian peasantry would 
have been preserved and the social conditions of Italy would 
have remained healthy. But Roman traders could import 
cheap grain from Africa without hindrance, the rural 
industries decayed, the rural population disappeared, and 
the Campagna, which surrounds the capital, became a vast 
desert." 

Professor Mommsen expressed the same view in his 
Bomische Geschichte. 

One of the younger political economists, Mr. Victor Leo, 
said in The Tendencies of the World's Commerce : 

" Protective tariffs must continue, and a moderate increase 
of them cannot be considered as a misfortune. In practice 
it is not possible simply to drop entire industries because 
similar industries can produce more cheaply somewhere 
else. From the point of view of the world economist it is 
correct to insist on a division of labour which gives to every 
nation those industries for which it is most adapted ; 
from the point of view of the national economist the dis- 
advantages resulting from such a policy would be greater 
than the advantage to the consumer of being able to buy 
the article in question at a cheaper price." 

The belief that Free Trade presupposes a universal 
brotherhood among the nations, and is therefore impractic- 
able, was general in Germany. Therefore we read in the 



178 ECONOMIC POLICY 

article " Free Trade " in BrocTchaus's Encyclopedia , which 
faithfully reflects the mind of the nation : 

" As long as mankind is divided into autonomous States 
possessing individual institutions, no State must expose 
itself to the danger, which is not only an economic but also 
a political and social danger, that home production should 
lose its independence by over-powerful foreign competition. 
... A weaker State, if it wishes to preserve an independent 
existence, is absolutely justified in safeguarding its imper- 
fect means of production against foreign competition by 
Protection." 

In spite of the almost universal opposition to Free Trade, 
Protection was not elevated to a dogma in Germany. It 
was considered merely as a policy, which was well adapted 
to the requirements of the time, but which, like every 
policy, was subject to reconsideration in altered circum- 
stances. Professor Schmoller, the distinguished lecturer at 
Berlin University, stated : 

" Protection and Free Trade are for me not principles, 
but remedies for the political and economic organism which 
are prescribed according to the state of the nation. A 
doctor who would say that he prescribed on principle to 
every patient restringentia or laxaniia would be considered 
insane. However, that is the idea both of the extreme 
Free Trader and of the extreme Protectionist." 

Professor Biermer wrote, using a similar metaphor : 

" Protection and Free Trade, rightly considered, are not 
questions of principle, but only remedies of political and 
economic therapeutics which, according to the state of the 
patient, have to be prescribed sometimes in big ajid some- 
times in small doses." 

Professor Roscher wrote : 

" The greater the extent of a territory protected by 
tariffs, the sooner will active competition spring up within 
its frontiers. Foreign markets are always uncertain. Hence 
all customs unions between related States are to be recom- 
mended, not only as financially, but also as economically 
advantageous." 



ECONOMIC POLICY 179 

The uncertainty of foreign markets and the danger of 
becoming dependent for one's very existence on foreign 
markets and on foreign goodwill became a matter of the 
greatest concern to the statesmen and political economists 
of Germany. Therefore there arose a feverish anxiety in 
poUtical circles to acquire colonial possessions and to found 
a Central European Customs Union, while the political 
economists loudly warned the country against Germany 
becoming economically dependent on foreign nations. Pro- 
fessor Oldenberg said : 

" When our home industries work for exportation and 
live on foreign countries by exchanging their produce for 
foreign food, the huge industrial structure of Germany 
branches sideways into the air and is made to rest on 
pillars of trade which are erected on foreign ground. But 
those pillars, which support our very existence, will remain 
standmg only for so long as it pleases the owner of the ground. 
Some day, when he wishes to use his own land, he cuts off 
the pillars of our existence from under us and thus jbreaks 
down the building which we have reared on them." 

Another economist, Mr. Paul Voigt, wrote : 

" The loss of our export trade would bring starvation to 
the masses of German workers, and compel them to emigrate 
and to beg before the doors of foreign nations for work and 
for food. The collapse of our export trade would be the 
most terrible catastrophe in German history and would rank 
with the Thirty Years' War as a calamity. It would wipe 
out the German nation from the great nations of the world 
and might end its political existence." 

The cotton famine in Lancashire, the constantly growing 
dependence of Great Britain on foreign food and raw 
material, the numerous " corners " in grain and cotton 
under which England had to suffer, made a deep and lasting 
impression in Germany. 

Before 1879 there had been a period of moderate Free 
Trade in Germany, and in consequence German industries 
were acutely suffering. At last Bismarck intervened and 
inaugurated in that year a strongly protective policy. 



180 ECONOMIC POLICY 

Since then Germany's prosperity has grown by leaps and 
bounds. Up to the early 'eighties Germany was only 
known as the provider of inferior goods, which were usually 
clumsy imitations of English goods. Soon afterwards 
Germany conquered the markets of the world with pro- 
ducts of high excellence. 

There were always many Free Traders in the German 
Reichstag, as that assembly was largely composed of pro- 
fessional men and of men belonging to the leisured class 
who were consumers, who could easily understand the 
" consumers' argument." Consequently, Bismarck's de- 
mand for Protection met with considerable opposition from 
the parliamentarians and from bankers and merchants. 
Agriculture and the manufacturing industries enthusias- 
tically supported him. It must be interesting for EngUsh- 
men of all classes to follow Bismarck's arguments in favour 
of Protection. In his speech of the 2nd of May 1879, in 
which he introduced his protective policy, he said : 

" I do not mean to discuss Protection and Free Trade 
in the abstract. . . . We have opened wide the doors of 
our State to the imports of foreign countries, and we have 
become the dumping-ground for the over-production of all 
those countries. Germany being swamped by the surplus 
production of foreign nations, prices have been depressed, 
and the development of all our industries and our entire 
economic position has suffered in consequence. If the 
danger of Protection were as great as we are told by enthu- 
siastic free traders, France would have been impoverished 
long ago, for she has had Protection since the time of 
Colbert, and she should have been ruined long ago, owing 
to the theories which have guided her economic policy. 

" After my opinion, we are slowly bleeding to death 
owing to insufficient Protection. This process has been 
arrested for a time by the five milliards which we have 
received from France after the war ; otherwise we should 
have been compelled already five years ago to take those 
steps which we. are taking to-day. 

" We demand a moderate Protection for German labour. 
Let us close our doors and erect some barriers in order to 
reserve to German industries at least the home market, in 



ECONOMIC POLICY 181 

which German good nature is at present being exploited 
by the foreigner. The problem of a large export trade is 
always an extremely delicate one. No more new countries 
will be discovered ; the world has been circumnavigated, 
and we can no longer find abroad new purchasers of import- 
ance to whom we can send our goods. 

" In questions such as these I view scientific theories with 
the same doubt with which I regard the theories applied 
to other organic formations. Medical science, as con- 
trasted with anatomy, has made Uttle progress with regard 
to those parts which the eye cannot reach, and to-day the 
riddle of organic changes in the human body is as great as 
it was formerly. With regard to the organism of the State, 
it is the same thing. The dicta of abstract science do not 
influence me in the slightest. I base my opinion on the 
practical experience of the time in which we are living. I 
see that those countries which possess Protection are pros- 
pering, and that those countries which possess Free Trade 
are decaying. Mighty England, that powerful athlete, 
stepped out into the open market after she had strength- 
ened her sinews, and said, Who will fight me ? I am pre- 
pared to meet everybody. But England herself is slowly 
returning to Protection, and in some years she will take 
it up in order to save for herself at least the home market." 

On the 14th of June 1882 Bismarck, in another speech 
on Protection and Free Trade, said : 

" I beheve the whole theory of Free Trade to be wrong. 
. . . England has aboUshed Protection after she had benefited 
by it to the fullest extent. That country used to have the 
strongest protective tariffs until it had become so powerful 
under their protection that it could step out of those 
barriers like a gigantic athlete and chaUenge the world. 
Free Trade is the weapon of the strongest nation, and 
England has become the strongest nation owing to her 
capital, her iron, her coal, and her harbours, and owing 
to her favourable geographical position. Nevertheless she 
protected herself against foreign competition with exorbi- 
tant protective tari£Es imtil her industries have become so 
powerful." 

It is very interesting to observe that Prince Bismarck 
predicted in 1882 that Great Britain would have to go 



182 ECONOMIC POLICY 

back to Protection, " in order to secure for herself at least 
the home market,''^ and that the demands for Protection 
which were advanced by List in 1840, and by Bismarck in 
1879, were based on the same arguments which were used 
by Mr. Chamberlain. 

German Free Traders of course predicted that Protection 
would bring disaster to the German industries and especi- 
ally to the German export trade. These objections were very 
effectively dealt with by the German political economists. 
Professor SchmoUer, for instance, said in 1879 : 

" Exports will certainly suffer in one or the other branch, 
but that is a point of minor consideration. At present the 
conditions of our export business are so bad that they can 
hardly become worse. Our export trade can only become 
better if we have commercial treaties and an autonomous 
tariff." 

The Society for Social Policy in Berlin adopted the follow- 
ing resolution : 

" Considering that our endeavours to conclude com- 
mercial treaties, which will open new markets to German 
industries, must prove unsuccessful in view of the present 
position of the world, and 

" Considering that it will be necessary to increase some 
important duties in order to place the finances of the 
Empire on a firm basis, 

" The Society for Social Policy declares itself in favour 
of a moderate fiscal reform in a commercio-political and 
protectionist direction by a tariff which is especially directed 
against those countries which are particularly harmful to 
German production." 

The beneficial effect of the protective tariff on German 
industries was immediate. On the 16th of March 1881 
Mr. von Kardorff stated in the German Diet that 85,901 men 
were occupied in the German iron and steel industries in 
January 1879, and 98,224 men in January 1881. Mr. 
iLoewe, another member of the Diet, reported on the same 
date that in the important districts of Bochum and Dort- 



/ 



ECONOMIC POLICY 183 

mund wages had risen from 5 to 15 per cent., and that 
the men who some years ago had been only partly occupied 
were now fully occupied. Some had formerly been working 
only three or four days a week. Other deputies gave 
similar reports. This rising tendency of wages continued 
almost uninterruptedly from 1879 down to 1914. How 
rapidly the wealth of Germany had grown since 1879 and 
how wealthy Grermany had become is well known. 



13 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE RURAL INDUSTRIES OF GERMANY ^ 

Until the War had opened their eyes most EngUshmen 
believed that a European State could not possess at the 
same time flourishing manufacturing and prosperous rural 
industries. Yet Germany possessed bo'Ji highly-developed 
manufacturing industries and an exceedingly flourishing 
agriculture. Therefore, it is worth while to study the 
agricultural prosperity of Germany and its causes ; for if 
Germany could make her rural industries pay, Great Britain, 
which is far more favoured by Nature, should certainly be 
able to do likewise. 

Compared with Great Britain, Germany possesses a poor 
soil, an unfavourable geographical position and structure, 
and an unfavourable cHmate, her winter being long and 
very severe. Her transport facilities for agricultural pro- 
duce by land and water were formerly quite insufficient, 
and even now her agricultural produce has to be carried for 
hundreds of miles inland to the markets, while British fields 
are everywhere in easy reach of the sea. In East Prussia 
and Pomerania, for instance, there are agricultural districts 
which lie twenty miles from the nearest railway station. 
The rural labour of Germany also was, and probably is 
still, inferior to that of Great Britain. A century ago, the 
German peasants were serfs — serfdom lingered in places 
until the middle of the nineteenth century — and until 1914 
the independence of the peasantry was, in many parts of 
Germany, more theoretical than real. Therefore Germany's 
rural population was, and in certain parts of Germany is 

1 From the Contemporary Review^ November 1905. 
184 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 185 

still, obstinately and stupidly conservative. When Frede- 
rick the Great distributed clover seed to the peasantry, 
they refused to sow it. When ordered to sow the seed, they 
boiled it first in order to prevent it sprouting. When given 
seed potatoes, they boiled the seed potatoes before putting 
them in the ground. 

Owing to the poverty of the soil, the inclemency of the 
climate, long distances, the difficulties of transport, and 
the backwardness and poverty of her rural population, 
agriculture in Germany was extremely primitive when it 
was highly successful and prosperous in England. Some 
decades ago, prices for corn and meat were exceedingly low 
in Germany, cattle were kept chiefly for ploughing and for 
manure, and were largely fed on straw. Agricultural Ger- 
many used to bear an aspect similar to that of agricultural 
Russia of to-day. However, during forty or fifty years, 
the rural industries of Germany have continually pro- 
gressed, and they have progressed even during those decades 
when Great Britain suffered from an unparalleled agricul- 
tural depression. 

Between 1875 and 1908, 3,200,000 acres which were under 
cereals, and 1,000,000 acres which were under green crops, 
went out of cultivation in Great Britain. But, notwith- 
standing the great increase of pastures, the number of live 
stock in Great Britain had, during that time, increased by 
only 10 per cent. If we now turn from this dismal picture 
of decay to Germany, we find that during the most trying 
period of British agriculture, the rural industries of Germany 
showed the following record : 

AoBiouiiTirRAL Area of Germany 
Hectares ( 1 hectare is equal to 2 i acres) 

Corn crops. Oreen crops, 

1883 15,723,970 6,700,600 

1893 15,992,120 7,018,120 

1900 16,050,990 7,437,790 

1913 16,250,900 7,891,000 

From the foregoing figures we see that, during a period 
when, in Great Britain, an enormous area which was under 



Oardcns. 


Grasslands. 


415,950 


3,336,830 


472,620 


2,760,350 


482,790 


2,285,740 


536,600 


1,380,700 



186 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 



the plough was abandoned to grass, the area under grass in 
Germany has shrunk by almost two thirds, because it has 
been taken under the plough and has been converted into 
fields. And while the acreage of fields on which cereals 
and vegetables are grown has been considerably increased, 
agricultural processes have been so greatly improved that 
each acre of agricultural land produces now very much 
more than it used to do. This appears from the following 
table : 

Yield pee Hectare of Geound in Kilogeammes 





Wheat. 


Rye. 


Barley. 


Oats. 


Potatoes. 


Bay. 


1893 


1670 


1490 


1480 


1070 


13.410 


2230 


1895 


1640 


1320 


1680 


1550 


12,390 


3700 


1897 


1700 


1370 


1560 


1430 


11,010 


4280 


1899 


1910 


1480 


1820 


1720 


12,290 


4040 


1901 


1580 


1400 


1790 


1600 


14,670 


3760 


1903 


1970 


1650 


1950 


1840 


13,250 


4450 


1905 


1920 


1560 


1790 


1570 


14,570 


4410 


1907 


1990 


1610 


2060 


2090 


13,810 


4170 


1909 


2050 


1850 


2120 


2120 


14,050 


3710 


1910 


1990 


1700 


1850 


1840 


13,190 


4740 


1911 


2060 


1770 


1990 


1780 


10,350 


3370 


1912 


2260 


1850 


2190 


1940 


15,030 


4680 


1913 


2360 


1910 


2240 


2190 


15,860 


4930 



From the foregoing tables it appears that while the 
agricultural area of Germany has been considerably extended 
the produce per acre has been universally and enormously 
increased. At the same time the live stock of Germany has 
astonishingly multiplied, notwithstanding the great shrink- 
age of grass lands. The following figures give a record of the 
fluctuation in the numbers of live stock since 1873 : 







Live Stock of 


Gbbtvtany 






Horses. 


Cattle. 


Sheep. 


Pigs. 


1873 


3,352,231 


15,776,702 


24,999,406 


7,124,088 


1883 


3,522,525 


15,786,764 


19,189,715 


9,206,195 


1892 


3,836,256 


13,555,694 


13,589,612 


12,174,288 


1897 


4,038,485 


18,490,772 


10,866,772 


14,274,557 


1900 


4,184,099 


19,001,106 


9,672,143 


16,758,436 


1907 


4,337,263 


20,589,856 


7,681,072 


22,080,008 


1913 


4,523,059 


20,994,344 


5,520,837 


25,659,140 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 187 

From the foregoing table we see that, while British live 
stock, notwithstanding the enormous increase of the area 
under grass, has increased by only about 10 per cent., the 
horses of Germany have increased by about 33 per cent.,V. 
the cattle by about 33 per cent., and the pigs by no less than ' 
250 per cent., in spite of the decrease of pasture land. It is 
true that at the same time the number of sheep has declined 
by more than 19,000,000, largely owing to the shrinkage of 
pasture land which was turned into fields ; but this shrink- 
age is not BO serious as it seems. In Germany two pigs 
represent about the same value as do five sheep. Con- 
sequently, the 19,000,000 pigs which had been added repre- 
sented more than double the value of the 19,000,000 sheep 
which had been lost. 

The total area of Imperial Germany was about 70 per 
cent, greater than that of Great Britain, and as the popula- 
tion of Germany was about 50 per cent, larger, Great Britain 
was not much more densely populated than Germany. 
Hence both countries could be fairly compared in size and 
population with regard to agriculture. Now, both per 
square mile of territory and per thousand of population, 
there were more horses and far more cattle in Germany than 
in Great Britain. Besides, there were five times more pigs. 
Only in sheep Great Britain had a great advantage over 
Germany, but this was not an advantage for which German 
agriculturists were envious. Sheep require to be kept in 
the open, on grass land. Hence, only waste lands in the 
interior of Australia and of Argentina, but not valuable 
agricultural land in populous parts of Europe and in the 
immediate vicinity of their natural markets, were considered 
in Germany proper for rearing sheep. The soil of Germany 
was thought to be too valuable to serve as prairie land. 

How severely the value of agricultural land had fallen 
in Great Britain before the War is well known. In Germany 
agricultural land had not fallen, but had considerably in 
creased in value with the increase in its productive power. 

If a German agriculturist fails, his lands are sold by 
pubhc auction. Consequently the statistics of forced sales 



188 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 



give a good indication of the position of Germany's agri- 
culture. The number of forced sales declined since 1886 
as follows, in Prussia : 



1886-7 

1889-90 

1892-3 

1895-6 

1898-9 

1903 

1907 

1909 



Forced Sales in Prussia 



2975 holdings 

2014 

2299 

1834 

1210 

1047 

737 

668 



On an average not one holding out of every two thousand 
was yearly sold by public auction, and it should be noted 
that, on an average, nine-tenths of these sales took place 
in Eastern Germany, where pecuHar agricultural conditions 
prevailed, which will be described in the course of this 
chapter, and that the larger part of the holdings sold con- 
sisted of large farms and estates from one hundred and 
twenty-five acres upwards. Forced sales were exceedingly 
rare in the middle and west of Germany, and especially in 
the case of small and medium-sized farms. 

How exceedingly profitable agriculture was in Germany 
may be seen by comparing it with that of Great Britain. 
If we make such a comparison, we find not only that there 
was proportionately far more live stock in Germany than 
in this country, but also that the area under corn -crops, 
potatoes, etc., was six times as great as in Great Britain, 
and that the rural industries of Germany afforded a very 
good livelihood to a population which was many times 
greater than that of this country. 

We shall now inquire why Germany, with a poor soil, I 
an unfavourable climate, bad geographical conditions, and' 
a somewhat intractable peasantry, possessed a prosperous 
and vigorously expanding agriculture, while the agriculture 
of Great Britain, which possesses a better soil, better 
climate, a better geographical position, a more open-minded 
and progressive rural population, better markets, and which 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 189 

I 
had a far better start, and far more capital, was rapidly | 

decaying. 

If before the War a man took a railway trip through the 
British Islands, and looked frequently out of the window, 
he noticed chiefly grass fields, which covered 60 per cent, 
of the agricultural area of the United Kingdom, but he 
rarely saw cereals growing. If he took a railway journey 
through Germany, he would see chiefly cereals, which, in 
that country, take up more than 60 per cent, of the agri- 
cultural ground. The proportion of grass lands in Germany 
was no greater than the proportion of oat -fields in Great 
Britain. In other words, pastures were met with as rarely 
in Germany as oat-fields in Great Britain. 

The following most important table shows how agricul- 
tural land was owned in Germany. It gives a bird's- 
eye view of the distribution of agricultural land in that 
country. 

AGBICXJIiTURAL HOLDINGS IN GERMANY IN 1907 



Size of Holdings. 


Number of 
Holdings. 


Acreage 
Hectares (1 Hec- 


Percentage 
of Agricul- 




tare = 2J Acres). 


tural Area 


Less than 5 acres . 


3,378,509 


1,731,317 


5-4 


5 to 12^ acres 


1,006,277 


3,304,872 


10-4 


12^ to 50 acres 


1,065,539 


10,421,565 


32-7 


50 to 125 acres 


225,697 


6,821,301 


21-4 


125 to 250 acres . 


36,494 


2,500,805 


7-9 


250 to 1250 acres . 


20,068 


4,503,159 


14-2 


1250 and more acres 


3,498 


2,551,854 


8-0 


Tota] 


5,736,082 


31,834,873 


100-0 



In the whole of Germany there were, in 1907, 5,736,082 
agricultural properties, and the average size of the pro- 
perties was about fifteen acres. It is remarkable that there 
were no less than 3,378,509 individual holdings of an average 
size of three acres and under. On the other hand, it should 
be observed that by far the greater part of the agricultural 
area of Germany, namely, 84 per cent, of the total, was 
owned by agriculturists who cultivated more than 12^ acres. 
Consequently, it is apparent that German agricultural land 



190 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

I was chiefly exploited by farmer-peasants, who possessed 
I substantial properties. 

The difference in the size of the individual holdings 
appears to bring with it a striking difference in the way in 
which these were cultivated. Imperial Germany could be 
divided into two agricultural spheres — the Eastern part 
and the Central and Western part. The east of Germany 
is flat, sandy, and somewhat thinly populated. It is in- 
sufficiently opened by waterways and railways, and land 
was chiefly in the hands oiaristQ CTSktic owners, who possessed 
large, and sometimes huge, estates. In the middle and the 
west of Germany the country is broken, the soil is more 
fruitful, the population is denser, manufactures prevail, 
markets are near at hand, waterways and railways are 
plentiful, and land was chiefly held by small farmers and 
peasants who, as a rule, worked on freehold land. 

In Prussia of the properties below five acres, 73*4 per 
cent, were freehold ; of those from five acres to fifty acres, 
87*3 per cent, were freehold ; of those from fifty to two 
hundred and fifty acres, 93 per cent, were freehold ; of those 
above two hundred and fifty acres, 81*8 per cent, were free- 
hold. It therefore appears that the proportion of free- 
holders was smallest among the very small and among the 
very large proprietors. Of the properties of medium size 
which covered the greater part of agricultural Germany, 
the proportion of freehold land was largest, and more than 
90 per cent, of the ground of medium -sized agricultural 
estabhshments consisted of freehold properties. 

The small agriculturists of Germany produced, on the 
whole, larger harvests per acre than did the large land- 
owners, who cultivated their fields with hired labour. 
Largely owing to this difference, the middle and the west 
of Germany were chiefly devoted to intensive culture. In 
the east of Germany, where the large landowners were, 
we find poor fields, less thorough cultivation, and smaller 
crops. East Germany thus resembled Great Britain not 
only in this, that the land was in the hands of a few large 
owners, who liked to enjoy themselves in town, and who 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 191 

left the supervision of their estates to their paid underlings ; 
but a further resemblance to Great Britain could be found 
in the fact that, in those districts, the raising of live stock 
was more developed than the cultivation of the soil. Never- 
theless, the small landowners in the middle and the west 
of Grermany were not only more efficient in agriculture, 
but also in stock-raising, for the small agriculturists raised 
on their holdings far more horses, cattle, and pigs per acre 
than did the large proprietors in the east. Some years ago 
the German live stock was distributed as follows between 
large and small agriculturists : 

Average Quantity of Live Stock kept on 250 
Acres of Ground 

On properties from On properties from 50 acre* 

5 to 50 acres. and more. 

16 horses ..... 11 horses 

147 cattle 37 cattle 

242 pigs 20 pigs 

In Germany one head of cattle was considered to be equal 
in value to two -thirds of a horse, or to four pigs. If we now 
reduce the live stock kept on the farms of the two types 
given to " pig-units," if such a word may be used, we find 
that the owners of fifty and more acres raised only 227 
pig-units on the same quantity of ground on which smaller 
farmers raised 915 pig -units. In other words, on an area 
of the same size small agriculturists raised a little more 
than four times as much live stock as was raised by the 
larger landowners. 

The following somewhat more detailed figures give a most 
interesting picture of the greatly varying density of the 
live-stock population on farms of different sizes. They 
show that small holdings were most favourable for raising 
pigs, that middle-sized properties were most suitable for 
raising cattle and horses, and that large properties were least 
suitable for raising live stock, except for comparatively 
valueless sheep. In Germany one pig is estimated to be 
equal in value to two and a half sheep, as has already been 
mentioned. 



192 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 



Average Number of Animals per 250 Acres on Properties 
of Various Sizes in 1907 

Size of Holding. 
Below 1 J acres 
1 J to 5 acres . 
6 to 12 J acres 
12^ to 50 acres 
50 to 250 acres 
250 to 500 acres 
500 and more acres 



Horses. 


Cattle. 


Pigs. 


Sheep 


1-5 


31-7 


319-0 


29-0 


3-3 


59-7 


128-6 


12-6 


5-6 


73-2 


71-3 


. 8-3 


9-6 


57-2 


47-5 


10-5 


9-5 


42-0 


29-0 


18-4 


6-6 


17-3 


14-0 


44-0 


6-4 


22-0 


13-3 


50-3 



From the foregoing tables it appears that the large holdings 
of Germany were unfavourable to the thorough pursuit of 
agriculture and to efficiency in cattle -raising as well. But 
here, as in other things, les extremes se touchent. If holdings 
become too small, animals can neither be raised nor be 
employed in the field, spade work becomes necessary, and 
human labour has to take the place of animal labour or 
machine labour. 



Animals kept in June 1907 on Agricultural Properties only 

On Properties of 
Less than 5 acres 
6 to 12 i acres . 
12 i to 50 acres. 



50 to 250 acres. 
250 acres and more 



Horses. 

71,369 

241,636 

1,323,290 

1,202,176 

652.536 



Cattle. 
1,315,572 
3,155,323 
7,873,092 
5,305,871 
2,327,291 



Pigs. 
4,383,244 
3,107,008 
6,334,238 
3,655,156 
1,386,272 



Sheep and Lambs. 
415,750 
359,943 
1,448,535 
2,326,268 
4,371,103 



Total 3,491,007 19,977,149 18,865,918 8,921,599 

In 1907 the peasants who farmed less than fifty acres 
possessed one-half of all the horses, two-thirds of all the 
cattle, and three-fourths of all the pigs. 

Evidently the very small peasant cannot always avail 
himself of animal labour on his tiny holding, owing to 
poverty, lack of accommodation, or lack of fodder. There- 
fore we find that the men who owned less than five acres 
used, on an average, one-third of the horse power which 
was employed on properties of larger size. The very small 
cultivator made, however, a greater use of cattle for pulling 
the plough than did the owner of a medium -sized farm. 
His only cow had not infrequently to labour in the field. 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 193 

The large landowner, on the other hand, appears not to 
have made the fullest use of animal power, for we find 
that he employed a smaller number of horses and cattle for 
work than did the smaller cultivator. 

It might be expected that the large German landowners, 
who used less animal power for cultivation than the 
small farmers, would be easily first in the use of labour- 
saving, steam-driven machinery. This appears not to have 
been the case, for we find that the smallest number of steam- 
driven agricultural machines was used in the province of 
East Prussia, where huge estates were common, while the 
largest number was employed in the province of Saxony, 
where middle-sized and small holdings prevailed. The 
fact that labour-saving machinery was more used on medium - 
sized than on large properties is clearly brought out in the 
following figures, which relate to those two provinces : 

Agricultural Steam Machinery used in 1907 

Drills. 

46,898 
4,639 

The difference in the quantity of machinery used in 
purely agricultural East Prussia, with its huge estates, and 
in chiefly industrial Saxony, with its small agriculturists 
and independent peasants, is startUng ; and this difference 
in the manner of cultivation goes far to explain why the 
Grerman agrarians east of the Elbe loudly complained about 
agricultural depression, while the peasants west of the Elbe 
were, on the whole, prosperous and contented. 

If we now look into the indebtedness of the agricultural 
soil in Germany, we find the following astonishing varia- 
tions in the various districts : 

Estimated Indebtedness of the Agricultural Soil 

East Germany 

District Konigsberg ...... 60-90 per cent. 

,, Gumbinnen ...... 48'58 ,, 

,, Dantzig ...... 55-11 ,, 

Marienwerder ..... 65-68 





steam 




Plougli: 


Saxony . 


. 439 


East Prussia 


80 



Seed-casting 
Machines. 


Steam Threshing 
Machines. 


46,898 


17,669 


4,639 


3,928 



194 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

Central Germany 

District Magdeburg ...... 22-82 per cent. 

,, MersebTirg 27-82 „ 

Erfurt 23-40 

West Germany 

Cologne 17-94 

Treves 15-83 

„ Aix-la-Chapelle 13-32 „ 

The foregoing table is based on carefully compiled offi- 
cial estimates. The thoroughly representative figures used 
were taken from the official hand-book of the Agrarian 
Party. From this table it appears that the agricultural 
indebtedness of the soil was dangerously large in the east 
of Grermany, medium -sized in the centre of the country, and 
small in the west of the country. This curious difiference 
arose from the fact that in the east of Germany huge estates 
preponderated, while in the centre middle-sized properties 
and in the west small holdings prevailed. The large German 
landowner in Pomerania and East Prussia could easily 
borrow from banks and other institutions at a reasonable 
rate of interest, and he did so freely and somewhat in- 
discreetly. Hence, his estates were encumbered with debts 
up to the hilt. The medium-sized and somewhat obscure 
agriculturists in Middle Germany could not so easily raise 
money on their land. Lastly, the small cultivators who 
prevail in the Rhenish Province, where, owing to the use 
of the Code Napoleon and the French law of succession, the 
land had been divided and subdivided in equal parts among 
the children so often that individual holdings had become 
very small, found it often absolutely impossible to raise 
money on their freehold properties at any price. 

In Great Britain very small landowners and peasants 
would find no difficulty in raising money on their land, for 
local usurers would prosper on the ignorance, the improvi- 
dence, or the inexperience of the small cultivators to whom 
they would lend money at 30, 50, or more per cent. But 
the paternal Government of Germany was sensible enough 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 195 

not to allow usurers to prey upon the ignorant or foolish 
producers. Usury was as good as non-existent, owing to\. 
most stringent usury laws. Consequently, if the German 
cultivator could not raise money at low rates (up to 6 per . 
cent.) and on fair security, he could not borrow money at all. [ 
This disability was, no doubt, very inconvenient to some 
improvident individuals, but from the point of view of a 
truly national economy it seems a lesser evil to suppress 
the usurers altogether than to allow them to become pros- 
perous by relentlessly exploiting the poor, the weak, and 
the foolish. 

From the facts and figures which have so far been given, , 
it is clear that the rural industries of Germany were highly 
prosperous, but it is equally clear that the prosperity of the 
German agriculturists was variable, and that it stood in a 
somewhat close relation to the size of their holdings. The 
larger properties were somewhat unproductive, and were 
uneconomically exploited, largely because their owners 
were not qualified, or not wilUng, to manage their estates 
themselves. That large estates should yield disappointing 
results is only natural. Hired labourers will work as little 
as possible for their wages, and managers and overseers 
will act in a similar manner. But even if these paid agents 
are conscientious, their supervision will, in any case, cause 
a considerable extra expense which burdens the land. 

Many large landowners in Germany wished to shine in 
ParHament or in society, or simply to enjoy themselves, 
finding the country too dull. Such men — and they were 
very numerous among the large landed proprietors — ■ 
desired to spend much money, which they could easily raise 
on their estates. Hence, the large estates of Germany 
were not only the most wastefully exploited properties, but 
they were at the same time those which were most heavily 
burdened with mortgages. 

While the large estates suffered from superfluity of land 
and the extravagance of their owners, who, in their turn, 
suffered from superfluity of leisure, the very small peasants' 
properties suffered from lack of capital and from lack of 



196 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

labour-saving animal and machine power. For these 
reasons, inefficient cultivation was common on both the 
largest and the smallest agricultural properties. Therefore 
land passed from the hands of very smaU peasants and of 
very large landowners into the hands of townsmen, and in 
the end the former freeholders were replaced by agricultural 
leaseholders and labourers. For these reasons, we find 
that men who worked less than five acres had only 73*4 
per cent, of freehold land, and that the men who cultivated 
more than two hundred and fifty acres had 81'8 per cent, 
of freehold land, while the agriculturists who possessed 
medium properties had more than 90 per cent, of freehold 
land. 

On properties measuring from five to two hundred and 
fifty acres were found the substantial peasants and peasant- 
farmers who were the backbone of Germany's agriculture. 
Nine-tenths of their fields were freehold land. Their land 
belonged to them and to their descendants for ever. These 
peasant proprietors usually cultivated their holdings with 
the assistance of their families. The men did the hard 
work in the fields, the women looked after the cattle and 
the children, helped at harvest -time, when the rural schools 
closed in order to enable the small peasants to get the 
assistance of their youngsters in picking up potatoes, 
gathering sheaves, picking fruit, etc. Each member of the 
peasant's family worked "«-ith love and earnestness, not for 
a daily wage, but for himself, with the sense and pride of 
property, and of absolute ownership. Where holdings 
were so large that outside assistance was required, farm 
servants or labourers were hired who, as a rule, lived with 
the peasants. They formed part of the peasant's family, 
and worked under the constant supervision of the owner. 
Consequently, an agricultural labourer was certain to do 
far more work on a peasant's farm in Westphalia under 
the eye of the owner of the farm, than on a big estate in 
Pomerania under the supervision of paid stewards and 
inspectors. The well-to-do peasant was thrifty, robust, 
healthy, and contented, while the small peasant, who had 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 197 

but a few acres, worked himself to death, owing to lack of 
land, lack of capital, and lack of labour-saving animal and 
machine power. Co-operation of course helped the small 
peasants very greatly in their struggle. A further account 
of German agriculture is contained in my book Great and 
Greater Britain (John Murray, London). 

Some distinguished British politicians and statesmen 
have recommended dividing the agricultural land of 
Great Britain. Their policy has been summed up in the 
cry " Three acres and a cow." Three acres and a cow may 
perhaps be a good electioneering cry, but it is not a good 
policy. Although life with three acres and a cow may 
appear very idylhc to the townsman, who takes his arm- 
chair as a coign of vantage, it is the reverse of idyllic from 
the countryman's point of view. If the policy of " three 
acres and a cow " should ever be carried out in Great Britain, 
it would lead, no doubt, to a resettlement of the people on 
the land. But it seems hardly desirable that the proletariat 
of the congested towns should, by an ill-considered policy 
and at a huge cost to the nation, be dumped into the country 
and be transformed into an equally wretched and miserable 
country proletariat. Besides, such an artificially created pro- 
letariat could not be made to stop. A cloud of usurers would 
descend on the country, and the British stage-peasants, 
after having eaten their cow, would as rapidly as possible 
raise enough money on their three acres to buy a ticket 
for Canada, and the British country districts would be 
left more desolate and more unproductive than before. 
Such an experiment would certainly end in failure. What 
Great Britain requires for the salvation of her agriculture 
is, in the first place, the gradual creation of a substantial 
peasant class, who work with their own hands on freehold 
agricultural properties of moderate size. 

In every business a certain fixity of conditions is required 
to make it attractive. Where that fixity is lacking, a 
calculation of risks and chances is impossible, and business 
is turned into speculation. If the peasant has no land of 
his own, but has to pay rent, his heart is not in his work. 



198 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

His improvements may eventually benefit the landlord. 
His rent may in bad seasons be so higb as to ruin bim, and 
in good seasons so low as to allow him to idle or to sublet 
his land. Hence agriculture under a tenant system lacks 
stability and security. The peasant or farmer wiU be turned 
into a speculator. 

PoHticians insufficiently acquainted with the real con- 
ditions of agriculture may, of course, devise an elaborate 
system for the fair and automatic adjustment of rents, and 
for securing to the cultivators at the end of their tenure 
the fruit of their labour, by suitable enactments. But such 
a system, which may look excellent on paper, would hardly 
work in practice. In the first place, it would be too com- 
plicated. In the second place, a huge and costly official 
machinery would have to be created, and the peasant would 
have to pay for mediating and adjusting service which 
would be productive of much costly litigation. Therefore a 
freehold peasantry must be created, and it can be created 
out of the greatly reduced army of rural labourers. Only 
then will Great Britain have again a sturdy, prosperous, and 
contented yeomanry as of old. 

The creation of peasant freeholders should be accompanied 
by legislation aboHshing the necessity of enclosing agricul- 
tural properties with hedges, fences, etc. Hedges give, no 
doubt, a peculiar charm to the landscape, but they con- 
stitute a very onerous burden for agriculturists. The 
expense of planting a hedge and of keeping it in order is 
very great. Besides, the agricultural ground which is 
wasted through hedges is not only the strip on which it 
grows ; for, as it is difficult to go close to the hedge with 
plough and harrow, two huge additional strips on both sides 
of every hedge around every enclosed field remain unpro- 
ductive. Thus hedges and fences cause an '^"enormous 
unnecessary expense and waste, which would be much 
increased if, through the creation of small holdings, hedges 
should be multiplied. In Great Britain, as in most other 
European countries, boundary stones at the corners of fields, 
together with carefully-kept local registers of rural pro- 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 199 

perties, should suffice to show the limits of individual 
holdings, and should make the wasteful and primitive 
method of enclosing unnecessary. The fall of the hedges 
would diminish the picturesqueness of the country, but it 
would immediately enhance the value of our agricultural 
soil by many millions of pounds, and the men who now 
clip hedges may t\irn their hands from useless to productive 
labour. 

In most countries of Europe the peasants were formerly 
landless serfs, who had to be liberated and to be enabled to 
acquire land by gradual payments spread over a number 
of years. Grermany did so a century ago, and Great Britain 
will have to do likewise, for the continuance of the impos- 
sible tenant system means the extinction of agriculture. If 
England wishes to possess again flourishing rural industries 
she must begin at the base, and must first of all abolish her 
present system of land tenure, and replace it by the freehold 
system. She must begin by giving agriculture a stable, 
safe, and permanent basis. If the cultivator has ground of 
his own, he will love and cherish it. Otherwise, he will 
desert the country and either emigrate or come to the 
towns. Landowners will find it in their interests to sell 
gradually their land, instead of letting it to cultivators under 
a system which greatly benefits a host of unproductive and 
useless middlemen, whom landlords and tenants have to 
keep at a large expense to themselves. 

British farmers complain of the insufficient number of 
rural labourers, and the lack of agricultural workers is so 
great that at harvest time swarms of town loafers migrate 
from the slums to the country, and these men are employed 
by the farmers, notwithstanding their utter unsuitability. 
In Germany, the army of agricultural labourers has not 
been shrinking, but it has increased, partly by the immigra- 
tion of Russians, Austrians, Poles, etc. At the census of 
1882 there were 5,763,970 rural labourers, male and female, 
in Germany. At the census of 1895, 5,445,924 agricultural 
hands were counted. At the census of 1907, 7,054,900 
rural labourers of both sexes were counted. Of these almost 
14 



200 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

a million were foreigners who came into Germany for the 
harvest and went back to their homes across the frontier 
when winter came. 

The increase in the number of rural labourers in Germany, 

in spite of the fact that machine power has largely supplanted 

men power and animal power, is very remarkable, and it is 

worth inquiring why the country population has remained 

, almost stationary. 

Two classes of agricultural workers have to be considered : 
farm servants, who are engaged for a term, and day labourers. 
The huge army of farm servants, male and female, is com- 
posed of the sons and daughters of small peasants, who send 
their children into service, partly in order that they should 
earn a living, partly in order that they should learn improved 
methods. The male farm servants expect to come, in 
course of time, into the freehold property of their parents, 
and therefore refuse to sacrifice a certain livelihood in the 
country to an uncertain one in the towns ; while the female 
farm servants naturally wish to work near their home and 
their friends. The day labourers also are partly the children 
of small peasants, and they refuse to leave the country in 
which they have a substantial stake ; partly are they small 
peasant proprietors, with properties of their own, which are 
so small that they have to accept some outside work in 
order to make a living. The following most interesting 
table gives a clear picture of the different status of 
agricultural day labourers in the east and in the west 
of Germany. 





Eastern Oermany 




East Prussia 

Westphalia 

Pomerania 


Agriculturalday 
1 abourers with land . 

. 12,935 

. 13,578 

. 14,475 

Western Germany 


Agriculturalday 
labourers withoutland 

154,777 

117,927 

111,457 


Rhenish Province 
Hesse- Nassau 
Westphalia 


. 28,866 
. 12,172 
. 15.828 


38,411 
15,744 
16.425 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 201 

From the foregoing figures we see that the landless 
labourers, the agricultural proletariat, formed in the east of 
Grermany, as they do in Great Britain, the overwhelming 
majority of agricultural hands, for in that part of Germany 
hardly one labourer out of ten had land of his own. On the 
other hand, in the Western Provinces, the day labourers 
who owned land and those who did not own land were about 
equal in numbers. In the Eastern Provinces, where huge 
estates owned by noblemen were to be found, the day 
labourers were considered merely as two-legged cattle, and 
were only too often treated as such. Therefore the whole I 
interest of these landless labourers lay in their daily wages, 
and they left the country for the town in order " to better • 
themselves," without hesitation. Therefore, it came that 
in the east of Germany the cry of lack of labour was just as 
loud as in Great Britain. The lack of rural labour both in 
east of Germany and Great Britain sprang evidently from 
the same cause — the landlessness of the labourers. -> 

Many British landowners have been wise enough to give 
to their day labourers a stake in the country in the shape of 
a cottage and a plot of ground, and their labourers stay 
in consequence ; but the great proprietors in the east of 
Germany, instead of acting likewise, had the incredible 
heartlessness to clamour for legislation restricting the 
freedom of migration for rural labourers. In the west of 
Germany, where middle-sized, small, and very small farms 
were mixed, the scarcity of rural labour was much less in 
evidence. Happily for the employers of agricultural labour 
in Germany, the rural wages paid in Austria -Hungary and 
Russia were so low that every year an army of from 200,000 
to 400,000 rural labourers flocked from Poland and Galicia; ' 
into Germany. These temporary immigrants supplied the' 
needful labour at the most critical time of the year, 
exactly as do the Italian labourers, who yearly migrate in 
hundred thousands into France, Switzerland, the United 
States, and Argentina for the harvest. 

British agriculture must create a large number of peasant 
proprietors and peasant labourers, or employ in constantly 



202 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

growing numbers slum -dwellers, who, of course, may be 
reinforced by immigrants from abroad. If British free- 
holders should not be created in large numbers as rapidly 
as possible, the agricultural work may have to be done by 
foreigners. The British population will almost exclusively 
live in the towns, and the national physique will still further 
deteriorate. 

The possession of freehold land is not only most important 
to the farmer as an inducement to do his best, but it is 
also of great importance inasmuch as it attaches the rural 
workers to the soil. 

In the manufacturing industries and in trade, young men 
are chiefly wanted. In advertisements it is frequently 
stated that men above forty or fifty years need not apply. 
Old men are almost useless for manual labour in towns, but 
they can find plenty of work in the country. According to 
a census which was taken on the 1 4th of June 1895, the 
proportion of agricultural labourers above fifty years in 
Germany was 15-80 per cent., while the proportion of 
industrial labourers above fifty years was only 9-30 per cent. ; 
the proportion of agricultural labourers above sixty years 
was 7* 31 per cent., whilst the proportion of industrial 
labourers above sixty years was only 2*93 per cent. ; the 
proportion of agricultural labourers above seventy years 
was 1-94 per cent., whilst the proportion of industrial 
labourers above seventy years was only 0-53. From these 
figures it appears that the chance for old men to find em- 
ployment in agriculture was in Germany from two to four 
times as great as their chance to find occupation in trade 
and in the manufacturing industries. In Great Britain, 
where town life and town work is more of a rush and scramble 
than in Germany, the chance of finding occupation for men 
above forty or fifty years should be from three to six times 
greater in agriculture than in the manufacturing industries 
and in trade. The nation might usefully employ on the 
land many thousands of old men who live now in the work- 
house, and millions which are yearly spent in poor relief 
might be saved. 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 203 

In the beginning of this chapter it has been explained that 
Germany's agriculture was very primitive at a time when 
the rural industries of Great Britain were advanced and 
most flourishing. When British agriculture was at the 
height of its success, the spirit of scientific inquiry and 
experiment arose, and the ambition to make improvements 
of every kind was very strong. Hence, French and German 
agriculturists and economists flocked to England to study 
and to copy her highly-advanced agricultural methods, 
which served as a model to all nations. 

On the model of British agriculture the present prosperity 
of the agriculture of Germany and France was founded. 
Between 1798 and 1804, Albrecht Thaer published his 
celebrated work. Introduction to the Knowledge of English 
Agriculture, in three volumes, which was followed by a work 
in four volumes, entitled The Fundamental Principles of 
Agriculture, which was also based on his study of England's 
rural industries. These books became the German agri- 
culturist's Bible. Honours were showered upon Thaer 
during his lifetime, and life-sized statues in marble and in 
bronze of the man who introduced British agricultural 
methods into Germany may now be found in Celle, in 
Leipzig, and in Berlin. Later on, Wilhelm Hamm's book. 
The Agricultural Implements and Machines of England, 
which was published in 1845 in Brunswick, exerted almost 
as great an influence as did Thaer's writings in Anglicising 
German agricultural methods. 

Great Britain was the pioneer in the empiric methods 
of cultivation, in the introduction of improved machinery, 
and in making scientific agricultural experiments. Through 
the munificence of Sir John Lawes the experimental station 
of Rothamsted was founded in 1840, and eleven years later 
Germany followed his example by opening an experimental 
station at Mockern, near Leipzig. But while Great Britain 
opened her second experimental station more than thirty 
years after the creation of the Rothamsted establishment, 
Germany opened station after station in rapid succession. 
In 1856, tVo experimental stations were opened at Bonn 



204 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

and at Breslau ; in 1857, three experimental stations arose 
in Gottingen, Dahme, and Munich ; in 1858, another 
institution was created in Insterburg ; and recently there 
existed no less than seventy experimental stations in Ger- 
many, where, by constant research and practical investi- 
gation, scientific agriculture was advanced, seeds and 
manures were tested, etc. 

Great Britain was the first and the foremost nation in 
applying science to agriculture. Private enterprise was 
the pioneer, and has done wonders, but the isolated efforts, 
made by some munificent, unselfish, and patriotic individuals, 
have, on the whole, proved as ineffective as isolated efforts 
at making improvements are always apt to prove. On the 
other side of the Channel, the German Governments took 
up the ideas which they received from England. They 
exploited and applied them throughout Germany by means 
of the Government machinery, and encouraged scientific 
agricultural investigation with liberal grants. At the 
present moment, even Japan is probably far ahead of 
England in applying science to agriculture. 

While Germany imitated this country in many respects, 
she struck out a line of her own by the work of Justus von 
Liebig. That great chemist published in 1840 his cele- 
brated work, Organic Chemistry applied to Agriculture and 
Physiology, which proved revolutionary. If Liebig had 
lived in Great Britain, his work would have benefited only 
the far-seeing few, for the officials would have remained 
indifferent to his discoveries, even if they had understood 
their value. They would have left their exploitation and 
fruition to unaided private initiative. But the German 
Government took care that his brilliant discoveries should 
prove beneficial to the whole nation. Chemical investi- 
gation and tuition was promoted and spread by the liberal 
aid of the Governments which opened chemical laboratories 
and created chairs of Chemistry throughout Germany. 
Thus the chemical industry of Germany became the fore- 
most in the world, and it proved of incalculable help to 
Germany's agriculture. The greatest chemists were, and 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 



205 



are stiU, Frenchmen and Englishmen. Nevertheless, Ger- 
many had the foremost chemical industry, because she had 
an enormous number of working chemists, and an organ- 
isation which favoured the exploitation of chemical and 
other inventions throughout the whole of the empire. 

When the German chemists produced sugar from beet- 
roots, the West Indian planters laughed at the chemical 
sugar ; but soon the German sugar industry stood supreme 
in the world, perhaps less because of the bounties which the 
Government granted than because of the improvements 
which the German chemists gradually effected both in 
agriculture and in the utilisation of the roots. How mar- 
vellously the Grerman sugar industry improved with the 
assistance of the chemist may be seen from the substantial 
increase in the percentual yield of sugar. How great and 
how continuous this improvement has been, and how 
greatly the production of sugar has increased, may be seen 
from the following figures : 



1875-6 

1880-1 

1885-6 

1890-1 

1895-6 

1900-1 

1905-6 

1908-9 

1909-10 

1913-4 

Without the marvellous improvements in the percentage 
of sugar extracted, the sugar production of Germany would 
certainly not have grown sevenfold since the year 1875-6 
and have become by far the largest in the world. Recently 
the German raw sugar factories employed about 100,000 
men during part of the year, while about 650,000 men were 
occupied with growing the roots, which represented a value 
of about £12,500,000. The sugar extracted was worth 
about £20,000,000 per annum, of which half was exported, 
and probably about £15,000,000 per annum was spent 



Percentage of Raw Sugar 


Production of Sugar 


extracted from Beet. 


in Germany. 


8-60 per cent. 


358,048 tons. 


9-04 


573,030 „ 


. 11-85 


838,105 „ 


. 12-54 


1,336,221 „ 


. 14-02 


1,637,057 „ 


. 14-93 


1,979,000 „ 


. 15-27 


2,400,771 „ 


17-60 


2,079,221 „ 


. 15-80 


2,037,397 „ 


16-00 


2,715,870 „ 



206 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

in wages in the sugar industry. The tops of the roots were 
locally used for fodder, and the residue of the roots, from 
which the sugar had been extracted, was dried and sold 
for fodder which could be preserved through the whole 
year, and which represented a value of about £2,000,000. 
Thus the German chemists have, with the liberal assistance 
of the Government, artificially created this enormous and 
most valuable additional crop. 

Evidently the policy of non-interference in business 
matters is not without its disadvantages, but discretion 
and knowledge is needed on the part of a Government 
which wishes to interfere in matters of business. If Great 
Britain wishes to apply science to industry and make it 
more than a fashionable and popular cry, the higher educa- 
tion must be reformed root and branch, and State aid must 
be forthcoming without stint. But not only must money 
be spent like water, it must be spent in the right direction, 
for England has fallen behind-hand in the organised pursuit, 
and especially in the organised apphcation, of science. The 
cleverest chemists are of little service if, for lack of rank 
and file, their inventions are exploited abroad. 

British education is, unfortunately, more ornamental 
than useful. Prussia alone had seven agricultural High 
Schools, where about 2,500 pupils were trained by 200 
teachers. Before the War these High Schools were attended 
by 1 ,889 German students, and by no less than 524 foreigners. 
Evidently, these courses were very popular not only with 
German agriculturists, who, by the by, were very foolish 
not to keep their knowledge for themselves. The State 
aided these High Schools with grants of £37,000 per annum. 
Besides there were 200 ambulant lecturers provided by the 
State, who taught scientific agriculture. Furthermore, 
there were in Prussia 350 other agricultural schools, with 
2,000 teachers and 25,000 pupils, and facihties were pro- 
vided in every direction for spreading the scientific know- 
ledge of agriculture far and wide. Many teachers in rural 
elementary schools voluntarily studied agriculture in the 
High Schools, in order to be able to teach some useful and 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 207 

valuable things to the country children and their parents. 
The Prussian Ministry of Agriculture spent yearly about 
£200,000 on agricultural education in all its branches, and 
the sum-total spent by all the German Governments and 
local authorities in this direction amounted to about 
£500,000. 

The general education in the rural districts of Great 
Britain is unfortunately too townified, and the little boys 
and girls are taught subjects at the schools which not 
only are useless, but which unfit the children for rural life. 
The boy who leaves the elementary schools has only too 
often been estranged from the country, and has been 
taught to turn up his nose at agriculture ; the girl aspires 
to a situation in town and the possession of a piano. 
Unfortunately, the mistakes which are made in primary 
education can never be rectified. 

Co-operation for agricultural purposes first sprang up 
in England, but, owing to the indifference of the State, 
it did not spread. The lack of co-operation among British 
agriculturists is due not only to the indifference of the 
State and the insularity of the people, but also to the fact 
that every rural property is enclosed by a fence or a hedge 
in England and by stone walls in Ireland and Scotland. 
Not only are these hedges unnecessary and exceedingly 
wasteful, but they form a most effective barrier to progress, 
inter-communication, and co-operation. A farmer does 
not like to look over another man's fence, and he does 
not like his neighbour to look into his fields. 

In Germany, in France, in Austria-Hungary, in Switzer- 
land, and in other countries farmers do not work behind 
the screen of a hedge. They constantly observe one another, 
freely talk to one another, and a community of interest is 
established. Thus the co-operative movement could more 
easily develop in Germany than in England, especially as 
its extension was actively assisted by the Government, 
which saw in it a powerful factor for the advancement of 
agriculture. 

Aided by the State and by the communities, co-operation 



208 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

among the German agriculturists developed with ever- 
increasing rapidity. In 1890 there were in Germany 3,000 
co-operative agricultural societies. In 1908 there were 
no less than 22,000 societies in existence. Of these, 
16,092 were credit societies, 1,845 were societies for co- 
operative buying and selling, 2,980 were co-operative dairy 
societies and societies which deal with milk, and more 
than 1,000 associations were devoted to various purposes. 
How vast the number of these societies is in Germany 
may be seen from the fact that there is now on an average 
one co-operative society for every three hundred individual 
holdings. 

There are numerous associations for building dykes 
against floods, for developing irrigation, for draining fields, 
drying swamps, acquiring buUs and staUions for breeding 
purposes, for milling and storing grain, for effecting in- 
surance, etc., and in consequence small and poor farmers 
may have the use of steam ploughs, threshing machines, 
etc., at most moderate rates. Thus a comparatively small 
quantity of expensive agricultural machinery is made to 
do service to large numbers of peasants, much capital is 
saved, and small cultivators receive all the advantages 
which otherwise are only within the reach of wealthy 
landowners. 

The State and local bodies assist in the formation of such 
associations, and often provide funds. Two or three small 
and poor local bodies agree to buy on joint account certain 
expensive machinery and hire it out by the day, while the 
State or individual provinces undertake larger works for 
the benefit of agriculture, such as the draining of the exten- 
sive marshes near the coasts of the Baltic and of the North 
Sea. 

Perhaps the most important co-operative enterprise 
created by the State is the Preussische Centralgenossen- 
schaftskasse, the Central Bank of Co-operative Associations. 
This huge bank, which was created in 1895, was meant to 
be the banker of the co-operative societies. It accepts 
deposits, grants loans, etc., and the State started it on its 



THE KURAL INDUSTRIES 209 

career with a capital of £2,500,000 in cash. How great the 
service of that bank has been may be gauged from the fact 
that its turnover amounted to no less than £560,795,300 
in 1908, and that it served as a bank to no less than 
1,213,194 producers. The rate of interest charged by that 
institution is extremely low, and fluctuates, as a rule, 
between 3 per cent, and 4 per cent. 

While agricultural co-operation in Germany is a powerful 
factor in the economic life of the nation, it figures in this 
country chiefly in the speeches of politicians, who very often 
have a somewhat hazy idea of the meaning of co-operation. 

Apart from the co-operative associations, the rural indus- 
tries of Germany possess numerous huge and powerful 
societies for improving the breed of horses and cattle, pro- 
moting the keeping of fowls, for growing hops and fruit, 
for keeping bees, etc. Many of these societies receive 
considerable subventions from the State. 

The whole of the agricultural population of Germany is 
organised in some enormous political associations, Farmers' 
Associations and Peasants' Societies, which have about a 
million members. Through these associations the agri- 
cultural interest of Germany exercised some considerable 
influence in the Imperial Parliament, and in the various 
local ParHaments, while in England, the classical land of 
political organisation, agriculture is politically inarticulate, 
and therefore neglected — an unknown factor, a plaything, 
and a victim to the political parties and to local authorities, 
without a friend, without an advocate, and without a 
champion, especially as " the man in the street " is un- 
fortunately a townsman. Had it not been for the , 
powerful combinations of all the agriculturists, and for the/ 
determined agitation of their representatives in Parhament, 
the rural industries of Germany would certainly not have 
obtained the strong fiscal protection which they have 
enjoyed. 

In Germany the consumer buys much agricultural pro- 
duce directly from the producer. There are huge markets 
in all German towns, even in the very largest, and there 



210 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

the peasants from the surrounding districts will be found 
offering their produce for sale. The charges made for the 
use of these markets is either purely nominal or nil. In 
Great Britain, where similar markets are known only in 
out-of-the-way places, the working man cannot buy agri- 
cultural products from the farmer, but has to purchase them 
from a shopman, who receives his goods from a wholesale 
dealer. Therefore it is not the British farmer only who has 
to maintain a host of unproductive middlemen ; the British 
consumer also has to maintain an army of unnecessary 
middlemen, which does not exist in Germany. In Germany, 
no thrifty housewife would dream of buying her vegetables, 
her fruit, her poultry, her eggs, her butter, etc., at a shop. 
She goes to the market for her supply. The turnover of the 
average greengrocer is very small, and as the goods are 
easily perishable, the shopman has to charge sometimes 
two, three, or four times the price which the producer 
receives. Therefore vegetables and fruit which are luxuries 
in England are the poor man's food in Germany. 

In the biggest towns of Great Britain, and at the seaports 
where foreign agricultural produce arrives in huge quanti- 
ties, and has to be sold quickly, food is cheap, and is often 
cheaper than it is in the country. In Germany, on the 
other hand, where duties on imported food are levied on 
arrival at the harbours, food is much cheaper in the country 
districts where it is raised. Hamburg, the German Liver- 
pool, is the most expensive town in Germany. Families in 
reduced circumstances in Germany migrate to the country 
for cheapness, while people living in the country districts 
of Great Britain find it often cheaper to get their agricul- 
tural produce from London. The British towns have 
grown out of all proportion, not only because the chances 
of finding employment for labour and relief for the destitute 
are greater, and because there are no peasant proprietors 
in the country, but also because food is cheaper in town than 
in the village. 

That agricultural products are cheaper in London than 
they are in the country is most unnatural and most un- 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 211 

fortunate. This artificial cheapness is an additional cause 
of the ruin of agriculture. If we look at wholesale prices, 
food is so cheap in Great Britain that agriculture, which in 
selling its produce receives only the wholesale price, suffers ; 
but if we look at the retail prices, we find the same products 
extremely dear, owing to the exactions of the middleman. 
The middlemen have spoiled the market for the rural 
industries. The rural industries should strive to bring 
producers and consumers together, and to eUminate those 
crowds of unproductive and unnecessary go-betweens who 
batten on the rural industries. 

British agriculture suffers also from outrageously high 
transport charges. In Grermany agricultural produce has 
to travel enormous distances by rail, and is carried cheaply. 
In Great Britain, where, owing to the size and happy con- 
figuration of the country, agricultural products need travel 
only trifling distances overland, railway carriage is often 
prohibitive to farmers. The railways are even allowed to 
exact far more from the British farmer than they charge 
to the State-protected and prosperous foreign agriculturists. 
Therefore it comes that American, Austrahan, and Con- 
tinental fruit can be sold in London at a profit, while English 
fruit often rots on the trees not far from town. Foreign 
producers receive a greater bounty from the British railway 
companies in the shape of preferential railway rates than 
from their own Governments in the shape of fiscal protection. 

In the congested towns, millions of poor are crying for 
cheap food, and in the country districts hundreds of thou- 
sands of farmers are crying for town prices for their veget- 
ables, their meat, their fruit, etc. Yet the bitter cry of 
country and town remains unheard. Consumers and pro- 
ducers cannot meet because the railway companies stand 
between the two and exact a ruinous toll in the form 
of railway rates which are without a parallel in the world. 

We have of late heard much of the deterioration of the 
national physique, and it cannot be doubted that the sturdy 
English race of former times is becoming almost extinct, 
and is being replaced by a puny, stunted, sickly, sterile, 



212 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 

narrow-chested, weak-boned, eliort -sighted, and rotten- 
toothed race. England's magnificent physique, which used 
to be the envy of all foreign nations, is rapidly disappearing, 
notwithstanding the fact that, according to the statistics, 
no nation in Europe consumes more meat per head of 
population than does Great Britain. But at the same 
time, no nation in Europe leads a more unnatural and a 
more artificial life. Out of one hundred Britons, no less 
than sixteen are Londoners, and almost four -fifths of the 
population live in towns. In Germany only three men out 
of one hundred live in BerUn. 

Not only do four-fifths of the people live in unnatural sur- 
roundings, they are also unnaturally fed. Town mothers 
rarely have a sufficiency of good milk. Milk is a luxury, and 
pure milk is almost unobtainable. Hence, the poor town 
babies are brought up on artificially coloured, chemically 
treated, impure, and often adulterated cows' milk, on 
patent foods, etc., while country babies are usually brought 
up on their mothers' milk. Later on the town children, 
who had never a proper start and a fair chance, are to a 
large extent fed on tinned, chilled, frozen, chemically pre- 
pared, and adulterated agricultural products, which are 
imported from abroad. That a race which is brought up in 
such a manner is not a strong one cannot be wondered at. 
On the other hand in Ireland, where there is proportionately 
a huge agricultural population, by far the finest specimens 
of British manhood are to be found, although the Irish 
country population was until recently poor and chronically 
under -fed. The striking difference between the under-fed 
but country-bred Irishmen and the over-fed, town-bred 
Englishmen should give food for reflection. 

German economists, statisticians, and generals have 
from time to time drawn attention to the physical deteriora- 
tion of the population in the large German towns, and have 
made comparisons from which it is apparent that the birth- 
rate in the German towns is rapidly falling, and that towns- 
men in Germany are physically deteriorating and becomings 
sterile. Therefore Bismarck refused to allow Germany to- 



THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 213 

become a purely industrial State like England. He fostered 
the rural industries of Germany directly and indirectly, so 
as to preserve the strength and health of the nation, which, 
after all, is its most valuable asset. 

The foregoing short sketch shows why Germany, which 
has a poor soil, an unfavourable climate, and an unfortunate 
geographical position and structure, and a somewhat dull- 
minded country population, possessed before the War a 
powerful, flourishing, and expanding agriculture, while 
Great Britain, which has the most fruitful soil in Northern 
Europe, a mild and equable climate, a most favourable 
geographical position and structure, an enterprising and 
energetic population, and a great agricultural past, had 
rural industries which had been decaying for decades. 
This chapter shows that the ills from which England's rural 
industries are suffering are not incurable. However, they 
can only be cured by a man of action and of determination, 
who is backed by a Government which is willing to lead. 

Before all, the powerful agricultural interest must strive 
to gain power by combination. It must form a solid 
phalanx, and must assert its claims with energy in Parlia- 
ment and before the local authorities, which only too often 
tax and worry agriculturists out of existence. If the agri- 
cultural interest remains politically formless, shapeless, 
voiceless, and inert, it will continue neglected. If it is 
united in mind and in purpose, the great political leader will 
be forthcoming who will make the cause of agriculture his 
own, and who is prepared to create conditions which 
will make the rural industries powerful and prosperous. 
England's latent agricultural resources are probably un- 
paralleled in Europe. Great Britain may again become the 
envy and the model of all European nations by the un- 
rivalled excellence and prosperity of her agriculture. But 
much hard work will have to be done to achieve such a 
result, which is worthy of a great statesman's ambition, for 
he who re-creates England's agriculture will regenerate 
the race. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE RAILWAYS AND THE RAILWAY POLICY OF GERMANY * 

At the beginning of the railway era, Great Britain pursued 
a vigorous national policy, while the Governments of 
divided Germany were cosmopolitan in theory and parochial 
in practice ; Great Britain was Protectionist, but Germany 
followed hazy ideas of Free Trade and Individualism ; Great 
Britain was truly a United Kingdom, in Germany Particu- 
larism was in excelsis, and German unity existed only in 
the minds of some German ideaHsts ; Great Britain was pro- 
gressive, active, and husthng, while Germany was back- 
ward, conservative, impractical, and indolent. Industry 
in Germany was incredibly behindhand. The country was 
peopled by peasants and professors. Berhn had 200,000 
inhabitants, and large provincial towns did not exist. 

When in 1825 Great Britain opened the celebrated 
Stockton -DarUngton Railway, and started railway building 
with energy, Germany philosophised, gazed, and wondered. 
Only ten years later, Germany timidly followed England's 
lead by opening, on the 7th of December 1835, the Nurem- 
berg-Fiirth Railway, which was less than four miles in 
length. Only in 1838, when in this country 540 miles of 
railway were open to traffic, Prussia opened her first line 
from Potsdam to Zehlendorf , which was about thirteen miles 
long. 

But in the same year which saw the birth of her first 
railway, Prussia passed a wise and far-seeing law, the law 
of the 3rd of November 1838, by which the State gave the 
greatest liberty to enterprising individuals to build railways, 

1 From the Contemporary Review, October 1905. 
214 



RAILWAY POLICY 215 

but reserved to the State an adequate control over their 
construction and management and over fares, freight rates, 
etc. It laid down that the State was entitled to take over 
private railways after thirty years at a valuation based on 
the actual capital outlay, and provided that fares and 
freights had to be proportionately lowered whenever the net 
profit of railway companies should exceed 10 per cent, on 
the capital actually invested. Great care was taken to 
safeguard Prussia's national interests and to protect them 
against the railway companies. Thie law remained for a 
long time a dead letter. The State did not expropriate 
private railways. 

In the beginning of the railway era, the economic views 
of the German Government were tinged by philosophy, 
philanthropy, and romantic cosmopolitanism. They were 
guided by abstract principles, beautiful theories, and senti- 
mental reasons, not by practical, cold-blooded business 
considerations. Germany was still a land of dreamers and 
visionaries. Hence the voice of that great economic re- 
former, Friedrich List, who passionately pleaded for a 
"national" economic pohcy, was a voice crying in the 
wilderness. He was hounded out of Germany by the 
advocates of official indolence and indifference, scientific- 
ally called " Non-interference," and, disappointed, abused, 
persecuted, and impoverished, he shot himself in 1846. 
Truly, no prophet is honoured in his own country during 
his lifetime. Now the nation has erected a monument to 
the man who was the intellectual originator of Bismarck's 
protective policy and of his railway policy. 

List's magnum opus, The National System of Political 
Economy, appeared in 1840 ; but already in 1833, two years 
before the miniature railway from Nuremberg to Fiirth was 
opened, that far-seeing man wrote, On a Saxon Railway 
System as the Basis of a German Railway System, and in 1838, 
the year when Prussia built her first railway, he published 
The National Transport System. List was greatly in advance 
of his time. Although his strenuous recommendations to 
organise railway transport and to develop industries in 
15 



216 RAILWAY POLICY 

Germany on a national basis with the assistance of the State 
were little heeded by the doctrinaire politicians of his time, 
List had at least the satisfaction that, owing to his agitation, 
the Saxon Government assisted the building of the first 
Saxon railway from Leipzig to Dresden, which had the 
respectable length of almost seventy miles. Saxony allowed 
the railway to issue 500,000 thalers, or about £75,000, in 
bank-notes. 

Railways were to Germany a British invention, and 
Germany imported with the invention not only British 
railway materials, locomotives, etc., but also the British 
idea that the State should by no means interfere with 
industrial freedom or engage in business pursuits. Guided 
by axioms which were suggested to British professors of 
political economy by the late Mr. Cobden and his satellites, 
Brunswick, which in 1838 built the first State railway in 
Germany, the line Brunswick- Wolf enbiittel, sold it in 1869 
to a private company, from which it was purchased by the 
Prussian State in 1880. 

The railway systems of Great Britain and of Germany are 
fundamentally different. While in England all the railways 
are private companies, more than nine-tenths of the German 
railways are owned, managed, and directed by the various 
German Governments. In Germany, as in England, the 
railway interest, the majority of the professors of political 
economy, the Liberal Party, and a large proportion of the 
officials were in favour of unrestricted private ownership, 
and to them Great Britain served as an ideal and a model. 
Hence it is worth while to take note of the weighty con- 
siderations which caused the German States to buy, at a 
gigantic figure and at more than their then market value, 
practically the whole of the country's railways and to incur 
the enormous and onerous responsibihties of managing and 
extending them. 

Up to the 'seventies the German States had not pursued 
a settled and well-planned railway pohcy, but had acted in 
accordance with the requirements of the moment. When 
private enterprise came forward, railways were built by 



RAILWAY POLICY 217 

limited companies ; but in cases when important strategical 
or commercial railway lines were not undertaken by private 
builders, the Government either assisted private companies 
or built the lines itself. In consequence of the different 
policies which had been followed in the different German 
States, the organisation of Railway Germany was as confused 
as was that of PoUtical Germany. There existed indepen- 
dent private companies over which the State had some 
control and railways which were run and completely con- 
trolled by the State. Freights were dear, rates were un- 
certain, railway business was exceedingly compHcated and 
involved, and in many instances railway charges were fixed 
on the principle , ' ' Charge what the traffic wiU bear . ' ' Where 
there was competition, freights were cheap ; where there 
was no competition, the people had to suffer at the hands 
of the railways, which demanded the uttermost farthing ; 
where there were feuds between railway companies, direct 
travel and the speedy dispatch of goods were often impeded 
by the trickery of the contending railways. Owing to the 
arbitrariness and the exactions of the railways, and the 
uncertainty of the constantly fluctuating rates, business 
suffered severely. 

The year 1879 was a memorable one for Germany. It 
witnessed both the birth of Protection and the rise of the 
magnificent system of the German State Railways. In 
1876 Bismarck had tried to initiate both these measures for 
developing the foreign trade of the country and for regulat- 
ing its railway traffic. In the same year in which Prince 
Bismarck penned the sentence " Nothing hut reprisals ^ 
against their products will avail against those States which 
increase their duties to the harm of German exports," and 
took steps to introduce a protective tariff, he also tried to 
protect the German producer against the exactions of the 
German railway companies by proposing to transfer the 
railways from the hands of private owners and of the in- 
dividual States to the German Empire. However, in 1876 
both attempts failed. Germany was not yet ripe for Pro- 

^ The italics are in the German original. 



218 RAILWAY POLICY 

tection, and several of the minor States of Germany were 
unwilling to hand over their railways to the Empire. When 
recommending the transfer of the railways of Germany to 
the Imperial Government, Bismarck said on the 26th of 
April 1876 : 

"... Germany is divided into sixty- three railway pro- 
vinces, or rather territories, which are endowed with all 
territorial and feudal rights and privileges, including the 
right of making war ; and the railway boards avail them- 
selves of these privileges, and even make wars against one 
another, which cost much money, for the sake of power and 
as a kind of sport. 

" In my opinion, the railways are intended rather to serve 
the requirements of trade than to earn a profit for their 
owners. The profits which the individual States derive 
from the railways owned by them, or which are distributed 
to shareholders in the shape of dividends in the case of private 
companies, are rightly considered a national taxation which 
the State would be entitled to impose, but which is paid not 
to the State but to the shareholders in private concerns. 
It should be our aim to see that that taxation is not op- 
pressive, but that it stands in due relation to the requirements 
and the means of the railway users, that it is financially 
just " 

On the 1st of January Bismarck issued the following 
interesting opinion as to the right of the State to withdraw 
the privileges which it had previously granted to the private 
railway companies. Bismarck wrote : 

" Railways were meant to be, and are, instruments for 
conveying the national traffic, and they were given their 
far-reaching privileges and they were constructed in order 
to serve the public and general interest. Therefore their 
character as profit-earning instruments may be taken into 
consideration only in so far as that character is compatible 
with the general welfare, which has to be considered first 
and foremost. Hence the right of constructing and ex- 
ploiting railways can be considered only as temporary, and 
their eventual purchase by the Government is a matter of 
course." 



RAILWAY POLICY 219 

In the same year Bismarck issued an interesting document 
in which he summed up the evils caused by the private 
ownership of railways, as follows : 

"1. Unnecessarily high working expenses and correspond- 
ingly high charges in consequence of the multiplicity of 
railway boards, managers, offices, and the unnecessary 
duplication of lines, stations, material, rolUng-stock, etc. 

"2, Chaos of freight charges, there being 1,400 different 
tariffs which are constantly changing, which are unclear, and 
which make trade an uncertain and speculative venture. 

"3. Because direct travel of passengers and goods over 
the whole railway system of the country is often impeded 
with the object of harming competing railway systems, and 
consequently much damage is done to trade and industry." 

The steps which Bismarck took in 1876 in order to in- 
troduce Protection and to bring the German railways under 
the direct and absolute control of the Imperial Government 
were somewhat half-hearted. Possibly they were meant 
to be merely preparatory ; but in 1879 Bismarck opened his 
campaign in favour of Protection and for the acquisition of 
the Prussian railways by the Prussian State in real earnest 
and with his usual skill and energy. It was a very difficult 
matter to make these two enormous measures acceptable 
to the Governments of the individual States and to a majority 
in the German ParKament, but his arguments proved con- 
vincing both to the high officials of the aUied States and 
to the elected representatives of the people. It is worth 
while to take note of Bismarck's principal arguments in 
favour of his anti-individuaUstic policy ; for in that year 
Germany broke for good with British traditions, and refused 
to follow any longer the laissez-faire policy of England. 

Bismarck opened his railway campaign by writing on the 
3rd of January the following letter to Messrs. Hofmann, 
Friedenthal, and Maybach, who were the Prussian Ministers 
for trade, home affairs, and railways : 

" I intend to raise the question whether it be not necessary 
to regulate the railway tariffs by imperial law. . . . The fact 



220 RAILWAY POLICY 

that such far-reaching pubUc interests as the transport 
business of railways is left to private companies and to 
individual railway boards which are free from any super- 
vision by the State, and the fact that these companies are 
entitled to make their own interest their sole guide, finds no 
analogy in the economic history of modern times except in 
the way in which formerly a country's finances were farmed 
out to certain individuals. In view of this fact, I intend, 
after due investigation, to bring forward the question 
whether it is not possible to introduce, by means of imperial 
legislation, a imiform tariff on all the railways of Germany." 

After having thus prepared his colleagues, he addressed 
a long letter to the German States, represented in the 
German Federal Council, of which the following abstract 
gives the chief points of interest : 

" The regulation of freights on railways, which are 
public roads, is of far-reaching importance for the economic 
interests of the nation, and nobody must be damaged 
or be artificially hmited in their use. The Government 
will no longer be able to abstain from promoting the public 
interest by creating those conditions which are necessary 
for the requirements of our national industries. The rail- 
ways are pubUc roads for traffic, but can be used only by 
one corporation. By granting to these corporations certain 
privileges, such as that of expropriation, of police and of 
raising capital, the State has ceded to the railways part of 
its power. This part of its power was ceded to the railways 
not in the interest of the proprietors of the railways, but 
in that of the general public. Therefore it follows that the 
management of a railway cannot be left entirely to the 
discretion of the railway companies themselves. Their 
management must be regulated in accordance with the 
requirements of the pubHc and with an eye to the public 
welfare. 

" Therefore it follows that railway charges must not 
be fixed solely in order to obtain the largest possible profit. 
The State must not only consider the interest of the share- 
holders in determining railway freights, but it has also 
to see that the well-being of the population as a whole is 
fostered and promoted, and that thus the vitality of the 
nation will be strengthened. 



RAILWAY POLICY 221 

" At any rate it means a damage to the interest of the 
community if a railway corporation takes no notice of these 
larger considerations. Hence the arguments which can be 
raised against the system of private railways as such are 
strengthened. Railways must not be allowed, by arbitrarily 
fixed tariffs, to develop industries in certain parts and to 
destroy other industries in other parts of the country. 
Even the most far-seeing railway directors cannot reaUse 
the consequences which a policy of discriminating tariffs may 
have later on, although such a policy may prove beneficial 
in the immediate future, and several railway boards have 
already begun to understand that it is not their vocation 
to act the part of Providence, to alter the natural conditions 
of demand and supply, and to dominate trade and industry, 
but that it is their duty to serve them. 

" Starting from these considerations, it is clear that 
railway tariffs should correspond with the requirements 
of production and consumption, and should not be subject 
to violent fluctuation. They should, therefore — 

" 1. Be clear, and be drawn up in such a manner as to 
enable everybody to easily calculate the freight for goods 
sent. 

" 2. They should secure to all citizens in all parts of the 
country equality of railway charges. 

" 3. They should eliminate the disadvantages which at 
present weigh down the small producers. 

" 4. They should secure the aboHshment of unnecessary, 
and therefore wasteful, services, and ensure the honesty 
of railway officials. 

" These requirements are not fulfilled by the present 
tariff system." 

After describing in detail the vast number of different 
tariffs and the confusion and injustice resulting from them, 
as well as the impossibility for traders to make a clear 
business calculation of railway charges, Prince Bismarck 
continues : 

*' Preferential tariffs are an injustice by the damage they 
do to those who are not preferentially treated, and the 
tendency of railways to differentiate not only locally but 
also to give cheaper freight to senders of large quantities 
may damage the national prosperity to a very great 



222 RAILWAY POLICY 

extent. In order to secure large masses of goods, railways 
will go down below their normal rates, and will even work 
without a profit, and will thus favour the foreign producer 
at the cost of our home industries. 

" The railways which have received from the State the 
monopoly of public transportation have the duty to treat 
all railway users alike ; but differential tariffs of this kind 
destroy the equal rights which all citizens should enjoy. 
Through the changes effected by the tariffs, the economic 
interests of the country become dependent upon the railway 
companies, and our home industries, and the possibihties 
which they have for selling their products, are subjected to 
constant changes which cannot take place without inflicting 
great damage upon individual interests. 

" Those who argue that competition among railways 
cheapens freights overlook the fact that railways recoup 
themselves for their loss on competitive traffic by charging 
proportionately higher rates on non -competitive traffic ; 
and as railway competition brings cheap freights principally 
to the largest towns, railway competition leads to an un- 
healthy centralisation of trade and industry which economi- 
cally and politically gives cause for concern. 

" In order to avoid mutually ruinous competition, rail- 
ways frequently combine and agree to direct the flow of 
traffic in certain fixed proportions over the various lines 
belonging to the combine. Hence goods are diverted from 
the shortest and most natural route and travel over artifi- 
cially arranged roundabout routes, a proceeding which is 
opposed to the rational and economical dispatch of goods, 
and which increases the costs of transport. 

" These unnatural conditions would be abolished if the 
railways were obliged to charge standard rates and to send 
freight on normal routes, if unnecessary competition was 
abohshed, and if the artificially diverted streams of traffic 
would again be brought back to their natural routes. 

" The foregoing statement shows that an improvement 
can only be effected by insisting upon the principle that the 
railways are meant for the service of the nation. In rail- 
way matters changes are taking place which have already 
been observed in the general development of nations. New 
economic factors have arisen, and have grown up without 
State interference, but soon the interest in these institutions 
has become so great and so general that their further direc- 



RAILWAY POLICY 223 

tion can no longer safely be left to the egotism and arbitrari- 
ness of irresponsible individuals, but must be brought into 
harmony with the general interests of the country." 

Addressing ParHament, Prince Bismarck said : 

". . . Did formerly anybody trouble whether the intro- 
duction of railways ruined the coaching industry and the 
innkeeper ? The railway monopoly is to my mind far 
more unjust than was that of the coaching industry, for 
the railway monopoly actually means the farming out of 
a province to a railway company. This monopoly arose 
naturally when all other means of transport had been 
killed by the railways. Every one who had goods to send 
or to receive fell into the hands of the railways, and these 
acted in exactly the same manner as did the Fermiers 
Generaux who impoverished France before the Revolution, 
for they also were given a large part of the country, and 
were allowed to exploit it at their will. The object of the 
railways is to squeeze out of the country the largest possible 
dividends. This is an extraordinary abuse of the tax- 
paying and traffic-requiring community which favours 
those capitalists who were given the traffic monopoly that 
accrued to the railways. . . ." 

Following the lead given by his great chief, the Minister 
of Railways, Maybach, declared on the 8th of November 
1879, before ParUament : 

". . . As regards the tariff pohcy of railways, I am of 
opinion that railway charges should be fixed in accordance 
with the requirements of the country ; and if it be neces- 
sary to give the second place either to the national interest 
or to the railway interest, I am incHned to give the second 
place to the railway interest. The system of private 
railways has been imported from England, but it does not 
suit Prussia. Prussia requires State railways. It is our 
aim to take the railways out of the hands of speculators, 
and to make them truly national for the defence of the 
country and for the development of its prosperity." 

Privately Bismarck remarked, in 1879, that it would be 
his ideal that all goods imported from abroad should be 



224 RAILWAY POLICY 

transported over the German railways at somewhat higher 
rates than those of home production, for he could not allow 
that the fiscal Protection which he had introduced in 1879 
should be neutralised by preferential freight rates given 
to the foreigner. As a matter of fact, he expected that the 
preferential tariffs given on the German railways for Ger- 
man industrial and agricultural products would be more 
effective in protecting the home industries, and increasing 
their strength and prosperity, than would be the moderate 
fiscal Protection which he had introduced. 

When the foregoing weighty arguments had prepared 
the ground, a Bill for taking over the railways was brought 
out on the 29th of October 1879, and the Memoire accom- 
panying it laid down the following general principles : 

" Among the various forms in which railways have been 
developed in civilised countries, the system of State rail- 
ways pure and simple is the only one which is able to 
fulfil in the most satisfactory manner all the tasks of a 
national railway policy, by creating uniformity throughout 
the country and equality for all, and by promoting equally 
the welfare of all interested in railways. Only in the case 
of State railways is it possible to utilise to the full and in 
the most thorough manner the enormous capital invested 
in railways ; only in the case of State railways is it possible 
to give direct and effective protection to the public interest 
which is the Government's duty ; lastly only in the case of 
State railways is it possible to establish a simple, cheap, 
and rational railway tariff, to effectually suppress harmful 
differentiation, and to create a just, diligent, and able 
administration which is solely guided by considerations of 
the general good. Therefore the State railway system 
must be considered as the final development in the evolu- 
tion of the railway system." 

In his economic pohcy, Bismarck left the traditional 
course which statesmen had followed hitherto. With 
great boldness he broke with the doctrines of Free Trade, 
non-interference, and Individuahsm, which were almost 
universally accepted. He dehberately returned to the 
economic policy of Oliver Cromwell and Colbert, and 



RAILWAY POLICY 



225 



revived, or rather re-created, the mercantile system, to 
the horror of all professors of political economy. The 
world has gradually been going back to the Mercantile 
system, owing to Bismarck's economic reform of 1879, 
although the professors of political economy have not yet 
discovered this curious phenomenon. 

According to economic theories which still enjoy great 
prestige in England, State interference in economic matters 
is a sure road to national ruin. Many text-books "prove " 
that a State or municipal corporation is, per se, not fit to 
engage in industrial pursuits. However, it does not follow 
that governmental and municipal enterprise in matters 
economic is bound to be a failure, because British Govern- 
ment departments and municipalities which engage in 
industrial pursuits are usually red-tape bound, amateurish, 
and ignorant of business. 

Immediately after 1879, Prussia rapidly bought up all 
the more important lines, and within a few years the State 
more than trebled its railway property. 

Mileage of Railways of Prussia 





State Railways. 


Private Railways. 


Total. 


1879 


. 6,323-6 kUs. 


13,650-1 kils. 


19,973-7 kilB 


1880 


. 11,455-3 „ 


8,893-1 „ 


20,348-4 „ 


1881 


. 11,584-6 „ 


9,159-2 „ 


20,743-8 „ 


1882 


. 14,825-6 „ 


6,329-8 „ 


21,155-4 „ 


1883 


. 15,301-1 „ 


6,604-2 „ 


21,905-3 „ 


1884 


. 19,766-9 ,, 


3,002-6 „ 


22,769-5 „ 


1885 


. 21,138-4 „ 


2,496-6 „ 


23,635-0 „ 



In five years the State turned from a small railway 
manager and owner to a railway monopolist. The Prussian 
Government did not go to sleep once it had acquired the 
railways, but extended them most energetically, as foUows : 



Mileage of Prussian State Railways 

1885 . 21,138 kils. 

1895-6 25,214 „ 

1900 27,513 „ 

1909 33,217 ., 

1913 35,301 „ 



226 



RAILWAY POLICY 



The activity and progressiveness of a railway system are 
apparent not only by its length and growth, but also by its 
equipment. The magnificent palatial railway stations of 
Germany are well known. But it is not so well known 
how rapidly the roUing-stock has increased since the year 
when almost the whole of the railways were brought into the 
possession of the State. 



1879 . 
1884-5 . 
1889-90 
1894-5 
1900-1 
1907 . 
1909 . 



Locomotives, 


Passeiiijer Cars 


7,152 


10,828 


8,367 


13,063 


9,425 


15,177 


10,991 


18,391 


13,267 


24,225 


17,177 


32,755 


19,171 


37,243 



Freight and 
Luggage Cars. 

148,491 

174,157 

194,705 

231,266 

303,364 

377,649 

411,945 



During the thirty years following the creation of the 
State railways, the rolling-stock of the country practically 
trebled. Improved material was introduced everywhere ; 
travelling was made infinitely more safe, more comfortable, 
and more rapid on the State railways than it ever was on 
the old private lines, and owing to the introduction of more 
powerful engines, larger freight cars, etc., haulage became 
far more economical and efl&cient. Before the War goods 
trains in Germany conveyed, as a rule, more than twice the 
weight which they carried in England ; but an exact com- 
parison cannot be made, because the British railways do 
not pubUsh ton-mile statistics, which would glaringly show 
their inefficiency. While the most common truck in Great 
Britain holds about ten tons, that mostly used in Germany 
carries fifteen tons. The German goods trains haul a smaller 
dead- weight, and are therefore much more economical than 
are EngUsh toy trains puUed by toy engines, and composed 
of insufficiently loaded toy trucks. 

How rapidly the freight and passenger business on the 
German railways has expanded since they came into the 
possession of the State may be seen from the following 
statistics : 



RAILWAY POLICY 



227 





Passenger Kilometres 


Ton Kilometres 


1879 . 


3,797,172,000 


8,644,625,000 


1884-5 


5,083,700,000 


12,414,712,000 


1889-90 


6,903,526,000 


16,142,648,000 


1894-5 


. 8,763,723,000 


18,162,727,000 


1900 . 


. 14,310,204,000 


27,434,536,000 


1908 . 


. 21,331,413,729 


38,187,612,343 


1910 . 


, 25,221,995,000 


42,538,085,000 



The following have been the profits earned on the total 
capital of all the railways of Prussia : 



1869 
1874 



6-5 per cent. 
4-4 



1879 4-9 

1884-5 4-9 

1889-90 6-2 



1894-5 

1900 

1905 

1908 

1910 



6-6 
7-0 
7-4 
6-3 
6-5 



Under private management the railway profits were 
stagnant or retrogressive. They became rapidly progres- 
sive after the railways had in 1879 been taken over by 
the State. A profit of 6 to 7 per cent, on the whole railway 
capital is a result of which an English railway director 
might perhaps dream, but would not think, for the net 
receipts of all the British railways have fluctuated for so 
many years between ^ and 4 per cent, that 4 per cent, 
appears now an ideally high return on the total British 
railway capital. As Prussia borrowed the money with 
which she bought the railways by means of loans, returning 
about Z\ per cent., the State made every year on its railways 
an immense profit, which flowed into its exchequer. 

The railway-using public desires that the conveyance of 
passengers and goods should be quick, convenient, punctual, 
equitable, and cheap. These five requirements are well 
fulfilled by the German State railways. Although before 
the War a few show trains on British lines were faster than 
the show trains on German lines, the average speed of 



228 RAILWAY POLICY 

passenger trains was, according to a high German authority, 
considerably greater in Germany than in Great Britain. 
The German lines were no doubt more convenient than 
the British lines, owing to the unity and uniformity of 
their traflSic arrangements, trains, time-tables, etc. Tickets 
issued from one town to another were, as a rule, available on 
the different lines connecting the two towns. 

In Great Britain it requires years of travel and of careful 
observation to learn one's way across the country, and its 
numerous lines, and to avoid the many pitfaUs which are 
everywhere placed in the way of the inexperienced. In 
Germany, such pitfalls do not exist, and the greatest simple- 
ton will travel as cheaply, as comfortably, and as rapidly all 
over the country as the most cunning commercial traveller. 
On many British lines, and especially on those south of 
London, trains appear to be late on principle. In Germany, 
railway trains used to arrive, in nineteen times out of 
twenty, to the minute, because the Government punished 
severely those responsible for delay. 

On British railways people are not equitably and not 
equally treated. Individuals who can "influence freight" 
are often able to extort favours from certain railways, and 
the amount of freight charged is largely a matter of negotia- 
tion and of influence. The British merchant cannot tell 
beforehand what the freight will come to unless he inquires. 
The British railways charge on freight " what the traffic 
will bear " — that is, they put on the screw till the victim 
shrieks or goes bankrupt. They are, no doubt, to a great 
extent guilty of the ruin of agriculture and of certain in- 
dustries. A rehable guide to the freight charges does not 
exist, and it could not be compiled, for the freight charges 
per mile, for the identical goods and even on the same line, 
vary in almost every town. Therefore a complete freight 
tariff for Great Britain would probably be bulkier than the 
Encyclopcedia Britannica. Besides, freights fluctuate con- 
stantly. Consequently, the British trader who has to send 
goods by railway works in absolute uncertainty, and when he 
sends his goods carriage forward, the chance is that the 



RAILWAY POLICY 229 

railway company levies an extortionate toll at the other 
end, and the trader loses his customer. This is particularly 
often the case when goods are sent abroad, for the foreign 
customer believes himself to be swindled when seeing the 
high railway charge, and feels inclined to give his business 
to a German exporter, whose freight charge is moderate and 
not a matter of speculation. 

The German State railways have largely contributed 
to the prosperity of the German industries ; the British 
railways have largely contributed to the stagnation and 
decline of the British industries. In Great Britain trade 
policy is made by the railways, which, without consulting 
the traders, prescribe the course of trade, stimulating it here 
and stifling it there. But the greatest injustice under 
which the British producer suffers is that the British rail- 
ways are allowed to convey foreign produce more cheaply 
than the British. Thus they directly subsidise the foreigner 
to the harm of the native producer. They support foreign 
industries on the principle, " On British produce we charge 
what we can, on foreign produce what we may ; British 
produce has to come to us, foreign produce has to be 
attracted." Unfortunately, redress for those who are 
injured is very difficult, very costly, and almost impossible. 

The German freight tariff is of the greatest simplicity. 
There are only a few classes of goods, and every trader 
possesses a little book by means of which the office-boy can 
calculate in a moment the exact amount of the freight 
charges for any weight between any two stations. Freight 
charges in Germany are as uniform, as generally known, and 
as simple as are postal charges. They are not determined 
by negotiation, or by influence, and the goods of the 
foreigner which compete with German goods are not carried 
at a lower, but at a higher, rate than the native produce. 
But foreign raw material is carried cheaply. Thus 
Bismarck's ideal mentioned in the foregoing has been 
fulfiUed. 

While the British railways raise fares and freights at every 
opportunity, the fares and freight charges of the Grerman 



230 



RAILWAY POLICY 



State railways have steadily been going down, as the follow- 
ing jfigures show : 

Receipts of the German Railways (per ton kilometre) 





Goods by fast train. 


Goods by ordinary train 




pfennigs. 




pfennigs. 


1893 


. 24-47 




3-79 


1896 


. 24-09 




3-79 


1899 


. 21-75 




3-57 


1902 


. 17-01 




3-52 


1909 


. 16-52 




3-51 


1913 


. 17-97 




3-58 


Receipts of the German Railways (per 


passenger kilometre) 




1st Class. 2nd Class. 


3rd Class. 


4th Class. 




pfennigs. pfennigs. 


pfennigs. 


pfennigs. 


1893 . 


. 7-87 4-96 


2-94 


1-99 


1896 . 


. 7-94 4-71 


2-76 


1-98 


1899 . 


. 7-75 4-66 


2-69 


1-96 


1902 . 


. 7-33 4-48 


2-67 


1-89 


1909 . 


. 7-48 4-06 


2-54 


1-85 



In Great Britain the maximum charge for third-class 
travelling was before the War Id. per mile, and in nine cases 
out of ten the full maximum rate was charged. In Germany 
the lowest class is the fourth class, where the average charge 
was Id. per mile, while the charge for third class was about 
^. per mile. But travelling first class was much dearer 
than in England. In Germany, the poor man travelled 
cheaply, while in England the rich man travelled cheaply. 

Unfortunately, the German statistics of passenger charges 
and freight charges per mile cannot be compared with 
similar British statistics, because comprehensive British 
statistics are not issued by the British railway companies, 
for reasons best known to themselves. The British railways 
pubhsh neither these statistics nor their freight charges. 
In 1884 Sir Henry Calcraft and Sir Robert Giffen, assistant 
secretaries of the Railway and Statistical Departments, 
regretted that " It is impossible to show what is the receipt 
per ton per mile." In 1886 Mr. J. S. Jeans read a paper on 
Railway Traffic before the Statistical Society, in which he 
said : 



RAILWAY POLICY 231 

" The average transport charges may be ascertained for 
every European country except our own, as regards both 
goods and passenger traffic. In Great Britain the railways, 
whether by accident or by design, have hitherto con- 
trived to make it impossible for the public to discover 
the average charges for the transport of either the one 
or the other, for any one railway or for the country as 
a whole." 

The demand has frequently been raised by the public 
that the railways should publish their charges and their 
earnings per ton mile and per passenger mile, etc. But 
although the railways have, through their advocates in 
the press, written and argued a great deal, they continue 
to work in that congenial obscurity which they find, 
apparently, most conducive to the conduct of their 
business. 

The Grerman States pursued a truly national railway 
policy. Railways were built where they were wanted by 
the population or by the State, even if they did not pay ; 
for the Grerman State monopolist considered himself as the 
servant of the nation and as the trustee of its interests, and 
not the nation as the milch-cow of the railway department. 
Hence, the Grerman States have encouraged the building of 
canals and have in no way interfered with the building of 
electrical trams, while the railways in the classical country 
of Freedom and Non-interference have nefariously closed 
the canals and have obstructed the building of electrical 
tramways. 

If we compare the capital of the German and the British 
railways, we find that the British railway capital per mile 
is almost two-and-a-half times as large as is the German 
railway capital. The inflated capital of the British railways 
hangs like a miUstone round their necks, and here we 
have one of the chief reasons why fares and freights are 
high in this country and low in Germany, and why rail- 
way profits are large in Germany and small in Great 
Britain. 

British railway capital was not always as unwieldy as it 
16 



232 



RAILWAY POLICY 



is now, but has gradually become so, as the following figures 



prove 



Capital of British Railways 



1861 
1871 
1881 
1891 
1901 
1910 



Miles of 
Railway Open. 


Total Capital. 


Capital per Mile 


. 10,865 


£362,327,000 


£33,335 


. 15,367 


552,680,000 


35,944 


. 18,175 


745,528,000 


41,019 


. 20,191 


919,425,000 


45,542 


. 22,078 


1,195,564,000 


54,152 


. 23,387 


1,318,500,000 


56,377 



No doubt a large part of this colossal sum of now about 
£60,000 per mile has been spent properly, but perhaps an 
equally large part represents promoter's plunder, water, 
and, before all, "improvements" for necessary renewals, 
repairs, etc., which are, whenever possible, feloniously 
charged to capital account, instead of being paid out of 
earnings. 

The German State railways have pursued a more con- 
servative financial policy, as the following table shows. 
When they were in private hands, they also increased their 
capital year by year, though their financial excesses were 
comparatively small. 

Capital of German Railways 



1871 . 


. Marks 220,300 per 


kilometre 


1873 . 


„ 242,300 


»» 


1875 . 


„ 249,200 


»> 


1877-8 . 


„ 265,000 


" 


1882-3 . 


„ 265,400 




1887-8 . 


„ 255,100 


,, 


1892-3 . 


„ 253,200 


»> 


1902 . 


„ 258,800 


,, 


1909 . 


„ 288,700 


>» 



The British railways were heavily handicapped from the 
beginning by the extortions of the landowner, the promoter, 
and the lawyer. The German railways also suffered at the 
promoter's hands, but they got at least their ground cheaply. 
Of the Prussian railway capital only 9'87 per cent, was 



RAILWAY POLICY 233 

spent on account of land. Hence, land accounts on an 
average for a capital outlay of only about £2,000 per mile 
on the German railways, while the British railways had to 
buy land at fancy prices. The law expenses also were 
low in Germany, while they were extortionate in England. 
The law costs in respect of the London, Brighton, and South 
Coast Railway are said to have come to £4,806 per mile, 
and those of the Manchester-Birmingham Railway to 
£5,190 per mile. Apparently, it often cost British railways 
much more to acquire their title than it cost German 
railways to acquire their land. These are some of the dis- 
advantages of unrestrained individuahsm, which is favoured 
by the policy of laissez-faire. Laissez-faire means, unfor- 
tunately, only too often, laissez-mefaire. 

Three hundred years ago, Lord Bacon wrote : " There 
are three things which make a nation great and prosperous : 
a fertile soil, busy workshops, and easy conveyance for men 
and commodities from one place to another." Colbert, the 
father of the Mercantile System, left a beautiful saying : 
" The most precious thing which a State possesses is the 
labour of its people." All parties should combine to 
protect the labour of the British people, and to promote 
actively the industrial welfare of the nation. The policy 
of Non-interference has had its day. Who restricts labour 
destroys life ; who increases production makes a nation 
great and prosperous. That is the lesson of the German 
railways and of Bismarck's railway policy. 

When, on the 24th of February 1881, Prince Bismarck 
was told by the leader of the Radical Party that his economic 
policy was unsound, unscientific, opposed to economic 
principles and traditions, the Prince did not quote political 
economists to support his policy, but retorted : " For me 
there has always been one single aim and one single 
principle by which I have been guided : Salus publica.^^ 
May that also be the guiding-star of all those politicians 
who have the economic regeneration of Great Britain at 
heart. 

State railways have been a great success in Germany, 



234 RAILWAY POLICY 

but whether they would be a success in a democracy, such as 
Great Britain, is an open question. They might become a 
prey to party politics. Party leaders bent upon obtaining 
votes might easily diminish their financial result and even 
destroy their efficiency. 



CHAPTER XV 

WATERWAYS AND CANALS * 

Up to 1914 England's most active and most dangerous 
industrial rival was Germany. British merchants and 
manufacturers often asserted, not without reason, that 
the German industries were so exceedingly successful 
largely because they enjoyed cheap transport facilities. 

The natural conditions for cheap transport in Great 
Britain and Germany are totally different, but they are 
not by any means in favour of Germany. A glance at a 
map of Europe will prove this assertion to be true. The 
greatest industrial and exporting centres of Imperial Ger- 
many were the following : The Rhenish- Westphalian 
centre, with the towns of Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Ruhrort, 
Barmen, Elberfeld, Essen, Bochum, Diisseldorf, Cologne, 
Aix-la-Chapelle, etc. ; the Alsatian centre, with Mulhouse, 
Gebweiler, Dornach, Cohnar, etc. ; the various centres 
situated in the Palatinate, Hesse, Baden, Wiirtemberg, and 
Bavaria, with the towns of Hochst, Ludwigshafen, Carlsruhe, 
Mannheim, Offenbach, Frankfort, Reutlingen, Bamberg, 
Nuremberg, etc. ; the centre in the Saxonies, with Chemnitz, 
Glauchau, Zwickau, Plauen, Greiz, Gera, Dresden, Leipzig, 
etc. ; and the Berlin district. In the north of Germany, 
near the sea border, there were practically no industrial 
towns. Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel, Liibeck, Stettin, Dantzig, 
Konigsberg, did some manufacturing, but they could hardly 
be called manufacturing towns. The manufacturing dis- 
tricts were to be found in Central, and especially in Southern, 
Germany, far from the sea. If we draw a straight line from 

1 From the Contemporary Review, December 1914. 
235 



236 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 

the Rhenish- Westphalian centre, which was chiefly devoted 
to the coal and iron industries, to its nearest harbour, 
Antwerp, the distance, according to the towns chosen, 
came to 100 to 150 miles. Berlin was separated by 90 
miles of land from the sea. AJl the manufacturing towns 
belonging to the other centres were separated from their 
nearest harbour or from the sea border by a distance of 
from 200 to 350 miles. The German industries as a whole 
were carried on at an average distance of more than 200 
miles from their harbours. 

If we now look at a map of Great Britain, we find that 
its industrial towns are in most instances situated either 
on the sea or a few miles inland. They are carried on 
as a rule not further than 10, 20, or 30 miles from the sea 
border, and the maximum distance which need be con- 
sidered, and which is altogether exceptional, is 60 miles in 
a straight line. Consequently the raw materials imported 
from abroad by sea and used in manufacturing, such as 
cotton, wool, ores, metals, wood, etc., and the articles for 
the consumption of the industrial workers, the prices of 
which indirectly affect the cost of manufacturing, such as 
wheat, flour, meat, petroleum, etc., had to travel a distance 
which in Germany was from eight to ten times as long as 
in Great Britain. The industrial products exported, also, 
had in Germany to be transported inland eight or ten 
times the distance which they had to travel in Great 
Britain. 

While Inverness, Aberdeen, Dundee, Perth, Glasgow, 
Edinburgh, Greenock, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Sunderland, 
Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-Tees, Bristol, Cardiff, Swansea, 
Manchester, Preston, Barrow-in-Furness, London, Belfast, 
etc., can manufacture on the very sea border, their German 
competitors, the shipbuilding industry of course excepted, 
had to labour more than 100 miles inland. But even the 
German shipbuilding industry was at a great disadvantage, 
for it also had to rely on the far-away industrial Hinter- 
land for a large part of its supplies, notably coal and iron. 
The natural advantages of Great Britain were so immensely 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 237 

in its favour that the German industries would have been 
incapable of competing with the British industries had the 
enormous advantages which their geographical position 
offers been fully utilised. 

Germany was very heavily handicapped by nature in 
the race for industrial success, and the position of most 
Continental countries was similarly unfavourable. The 
manufacturing industries of France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, 
and Russia, also, are carried on far inland. Lyons lies 
160 miles from the sea ; the distance between Milan and 
Genoa is only 80 miles, but Italy has no coal ; the manu- 
facturing towns of Bohemia are 300 miles distant from 
their harbour, and Lodz in Russian Poland is separated by 
170 miles from the coast. One might almost say that in 
Europe the industries are situated in the centre of the 
Continent, with the exception of Great Britain, where 
they are placed on, or close to, the sea border. Therefore 
Great Britain might again acquire and maintain the indus- 
trial monopoly, or at least industrial predominance, in 
Europe should she avail herself of her most favoured 
position. 

As industrial Germany was thus heavily handicapped, 
its industries required for their success a practical, business- 
like education, the application of science to industry, thrift, 
and a comprehensive and efficient system of cheap transport 
whereby to bridge over the long distances which separate 
the numerous interdependent industrial centres from one 
another and which part these centres from the sea. 

In the Middle Ages the foreign trade of Germany relied 
chiefly on her waterways. The Valley of the Rhine was 
the highway over which for more than 1 ,000 years the com- 
merce flowed between the Orient and Great Britain, going 
via Italy, Switzerland, and the towns of Flanders and 
Holland. Before the age of steam and of machinery, the 
Grerman industries flourished in the towns on the Rhine, 
Elbe, and Danube, and their tributary streams. Their 
prosperity was founded on cheap water transport. Nature 
and tradition pointed to the waterways for Germany's 



238 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 

prosperity, and modern Germany resolved to extend the 
use of her historic waterways to the uttermost, notwith- 
standing the example of Great Britain. 

When the railways were introduced, Great Britain ceased 
to extend her system of waterways. Her canals, which had 
been the foremost in Europe, and which used to be the 
admiration and envy of foreign nations, were declared to be 
useless by the promoters of railways and their friends, and 
the nation weakly and fooUshly allowed its canals to fall 
into decay at the bidding of those interested in railways. 
One of the greatest German authorities on inland navigation 
wrote in a most important book on Inland Navigation in 
Europe and North America, compiled by order of the Minister 
of Public Works, which was published in 1899 : 

" The artificial waterways of England are the oldest in 
Europe. . . . Next to Sweden and Finland, Great Britain 
possesses the closest net of water-courses in Europe, and 
she is exceedingly favoured by nature for inland transport 
by water owing to the climatic conditions prevailing, the 
plenty and equal distribution of rain, and the mild winters 
usual in that country, as well as owing to the formation of 
the coast with its numerous inlets of the sea, which deeply 
penetrates from all sides into the land. 

" With the arrival of railways, the building of canals 
ceased almost completely in 1830. The railways were 
placed in a position in which they could easily destroy the 
canals. Through traffic on the most important canal routes 
had to pass through a number of different and independent 
canal systems. As soon as a railway succeeded in obtaining 
the control of an indispensable part of the canal route by 
purchase, lease, or traffic agreement, it took to destroying 
the traffic on the adjoining canals, either by enforcing 
maximum rates or by numerous other expedients. After 
having been damaged in this manner, canals were bought up 
cheaply by the railways, which used them for traffic which 
could not conveniently be handled by the railroads or they 
stopped the canal traffic altogether. The numerous inde- 
pendent canal companies possessed no central organisation, 
and when, in 1844, an organisation for combined defensive 
action was created, important parts of the canal system 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 239 



were already in the possession, or under the influence, of 
the railways, and it was too late to oppose their further en- 
croachments. In 1871 canal property had on an average 
fallen to one- third of its former value. Only in 1873 were 
the railways prohibited to close for traffic canals in their 
possession, or to allow them to fall into disrepair." 

Grermany had copied Great Britain in many ways, but 
she had not by any means copied her bhndly. She refused 
to adopt Free Trade, notwithstanding the vigorous agitation 
of the Cobden Club and its professorial sympathisers in 
Grermany. She declined to hand over the whole of her 
productive industries to the tender mercies of her transport 
industries, relying on the dogma of free competition, 
preached by the champions of Free Trade. She declined 
to let her agriculture be ruined. She firmly refused to let 
her canal system decay in the interest and at the bidding 
of the railways. Germany tried to develop all her industries 
harmoniously, and not to allow one or the other to become 
great and prosperous at the expense of the others. 

Recognising the importance of cheap transport and of an 
alternative transport system, Grermany steadily extended, 
enlarged, and improved her natural and artificial waterways, 
and kept on extending and improving them. 

Since 1871 England has done practically nothing for 
inland navigation, for the Manchester Ship Canal is a sea 
canal. During the same period, Germany built about 
1 ,000 miles of inland canals and immensely improved all her 
navigable rivers. The German- Austrian canals lately pro- 
posed or begun have a length of more than 1,500 miles, 
while their probable cost should exceed £50,000,000. The 
Rhine-Elbe Canal Bill of 1901, for instance, proposed the 
spending of £19,450,000 within fifteen years. The very 
cautious and very thrifty Government of Germany was 
willing to sink immense sums in canals, although they would 
prove exceedingly able competitors to the State railways. 
The monopolist State was deUberately creating a most 
powerful competition to itself. 

Germany possesses a number of big rivers, but these were, 



240 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 

until a very recent period, in a state of neglect. They were 
natural water-courses with a natural, unevenly deep and 
partly shallow bed, which did not allow of the use of big 
ships, and the soft natural banks prevented ships going at 
a considerable speed, because the heavy waves created by 
their rapid progress would have washed them down into 
the river. For this reason ships had to travel at a very 
low speed in Germany exactly as they have to proceed on 
British rivers, and even on those which are emphatically 
industrial rivers. 

The larger a ship or barge is, the cheaper is the cost of 
transport, for the same number of men who are required to 
look after a small barge can handle a large one. Besides, 
the dead weight of the hull, the proportion of living room 
to stowage room, etc., is of course far greater in a small than 
in a large vessel. For the same reason for which ocean 
steamers are increasing in size from year to year, the ships 
and barges used in inland navigation are growing continually 
bigger in those countries where inland navigation is fostered. 
Again, the quicker a cargo boat travels, the more economical 
it is, for time is money. In order to make it possible to use 
large and swift cargo boats on her rivers, Germany set to 
work to regulate her natural rivers. 

With this object in view, the natural earthbanks of rivers 
and canals were replaced by solid masonry walls, the river 
beds were narrowed and deepened, the rocks which in many 
parts — for instance in the Rhine at Bingen — were a danger 
to navigation were blasted away, and provisions were made 
to prevent the ice forming during severe winters and closing 
streams and canals to navigation. Numerous well-equipped 
harbours and quays were built by all towns within reach 
of inland navigation, and gradually all the more important 
German waterways were greatly perfected and improved. 
Cologne, which in a straight line is situated about 150 miles 
from the sea, was made a seaport, trading regularly with 
England, Scandinavia, and Russia. High up the Rhine 
and 300 miles inland lies Strasbourg, which formerly 
could be reached only by the smallest river craft, but 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 241 

now boats carrying 600 tons are going to and from that 
town. 

The tributary streams of the Rhine also were very greatly 
improved. The Main, for instance, was a shallow stream 
with a depth of only 2| feet. This depth was gradually 
increased to 8 J feet for a distance of twenty miles up-stream, 
and at a cost of £400,000, in order to provide the industries 
of Frankfort with cheap transport. Up to Frankfort, the 
bed of the river Main is as deep as that of the Rhine, and 
the same steamers which can travel on the Rhine can now 
go up to Frankfort. 

The towns at or near the Rhine vied with one another 
in tapping that stream. Crefeld and Carlsruhe, which are 
situated some distance away from the Rhine, dug canals 
to that river, and many old-world sleepy towns on the 
Rhine, which used to subsist on the wine- trade and on tourist 
traffic, equipped the water's edge with the most perfect 
and most up-to-date installations for warehousing and for 
loading and unloading goods directly from train to steamer 
or barge, and from boat to train. Formerly, sacks of wheat 
weighing 2 cwt. each were carried on the shoulder by sturdy 
men from small grain boats to old-fashioned sheds, where 
they were stacked. Now huge ships fiUed with wheat in 
bulk are unloaded by suction in a few hours, and the grain 
is automatically weighed whilst being whisked from steamer 
to store, or is put into sacks at an incredibly high speed 
by machinery and dropped into railway trucks. Electricity 
is largely made use of for working the machinery of these 
harbours, and some of these are very likely the best-equipped 
inland harbours in the world. 

Formerly the greatest attraction for travellers on the 
Rhine was its romantic scenery and its ruined castles. 
Now its greatest interest lies in this, that it is perhaps the 
most perfect waterway in the world for the promotion oi]j 
industry. Its shores are no longer so remarkable for their 
romantic views as for their countless smoking factory 
chimneys. However, this bustling activity is not by any 
means restricted to the Rhine. Everywhere in Germany 



242 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 

water transport has been developed with the utmost energy. 
On all the rivers and all the canals commercial and industrial 
activity has marvellously developed, and the promotion of 
water transport has become a passion with the German 
business community. 

On the British canals and rivers, which are, as a rule, only 
shallow ditches filled with water, tiny barges loaded with 
from 30 to 50 tons may be seen which are laboriously hauled 
by horses at a speed of about three miles an hour. On the 
German rivers and canals, trains of barges of 300, 500, or 
1,000 tons each, which are hauled by steamers, may at every 
hour and on every day be seen proceeding at a very con- 
siderable speed. 

Water transport possesses great advantages over trans- 
port by land. A large iron barge of a loading capacity of 
2,000 tons, and of the type which is used on the Rhine, costs 
only about £5,000, or about £2 10s. per ton of load room. 
A German railway wagon of ten tons' capacity costs 
about £125, or £12 IO5. per ton of load room, and is there- 
fore, as a vessel for carrying freight, five times more costly 
than a barge. As regards the cost of moving freight by 
land and water, water transport possesses an immense 
advantage over land transport. On a horizontal road, and 
at a speed of about three miles per hour, a horse can pull 
about two tons ; on a horizontal railway it can pull about 
15 tons ; on a canal it can pull from 60 to 100 tons. There- 
fore, from four to six times the energy is required in hauling 
goods by rail, and thirty to fiifty times as much force is 
expended in hauling it by road, whatever the motive force 
may be. Therefore, the cost of propulsion by water, 
whether the motive force be horse traction, steam, or 
electricity, is only a fraction of the cost of propulsion by 
road or rail. Furthermore, the construction of railways 
is exceedingly costly. On an average at least £20,000 to 
£30,000 per mile are required to build a railway in a country 
such as Great Britain or Germany, while a canal can often 
be built at considerably smaller cost. A further circum- 
stance in favour of water traffic Hes in this — that far more 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 243 

traffic can pass over a broad canal than can be sent over 
railway. It is therefore clear that transport by water is, 
and must always remain, so very much cheaper than land 
transport, be it by road or by rail, that railways cannot 
possibly compete with properly organised, properly managed, 
properly planned, and properly equipped waterways. Hence 
it is economically wasteful not to extend and develop 
the natural and artificial waterways which a country 
possesses, and it is absolutely suicidal and criminal to let 
them fall into neglect and decay. \ 

Canals and rivers are most suitable for the transport 
of bulky goods which are not easily perishable, and which 
need not be dehvered in the shortest possible time. There- 
fore canals and rivers are particularly suitable for trans- 
porting cotton, ore, metal, coal, wood, petroleum, grain, 
manure, chemicals, fodder, wool, potatoes, cement, stone, 
leather, salt, sugar, vegetables, fruit, machinery, and those 
manufactured goods which are dispatched in fairly big 
parcels or which are packed in strong boxes and bales. 
/ If it were not for the existence of the German waterways, 
j the Grcrman industries would certainly not have flourished 
I so much. The iron industry was completely dependent 
/ upon it for the imported iron ore, and that of Lorraine, had 
to be carried over huge distances to the Ruhr coal district 
to be smelted. Certain valuable products and by-products 
of the German mines and ironworks, and the more bulky 
products of the chemical industries of Germany could, 
according to Major Kurs, a leading authority on inland 
navigation, be sold in Germany and abroad only owing 
to the cheapness of transport by water. In many cases 
the profit was cut so fine that an increase of the freight 
charges by about one-fiftieth of a penny per ton per 
mile would have killed important industries. Germany's 
industrial success was no doubt due to a large extent 
to the immense assistance which she received from her 
waterways. 

In consequence of the energetic steps which were taken 
for improving the navigable channel of the Rhine, the 



244 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 



volume of transport flo^^^ing over that river inereased, 
according to the otHoial statistics, in the folknving remark- 
able manner : 



Thkouoh Trafi 


uo OF Goods Passing Emmerich (German-Dutch 




Frontier) 




I' p-strt-<iin. Doirn-strtatn. 


1889 


2.799.800 toiia 2,593,000 tons 


1894 


•4,771.500 „ 3,142,000 ,, 


1897 


0,929,100 „ 3,480.200 „ 


1900 


9.030.400 ., 4,129,700 ,. 


1903 


. 10,027.900 „ 7,211,900 „ 


190G 


. 13.402.400 „ 7,078,300 ., 


1909 


. 14.881.300 ,. 9,904,700 ,. 


1913 


. 19,823,047 „ 17,038,484 „ 



An almost equally rapid increase in the traffic took place 
on all the other rivers and ciinals. Owing to the marvellous 
expansion of the traffic, the tonnage of the ships used in Ger- 
man inland naviuation increased in the folloAvine manner : 



1882 
1887 
1892 
1897 
1902 
1907 
1912 



Tonnage op the German Iniand Fleet 

yiimhtr of Ships, Tannagf. 

. 18,715 1,058,200 tons 

. 20,930 2,100,705 ,, 

. 22,848 2,700,553 „ 

. 22,504 3,370,447 ,, 

. 24,839 4,873,502 ,, 

. 20,235 5,914,020 „ 

. 29,533 7,394,507 ,, 



We have often heard of the marvellous progress of the 
German merchant marine, but it would appear that the 
progress of the German inland fleet has been much more 
rapid. While the Gt*rman inland shipping increased 
between 1S82 and 1912 from 1,658,260 tons to 7,394,567 
tons, the German merchant marine increased between 
1881 and 1913 only from 1,181,525 tons to 3,153,724 tons. 

The full significance of this enormous increase in the 
tonnage of inland shipping is brought out only if we take 
note of the change in the character of Germany's inland 
fleet, which is apparent from the following table : 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 245 

Classification of Ships of the German Inland Fleet 





Shipt of 


Ships of 


Ships of 


Ships of 


Skips of 




less than 


100-150 


150-250 


250-600 


600 and 




100 tons. 


tons. 


tons. 


tons. 


more ton* 


1887 . 


. 11,281 


5,460 


1,757 


1,271 


220 


1892 . 


. 11,430 


6,326 


2,343 


1,822 


457 


1897 . 


. 10,390 


4,405 


S,irA 


2,746 


650 


1902 . 


. 10,764 


1,705 


5,732 


4,087 


1,661 


1907 . 


. 10,930 


1,859 


6,301 


4,987 


2,112 


1912 . 


. 11,843 


2,264 


6,316 


6,027 


3,073 



The ships and barges of less than 150 tons decreased in 
number during the last twenty years. The whole of the 
immense increase in inland tonnage took place in ships of 
large and of the largest size. This increase is particularly 
striking in the case of ships of 600 tons and more, which 
increased almost fifteen-fold. The decrease of the boats 
measuring less than 150 tons should be particularly interest- 
ing to Great Britain, inasmuch as a ship or a barge of 150 
tons, which is too small for German inland transport, and 
is considered to be ripe for the shipbreaker, is a very large 
vessel in British inland navigation, in which ships of 30 or 
50 tons abound. 

How enormous the influence of the size of ships is on the 
cost of transport may be seen from the following table, 
which was supplied by one of the leading German authorities 
on inland navigation : 

Cost of Transport per Ton per Kilometre on Canals, in Ships of 
Various Sizes. DuniNa a Ten Months' Shippino Season 



150 


200 


300 


400 


450 


600 


1000 


1500 tons 


0-79 


0-63 


0-48 


0-41 


0-38 


0-30 


0-23 


0-21 pfg. 



One pfennig being about one-eighth of a penny, these 
rates are roughly equal to the incredibly low charge of from 
one-seventh to one-twenty-fourth of a penny per ton per 
mile ! If British industries should secure rates approximating 
those given above for their transport requirements, a new 
era would dawn for them. 

The foregoing table shows how exceedingly uneconomical 
the toy barges are which ply upon British canals and rivers. 



246 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 

The cost of transport in boats of 150 tons is about four 
times as great as in boats of 1,500 tons. Nevertheless, even 
boats of 150 tons are hardly to be found on British canals 
and rivers, where barges of smaller size, such as 30 and 
50 tons for instance, are still transporting goods at a 
leisurely speed and excessive costs, exactly as they did in 
the era of the mail coaches and turnpikes a hundred 
years ago. 

The cost of transport per ton per kilometre for barges of 
a smaller size than 150 tons cannot be given, for such barges 
are no longer of importance on the German waterways, and 
the rates for such small boats are not supplied by the German 
source from which the foregoing figures are taken. The 
average size of the large boats plying on the German water- 
ways is from 200 to 400 tons on the minor waterways, on 
the Elbe it is 1,000 tons and more, and on the Rhine barges 
from 2,000 to 2,350 tons may be seen. 

The exceedingly low costs of transport given in the fore- 
going for ships of various sizes apply of course only to new 
and perfectly-equipped water-courses. They presuppose 
a well-filled ship. But as the ideal state of the perfectly- 
equipped water -course and the well-fiUed ship is at present 
rather the exception than the rule in Germany, for there 
are still many ships which can only be described as misfits, 
it is worth while to take note of the average cost of transport 
on the German rivers, and to allow for the fact that a large 
portion of the tonnage is during part of the year only partly 
employed or unemployed. One of the foremost German 
authorities has furnished the following table of the actual 
costs of water transport, which is most interesting, because 
it gives a fair idea of the real, not the ideal, business con- 
ditions : 

Cost op Transport on Principal German RrvrsRS 

Average Cost of Transport per Ton per Kilometre 

On the Rhine. 

Fiill load during one-third of year. 'j 

Three-quarter load during one-third of year. >- 0-46 pfennig. 

Half load during one-third of year. J 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 24? 

On the Elbe. 

Ftill load during two-fifths of year, "\ 

Three-quarter load during one-fifth of year. L n Rfi f 

Half load during one- fifth of year. j 

Quarter load dui'ing one-fifth of year. J 

On the Oder. 

Full load during one-quarter of year, "\ 
Three-quarter load during one- quarter of year. I ^v n * 

Half load during one-quarter of year, f 

Quarter load during one-quarter of year, J 

On the Vistula. 

Full load during one-quarter of year. ^ 

Three-quarter load during one-quarter of year, , „„ , 

TT ir 1 J J • X f r 1 -38 pfennig. 

Half load during one-quarter of year. I 

Quarter load during one-quarter of year, J 

The Oder and Vistula flow through chiefly agricultural 
provinces in the east of Germany where freight is less 
plentiful and less regular, and where the equipment for 
economic transport is less advanced than in Central and 
West Germany. Therefore the cost of transport is com- 
paratively high on these rivers, being equal to about 
one-sixth of a penny per ton per mile on the Oder, and one- 
fourth of a penny per ton per mile on the Vistula. On the 
Elbe the cost of transport is about one-eighth of a penny 
per ton per mile, and on the Rhine it is as low as one-eleventh 
of a penny per ton per mile. As in the foregoing table full 
allowance appears to have been made for slack time and for 
the time when navigation has to stop in consequence of 
frost, these figures should give a fair indication of the actual 
cost of transport. 

The costs of transport from place to place are not merely 
the costs of water carriage. We can obtain a real insight 
into the costs of transport only if we compare all the costs 
of water transport with all the costs of transport by railway. 
In the following table, three typical cases are given in which 
all the costs of water transport and of transport partly by 
water and partly by rail are compared with all the costs of 
transport by rail. The costs of water transport are calculated 
on the basis of 600 ton vessels, a size which may be considered 
17 



248 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 

a fair average on the up-to-date waterways of Germany. 
The costs of railway carriage are those of the Prussian State 
railways, the transport costs and freight charges of which 
are exceedingly low, as is generally known. 

All Costs for Sending Coal 
From Heme {Westphalia) to Hanover. By Canal. By Railway. 

Distance 260 kilometres . . . 3-43 Mks. 5-80 Mks. 

From Heme to Schonebeck on the Elbe. 

Distance 444 kilometres, the mine 
lying 7 kilometres away from 

Heme Harbour .... 7-00 Mks. 9-00 Mks. 
From Heme to Mannheim on the Rhine. 

Distance 393 kilometres . . . 3-88 Mks. 8-30 Mks. 

From the foregoing figures it appears that if all incidental 
expenses are duly considered, the costs of carrying coal 
between two of the places mentioned are roughly from 50 
to 115 per cent, higher by railway than by canal only, or 
by canal and river, or by railway and canal. As the trans- 
port costs on the Prussian State railways are exceedingly 
moderate — they are probably the lowest in Europe — this 
result is surely very remarkable. 

Owing to the greater cheapness of transport by water, 
huge and increasing quantities of freight are naturally being 
diverted from the German railways to the waterways, 
especially as it has been found that well-equipped waterways 
of sufficient size can deal more satisfactorily and more 
rapidly with large quantities of goods than can the best- 
equipped railways. Railway stations are always apt to 
become congested, and they cannot so easily be enlarged 
in order to keep pace with the growing traffic requirements 
of the time as quays along the banks of rivers and canals. 
Besides, the number of goods trains which can be dispatched 
over a railway is limited in consequence of the exigency of 
the general traffic, which must not be disturbed, while on 
a river or canal of sufficiently generous size a practically 
unhmited number of cargo boats can be sent at all times 
and in either direction. Lastly, a goods train can carry 
only a moderate load — 300 tons is an exceedingly satis- 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 249 

factory performance for a British train — while a train of 
barges can easily transport several thousand tons of freight. 
For these reasons a far larger quantity of goods can be sent 
over a fair-sized waterway than can be sent over a railway 
of similar length, and on a river or a well-equipped canal 
enormous masses of goods can easily, quickly, and without 
delay be forwarded, which would cause congestion, con- 
fusion, and ultimately a complete breakdown on the best- 
equipped and best-managed railway. The progressive use 
of the waterways in Germany and their ability to handle 
considerably larger quantities of freight than the railways 
may be seen from the following figures : 





Tkansport of Goods 


on the German Waterways 




Arrivals. 


Departures. 


1875 


11,000,000 tons 


9,800,000 tons 


1885 


14,500,000 ,, 


13,100,000 ,, 


1895 


25,800,000 ,, 


20,900,000 „ 


1905 


56,400,000 ,, 


47,000,000 ,, 




Tbanspokt of Goods 


ON THE German Railways 




Arrivals. 


Departures. 


1875 


83,500,000 tons 


83,500,000 tons 


1885 


100,000,000 „ 


100,000,000 ,, 


1895 


164,000,000 ,, 


167,000,000 ,, 


1905 


291,000,000 „ 


297,700,000 „ 



These figures show that between 1875 to 1905 the quantity 
of freight handled by the German railways has increased 
by a little less than 250 per cent., whilst the quantity of 
freight dispatched over the German waterways has increased 
by considerably more than 400 per cent. 

If we now look at the record of ton kilometres, and at 
the quantity of freight carried per kilometre on both railways 
and waterways, we find the following figures : 

Freight Record on German Railways 

Ton Mlometres. "'"'" 'Jj7iL'iT''" 
1875 .... 10,900,000,000 410,000 tons 

1885 .... 16,600,000,000 450,000 ,, 

1895 . . . . 26,500,000,000 590,000 ,, 

1906 .... 51,200,000,000 820,000 „ 



250 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 

FBEIGHT ErECOBD OF GERMAN WaTEBWATS 

Ton kilometres. ^<"« "^ ^I'^^^'' dispateJied 

per kilometre. 

1875 .... 2,900,000,000 290,000 tons 

1885 .... 4,800,000,000 480,000 ,, 

1895 .... 7,500,000,000 750,000 ,, 

1905 . . . . 15,000,000,000 1,500,000 ,, 

From the foregoing figures it appears that the quantity 
of goods which have been dispatched over each kilometre 
of railway has increased during the thirty years under 
review from 410,000 to 820,000 tons, or by only 100 per cent., 
while during the same period the quantity of goods dis- 
patched over each kilometre of waterway has increased from 
290,000 tons to 1,500,000 tons, or by no less than 417 per 
cent. Water carriage in Germany has expanded more than 
four times as quickly as railway carriage. In 1875 the 
goods traffic was 410,000 tons per kilometre of railway, and 
only 290,000 tons per kilometre of waterway. At that time 
the railways were still supreme. In 1905 this position had 
been completely reversed, for the railways dealt in that 
year with 820,000 tons of freight per kilometre, whilst the 
waterways handled no less than 1,500,000 tons per kilo- 
metre. Evidently the waterways are in the ascendant, 
and if later figures were available, it would probably be seen 
that the waterways have considerably improved upon their 
record of 1905. 

The effect of the extension and improvement of the 
German waterways, both natural and artificial, may be 
gauged from the significant fact that the most prosperous 
industrial centres in Germany, though they lie far inland, 
are situated close to the waterways of which they make the 
most extensive use. The most prosperous part of industrial 
Germany is the Rhenish- Westphahan district, with the 
towns of Diisseldorf, Essen, Dortmund, etc. This is the 
stronghold of the German iron and steel industry. The 
industrial success of the Rhenish- Westphalian district 
would have been impossible had it not been for the cheap 
carriage of goods afforded by the Rhine. The following 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 



251 



figures clearly show what water traffic has meant for the 
chief industrial centre of Germany : 

WATEB TbAFBIO of HOCHFELD-DtriSBUKG-RTTHEORT (RhENISH- 

Westphalian District) 

2,900,000 tons 
3,500,000 



1875 
1880 
1885 
1890 
1894 
1896 
1900 
1909 
1913 



4,500,000 

6,200,000 

8,200,000 

9,700,000 

13,000,000 

17,000,000 

28,830,000 



The traffic of that most important inland harbour, which 
is unknown to most Englishmen, has grown prodigiously 
since 1875. It stands now among the very foremost har- 
bours of the world, and only those who have thoroughly 
examined that enormous inland harbour can form an idea 
of its vastness, the excellence of the harbour appliances, 
and its activity. The Port of London appears asleep if 
compared with that inland port, the name of which is hardly 
known outside Germany. 

The enormous activity of the German waterways has 
greatly benefited Holland, for three-quarters of the through 
trade of Holland is German water-borne trade. Holland 
lives largely on German trade, and Germany resents that 
the trade on her chief stream has to pass through a foreign 
country to which it has to pay a heavy tribute. The un- 
ceasing agitation of the Pan- Germanic League against 
Holland, and its advocacy of the incorporation of Holland 
into Germany, sprang to a great extent from the resentment 
that the mouth of the Rhine is situated in a non-German 
country. This feeling was not confined to the Pan- Germans. 
It was one of the principal causes which determined the 
Government to construct at immense expense the Rhine-Ems 
Canal with the object of giving to the Rhine an outlet at 
Emden, which was converted into a well-equipped port. 
It was intended to divert the export and import traffic of 
Germany from Rotterdam to Emden, to impoverish Holland, 



262 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 

and to bring her to her knees by economic pressure. On the 
11th of August 1899, the Dortmund- Ems Canal was opened. 
The year book Nauticus, which was officially inspired, wrote 
in the same year : 

" In our time our dependence on foreign countries has 
frequently been felt by the circumstance that the mouth of the 
Rhine is in the hands of a foreign country, and that that 
country in consequence draws away the chief profit of our 
export industry. This state of dependence will be ended by 
the Dortmund-Ems Canal, which gives to the Rhine, at least 
for the Province of Westphalia, a German outlet in Emden."" ^ 

Roads and canals are open to aU. Hence, free competition 
ensures on roads and canals a cheap and effective service on 
the part of the numerous carriers who make use of them. 
When the British railways were in their infancy it was 
expected by many sagacious men that the iron road also 
would be a common road for the use of all on which com- 
peting carriers would travel with conveyances of their own. 
Their anticipations were not realised. The owners of the 
iron roads, unUke the owners of roads and canals, became 
the only carriers on them, and thus a monopoly arose 
somewhat unexpectedly. The productive industries were 
given over to the mercy of the railways, and these hastened 
to close as quickly as possible the only alternative inland 
trade routes, by acquiring and obstructing the canals or by 
" repairing " them out of existence. 

Great Britain possesses no adequate waterways for her 
industries not so much because Nature has been unkind, as 
because men have been short-sighted and neglectful. While 
Germany has vigorously developed her waterways hundreds 
of miles inland, Great Britain has not even adequately 
regulated the Thames. London, with its incomparable 
position, might become the finest entrepot in the world by 
making a barrage east of the towTi, and converting the 
stream for many miles below London into a gigantic lake 
of still water where, undisturbed by the tides, ships could 

1 The italics are in the German original. 



WATERWAYS AND CANALS 253 

load and unload from train to ship and from ship to train, 
and where they could store their goods in gigantic modern 
warehouses. Instead of such a harbour, we find a mediaeval 
river with mediaeval docks, where goods have to be "light- 
ered," exactly as in the time of Charles I,, and even in the 
heart of industrial and commercial London, the Thames, 
which ought to be the best-equipped commercial river in 
the world, presents its ancient and unlovely mud banks at 
low tide exactly as it did 1,000 years ago. 

The policy of the German Government with regard to 
waterways was laid down in an official publication some 
time ago as follows : 

" Any means whereby the distances which separate the 
economic centres of the country from one another can be 
diminished, must be welcomed and be considered as a 
progress, for it increases our strength in our industrial 
competition with foreign countries. Every one who desires 
to send or to receive goods wishes for cheap freights. Hence 
the aim of a healthy transport policy should be to diminish 
as far as possible the economically unproductive costs of 
transport. A country such as Germany, which is happy 
enough to produce on her own soil by far the larger part of 
the raw material and food which it requires, occupies the 
most independent and the most favourable position if, 
owing to cheap inland transportation, its economic centres 
are placed as near as possible to one another. When this 
has been achieved, Germany will be able to dispense with 
many foreign products, and it will occupy a position of 
superiority in comparison with all those States which do not 
possess similarly perfect means of transport. 

" Many circumstances which in former times gave su- 
periority to certain countries, such as the greater skill of 
their workmen, superior machinery, cheaper wages, greater 
natural fertility of the soil : all these advantages are gradu- 
ally being levelled down by time and progress. But what 
will remain is the advantage of a well-planned system of 
transportation which makes the best possible use of local 
resources and local advantages.^ It is to this that England 
owes to a large extent her unique position for commercial 
exchange with other countries." 

^ The italics are in the German original. 



254 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 

These words are well worth reading, re-reading, and 
remembering. England's " unique position for commercial 
exchange," as the German document calls it, still remains, 
while her equally unique position for industrial pursuits has 
been spoilt and partly lost through the insufficiency, the 
inefficiency, and the expensiveness of British inland trans- 
port. It is for the nation and its Government to decide 
whether they will allow Great Britain's industrial supremacy, 
which nature has put into her reach and which she once 
possessed, to be finally lost or to be regained. 

Germany owed much of her industrial success to her wise 
policy of protection. But with her protection was not 
merely a fiscal, but a general and comprehensive policy. 
She protected her population, not only against tariff attacks 
from without, but also against the far more dangerous 
attacks upon their prosperity from within. She protected 
and fostered her industries, not only by her tariff, but also 
by a practical national education, by equitable and cheap 
laws, and before all by the provision of adequate, efficient, 
and cheap means of transport. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE SHIPBTHLDING and shipping industries of GERMANY ^ 

The fact that Germany had before the War an exceedingly 
prosperous shipbuilding and shipping industry must appear 
exceedingly strange to those who are convinced that a 
prosperous shipping trade can be erected only on the basis 
of Free Trade. Therefore it is of interest to investigate 
why Germany, the classical land of protected industries, 
possessed before the War a very flourishing mercantile 
marine and shipbuilding industry. 

Coal and iron, which are the principal materials used in 
shipbuilding, are found in Germany not close to the sea coast, 
but far inland in the middle and in the south of the country. 
How enormous is the distance between the principal coal 
and iron centres of Germany and the most important ship- 
building towns may be seen from the following figures which 
have been furnished by Messrs. von Halle and Schwarz, the 
well-known authorities on German shipbuilding : 



Distances between — 

Essen. 
Miles. 


Aix-la- 

Ohapelle. 
Miles. 


Saarbrucken. 
Miles. 


Kattowiti 
Miles. 


Wilhelmshaven 


. 198 


258 


417 


647 


Bremen 


. 165 


237 


402 


581 


Geestemiiade 


. 204 


277 


437 


620 


Hamburg 


. 243 


318 


482 


534 


Kiel 


. 318 


390 


555 


568 


Liibeck 


. 283 


357 


523 


514 


Danzig 


. 640 


716 


798 


380 


Memel 


. 872 


950 


1,028 


568 



From the foregoing table it appears that the average 

distance which the heavy German raw material had to 

1 From the Fortnightly Review, March 1906. 
255 



256 SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 

travel overland before being worked into ships was ap- 
proximately 400 miles, a distance which is greater than that 
which separates London from Glasgow. It should be added 
that by far the largest part of the German iron ore came 
from Lorraine and Luxemburg. Consequently the column 
giving the distances between Saarbriicken and the various 
shipbuilding towns, distances which range from 400 to 1,000 
miles, is the most important. 

From the table of the distances we can form an idea of the 
difficulties under which the German shipbuilder had to work. 
We can easiest realise them by imagining that the ship- 
builders on the Clyde had to draw their raw material from 
Portsmouth, Land's End, or London, overland through the 
whole length of England. Great Britain is wonderfully 
favoured by Nature, by her geographical structure, and by 
the fact that coal, iron, populous towns, and harbours He in 
immediate proximity of each other, not only for the pursuit 
of shipbuilding, but for that of all manufacturing industries. 
It should be added that most of the material used in German 
shipbuilding was of German origin, that the German iron 
travelled almost exclusively by rail over hundreds of miles 
to the shipbuilding yards, and that the State railways wisely 
conceded very low freights in order to foster shipbuilding. 

During the middle of the last century German ship- 
building was rather flourishing. Numerous shipyards on 
the Elbe, the Weser, and along the North Sea coast were 
building wooden sailing ships for which the raw material 
was cheap and near at hand. In those days Germany 
supplied England with much shipbuilding timber. Prussia, 
always desirous to foster private industry by judicious 
official encouragement, opened in 1836 a technical high 
school of shipbuilding near Stettin, and the numerous fine 
fast clippers, which between 1850 and 1860 carried vast 
numbers of German emigrants to the United States, owed 
their excellence to that pioneer institution. 

When in the 'sixties iron-built steamships began to 
displace wooden saihng ships, the German shipyards declined. 
Great Britain, who was then practically the only industrial 



SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 257 

country in the world, easily obtained the monopoly in iron 
shipbuilding. During the 'sixties and 'seventies practically 
all the German merchant steamships were built in England. 
Competition with England seemed out of the question on 
account of Germany's unfavourable geographical position. 
Private enterprise in Germany shrank from undertaking an 
apparently hopeless task, and Germany would have remained 
an inland power, had not the Government again shown the 
way and encouraged the creation of a shipbuilding industry 
by a dehberate fostering policy. In 1870, a little before the 
outbreak of the Franco-German War, the Prussian Govern- 
ment estabhshed at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven repairing yards 
for the few British-built warships of Prussia. The victorious 
war and the unification of Germany encouraged the Prusso- 
German Government to build experimentally an armoured 
cruiser, the Preussen. The ship was a success, but although 
it was far more expensive than it would have been if it 
had been ordered in England, which then was the cheapest 
market for ships of war, the German Government decided 
to continue building its own warships, firmly expecting that 
eventually a powerful and profitable German shipbuilding 
industry would arise out of these small, costly, and appar- 
ently hopeless beginnings. 

On the 1st of January 1872 General von Stosch became 
the head of the German Admiralty. He proved a very 
capable and far-seeing organiser and administrator. He 
resolved to create a powerful shipbuilding industry. The 
creation of the German Navy proved a mighty stimulus to 
the German shipyards and to the German iron industry, 
especially as Von Stosch laid down the principle that all 
German warships should be built in German yards exclusively 
of German material. 

When, in 1879, Bismarck resolved to abandon Free Trade, 
he found that the German shipyards on the sea coast had 
since 1853 been able to import all their raw material free of 
duty, while the shipyards on the great rivers inland were not 
similarly favoured. The latter found the prices of foreign 
raw material too high owing to the duties charged. The 



268 SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 

important shipbuilding industry on the rivers had decayed. 
The very large river traffic on the Rhine was in Dutch hands. 
They used Dutch ships. In introducing general agricultural 
and industrial protection, Bismarck wisely made an ex- 
ception in favour of the shipbuilding industry. The German 
shipyards were exempted from all duties on the materials 
used. Thus they were given complete Free Trade. From 
a fiscal point of view, their business was carried on outside 
the German frontier. Therefore the German shipbuilding 
industry was treated like a foreign country by the German 
iron industry, which relieved itself of unduly large stocks 
by dumping iron and steel not only in England but in the 
German shipyards as well. 

Having given protection to all the German industries, 
except the shipbuilding industry, Bismarck converted the 
private railways of Prussia into State railways and arranged 
that the heavy raw material used in German shipbuilding 
should be hauled over the State railways at rates barely 
covering the cost of transportation. Thus he bridged the 
huge distances which separated the German seaports from 
their industrial bases, and made it possible for the ship- 
building industry to expand. Though not protected by 
fiscal measures it was no less fostered by these preferential 
traffic arrangements. 

For some considerable time the German shipping com- 
panies did not feel inclined to desert the British shipbuilders, 
who had hitherto furnished them with excellent ships. They 
did not trust the German shipbuilders, whose ability was 
doubted. Up to 1879 the German yards were not able to 
compete with English shipbuilders as regards price and 
rapidity of delivery. German materials were far more 
costly, and the working plant of the German shipyards was 
quite inadequate. Only when, in 1879, the import duties on 
shipbuilding materials had been abolished, and when at the 
same time the German iron and steel industries had been so 
much strengthened by Protection as to allow of their creating 
branch industries devoted to shipbuilding, could the building 
of merchant vessels on an adequate scale be inaugurated. 



SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 259 

Germany hesitatingly commenced experimenting with 
high-pressure boilers, and replaced the boilers of the old 
Lloyd steamers with triple expansion engines of German 
make. As these new boilers proved unsatisfactory, German 
steamship owners felt disinclined to order steamers in 
Germany. Only gradually were the difficulties overcome 
which threatened to overwhelm the industry. Only in 1882 
the Hamburg-American Line began to show some little 
confidence in the ability of German shipbuilders by ordering 
the Eugia from the Vulcan Company in Stettin, and the 
Rhaetia from the Reiherstieg yard in Hamburg. Thus the 
building of large vessels in Germany began. 

Only fifteen years after the launch of the Preussen and 
five years after the introduction of Free Trade for foreign 
shipbuilding material and of preferential railway rates for 
German shipbuilding material, the shipowners began to 
order their ships from German builders. They did so not 
from choice, but because they were induced, one might 
almost say compelled. In 1884 Bismarck introduced a Bill 
by which subsidies were to be given to the North German 
Lloyd under the express stipulation that the ships to be 
built were to be constructed in German shipyards by German 
workmen and, as far as possible, of German material. That 
action proved the salvation of the great German shipbuilding 
industry. Events have vindicated Bismarck's far-seeing 
policy, which was loudly condemned in British and in 
German Free Trade circles. 

The Government-subsidised North German Lloyd gave 
the first important order to German builders by ordering, 
under the Act of 1884, six liners from the Vulcan Ship- 
building Company. These vessels were found satisfactory 
in every respect, but the Vulcan Company had to buy 
dearly its experience, for it lost heavily upon this pioneer 
transaction. With perseverance the Vulcan Company 
continued competing for the construction of fast steamers 
without overmuch regard to financial risks, and it succeeded 
in 1888 in securing the contract for the fast steamer Augusta 
Victoria from the Hamburg- American Line notwithstanding 



260 



SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 



severe British competition. With the construction of that 
steamer the great German shipbuilding yard struck out a 
line of its own by introducing twin-screw propulsion for 
transatlantic liners. Two years later the Vulcan built the 
twin-screw steamer Filrst Bismarck, and the success achieved 
by these two twin-screw ocean flyers, which at the time 
were the fastest liners afloat, led in 1895 to the building of 
the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. That enormous vessel was 
built within eighteen months, and its speed exceeded that 
of any ship afloat. The Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse was 
followed by the three great liners, Deutschland, Kronprinz 
Wilhelm, and Kaiser Wilhelm II., all of which left far behind 
them the foremost British liners. Thus the Vulcan had 
brilliantly outstripped EngUsh competition in shipbuilding, 
which, until then, had been considered invincible. 

The following figures show the astonishing development 
of the German shipbuilding industry since 1879, the year 
when Protection was introduced into Germany, and since 
1884, the year in which the Steamships' Subsidies Bill was 
passed : 



Iron and Steel Shipping Built in Germany 



1880 
1885 
1890 
1895 
1900 
1909 
1913 



23,986 register tons 

24,554 
100,597 
122,712 
235,171 
326,318 
458.755 



In 1885 German shipbuilding was practically non-existent. 
In 1906 Sir Charles Maclaren, presiding at the yearly meeting 
of Palmer's Shipbuilding and Iron Company held at New- 
castle, said that Germany was now building a greater ton- 
nage than all the other Continental countries put together. 
Germany's progress in shipbuilding has been truly mar- 
vellous. It has been doubly marvellous in view of her most 
disadvantageous geographical position and her lack of 
experience. 

By wise, far-seeing, determined State action wer^ the 



SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 261 

German shipbuilding and shipping industries thus artificially 
established, fostered, and developed. The astonishing 
success of the German shipbuilding industry was due partly 
to its excellent management and organisation, partly to the 
appUcation of science and experience to industry, partly to 
the courage and perseverance of its directors, partly to the 
harmonious co-ordination and co-operation of the various 
economic factors which in more individualistic countries, 
such as Great Britain, are not co-ordinated. 

The strong man can stand alone ; the weak must stand 
together to protect themselves against the strong. The 
industrial weakness of Germany proved the cause of its 
strength, for the weakness of the individual German indus- 
tries which competed hopelessly against England in the past 
led to the formation of combinations for mutual support, 
and then to the formation of gigantic cartels. 

In Grermany the leading idea in the formation of industrial 
combinations was not to secure an undue advantage to a 
few wirepullers by the unscrupulous use of a monopoly, but 
to secure a legitimate advantage to a number of domestic 
producers by uniting their productive forces. The German 
trusts and limited companies devoted themselves rather to 
promoting industry than to exploiting the public, not because 
German business men are more virtuous than are British 
or American business men, but because the State kept a 
very sharp eye on company promoters, directors, and 
managers, and unsparingly punished with hard labour those 
who contravened the very strict Company Law which was 
devised to protect the pubUc and to teach the promoter that 
honesty is the best poUcy. 

The introduction of Protection in 1879 led to the formation 
of numerous combinations in the German iron industry. 
They strove to eliminate unnecessary competition, to regu- 
late prices, to buy and sell collectively, to eUminate unneces- 
sary middlemen, etc. According to Dr. Voelcker there were 
in 1903 forty-four conventions, trusts, and syndicates in the 
German iron industry. The multitude of these combinations 
deprived co-operation in the German iron industry of much 



262 SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 

of its usefulness. The contrast between these numerous 
combinations in the iron industry and the gigantic German 
coal trust which embraced practically the whole coal-mining 
industry of Germany was too glaring to be allowed to remain. 
In the beginning of 1904 a steel trust, embracing all Germany, 
was founded. 

At the time when the huge German steel trust was formed, 
the German shipbuilders had been in the habit of buying 
their material, not from the individual makers in retail 
fashion, but through the representatives of the various 
combinations. Therefore the central management of these 
combinations was able to effect very great economies in 
the production of metal wares used in shipbuilding by in- 
troducing a wisely-organised specialisation and division of 
labour among the numerous works belonging to the combine. 
For instance, the different plates used in German shipbuild- 
ing, about 150 in number, required special rollers, and in 
endeavouring to produce every kind, or at least many kinds, 
of steel plates, the various rolling-mills had not only to incur 
an enormous capital expenditure in laying down a huge 
plant, but the working expenses of the rolling-mills were 
necessarily made unduly heavy because a large part of their 
plant was unoccupied during part of the year. This un- 
necessary and exceedingly wasteful multiplication of plant 
was done away with by specialisation based on mutual 
agreement which gave to every work a proportionate number 
of specialities. Thus individual mills were enabled to 
produce with a smaller and constantly occupied plant larger 
quantities of uniform ship steel at a cheaper price than 
hitherto and at a larger profit to themselves. In this way 
judicious industrial combination may benefit both con- 
sumers and producers. Trusts are by no means an unmixed 
evil as many believe. 

Not only the German steel producers, but the German 
shipbuilders also formed a large combination. The Society 
of German Shipyards at Berlin comprised no less than 
forty- two individual yards. Thus the whole of the German 
shipbuilding industry was> in a position to meet the whole 



SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 263 

of the German steel industry in one room, and the two 
combinations could, through their representatives, amicably 
arrange matters between themselves to their mutual satis- 
faction. Thus, suicidal petty rivalry and endless wrangling 
between innumerable small concerns and a host of agents 
and other useless but expensive middlemen were abolished. 
The iron and the shipbuilding industries were united and 
could meet one another not in a spirit of commercial rivalry, 
of envy, and of secret or open hostility, but in friendly and 
loyal co-operation. 

Owing to co-operation and to systematic speciaUsation 
and division of labour, the saving of unnecessary labour was 
still further developed. The shipyards were taught by the 
steel-makers to save trouble and expense to the steel industry 
by adapting their requirements to the condition of the 
steel- works. On the other hand the steel-makers were 
taught by the shipbuilders how best to cater for the ship- 
yards, and how best to adapt themselves to their require- 
ments. The two great industries worked hand in hand 
like a single concern, and friction, expense, and correspond- 
ence between buyer and seUer were reduced to a minimum. 
A shipbuilder who required steel plates or columns of a 
certain kind had formerly to make inquiries at a large 
number of works before being able to place his order, and 
when he had made the most careful inquiry and studied the 
market, he could not be quite sure that he would receive 
exactly what he wanted at the cheapest price and in the 
shortest time from the work which he had selected. His 
task was henceforth easier. He could obtain all the in- 
formation which he required at the central office of the steel 
combination, which distributed all orders in such a way 
as to ensure that they were most economically and most 
rapidly executed according to standard specifications. 
Through this arrangement buying ceased to be a science. 
The convenience of being able to place orders rapidly on the 
most favourable terms and without much inquiry caused 
German shipbuilders to order their material in Germany, 
even if they were offered the identical goods at a lower price 
18 



264 



SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 



by well-known British makers. British steel almost ceased 
to be used in German shipbuilding. Its elimination was 
all the more remarkable as the German shipbuilding in- 
dustries worked under Free Trade conditions. However, 
much of the steel consumed by the German shipbuilders 
was " dumped " steel, sold at, or under, cost price by German 
makers, and was carried at a merely nominal charge, possibly 
at a loss, by the German State railways to the sea coast. 
The German shipbuilding industry enjoyed thus the ad- 
vantages of both Protection and of Free Trade. 

Since the creation of the German Empire the fleet of 
German merchant steamships has increased as follows : 



1871 


81,994 tons 


1881 


215,758 „ 


1891 


723,652 ,, 


1901 


. 1,347,875 „ 


1910 


. 2,349,557 „ 


1913 


. 3,153,724 ,, 



Before the War the tonnage of the two largest German 
shipping companies approached 2,000,000, and the ships 
possessed by the Nord Deutsche Lloyd and the Hamburg- 
Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien Gesellschaft were among 
the finest in the world. 

Bismarck's policy of fostering and promoting the German 
shipping trade was energetically continued by William II., 
partly by personal encouragement, partly by legislative and 
administrative action. The German Government not only 
assisted the German shipping and shipbuilding industries, 
but endeavoured to damage their foreign competitors. The 
German shipping companies did an enormous business in 
shipping emigrants. They carried every year from 200,000 
to 300,000 emigrants. Germany herself had practically 
no emigration, as only about 20,000 emigrants left Germany 
every year. Consequently the German shipping companies 
endeavoured to attract emigrants from Austria -Hungary 
and Russia to the German ports. In order to " induce " 
Austrian and Russian emigrants to patronise the German 
steamship lines, arrangements were made by the German 



SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 265 

Government at the Austrian and Russian frontiers. So- 
called control stations for emigrants were erected through 
which all foreign emigrants had to pass ostensiby in order 
to be medically examined, but if these emigrants were not 
in the possession of tickets issued by one of the German 
steamship Unes they were forbidden to proceed. Emigrants 
in the possession of tickets issued by the Cunard Company 
or some other British line were ruthlessly turned back. 
Thus the German companies secured the bulk of the valuable 
emigrant traffic from Austria -Hungary and Russia. 

The foregoing pages show that the German Government 
shaped its economic policy not in accordance with the rigid 
views of professors of political economy and of other more 
or less scientific doctrinaires. It followed neither a rigid 
policy of Protection nor an uncompromising doctrine of 
Free Trade, but applied Protection and Free Trade accord- 
ing to the requirements of individual cases. It did not 
condemn trusts as being bad in themselves. Its economic 
policy was not " scientific," but practical and businesslike. 
German statesmen adapted their action to circumstances, 
and they were guided by the views of practical business 
men whom they consulted. These are the reasons which 
enabled Grermanyto develop a great, prosperous, and success- 
ful shipping and shipbuilding industry, notwithstanding 
the greatest obstacles. 



CHAPTER XVII 



THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES ^ 



The chemical industry was the youngest, the most vigorous, 
and the most successful industry of Germany. While all 
other German industries were fostered by the most skilfully- 
framed protective tariff, the German chemical industry 
achieved its commanding and world-wide success practi- 
cally without fiscal aid. 

The German chemical industry was so successful that it 
obtained almost a world-monopoly in some of the most 
important branches of chemical production. Many univer- 
sally used chemical preparations were exclusively of German 
manufacture. Before 1914 about four-fifths of the dyes 
consumed in the world were made in Germany. The 
chemical industry was one of Germany's most important 
industries. It took a leading place among the great export- 
ing industries of the country. 

The meteoric development of the German chemical 
industry may be gauged from the following table : 



Impobts into and Exports from Germany of Coal-tab Dyes 





Imports. 


Exports. 




Marks. 


Marks. 


1880 . 


. 7,523,000 


53,537,000 


1885 . 


. 4,205,000 


47,782,000 


1890 . 


. 4,087,000 


58,162,000 


1895 . 


. 4,206,000 


81,590,000 


1900 . 


. 4,975,000 


109,172,000 


1905 . 


. 6,363,000 


165,795,000 


1910 . 


. 6,765,000 


193,840,000 


1912 . 


. 6,537,000 


209,166,000 



1 From the Contemporary Review, May 1904. 
266 



THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 



267 



Germany's exports of other chemicals developed at a 
similarly rapid rate. 

The chemical industry was for various reasons of national 
importance to Germany. . Though it employed much un- 
skilled labour, it was so prosperous that it paid very 
good wages, considering the character of the work done. 
Hence strikes were extremely rare. The following table 
conveys a clear idea of the interest of German labour in the 
chemical industry : 

Employment and Wages in Chemical Industeies 





Hands employed. 


Total wages. 


Wages per head 
per annum. 


1882 . 


71,777 


? 


V 


1894 . 


110,348 


£4,981,000 


£44-5 


1895 . 


114,587 


6,173,000 


44-14 


1896 . 


124,219 


5,686,000 


45-8 


1897 . 


129,827 


6,045,000 


46-2 


1898 . 


135,350 


6,482,000 


47-8 


1899 . . 


143,119 


6,978,000 


48-15 


1900 . 


153,011 


7,746,000 


50-12 


1902 . 


165,889 


7,983,000 


48-12 


1906 . 


202,177 


10,545,000 


52-20 


1909 . 


219,601 


12,688,000 


5780 


1913 . 


282,228 


18,378,000 


65-20 



The constant growth of the German chemical industry 
allowed not only of a yearly and considerable increase of 
the labour employed, but also of a yearly increase of the 
average wages. 

The national importance of the German chemical industry 
lay not only in the employment which it gave to the 
wage-earning masses, but also in the great direct and 
indirect benefits which other industries derived from it. 
Chemical research was no longer confined to purely 
chemical ends, for the chemists had most successfully ap- 
plied their science to agriculture and to the manufacturing 
industries. Many German industries owed their greatness 
to the assistance of trained chemists. Chemical research 
was applied with excellent effect to other industries — for 
instance, metallurgy, the glass industry, agriculture. Hence 
many prominent manufacturers, bankers, and landowners 
sent their sons to the Universities and technical High 



268 



THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 



Schools to study chemistry, so that they should be able 
to avail themselves of the assistance of that science in 
practical hfe. 

The enormous national importance of a prosperous 
chemical industry lies not only in the invaluable assistance 
which that industry can give to nearly all other industries, 
but also in the unthought-of resources which it will create 
almost out of nothing. A century ago Great Britain's 
wealthy sugar colonies were the envy of the world, and 
sugar -planters laughed at the idea of producing sugar from 
beet. However, the Grerman chemists ruined the West 
Indian sugar-planters, and produced the "tropical pro- 
duct " on a scale never dreamt of. Since 1890 Germany 
produced artificial musk at Mulhouse, natural vanilla was 
replaced by chemical vanilline, Japanese camphor by 
synthetic camphor, and sugar by saccharine, and vegetable 
dyes gave place to dyes made from tar. How natural 
indigo has been crushed out of existence by the synthetic 
indigo produced by German chemists may be seen from 
the following figures : 



1894-5 

1895-6 

1896-7 

1897-8 

1898-9 

1899-1900 

1900-1 

1901-2 

1905-6 

1909-10 



Acreage under 

Indigo 

in India. 

1,705,977 acres 

1,569,869 ,, 

1,583,808 ,, 

1,366,513 „ 

1,013,627 „ 

1,046,434 ,, 

977,349 ,, 

792,179 ,, 

400,552 ,, 

295,706 ,, 



Value of Bxportt 

of Indigo. 

Tens of Rupees. 

4,745,915 

5,354,511 

4,370,757 

3,057,402 

2,970,478 

£1,795,007 

£1,423,987 

£1,234,837 

£390,918 

£234,544 



Indigo Impobted to Great Britain 



1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1907 
1909 



£1,392,534 
1,533,722 
1,470,574 
890,803 
986,090 
542,089 
788,820 
498,043 
151,297 
139,336 



THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 



269 



Before the War Germany's exports of synthetic indigo 
exceeded £2,500,000. 

The facts and figures given make it clear that many a 
" natural monopoly " which is at present possessed by 
countries which control the tropics may be taken away 
from them by the discoveries of the chemists. There is 
no bound to the possibilities of chemistry, though prejudice 
always asserts for a time that the natural product is superior 
to the chemical one. The producers of natural indigo 
assert that the natural dye is superior to the artificial, 
while chemists maintain that both are equally good. At 
any rate, the artificial product is by far the cheaper, and 
the fatal effect of its production on the natural dye is visible 
from the figures given. The effect of the discovery of 
making artificial indigo may be seen from the following 
figures : 

Exports of Indigo 
from Germany. 

£410,000 

320,000 

240,000 

380,000 

390,000 

465,000 

635,000 

925,000 

1,035,000 

1,083,000 

1,974,000 

2,666,000 

A few years ago Germany was dependent for the indigo 
she used on India. In 1913 she almost monopolised the 
indigo market. Obviously the natural resources of a 
naturally wealthy country may be taken away from it 
without bloodshed by the able chemists of another country. 
The possession of a strong chemical industry is therefore 
of the utmost economic importance to all progressive coun- 
tries, and it is also of very great importance in time of war. 

Prince Bismarck remarked in 1894 : 

" Peace is being maintained less owing to the peaceful 
disposition of all Governments than owing to the ability 



1895 
1896 
1897 . 








Imports of Indigo 
into Germany. 

£1,075,000 

1,055,000 

635,000 


1898 
1899 
1900 








415,000 
415,000 
205,000 


1901 








215,000 


1902 
1903 
1904 
1909 
1913 , 








185,000 
90,000 
67,000 
30,000 
19,000 



270 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 

of chemists in inventing new kinds of powder. ... It sounds 
almost like irony, but it is the truth that the chemist is 
keeping the swords in their scabbards, and that he decides 
by his inventions whether there will be peace or war." 

The commanding position of Germany's chemical industry 
was in no way due to nature's bounty. On the contrary, 
Germany was largely dependent on foreign nations for 
many chemical raw products, which she turned into manu- 
factures. As a rule she imported five times as much 
chemical raw products as she exported, and her dependence 
on foreign raw products was rapidly increasing. Grermany's 
success was not due to the fortuitous possession of the first 
matter. 

The great success of Germany's chemical industry may 
be traced to the simultaneous action of the following 
causes : 

1. The natural disposition and aptitude of the individual 
German for close, patient, persevering, and painstaking 
work and study. 

2. The munificent and enlightened assistance and encour- 
agement given by the German Governments to the study of 
chemistry in all its branches regardless of expense and of 
immediate profitable returns. 

3. The spirit of combination and the absence of jealousy 
among chemical scientists and manufacturers, whereby 
scientific co-operation on the largest scale was made possible. 

That these three factors have combined in making the 
German chemical industry great is known to all who are 
acquainted with that industry, for chemical talent of the 
highest order flourishes rather in France and Great Britain 
than in Germany. The German chemists owed their 
successes rather to methodical combination and united 
plodding than to the inventive genius of individuals, for 
many of the most important chemical inventions were made 
outside Germany, but they were most successfully exploited 
in Germany. 

In the beginning of the nineteenth century Great Britain 



THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 271 

and France were the leading nations in the chemical indus- 
tries and in chemical research. The production of aniline 
dyes from coal tar was discovered in 1855 by Mr. W. H. 
Perkin. Notwithstanding the EngUsh discovery, nearly the 
whole of the anihne dyes used up to 1914 were made in 
Germany, and by the irony of fate they were largely made 
from English coal tar. A small and timely export duty on 
coal tar would probably have had the effect of transferring 
a large part of the chemical industry from Germany to 
England. 

A great chemical inventor is of little practical use to a 
country unless his inventions are utilised to the fullest 
extent by a large body of chemical manufacturers and 
chemists. Otherwise his great discoveries will only benefit 
that country where an apparatus exists for making use of 
them. 

The individual German has a great natural aptitude for 
patient sedentary work. At an age when EngUsh boys 
will romp or pursue various outdoor sports, German boys 
will be found poring over books and making fretwork. 
Owing to this disposition towards concentration and close 
application, Germans may be found in all countries as 
watchmakers, opticians, etc, A leaning towards chemistry 
had been prevalent in Germany already in the Dark Ages. 
Albertus Magnus, of Cologne, was the greatest chemist 
of the thirteenth century, and Theophrastus Bombastus 
von Hohenheim (better known under the name of Para- 
celsus) the greatest chemist of the sixteenth century. In 
the Middle Ages the capitals and university towns of the 
various German States were the favourite haunts of alche- 
mists, who spread the desire for chemical learning. Many 
of them were swindlers, but many were guided by the spirit 
of research, and not a few valuable discoveries were made 
by them. Brandt, for instance, discovered phosphorus ; 
Kunkel, ruby glass, etc. 

The German pharmacists never were, and are not now, 
merely shopkeepers who sell pills and patent medicines 
and the productions of " manufacturing chemists." Patent 



272 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 

medicines do not exist in Germany, being forbidden on 
account of the great harm that is often done to the 
community by unscrupulous manufacturing quacks. The 
German pharmacists were, and are, manufacturing and 
analytical chemists on a small scale, and in their daily 
work they have made many valuable discoveries. Besides, 
chemistry is with many German pharmacists a hobby. 
Many boys become pharmacists through inclination towards 
investigation and research. Many important chemical 
works in Germany have had their beginning in tiny pharma- 
cists' laboratories, and many leading chemists have come 
from them. 

When Justus von Liebig, the greatest German chemist, 
was at school, the importance of chemistry was not under- 
stood. At the German Universities there existed neither 
adequate facilities for its study, nor were there any public 
laboratories. Liebig's greatest service to his country lay 
not so much in his fruitful investigations and discoveries — 
which, by the way, chiefly benefited Great Britain and 
France, for these countries then possessed the most largely 
developed chemical industries — as in the organisation of 
chemical study and research on a broad national basis. 
0^ving to his exertions the first University laboratory, that 
of Giessen, was created in 1825; and he strove less to 
advance chemical science by his personal research than 
to train a large number of pupils, in order to spread his 
methods far and wide. His example was faithfully copied 
by his numerous assistants. Many of the most prominent 
German chemists living were initiated into that science by 
the pupils of Liebig. Thus the spirit of Liebig is still active, 
and the seed which he has planted has brought forth the 
magnificent harvest garnered by the German chemical 
industry. 

The German Governments were won over to the cause 
of chemistry by Liebig's agitation and by his numerous 
popular writings. Therefore assistance came speedily 
forward from all quarters of Germany. The laboratory of 
the University of Marburg was opened in 1840, that of the 



THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 273 

University of Leipzig in 1843, and from that time onward 
laboratory followed laboratory, and the various German 
Governments spent money without stint for the advance- 
ment of chemistry. They did not listen to the doctrines 
of laissez-faire. They neither waited for individual enter- 
prise and private munificence to come forward, nor did they 
inquire too closely whether an immediate profit could be 
secured by encouraging chemistry with substantial grants. 
They were convinced that the encouragement of chemistry 
might be beneficial to the nation, and considered it their 
duty to spend a little of the money of the nation on a 
promising experiment. The consequence of this enhghtened 
policy was that Germany had a huge army of trained 
chemists, while England and other nations had only a few. 

In former times a chemical factory was frequently founded 
on some excellent receipt, the secret of which was most 
jealously guarded by its owner. But nowadays it is 
impossible to maintain a monopoly either by keeping a 
process secret or by the protection of patents. Chemical 
science has so greatly advanced that the same ultimate 
end may be arrived at by a great variety of processes. 
Consequently neither a secret process nor any number of 
patents will ensure the continued success of a chemical 
factory which scientifically stands stiU. A chemical factory 
can maintain its position only if it remains, by constant 
research and constant improvement, in the very forefront of 
scientific excellence. Success can be won and maintained 
only by the strenuous and constant research of chemists of 
ability, by constant progress and the introduction of im- 
proved methods. This is all the more necessary as the prices 
of chemicals have been falling for many years, and will 
apparently continue to fall. 

Formerly it was possible to make industrially valuable 
discoveries in a somewhat haphazard fashion by individual 
and unconnected experiments, and the results arrived at 
could be utilised through several generations. But through 
the teaching of Liebig and his disciples a new era has begun. 
Individual planless effort has made way for teamwork, 



274 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 

for systematic, strictly logical, and exhausive research of 
many chemists under leaders of standing ; and the problem 
to be solved is patiently pursued in every direction by the 
combined forces of chemistry until the final aim is arrived 
at. Every success, every progress, every discovery, should 
become common property, and should be the starting-point 
for further and greater successes. In the laboratories of 
the German Universities and of the great chemical works 
thousands of highly-trained chemists co-operate as syste- 
matically as workmen do in a factory, and the work that 
is dropped by one chemist who falls out on the way is carried 
on by another. Thus the army of German chemists have 
continued their advance, and the astonishing success of the 
German chemical industry has been brought about. 

Combination is the watchword not only in the labora- 
tories, but also in the counting-houses of the chemical 
factories. In no German industry is there a larger propor- 
tion of mammoth enterprises. The great individual works 
were combined in groups for the regulation of prices. Ger- 
many abounded in combinations (Kartelle), and these were 
particularly numerous in the chemical industry. According 
to an inquiry made in the beginning of 1905 there were then 
in Germany 385 industrial combinations, 46 of which be- 
longed to the great chemical group. These proved a blessing 
to the chemical industry of Germany, but, by dumping, 
they did much damage to the foreign chemical industries, 
which they stifled. Thus they assisted in creating the world- 
monopoly of the German chemical industry. 

Of late much has been said and written as to the advan- 
tages of education and on the application of science to 
industry. However, many, perhaps most, people who 
recommended education and the application of science to 
industry have only a dim idea how education and science 
may help industry. British education suffers from two 
very great evils, which are unfortunately recognised by only 
very few people. In the first place higher education is more 
ornamental than useful, more literary than practical, and 
does not fit men for the battle of life. In the second place 



THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 275 

it is too often considered almost solely as a means to pass 
an examination, and tends therefore rather to exercise the 
memory than to strengthen the intelligence, the judgment, 
and the critical faculties. In other words, the influence of 
the crammer upon education is more noticeable than that 
of the practical man. Education is more for show than for 
use. 

In the application of science to industry the crying neces- 
sity of combination is insufficiently recognised. A British 
chemist is apt to be an island. The average work accom- 
plished by the average British chemist is probably greater 
than that of his Gorman competitor, for the Englishman 
puts more energy into his work, is more alert, and works 
more quickly. Yet, though some of the greatest chemists 
living are Englishmen, the British chemical industries 
suffer owing to the lack of organised and co-ordinated 
effort. In science co-operation is after all as necessary as 
in agriculture and industry. The scientific and the indus- 
trial part of the nation and its statesmen and politicians 
can learn much from the rise of the chemical industry of 
Germany. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

GERMAN INDFSTRIAIi CONDITIONS PREVIOUS TO THE WAR ^ 

Whether the workers of a nation are prosperous or not 
depends, in the first place, on the productivity of the 
national industries, for it is obvious that only a people 
which produces much will be able to consume much. The 
prosperity of the workers depends largely upon the adequate 
expansion of the national industries, for every year adds 
to the existing population fresh numbers who have to be 
housed, clothed, and fed, while the progress of civilisation 
and of luxury creates constantly new wants among the 
citizens. As great, but stagnant, industries cannot provide 
for a rapidly increasing population with rapidly increasing 
wants, the masses of the people can be prosperous only if 
the national industries are so vigorously expanding that they 
are able to provide the additional employment and com- 
modities which are constantly called for. 

Germany introduced Protection in 1879. Let us compare 
German and British industrial conditions, taking as start- 
ing-point 1880, wherever the figures for that year are 
available. 

The great productive industries are four in number — 
mining, manufacturing, agriculture, trade. Germany, like 
Great Britain, mines principally coal and iron ore. The 
production of these has progressed as foUows in the two 
countries, according to the Statistical Abstract for Foreign 
Countries (Cd. 5446), published in autumn 1911 : 

1 From the Fortnightly Review, August 1910. 
276 



GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 



277 



Production of Coal and Lignite 



1880 
1890 
1900 
1909 



1880 
1890 
1900 
1909 



In Oermany. 


In Great 
Britain. 


Tons. 


Ton?. 


59,118,000 


146,969,000 


89,291,000 


181,614,000 


149,788,000 


225,181,000 


217,433,000 


263,774,000 


Iron Ore 






In Great 


In Oermany. 


Britain. 


Tons. 


Tons. 


7,239,000 


18,026,000 


11,406,000 


13,781,000 


18,964,000 


14,028,000 


25,505,000 


14,980,000 



In 1880 Great Britain produced 150 per cent, more coal 
and 160 per cent, more iron ore than Germany. Things 
have changed since then. In 1909 Great Britain produced 
60 per cent, less iron ore than Germany, and her superiority 
in the production of coal had shrunk to a paltry 20 per cent., 
and threatens to be a thing of the past in a few years. On 
balance, Great Britain exported 60,000,000 tons of coal a 
year, while Germany exported only 10,000,000 tons. Hence 
it appears that Germany had overtaken Great Britain in the 
consumption of coal. In value Germany's mining produc- 
tion had, according to the Statistical Abstract for Foreign 
Countries, increased as follows : 



1880 
1890 
1900 
1909 



£ 

18,775,000 
36,282,000 
63,162,000 
97,393,000 



In value Germany's mining production had grown five- 
fold during the twenty-nine years under review. 

As the manufacturing industries are based on the use of 
coal, iron, and steam, the manufacturing eminence and 
progress of a country can best be measured by the national 
consumption of coal and iron, and by the power of its steam 



278 



GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 



engines. As regards the consumption of coal and iron, 
Germany and Great Britain compare as follows : 



Consumption of Coai, and Lignite 



1880 
1890 
1900 
1907 
1909 



1880 
1890 
1900 
1907 
1909 



1880 
1890 
1900 
1907 
1909 



In Germany. 


In Great 
Britain. 


Tons. 


Tons. 


57,008,000 


129,078,000 


90,798,000 


152,876,000 


149,804,000 


179,083,000 


208,195,000 


195,466,000 


206,321,000 


198,080,000 


p Pig Iron 




Tn Germany. 


In Great 
Britain. 


Tons, 


Tons. 


2,713,000 


7,749,233 


4,651,000 


7,904,214 


8,507;000 


8,959,691 


12,875,000 


10,114,000 


12,645,000 


9,532,000 


F Pig Iron 




In Germany. 


In Great 
Britain. 


Tons. 


Tons. 


2,713,000 


6,176,673 


4,940,000 


6,824,925 


9,106,000 


7,705,201 


13^16,000 


8,273,000 


12,308,000 


8,501,000 



In 1880 Great Britain consumed 72,000,000 tons of coal 
more than Germany. In 1909 she consumed 8,000,000 tons 
of coal less than Germany. In 1880 Great Britain produced 
5,000,000 tons of pig iron more than Germany. In 1909 
she produced 3,100,000 tons less than Germany. In 1880 
Great Britain consumed 3,500,000 tons of iron more than 
Germany. In 1909 she consumed 3,800,000 tons less than 
Germany. As the German people use much wood for fuel, 
and require besides less coal for their closed stoves than 
Englishmen do for their open fires, the difference in Germany's 
favour is far greater than appears from the foregoing figures. 

Whilst, since the introduction of Protection, Germany's 
coal consumption has quadrupled, and her iron consumption 



GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 



279 



has quintupled, the power of her engines has increased even 
more rapidly, as the figures for Prussia and Bavaria show : 

Horse Power of Stationary Ste^m Engines 





In Prussia. 




In Bavaria, 




1879 . 


887,780 


1879 




70,678 


1895 . 


. 2,358,175 


1889 




124,680 


1909 . 


. 5,768,010 


1908 




428,253 


1910 . 


. 5,837,782 


1910 


. 


V 



Since the introduction of Protection the engine-power of 
Germany has grown no less than sevenfold. Unfortunately, 
economic science, as distinguished from barren economic 
theory, has been very greatly neglected in this country. 
Hence no statistics of steam engines similar to those pub- 
lished in Germany are available for Great Britain, and we 
are spared a comparison which probably would be exceed- 
ingly humiliating. The figures given sho^Jil that the engine- 
power of Germany has increased enormously since the 
introduction of Protection, and as her new machines are 
better, and therefore more productive, than her old ones, 
and do not stand idle, we are justified in assuming that the 
industrial production of Germany has grown at least sixfold 
during thirty years of Protection. 

If we now turn to agriculture, we find that the German 
harvest has increased as follows : 



The German Harvest 





Bye. 


Tons. 
Wheat. 


Oats. 


1880 . 


4,952,525 


2,345,278 


4,228,128 


1890 . 


. 5,868,078 


2,830,921 


4,913,544 


1900 . 


8,550,659 


3,841,165 


7,091,930 


1908 . 


. 10,736,874 


3,767,767 


7,694,833 


1910 . 


. 10,511,160 


3,861,479 


7,900,376 




The German Harvest 








Tons. 






Potatoes. 


Sugar. 


Hay. 


1880 . 


. 19,466,242 


415,000 


19,563,388 


1890 . 


. 23,320,983 


1,261,000 


18,859,888 


1900 . 


. 40,585,317 


1,795,000 


23,116,276 


1908 . 


. 46,342,726 


2,139,000 


27,076,097 


1910 . 


. 43,468,397 


2,037,397 


28,250,115 


19 









2§0 



GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 



During the thirty years under review, when the pro- 
ductivity of her mines and the output of her manufacturing 
industries have grown about sevenfold, the rural industries 
of Germany have not decayed or stood still. On the con- 
trary, her soil produced in 1910 twice the quantity of bread 
corn, oats, and potatoes, and five times the quantity of 
sugar, which it produced before the introduction of Pro- 
tection, During the same period British agriculture has 
rapidly decayed, " owing to industrial prosperity," as the 
Free Traders tell us, and all British crops, from wheat to 
hops, have shrunk most lamentably, and have caused millions 
of British acres to be deserted by the plough and to revert 
to grass. 

The increase of Germany's meat production is no less 
surprising than that of her crops. Her meat production has 
more than kept pace with the increase of her population, as 
the following table indicates : 

Population of 
Germany. 

1873 . . . 41,564,000 

1883 . . . 46,016,000 

1892 . . . 50,266,000 

1897 . . . 53,569,000 

1900 . . . 56,046,000 

1904 . . . 57,475,000 

1907 . . . 62,083,000 

It will be noticed that between 1873 and 1907 the popula- 
tion of Germany has increased by 50 per cent. During the 
same period the number of her cattle has increased by 
33 per cent., and that of her pigs by no less than 200 per cent. 
Pork is the favourite meat of the German workers, whilst 
mutton is little esteemed by them. In beef and pork com- 
bined Germany now produces, per head of population, twice 
as much meat as she did thirty years ago. Her meat 
production has so greatly increased that Germany, not- 
withstanding the greatly increased meat consumption of 
her people, has become practically entirely independent 
of foreign meat supplies during the very time when British 
meat production has remained stationary, and EngUshmen 
have become dangerously dependent on foreign supplies 



Oattle in 


Pigs In 


Germany. 


Germany, 


15,776,702 


7,124,088 


15,786,764 


9,206,195 


17,555,834 


12,174,442 


18,490,772 


14,274,557 


18,939,692 


16,807,014 


19,331,568 


18,920,666 


20,630,544 


22,146,532 



GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 281 

for the greater part of the meat they eat. A comparison of 
British and German live stock is humiliating. In 1907 Great 
Britain possessed only 11,630,142 cattle and 3,967,163 pigs. 
It is worth noting that, according to the international 
statistics published in the Year-Book of the United States 
Department of Agriculture for 1908, Germany produces 
one-third of the world's potato crop. It is estimated that 
this enormous crop is used as follows : 

12,000,000 tons for human food. 



17,600,000 


, for fodder. 


2,500,000 


, for making spirit. 


1,400,000 


, for making starch. 


5,200,000 


, for seed. 


5,000,000 


, for loss and waste 


Total 43,700,000 





The British potato crop amounted in 1907 to 5,223,973 
tons. The whole of the United Kingdom produced, there- 
fore, merely as much potatoes as Germany used every year 
for seed alone. According to the American statistics, 
Germany produces one-sixth of the world's sugar. She 
raises yearly from 12,000,000 tons to 15,000,000 tons of 
sugar beet, which furnish 2,000,000 tons of sugar and 
10,000,000 tons of fodder, which, like the bulk of the potato 
harvest, is converted into pig meat. Germany's 22,000,000 
pigs are merely a by-product of her intensive agriculture. 

As all trade is exchange, the greatness of a nation's trade 
cannot fairly be measured by its foreign trade alone, as 
Free Traders do, especially as the home trade is far more 
important than is the foreign trade, both in Great Britain 
and in Germany, Free Traders never tire of assuring us 
that Protection makes production dear, that it thus hampers 
the sale of domestic manufactures in foreign markets, and 
"destroys" the export trade. Since 1879 the exportation 
of German manufactures has increased as follows : 

£ 

1880 83,500,000 

1890 107,440,000 

1900 149,100,000 

1910 239,800,000 



282 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 

The foregoing figures prove that Germany's foreign 
trade also is exceedingly prosperous and rapidly expanding. 
During the period 1880-1910, when Germany's manufactured 
exports have increased by no less than 200 per cent., the 
manufactured exports of Great Britain have increased by 
only 70 per cent. 

The statistics given prove that in all the productive 
industries, in mining, manufacture, agriculture, and com- 
merce, Germany's progress is stupendous, that Germany 
has overtaken Great Britain in industrial production, 
although England is still supreme in cotton and shipping ; 
and it stands to reason that the German people must have 
fully participated in this enormous expansion of national 
wealth production and consequent prosperity. 

Whether the masses of the people, of whom the majority 
are wage-earners, are prosperous or not depends on three 
factors — employment, wages, cost of living. Each of these 
three factors will be separately considered. 

Previous to the War unemployment appears to have been 
many times larger in Great Britain than in Germany. Ac- 
cording to the statistics of unemployment among Trade 
Unionists, published by the British Board of Trade, there 
were, as a rule, from three to four unemployed workers in 
Great Britain to every single unemployed worker in Ger- 
many. It is a weU-known fact that working men leave 
their country chiefly through lack of employment. A 
comparison of the emigration statistics of the two countries 
shows that there were, as a rule, from ten to twelve British 
emigrants to every single German emigrant. The harrowing 
tale of the British emigration statistics, and of the British 
statistics of unemployment among Trade Unionists, is amply 
confirmed by a comparison of the British decennial censuses 
with the German industrial censuses of 1892, 1895, and 1907. 
Unfortunately, the British censuses and the German 
industrial censuses are not strictly comparable. They have 
been taken in different years, and different classifications 
have been adopted in the two countries. Still, the existing 
figures suffice to show how employment has changed in 



GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 283 

certain important and comparable industries of the two 
countries during a considerable space of time. 

Employment in Certain Trades in Germany 





Metal and 
Machinery Trades. 


Textile 
Trades. 


Building 
Trades. 


Agriculture. 


1882 
1895 
1907 


815,802 
. 1,247,258 
. 2,093,147 


910,089 

945,191 

1,057,243 


533,511 
1,353,637 
1,905,987 


8,236,496 
8,292,692 
9,883,257 


Employment in Certain 


Trades in 


the United 


Kingdom 




Metals and 
Machinery. 


TextUe. 


Building 
Construction. 


Agriculture- 


1881 
1891 
19Q1 


978,102 
. 1,145,386 
. 1,475,410 


1,430,985 
1,519,861 
1,462,001 


926,135 

955,573 

1,335,820 


2,574,031 
2,420,926 
2,262,454 



A comparison of the two tables is most interesting. It 
shows that during the period covered by the last three 
censuses the German metal and machinery trades have 
provided employment for 1,280,000 additional workers, 
whilst the British metal and machinery trades have provided 
work for only 497,000 additional workers ; that the workers 
in the building trade have increased by 1,370,000 in Ger- 
many, and by only 410,000 in the United Kingdom ; that 
the workers in the textile trades have increased by 150,000 
in Germany and by only 31,000 in the United Kingdom ; 
that agriculture provides work for 1,600,000 additional 
workers in Germany, and for 312,000 fewer workers in the 
United Kingdom. Further figures, which I refrain from 
giving through lack of space, confirm the tale of vastly 
increased employment in Germany, and of slowly and in- 
adequately increasing, stagnant, or shrinking employment 
in Great Britain. 

The British population increased by only 400,000 a year, 
whilst the German population increased by no less than 
900 ,000 a year. Notwithstanding the relatively small increase 
in population, between 200,000 and 300,000 people emigrated 
on balance every year from the United Kingdom, while 
Germany, with her immense increase in population, had an 



284 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 

emigration of from 20,000 to 30,000 only. On balance she 
had no emigration, but received instead from 50,000 to 
100,000 people a year from abroad, immigration exceeding 
emigration by these numbers. People fled from England 
by the hundred thousand, as from a stricken land, through 
lack of work, while they migrated into Germany by the 
hundred thousand, being attracted thereto by regular em- 
ployment and good wages. In some districts of Germany the 
amount spent in wages had trebled and quadrupled within 
twenty years. According to the report of the Dortmund 
Mining Society for 1906, the wages paid to the Dortinund 
coal-miners have increased from £3,859,423 in 1886 to 
£18,942,579 in 1906. In 1910 they amounted to £23,114,778 
according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch. Those paid to the 
coal-miners of Upper Silesia have increased from £981,995 
in 1886 to £4,110,626 in 1906, and to £5,603,633 in 1910. 
Those paid to the coal-miners in the Saar district have 
increased from £999,840 in 1886 to £2,745,099 in 1906, and 
to £2,939,405 in 1910. We cannot wonder that a very large 
percentage of the coal-miners in Germany are foreigners — 
Russians, Poles, Austrians, Italians, etc. 

The price of labour, like the price of all commodities, is 
regulated by the law of demand and supply. Hence it is 
only natural that the great demand for labour of every kind 
which prevails in Germany has raised general wages very 
greatly in that country, while the insufficient demand for 
labour in Great Britain not only drove hundreds of thousands 
of Englishmen every year out of the country, but depressed 
general British wages below the German level. 

While in a few trades the nominal wages of the skilled 
workers — that is, wages which leave out of account loss 
through unemployment and short time — were higher in Great 
Britain than in Germany, the general level of wages, and 
especially of real wages, was certainly lower, especially as 
the wages of the numerically far more important unskilled 
workers were considerably higher in Germany than in 
Great Britain. In Great Britain skilled workers received 
approximately twice the wages of the unskilled workers 



GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 285 

owing to the strength of the firmly-established Trade Unions, 
which artificially restrict the supply of labour. In Germany I 
the Trade Unions were of very recent date, and as they had / 
not yet succeeded in securing abnormally high wages for \ 
their members, the difference in the wages of skilled and 
unskilled workers was very slight. How small this difference 
is may be seen from a report, Household Budgets in Families 
of Small Means, which was published by the German 
Statistical Office in 1909. From that publication we learn 
that the following average wages — not nominal wages, but 
real wages actually earned in the course of a whole year, 
which allow for short time and unemployment — were 
received in the cases investigated : 





£ «. d. 




». d. 




Skilled workers 


. 78 9 5 


per year 


or 30 2 


per week 


Unskilled workers . 


. 65 3 


,, 


or 25 1 


J J 


Dockers 


. 79 12 11 


,, 


or 30 7 


, J 


Road workers 


. 60 14 11 


>> 


or 23 4 


jj 


General labourers . 


. 67 5 8 


j» 


or 25 11 


.J 



While on an average British skilled workers in full employ 
earned before the War from 30s. to 35s. per week, British 
unskilled workers earned only from 18s. to 22s. per week. 
Possibly the average level of wages among skilled Unionist 
workers was slightly higher in Great Britain than in Ger- 
many, owing to the strength of the British Trade Unions. 
On the other hand, the average level of wages among un- 
skilled workers was certainly considerably higher in Germany 
than in Great Britain, owing to the greater demand for, and 
the consequent scarcity of, labour. ' 

That the wages of many German workers, especially of 
non- Unionists, who form the vast majority, were higher 
than the corresponding British wages, has been stated by 
many competent authorities. The report of the Chamber 
of Commerce of Elberfeld of 1908 stated : " Wages in 
Germany are, in numerous instances, higher than wages in 
England." The report of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce 
of 1908 complained that the ready-made clothes trade was 
leaving Berlin for London " because wages are lower in 



286 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 

London than in Berlin." The report of the British Consul 
in Frankfurt of 1908 said : 

" When recently some important chemical works were 
meditating the estabUshment of a factory in the United 
Kingdom, the directorate of the German company decided, 
after minute inquiries, so to prepare the plans of the new 
factory that various branches of their GermaiTtfianufacture 
could later be transferred to the United Kingdom, because 
the workman's wages are, at the present moment, consider- 
ably lower in England than in Germany." 

The report of 1909 of the British Consul in Frankfurt, 
who, by the by, was a Free Trader, stated : 

" A report from a prominent firm in the colour-printing 
trade runs as follows : ' While years back the wages paid 
to printers in Germany were considerably less than those 
paid in the United Kingdom, we should say that to-day 
little, if any, difference exists between the earnings of the 
average printer in the two countries ; while, with regard to 
the specially skilled colour printer, we should say that, if 
anything, the German to-day is in receipt of a higher wage 
than the same calibre man in the United Kingdom. The 
net result is, that whereas years ago fairly good colour 
printed work might be procured from Germany at a saving 
when compared with British work of the same quality, this 
difference has entirely vanished to-day, with the very 
natural result that a considerable amount of the work 
which used to go to Germany is now placed with British 
firms.' A report from a prominent brewing concern in the 
North, one of the partners of which has given special atten- 
tion to the question of comparative wages, assures me that 
he has no doubt whatsoever that, on the whole, the German 
workmen in the brewing business are decidedly better paid 
than the British. In the paper industry a similar impression 
prevails." 

It cannot be doubted that, if we take into account the 
many miUions of unskilled workers who receive a higher 
wage in Germany than in Great Britain, the general level 
of wages was considerably higher in Germany than in Great 
Britain. 



GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 



287 



How greatly German wages in certain trades have risen 
since 1879 may be seen from the following interesting 
figures, furnished by an official German statistician, Mr. 
Kuczynski, in 1909 : 



Daily Average Wages in Marks 







I 


)ortmiii 
Miners 


id Rostock 
Bricklayers 


Berlin 
Bricklayers 


Berlin 
Carpenters 


1879 . . . 2-55 




3-20 




— 


2-50 


1884 




3-08 




3-20 




3-75 


— 


1889 . 




3-42 




4-00 




5-50 


3-87 


1894 . 




3-73 




4-20 




5-25 


4-83 


1899 . 




4-84 




4-40 




5-40 


4-83 


1904 




4-,78 




4-70 




6-30 


6-28 


1907 




5-98 




5-30 




6-75 


— 




Hamburg Elberfeld 
Bricklayers. Bricklayers. 


Workers at 
Kxupp's. 


1879 . 


— 




3-00 




3-02 


1884 . 




5-00 




3-00 




3-55 


1889 . 




6-00 




3-50 




3-83 


1894 . 




6-00 




3-80 




4-06 


1899 , 




6-00 




4-51 




4-72 


1904 . 




6-30 




4-60 




4-88 


1907 . 








7-20 




5-41 




5-35 



If the cost of food had risen more than wages, the con- 
sumption of food, and especially of the more expensive kinds 
of food, should have dechned in Germany. That this is 
not the case appears from the White Books pubUshed by 
the German Ministry of Finance in 1908, from which I 
extract the following : 



Average Consumption per Head of Population 



1879 
1889 
1899 
1906 



Rye. 
125-1 
106-4 
144-6 
143-5 



In KUogrammes. 
Wheat. Barley. 



50-6 
56-2 
89-8 
94-4 



40-6 
50-6 
69-5 
82-5 



Potatoes. 
281-2 
423-1 
581-1 
592-6 



The consumption of beer per head increased from 85 
litres per head in 1879-83 to 118 litres per head in 1904-7. 
As regards meat, there are available only statistics regarding 



Beef. 


In Kilogrammes. 
Pork. 


Total. 


IM 


18-1 


29-2 


14-0 


20-6 


34-6 


15-2 


27-9 


43-1 


14-4 


27-9 


42-3 



288 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 

the consumption of beef and pork in Saxony, which show 
the following : 

Consumption of Meat, Exclusive of Veal, Mutton, Poultry, and 
Game, in Saxony 



1880 . 
1890 . 
1900 . 
1907 . 

During the period of Protection the consumption of beef 
and pork has grown by 50 per cent., not only in Saxony but 
throughout Germany, and the German Ministry of Finance 
published in its White Books of 1908 an estimate showing 
that the German population consumed 55 kilogrammes of 
meat of all kinds per head per year, as compared with only 
52*2 kilogrammes per head per year for the British popula- 
tion. 

The foregoing pages show that employment was con- 
siderably better in Germany than in Great Britain ; that 
general wages were considerably higher in the former 
country than in the latter ; that the cost of living was 
considerably lower to the workers in Germany than to the 
workers in England. From these three facts we must con- 
clude that the German working man was considerably better 
off than the British working man, and much corroborative 
evidence can be adduced in support of this conclusion. 

An eminent Free Trader, Lord Brassey, wrote in his 
book. The New Fiscal Policy, " For the masses of our 
population no test of progress can be more conclusive than 
the deposits in the Post OflBce and Trustee Savings Banks." 
Let us apply Lord Brassey' s test to Great Britain and 
Germany, and compare their progress since the introduction 
of Protection : 





Savings Banks Deposits 
in Germany. 

£ 


Savings Banks Deposits 
in Great Britain. 

£ 


1880 . 
1890 . 
1900 . 
1911 , 


. 130,690,000 
. 256,865,000 
. 441,929,000 
. 900,000,000 


77,721,084 
111,285,359 
187,005,562 
227,902,840 



GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 



289 



The foregoing table shows that during the period of 
Protection, 1880-1911, the German people have placed 
£770,000,000, and the British people have placed only 
£139,000,000, into the Savings Banks, whilst between 1900 
and 1911 the German people placed £459,000,000, and the 
British people only £41,000,000, into the Savings Banks. 
During these eleven years the German Savings Banks 
Deposits have grown more than eleven times as quickly 
as the British Savings Banks Deposits. It is worth noting 
that more than £700,000,000 of the German Savings 
Banks Deposits consisted of small sums which were 
put into these banks by people belonging to the working 
class. 

British workers put their savings, not only into the 
Savings Banks, but into Building, Friendly, Co-operative 
Societies, and Trade Unions as well. According to the 
second Fiscal Blue Book (Cd. 2337) these savings were as 
follows : 



Building Societies 
Friendly Societies 
Co-operative Societies 
Trade Unions 



62,000,000 

43,000,000 

40,000,000 

5,000,000 



Total 150,000,000 

According to the White Books published by the German 
Ministry of Finance, the savings in the German Co-operative 
Societies alone were, in 1906-7, as follows : 



Deposits 


in Allgemeiner Verband 


. 45,800,000 




Verband Darmstadt . 


. 68,650,000 




,, Neuwied 


. 18,170,000 




,, Bavaria 


9,730,000 




,, Baden 


2,765,000 




, , Wurtemberg 


4,150,000 




Trier . 


1,715,000 




,, Hanover 


4,895,000 




,, Posen . 


6,150,000 




,, Berlin . 


3,490,000 




Total 165,515,000 



290 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 

It will be noticed that the savings in the German Co- 
operative Societies alone exceeded those of all the British 
popular societies combined. According to Heiligenstadt 
{Jahrbuch filr Gesetzgebung 1901), the savings placed into 
the Prussian Co-operative Societies should be £7,500,000, 
and into all the German Co-operative Societies, £11,250,000 
per year. In the State Insurance Societies there were more 
than £100,000,000 to the credit of the workers, and many 
hundreds of millions of pounds were invested by the workers 
in freehold land and houses. 

Workers who are poor cannot afford to join a trade imion. 
The German Social-Democratic Trade Unions alone show 
the following record : 











Average 




Number 


Yearly 


Accumulated 


contribution 




of members. 


Income. 


Funds. 


per member 
per year. 






£ 


£ 


s. d- 


1891 . 


277,659 


55,829 


21,292 


4 2 


1893 . 


223,530 


111,218 


30,352 


9 11 


1898 . 


493,742 


275,434 


218,665 


11 2 


1903 . 


887,698 


820,999 


648,686 


18 8 


1908 . 


. 1,831,731 


2,427,220 


2,041,989 


26 6 


1910 . 


. 2,128,021 


3,216,110 


2,628,700 


24 10 



The Social-Democratic and the Non-Socialist Trade 
Unions combined had more than 4,000,000 members. 

In nineteen years the number of German trade unionists 
has grown eightfold, and their contributions nearly sixty- 
fold. The average contribution per member has risen 
from 45. 2d. per year to 24s. lOd. per year, or to 6d. a week. 
Could ill-employed and badly-paid workers who, as we are 
told, suffer severely from the dearness of food, spare 6d. a 
week for unions which in Germany serve mainly, not for 
purposes of insurance — that is done by the State Insurance 
Societies — but for purposes of agitation ? In some of the 
German unions the contributions are considerably higher 
than 24s. lOd. a year or 6d. a week. In 1908 55,482 com- 
positors contributed to their unions 80s. per head per year ; 
16,648 lithographers contributed 60s. per head per year ; 
146,337 wood- workers contributed 35s. per head per year ; 
360,099 metal-workers contributed 33s, per head per year. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE RISE, GROWTH, AND CHARACTER OP THE SOCIAL 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY ^ 

Almost every country possesses a more or less turbulent 
party which, as a rule, is in a small minority. In Germany 
alone, of all countries in and out of Europe, it has happened 
that by far the strongest political party has again and 
again been branded officially and semi-officially as the 
enemy of Society and of the country, " Die Umsturzpartei," 
the party of subversion. For instance, at the Sedan banquet 
on the 2nd of September 1895, the Emperor William II. 
declared in a speech that the members of that vast party 
which had polled 1,786,000 votes in 1893 were " a band of 
fellows not worthy to bear the name of Germans," and on the 
8th of September, in a letter to the Chancellor, he called the 
Social Democrats " enemies to the divine order of things, 
without a fatherland." 

It would seem worth while to look into the history, 
views, composition, and aims of that interesting party. 
As the full history of the Social Democratic Party in Germany 
would be as bulky as that of the British Liberal Party, it 
will, of course, be impossible to give more than a mere sketch 
of it in these pages. It may, however, be found that a 
sketch brings out the essential points and light and shade 
more clearly and more strongly than would a lengthy and 
detailed account. 

The creation of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, 

like the inauguration of many other pohtical movements in 

that country, was due not to the practical politician but 

1 From the Nineteenth Century and After, May 1903. 
291 



292 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

to the bookish doctrinaire. Roughly speaking, it may be 
said that that party has been created by the writings of the 
well-known Socialist authors, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, 
and Ferdinand LassaUe. It suffices to mention these names 
in order to understand that German Social Democracy was 
at first animated by the spirit of the learned and well- 
meaning, but somewhat nebulous and very unpractical, 
idealists who had read many books, and who sincerely wished 
to lead democracy from its misery and suffering straight into 
a millennium of their own creation. 

The fate of the followers of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle 
varied greatly. Some of them dissented and founded com- 
paratively unimportant pohtical schools and groups of their 
own. Some became anarchists like Johann Most. Some 
lost themselves in theoretical speculations and became 
respectable professors ; but the vast majority of Lassalle's 
followers developed into the German Social Democratic 
Party. That party became, by gradual evolution, the 
pohtical representative of German labour under the able 
guidance of talented working men. Its great leader was 
the turner, August Bebel, and among the most prominent 
members of the party were workmen such as Mr. Grillen- 
berger, a locksmith ; Mr. Auer, a saddler ; Messrs. Molken- 
buhr and Meister, cigar- workers ; Mr. Bernstein, the son 
of an engine-driver ; Mr. von Volhnar, formerly a post-office 
official. Working men such as those mentioned managed, 
led, and controlled a party which before the War embraced 
more than 4,000,000 men, and they maintained perfect 
order and absolute discipHne among that vast number. 

From its small beginnings up to the time of its present 
greatness, German Social Democracy has been democratic 
in the fuUest sense of the word. Some working men of a 
similar stamp to those mentioned, together with Wilhelm 
Liebknecht, a poor journalist, created the party, organised 
it, and led it. These leaders were always under the constant 
and strict control of the members of the party. Individual 
members often inquired, sometimes in an uncomfortably 
democratic spirit, not only into the expenditure of the 



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 293 

meagre party fund, which for a long time did not run into 
three figures, and of which every halfpenny had to be 
accounted for, but even cross-examined the party leader, 
the aged Liebknecht, as to his household expenses, and 
censured him for taking a salary as editor-in-chief of the 
Vorwdrts, the great Social Democratic Party organ, and 
keeping a servant. 

The idea of equality, which is often found in small demo- 
cratic societies, but which is usually lost when the society 
expands into a party, especially if that party is of enormous 
size, has been strictly preserved by the Social Democrats in 
Germany. The conservation of its original character was all 
the easier as the party had neither a great nobleman nor a 
distinguished professor for a figure-head, nor even wealthy 
brewers and bankers for contributors to the party fund, who 
might have influenced the party policy as they do in other 
countries. Thus the Social Democratic Party was, and has 
remained, essentially a Labour Party ; it has preserved its 
truly democratic, one might almost say its proletarian, 
character. However, it has been sensible enough not to 
write consistency on its banners, and has quietly dropped 
one by one many of the Utopian views and doctrines which 
it had taken over from the bookish doctrinaires who had been 
its originators. 

The Constitution of the German Empire gave universal 
suffrage to its citizens, and the number of Social Democratic 
votes, which had amounted to only 124,700 in 1871, rose 
rapidly to 342,000 in 1874, and to 493,300 in 1877. Bis- 
marck had been watching the rapid development of Social 
Democracy with growing uneasiness and disUke, and was 
casting about for a convenient pretext to strike at it when, 
on the 11th of May 1878, Hodel, an individual of illegiti- 
mate birth, besotted by drink, and degraded by vice and 
consequent disease, fired a pistol at the Emperor William. 

Long before his attempt on the Emperor, Hodel had been 
expelled from the Social Democratic Party, to which he 
had once belonged, on account of his character and his 
anarchist leanings, and he had joined the " Christian Socia- 



294 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

list Working Men's Party " of Mr. Stocker, the court 
preacher. Consequently it was not possible, by any 
stretch of imagination, to lay the responsibility for his deed 
at the doors of the Social Democratic Party. Nevertheless, 
Bismarck endeavoured to turn this attempt to account in 
the same way in which, in 1874, he had laid the moral 
responsibility for Kullmann's murderous attempt on himself 
upon the Clerical Party against which he was then fighting. 
He at once brought forward a Bill for the suppression of 
Social Democracy, but it was rejected by 251 votes against 57. 

By one of those fortuitous coincidences which have always 
played so conspicuous a part in Bismarck's career, a second 
attempt on the Emperor's life was made by Nobiling, only 
three weeks after that of Hodel, and this time the aged 
monarch was very seriously wounded. At one moment the 
doctors feared for his life, but in the end the copious bleed- 
ing was a blessing in disguise, for it rejuvenated the Emperor 
in mind and body. 

The two murderous attempts, following one another so 
closely, naturally infuriated the population of Germany, 
and, though Nobiling also was no Social Democrat, Bis- 
marck succeeded this time in turning the feelings of the 
people against Social Democracy. He immediately dis- 
solved the Reichstag and fanned the universal indignation 
at the crime to fever heat by his powerful press organisation. 
In the numerous journals throughout the land which were 
influenced from the Chancellory in BerHn, it was constantly 
declared that these repeated outrages were the dastardly 
work of Social Democracy. At the same time a reign of 
terrorism against Social Democracy was initiated by the 
German police. Countless political meetings of the Social 
Democrats were forbidden, a large number of Social Demo- 
cratic newspapers were suppressed, and the law courts 
inflicted in one month no less than 500 years of imprison- 
ment for Use-majeste. 

During the enormous excitement prevailing and in the 
seething turmoil caused by those two attempts, by the 
critical state of the Emperor, by the passionate campaign 



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 295 

of the semi-official press against the Social Democratic 
Party, and by the relentless persecutions waged against 
its members, the new elections took place, and, naturally 
enough, their result was a majority in favour of excep- 
tional legislation against Social Democracy. Bismarck 
brought his famous Sociahst Bill before Parhament without 
delay, and it was quickly passed, and was published on the 
21st of October in the Beichsanzeiger . 

Then the reign of terror, of which the Social Democrats 
had already received a foretaste, began in earnest. Within 
eight months the authorities dissolved 222 working men's 
unions and other associations, and suppressed 127 periodical 
and 278 other publications, by virtue of the discretionary 
powers given to them by the Socialist Law. Innumerable 
bona fide co-operative societies were compelled by the police 
to close their doors without any trial and without the possi- 
bihty of appeal. Numerous Social Democrats were sum- 
marily expelled from Germany at a few days' notice, through 
the discretion which the new Act had vested in the police. 
Many were placed under police supervision. Others were 
not allowed to change their domicile. Thousands of Social 
Democrats were thus reduced to beggary, many were thrown 
into prison, many fled to Switzerland, England, or the 
United States. 

The first effect upon Social Democracy of the new law was 
staggering. The entire party organisation, the entire party 
press, and the right of the members of the party to free 
speech, had been destroyed by the Government, and for 
the moment the party had become a disorganised and 
terrified mob. Everywhere in Germany scenes of tyranny 
were enacted by the police. In Frankfort-on-the-Main, a 
Social Democrat was buried, and, for some trifling reason, 
the pohce attacked the mourners in the very churchyard 
with drawn swords, and thirty to forty of the men were 
wounded. In 1886 a collision took place between some 
Social Democrats and some policemen in plain clothes, 
who, according to Social Democratic evidence, were not 
known to be poHcemen. With incredible severity, eleven 
20 



296 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

of the Social Democrats were punished for sedition, some 
with no less than ten and a half years' penal servitude, 
some with twelve and a half years of imprisonment. For 
the moment the Social Democratic Party was staggered by 
the rapidly succeeding blows. The election of 1878 reduced 
the number of Social Democratic votes from 493,300 to 
437,100, and in the next election, that of 1881, it sank even 
as low as 312,000. 

Prosecutions were not brought merely against Social 
Democrats who were considered lawbreakers by the local 
authorities and the poUce. On the contrary, the German 
Government directed the law with particular severity 
against the intellectual leaders of the party in Parliament, 
in the vain hope of extirpating it. Bebel and Liebknecht, 
the heads of the party and its leaders in the Reichstag, 
were dragged again and again before the law courts by the 
public prosecutor, often only in the attempt to construct, 
by diligent cross-examination, a punishable offence out of 
some inoffensive words which they had uttered, and time 
after time the prosecution collapsed ignominiously, and 
both men were found not guilty ; time after time they 
were condemned to lengthy terms of imprisonment for 
lese-majeste, high treason, and intended high treason. 

Liebknecht received his last conviction of four months 
of imprisonment for lese-majeste as a broken man of nearly 
seventy years, and even his burial in August 1900 was marked 
by that petty and annoying poUce interference under which 
he had suffered so much during his life. No less than 
2,000 wreaths and other floral tributes had been sent by 
Liebknecht' s admirers, yet, in the immense funeral pro- 
cession, in which about 45,000 people took part, not one 
wreath, not one banner was to be seen, for the pohce had 
forbidden their inclusion. Though hundreds of thousands 
of Social Democrats attended the funeral in the procession 
and in the streets of Berlin, and in spite of the provocative 
orders of the police, no breach of the peace occurred, no 
arrest took place, an eloquent testimonial to the orderliness 
and discipline of the party of subversion. 



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 297 

Bismarck soon recognised that his policy of force and 
violence promised to be unsuccessful. Therefore he tried 
not only to vanquish Social Democracy by breaking up the 
party organisation, confiscating its books and documents, 
destroying the party press, and taking from Social Demo- 
crats the right of free speech, but he tried at the same time 
to reconcile the German working men with the Government 
by instituting State Insurance for workers against old age 
and disablement. Thus he hoped to entice them away 
from their leaders, and to make them look to the State for 
help. However, his Workmen's Insurance Laws failed to 
fulfil the chief object which they were to serve. 

According to the Social Democratic leaders the Imperial 
Insurance scheme kept not one vote from Social Democracy, 
especially as it did not satisfy the workers by its performance. 
They complained that the benefits which they derived under 
the Insurance scheme were purely nominal, that the pre- 
miums paid came chiefly out of their own pockets, that 
the contributions made by the employers were insufficient, 
and that the cost of management was excessive. Conse- 
quently it failed to appease Grerman democracy and was 
scorned by it as a bribe. 

Gradually the terror of prosecution wore o£F. Social 
Democratic political meetings were held in secret. Party 
literature printed in Switzerland was smuggled over the 
frontier and surreptitiously distributed. By and by the 
party pulled itself together, and found that determination 
and perseverance which are born from adversity, and which 
are bound to lead individuals and parties possessing these 
quaUties to greatness. The campaign of oppression and 
the creation of martyrs had done its work. As Bismarck 
had created the greatness of the Clerical Party by the 
" Kulturkampf," by the prosecution of Roman Catholicism, 
even so he created the greatness of the Social Democratic 
Party. Social Democracy began again to take heart, and, 
from 1881 onwards, we find a marvellous increase in the 
Social Democratic votes recorded, notwithstanding, or rather 
because of, all the measures taken against it by the Grovern- 



298 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

ment. The astonishing progress of the party since 1881 
is apparent from the following table : 



Election. 


Social Democratic 
Votes polled. 


Total Votes polled. 


Percentage of Social 
Democratic Votes. 


1881 


312,000 


5,097,800 


6-12 per cent. 


1884 






550,000 


5,663,000 


9-68 


1887 






763,100 


7,540,900 


10-11 




1890 






1,427,300 


7,228,500 


19-74 




1893 






1,786,700 


7,674,000 


23-30 




1898 






2,107,076 


7,752,700 


27-18 




1903 






3,010,771 


9,495,586 


31-71 




1907 






3,259,000 


11,262,800 


28-94 




1912 


4,250,329 


12,206,808 


34-82 





When Bismarck saw Social Democracy increasing, not- 
withstanding all his efforts at repression, he tried another 
method. It happened very frequently in Germany that 
three, four, or more candidates, representing as many parties, 
stood for one seat. If in such a case none of the candidates 
obtained a majority over the combined votes given to all 
the other candidates, a second poll had to take place between 
the two candidates who had received the largest number 
of votes, whilst the other candidates had to withdraw. In 
order to destroy the chances of Social Democratic candidates 
in the very frequent second polls, Bismarck and his press 
used constantly to brand the Social Democratic Party as 
the State-subverting Party, and to enjoin "the parties of 
law and order," as he called the other parties, to stand 
shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy of Society 
and of the Fatherland. 

Many years had passed since Bismarck's dismissal. Yet 
official Germany did not discover a new method for the 
treatment of Social Democracy. It merely copied Bis- 
marck's example. Until yesterday the Social Democratic 
Party was still loudly denounced by every good German 
patriot as the party of subversion, which had to be 
shunned and combated. Hence the election managers of 
the numerous parties and factions did until recently, in 
case of a second poll, usually give the votes of their party 



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 299 

to the candidate of any other party in order not to incur 
the odium in official circles of having helped a Social Demo- 
crat into the Reichstag. But voices of protest began to be 
heard against the official fiction that Social Democracy was 
a pest, the enemy of the Country, of Society, of Monarchy, 
of the Family, and of the Church. In December 1902 
Professor Mommsen wrote in the Nation : 

" There must be an end of the superstition, as false as it 
is perfidious, that the nation is divided into parties of law 
and order on the one hand, and a party of revolution on 
the other, and that it is the prime political duty of citizens 
belonging to the former categories to shun the Labour 
Party as if it were in quarantine for the plague, and to 
combat it as the enemy of the State." 

In March 1890 Bismarck was dismissed by the Emperor 
William, and a few months later the exceptional law against 
Social Democracy was withdrawn. The net result of that 
law had been that 1,500 Social Democrats had been con- 
demned to about 1,000 years of imprisonment, and that 
the Social Democratic vote had risen from 437,158 to 
1,427,298. The effect of the Socialist Law, with all its 
persecution, was the reverse of what Bismarck had expected, 
for it had made that party great. If less drastic means had 
been employed by Bismarck, if less contempt and con- 
tumely had been showered upon Social Democracy by the 
official classes and society, and if instead consideration for 
the legitimate wishes and confidence in the common sense 
of the working men's party had been shown by the Govern- 
ment, Social Democracy would not have attained its for- 
midable strength. 

Among the various causes which led to the rupture 
between the present Emperor and Prince Bismarck, a pro- 
minent place may be assigned to the difference in their 
views with regard to the treatment of Social Democracy. 
When William the Second came to the throne he clearly 
saw the failure of Bismarck's policy of oppression, and, 
probably influenced by the liberal views of his English 



300 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

mother, resolved to kill Social Democracy with kindness. 
This idea dictated his weU-known retort to Bismarck, " Leave 
the Social Democrats to me ; I can manage them quite 
alone ! " Even before Bismarck's dismissal WiUiam II. 
demonstrated to the world his extremely liberal view 
regarding the German workmen with that astonishing 
impetuousness and with that complete disregard of the 
views of his experienced official advisers to which the world 
had to become accustomed. On the 4th of February 1890 
an Imperial rescript was pubHshed, which lacked the neces- 
sary counter-signature of the Imperial Chancellor whereby 
the responsibility for that document would have been 
fixed upon the Government. It declared it to be the duty 
of the State "... to regulate the time, the hours, and 
the nature of labour in such a way as to ensure the preser- 
vation of health, to fulfil the demands of morality, and to 
secure the economic requirements of the workers, to estab- 
lish their equality before the law, and to facilitate the free 
and peaceful expression of their wishes and grievances." 
A second rescript called together an International Conference 
for the Protection of Workers. 

These Imperial manifestations were greeted with jubila- 
tion by German democracy ; but the extremely liberal 
spirit which these documents breathed vanished suddenly, 
and gave way to autocratic and anti-democratic pronounce- 
ments. While the words of the Imperial rescripts were 
still fresh in every mind, and while German democracy still 
hoped to receive greater consideration at the hands of the 
Government, messages like the following, addressed to 
democracy, fell from the Imperial lips : 

" We HohenzoUerns take Our crown from God alone, 
and to God alone We are responsible in the fulfilment of Our 
duties. 

" The soldier and the army, not Parliamentary majorities 
and resolutions, have welded together the German Empire. 

" Suprema lex regis voluntas. 

" Only One is master in the country. That am I. Who 
opposes Me I shall crush to pieces. 



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 301 

" 8ic volo, sic jubeo. 

" All of you shall have only one will, and that is My will ; 
there is only one law, and that is My law. 

" ParUamentary opposition of Prussian nobility to their 
King is a monstrosity. 

" For Me every Social Democrat is synonymous with 
enemy of the nation, and of the Fatherland. 

" On to the battle, for ReUgion, Morality, and Order, and 
against the parties of subversion. Forward with God ! 
Dishonourable is he who forsakes his King ! " 

The Emperor did not confine himself to making in public 
pronouncements highly offensive and hostile to German 
democracy, such as those mentioned, but set himself the 
task of actively combating Social Democracy. Consciously 
or unconsciously, he gradually dropped into Bismarck's 
ways and copied, or rather exaggerated, Bismarck's methods, 
Bismarck's tactics, and Bismarck's mistakes. When, on 
the 13th of October 1895, a manufacturer named Schwartz 
was murdered in Miilhausen by a workman who had been 
repeatedly convicted of theft, WiUiam II. telegraphed 
to his widow, "Again a sacrifice to the revolutionary move- 
ment engendered by the Sociahsts," imitating Bismarck's 
attempt at foisting the guilt for an individual crime upon 
a ParUamentary party which then comprised 2,000,000 
members. 

The Socialistic Law of 1878 had been a complete failure. 
Nevertheless, the Government tried to introduce, under a 
different title, a near relative of that law, which breathed the 
same spirit of intolerance and violence ; for in 1894 a Bill, 
which became known under the name " Umsturz Vorlage " 
(Subversion Bill), was brought out by the Government. 
This Bill made it punishable " to attack publicly by insulting 
utterances Religion, the Monarchy, Family, or Property 
in a matter likely to provoke a breach of the peace, or to 
bring the institutions of the State into contempt." That 
Bill, which, with its flexible provisions, would have allowed 
of the most arbitrary interpretations, and would have 
virtually given a free hand to the police and to public 



302 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

prosecutors and judges anxious to show their zeal by the 
relentless persecution of Social Democracy, was thrown out 
by the Reichstag. Notwithstanding its failure another 
Bill of similar character, but intended for Prussia alone, 
was laid before the Prussian Diet on the 10th of May 1897, 
empowering the police to dissolve all meetings " which do 
not conform with the law, or endanger pubhc security, 
especially the security of the State or of the public peace." 
This Bill also was rejected. 

Shortly after his second failure, William II. made 
another and stiU more startUng attempt to suppress 
Social Democracy. On the 5th of September 1898, he 
declared at a banquet in Oeynhausen, "... A Bill is in 
preparation, and will be submitted to Parliament, by which 
every one who tries to hinder a willing German worker from 
doing his work, or who incites him to strike, will be punished 
with penal servitude." Naturally this announcement, 
which promised that strikers and their leaders would in 
future be treated as felons, created an enormous sensation. 
After a delay of nine months, which betrayed its hesitation, 
the Government brought out a Bill, which, however, had been 
considerably toned down with regard to its promised pro- 
visions. Still it was draconic enough, for it made threats 
against non- strikers, incitement to strike, and picketing 
punishable with imprisonment up to one year. Its piece 
de resistance was the following paragraph : 

" If, through a strike, the security of the Empire or of one 
of the single States has been endangered, or if the danger of 
loss of human lives or of property has been brought about, 
penal servitude up to three years is to be inflicted on the 
men, and penal servitude up to five years on the leaders." 

This BiU, like that of 1894, possessed an unpleasant 
elasticity which could make it an instrument of tyranny 
in the hands of servile judges. Hence the " Penal Servitude 
Bill," which had so rashly and so loudly been announced 
urbi et orbi by the Emperor, shared the ignominious fate of 
the two Bills mentioned. 



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 303 

In their desire to stifle the voice of the people and to please 
the Emperor many Conservatives recommended a coup 
d'etat. For instance, Count Mirbach stated at the meeting 
of his party, on the 1st of January 1895, that universal 
suffrage was a derision of all authority, and recommended 
the abohtion of the secret baUot. The same gentleman 
stated in the Prussian Upper House, on the 28th of March 
1895, " The country would greet with jubilation a decision 
of the German Princes to create a new Reichstag on the basis 
of a new Election Law." In the same place Count Franken- 
berg stated two days later, " We hope to obtain a new 
Election Law for the German Empire, for with the present 
Election Law it is impossible to exist." Freiherr von 
Zedlitz, Freiherr von Stumm, and Von Kardorff uttered 
similar sentiments. At the meeting of the Conservative 
Party on the 8th of March 1897, Freiherr von Stumm said, 
" The right to vote should be taken away from the Social 
Democrats, and no Social Democrat should be permitted to 
sit in the Diet," and Count Limburg-Stirum likewise advo- 
cated their exclusion. The official handbook of the Con- 
servative Party, most Conservative and many Liberal 
papers, warmly applauded these views. 

The aims of the Social Democrats in Germany were similar 
to those of the workers in other countries. They wished to 
better themselves pohtically, economically, and socially. 
PoUtically, German democracy was not free. Universal 
suffrage existed for the Imperial Reichstag, but the German 
Parhament had far less power than had the English Par- 
liament under Charles I. The facts that the Emperor 
could, at will, dissolve Parhament, according to Article 12 
of the Constitution ; that he could nominate and dismiss 
officials, according to Article 18 ; and that the Govern- 
ment was responsible only to the Emperor, proved the 
helplessness of the German Parhament before the 
Emperor and his officials, who were nominated and dis- 
missed, promoted and decorated by him, and by him 
alone. Parhament in Germany had no control whatever 
over, and hardly any influence upon, the poHcy and ad- 



304 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

ministration of the Empire. Its sole duty was to vote 
funds and laws. 

In the single States, German democracy fared stiU worse. 
The election for the Prussian Diet, to give an instance, took 
place upon the following system. The whole body of the 
electors was divided into three classes according to the 
amount of taxes paid. Each class contributed an equal 
amount and had the same voting power. The practical 
working of this curious system may be illustrated by the case 
of Berlin. The voters of Berhn belonging to those three 
classes were in 1895 distributed in the following way : 

Voters of the first class .... 1,469 
,, ,, second class .... 9,372 

,, ,, third class .... 289,973 



Total of voters in Berlin . . 300,814 

The figures given prove that the three classes system was 
the capitalistic system par excellence, for each of the rich 
men voting in the first class in Berlin possessed two hundred 
votes, each of the weU-to-do men in the second class had 
thirty votes, and the combined first and second classes, or 
3| per cent, of the electorate, formed a solid two-thirds 
majority over the remaining 96| per cent, of the electorate. 
There were, besides, some further complications in that 
intricate system which it would lead too far to describe. 
That franchise was worthless to democracy, A similar kind 
of franchise prevailed in other German States, 

Socially also German democracy had much to complain 
of. Except in the large centres, the position of the German 
working man was a very humble one. Further grievances 
were the all-pervading militarism, the exceptional and un- 
assailable position of the official classes, the prerogatives 
of the privileged classes, and the widespread immorality 
which had undermined and debased the position of women 
in Germany previous to the War. Nothing can better 
illustrate the latter grievance of Social Democracy than 
reference to the daily papers. For instance, in a pre-war 



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 305 

number of the Berlin Lokalanzeiger under my notice, there 
were the following advertisements : 

" Seventy-four marriage advertisements (some doubtful). 

" Forty-nine advertisements of lady masseuses (all 
doubtful), 

" Nine demands for small loans, usually of £5, by ' modest 
widows ' and other single ladies (all doubtful). 

" Six acquaintances desired by ladies (all doubtful). 

" Five widows' balls, ' gentlemen invited, admission free ' 
(all doubtful). 

" Thirty apartments and rooms ' without restrictions ' by 
the day (all doubtful), 

" Forty-seven maternity homes, ' discretion assured ; no 
report home' (all doubtful). 

" Sixteen babies to be adopted. 

" Sixteen specialists for contagious disease." 

These advertisements, found in one daily journal of a 
similar standing to that of the London Daily Telegraph, and 
similar in kind and extent of circulation, explain better the 
state of moraUty in Germany, and the attitude of the German 
Social Democratic working men, than would a lengthy dis- 
sertation illustrated with voluminous statistics. This state 
of affairs explains the importance with which the question 
of morality and of the position of women was treated in the 
political programme of German Social Democracy. 

In order to become acquainted, not only with the actual 
wishes of Social Democracy, but also with the tone in 
which those wishes were expressed, and with the manner 
in which they were formulated, we cannot do better than 
turn to the Official Handbook for Social Democratic Voters. 
The passages selected proved to Grerman officialdom that 
Social Democracy was the enemy of the Country, of Society, 
of Monarchy, of the Family, and of the Church, They^ 
clearly show the fundamental ideas of that party and the 
spirit by which it was animated. The Handbook says : 

" The aim of Social Democracy is not to divide all 
property, but to combine it and use it for the development 



30(5 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

and improvement of mankind, in order to give to all a life 
worthy of man. Work shall become a duty for all men 
able to work. The word of the Bible, ' He that does not 
work neither shall he eat,' shall become a true word. 

" Marriage, in contradiction to religious teachings, is in 
innumerable cases a financial transaction pure and simple. 
Woman has value in the eyes of men only when she has a 
fortune, and the more money she has the higher rises her 
value. Therefore marriage has become a business, and 
thousands meet in the marriage market, for instance, by 
advertisements in newspapers, in which a husband or a wife 
is sought in the same way in which a house or a pig is offered 
for sale. Consequently unhappy marriages have never 
been more numerous than at the present time, a state of 
affairs which is in contradiction to the real nature of 
marriage. Social Democracy desires that marriages be 
concluded solely from mutual love and esteem, which is 
only possible if man and woman are free and independent, 
if each has a free existence and an individual personality, 
and is therefore not compelled to buy the other or to be 
bought. This state of freedom and equality is only 
possible in the socialistic society. 

" Who desires to belong to a Church shall not be hindered, 
but he shall pay only for the expenses of his Church together 
with his co-religionists. 

" The schools and the whole educational system shall be 
separated from the Church and religious societies, because 
education is a civil matter. 

" The God of Christians is not a German, French, Russian, 
or English god, but a God of all men, an international God, 
God is the God of love and of peace, and therefore it borders 
upon blasphemy that the priests of different Christian 
nations invoke this God of love to give victory to their 
nation in the general slaughter. It is equally blasphemous 
if the priest of one nation prays the God of all nations for 
a victory over another nation. In striving to found a 
brotherhood of nations and the peaceful co-operation of 
nations in the service of civilisation, Social Democracy acts 
in a most Christian spirit, and tries to realise what the 
Christian priests of all nations, together with the Christian 
monarchs, hitherto would not, or could not, realise. By 
combining the workers of all nations, Social Democracy 
tries to effect a federation of nations in which every State 



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 307 

enjoys equal rights, and in which the peculiarities of the 
inner character of every nation may peacefully develop." 

Ideas such as those quoted were instrumental in framing 
the programme of the party, which was idealistic as well as 
utiUtarian. The ten demands of the programme were : 

( 1 ) One vote for every adult man and woman ; a holiday 

to be election day ; payment of members. 

(2) The Government to be responsible to ParUament ; 

local self-government ; referendum. 

(3) Introduction of the militia system. 

(4) Freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 

(5) Equality of man and woman before the law. 

(6) Disestablishment of the Churches. 

(7) Undenominational schools, with compulsory attend- 

ance and gratuitous tuition. 

(8) Gratuitousness of legal proceeding. 

(9) Gratuitous medical attendance and burial. 

(10) Progressive Income Tax and Succession Duty. 
Had the Social Democrats been as black as they were 

painted, the leaders could not have kept the millions of 
their followers in perfect order. Again, if the Social Demo- 
cratic politicians were selfish or mercenary, as has been 
asserted, they would not have died poor. Liebknecht 
once said, and his case is typical for the leaders of Social 
Democracy, " I have never sought my personal advantage. 
If I am poor after unprecedented persecutions, I do not 
account it a disgrace. I am proud of it, for it is an eloquent 
testimony to my political honour." The Kolnische Zeitung, 
commenting on these words, justly observed, " It would 
be unjust to deny Social Domocracy the recognition of the 
high personal integrity of its leaders." While the gravest 
scandals have discredited more than one German party and 
its leaders, the Social Democratic Party had, up to the War, 
stood immaculate — an eloquent vindication of the moral 
force of democracy, which force had been so thoroughly 
misunderstood in Germany. 

The lack of understanding and of sympathy with Social 



308 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

Democracy and its aims was not restricted to official circles 
in Germany. Typical of these views hostile to Social 
Democracy is the following pronouncement by Professor H. 
Delbriick, the distinguished historian, which appeared in 
the Preussische Jahrbiicher for December 1895 : 

" The duty of the Government is not to educate Social 
Democracy to decent behaviour, but to suppress it, or, if 
that should be impossible, at least to repress it, or, if that be 
impossible, at least to hinder its further growth. . . . What 
is necessary is that the sentiment should be awakened among 
all classes of the population that Social Democracy is a 
poison which can be resisted only by the strongest and 
united moral opposition." 

German democracy in the shape of the Social Democratic 
Party could not only raise the claim of moral force and 
numerical strength, of discipline and integrity, but could 
also be proud of the consummate political ability of its 
leaders and of the spirited support which these leaders 
received from the members of the party. No better and no 
juster testimonial, with regard to these quahties, can be 
given than the pronouncement of the German historian, 
Professor Mommsen : 

"It is unfortunately true that at the present time the 
Social Democracy is the only great party which has any 
claim to political respect. It is not necessary to refer 
to talent. Everybody in Germany knows that with brains 
like those of Bebel it would be possible to furnish forth a 
dozen noblemen from east of the Elbe in a fashion that 
would make them shine among their peers. 

" The devotion, the self-sacrificing spirit of the Social 
Democratic masses, impresses even those who are far from 
sharing their aims. Our Liberals might well take a lesson 
from the discipline of the party." 

While other German parties split into factions or decayed 
owing to the unruliness of their undisciplined members or 
to the apathetic support of the voters, or to the skilful action 
of the Government, the Social Democratic Party in Germany 



THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 



309 



was until recently constantly strong and undivided, not- 
withstanding the many and serious difficulties which it 
encountered. It was, no doubt, by far the best- led, the 
best-managed, and the most homogeneous party in Ger- 
many, and was the only party which, from an English point 
of view, could be considered a party. Similarly, there was 
in Germany no political journal more ably conducted than 
the Social Democratic Party organ, the Vorwdrts. 

The Social Democratic Party did not possess in the 
Reichstag that numerical strength which one might expect 
from the numerical strength of its supporters. This great 
under-representation sprang partly from the fact that, in 
the frequently occurring second polls, the other parties 
usually combined against the Social Democratic candidate 
as before related ; partly it was due to the fact that German 
towns were until 1914 represented by the same number of 
deputies as in 1871, notwithstanding the immense increase 
in their population. No redistribution had been effected, 
because the Government did not wish to strengthen the 
Liberal and Social Democratic parties which had their 
hold on the towns, and Parliament had no means of enforcing 
a redistribution. How enormous was the disproportion 
between votes and representatives in the Reichstag, and 
how this disporportion favoured the two Conservative parties 
and the Clerical Party, may be seen from the following 
table : 

Result of the General Election of 1907 





Votes. 


Members in 

Imperial 

Diet. 


Average Number 

of Votes 

per Member. 


Social Democrats 
Centre (Roman Catholic Party) 
National Liberals 
Conservatives 

Freisinnige (People's) Party- 
Free Conservatives 

Poles 

Seven factions 




3,259,000 

2,179,800 

1,637,000 

1,060,200 

736,000 

471,900 

453,900 

1,465,000 


43 

104 

55 

62 

27 
24 
20 
61 


75,790 
20,959 
29,764 
17,132 
27,259 
19,662 
22,695 
24,016 


Total .... 


11,262,800 


396 


28,441 



310 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

The consequence of the disproportion of votes to members 
in the different parties was that the Social Democrats, who 
commanded 28*94 per cent, of the votes, had only 10' 9 
per cent, of the seats in the Reichstag of 1907, whilst the 
Conservative Party, with only 94 per cent, of the votes, 
had 18'24 per cent, of the seats, and the conser^ atively- 
inclined Centre Party, with 19' 33 per cent, of t votes, 
had no less than 26'26 per cent, of the seats. Ba^ d upon 
the same proportion of votes to members which obtains with 
the Centre Party and with the two Conservative Parties, 
the representatives of the Social Democratic Party in the 
Imperial Diet should have numbered more than 150, and 
not 43. 

Whilst Social Democracy was flourishing and increasing, 
the various Liberal parties in Germany had been decaying 
for many years. The reason for that phenomenon was 
that the Liberal Party had striven to represent onlv such 
Liberalism as was approved of by the Government. 
Liberahsm shunned the Social Democratic Party and its 
leaders like poison, in accordance with the official mot d'ordre. 
Consequently the liberally-inclined German workman, small 
trader, clerk, teacher, etc., whom that approved Court 
Liberalism — which in reaUty was Conservatism in disguise 
— did not suit, abandoned that pseudo- Liberahsm and gave 
his vote to the Social Democratic candidate . 



CHAPTER XX 

THE PARLIAMENTARY POSITION IN GERMANY 
BEFORE THE WAR 

Among the causes which prompted the German Government 
in 1914 to embark upon a war of aggression was, no doubt, 
the increasing difficulty of the parliamentary position, of 
domestic politics. 

Three phenomena in German pre-war politics seemed 
almost inexplicable to the average Englishmen and Ameri- 
can : the fact that Germany possessed not two large Parties, 
but a large number of comparatively small and indepen- 
dent political Parties and Groups ; the fact that Germany, 
which was essentially a liberal-minded country, should have 
lacked a powerful Liberal Party ; the fact that more than 
one- third of the German citizens, who were very prosperous, 
who received the advantages of a thoughtful paternal 
Government, such as State Insurance against sickness, 
accident, invalidity, and old age, and who enjoyed universal 
manhood suffrage, should have been found in the Sociahst 
camp in a country which was supposed to be a model to all 
other countries as regards education and efficient adminis- 
tration. Those three phenomena deserve inquiring into. 

Imperial Grermany was a democratic country only in 
outward appearance. It is true that she possessed universal 
manhood suffrage, that plural voting was practically un- 
known, and that the principle of one man one vote was 
strictly carried out. As far as the voting went, Germany 
was the most democratic country in the world. But here 
the democratic character of Germany's poHtical institutions 
ended. Germany's Constitution was neither gradually 
21 311 



312 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 

evolved by a people struggling to be free, as was the British 
Constitution, nor was it devised in free discussion by a 
number of eminent democratic statesmen and politicians 
of different views as was the Constitution of the United 
States. Germany was an enlarged Prussia. The German 
Constitution was drawn up by a single man, by Prince 
Bismarck, a Prussian, and he aimed at creating an instru- 
ment which, though democratic in appearance, would not 
be an efficient obstacle to the absolute rule traditional in 
Prussia. Before all he desired to have a Constitution for 
Germany which would make it easy and convenient for him 
to administer the country according to his will. While 
giving to the people universal manhood suffrage, he took 
good care that their representatives in the Reichstag should 
be powerless. The national government and administration 
were to remain in the hands of an all-powerful bureaucracy. 
Bismarck came to power at a moment when the internal 
position of Prussia had become so desperate, when the 
conflict between the Bang and his Parliament had become 
so hopeless, that William I., who then was only King of 
Prussia, could no longer find a ministry wiUing to carry on 
the government of the country. The King had become so 
despondent that he had actually drawn up an Act of Ab- 
dication, and was about to retire into private life. Bismarck 
induced WiUiam I. to entrust him with the government of 
the country, and to tear up the Act of Abdication. Having 
been given full power, Bismarck governed Prussia with a 
hand of iron. He collected iUegaUy the taxes in opposition 
to a hostile and protesting Parhament, and he conducted 
three successful wars which made little Prussia the most 
powerful State in Europe, and which made WiUiam I. 
Emperor of a united Germany. WiUiam I. was loyalty per- 
sonified. He, who had been about to abdicate and leave 
the country, owed his great position to Bismarck. His 
gratitude to Prince Bismarck was great. Bismarck felt 
certain that he could absolutely rely upon the Emperor, 
that the Emperor was likely to act always in accordance 
with his own views. Therefore, in drawing up the German 



REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 313 

Constitution, Bismarck could most easily secure all influence 
and authority to himself by placing all power nominally 
into the old Emperor's hands. 

According to the Bismarckian Constitution, Germany 
had no responsible ministers, but only one responsible 
minister, the Imperial Chancellor, to whom all the Secre- 
taries of State were responsible. The Chancellor, who thus 
undertook responsibility for the conduct of all the depart- 
ments of State, was responsible not to Parliament, but only 
to the Emperor. In Germany, ministers and other high 
dignitaries were taken not from the parliamentary Parties, 
as in other parhamentary countries, but from the ranks 
of the bureaucracy, the army, and the courtiers. Hence 
Government and ParHament, and Government and people, 
were out of touch. The ministers were the Emperor's 
servants. They were appointed and dismissed by the 
Emperor, and they stood outside and above the Reichstag 
and the Parties. No vote of lack of confidence could, 
therefore, shake the position of a minister as long as he 
continued to enjoy the support of the monarch. When 
Emperor and Chancellor agreed, Parliament was powerless, 
especially as it was doubtful whether the German Reichstag 
was, according to the Constitution, entitled to withhold 
supplies by refusing the granting of taxes which had previ- 
ously been estabhshed for an indefinite number of years. 
In Germany, in Prussia, and in aU the minor German States, 
the ministers were chosen and dismissed by the sovereign, 
and they were responsible not to Parliament, but only to 
the sovereign. Therefore the people represented in ParHa- 
ment could not rid themselves of an incapable or unpopular 
minister by voting against him, by withholding supplies, 
or by not voting his salary. On the other hand, a Reichstag 
which had become obnoxious to the Emperor or to his 
Chancellor could be dissolved by the Government, for, 
according to the Constitution, the Emperor was entitled to 
dissolve it. An inconvenient Reichstag was simply sent 
home in the hope that the next Reichstag would be of a 
different character, and the powerful Government apparatus 



314 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 

was set in motion to influence the people at Election time 
in the desired way. Hence in Germany, and also in the 
individual States composing it, all real power was in the 
hands of the hereditary ruler, who was often far more 
strongly influenced by the views of his courtiers and his 
aristocratic entourage than by the views of the people, 
especially as the views of the people were only too often 
distorted by a venal press. In Germany parliamentarism 
was therefore merely a form. The people were practically 
powerless to interfere in matters of Government and ad- 
ministration or to influence appointments which, especially 
if the ruler was incapable and headstrong, often went rather 
by favour than by merit. The Handhuch filr Sozialdemok- 
ratische Wdhler wrote quite correctly : 

" A Constitution was given by Bismarck to Germany 
which provided for a democratic parliament based on uni- 
versal manhood suffrage, but which, owing to the fact that 
it left unclear the question whether the Reichstag is entitled 
to withhold suppKes, placed all actual power into the hands 
of the Federal Government, or rather into those of the 
Prussian Government which serves as its centre. The King 
of Prussia and the Prime Minister of the Prussian Cabinet, 
who acts at the same time as Chancellor of the German 
Empire, hold in their hands all real power. Bismarck made 
a Constitution which would suit himself. 

" Prussia rules in Germany, and Germany is ruled by the 
aristocrats and plutocrats who are all powerful in the un- 
democratic and non-representative Prussian parliament who 
possess a decisive influence upon the Court and the army. . . . 
Opinions differ as to the Reichstag's power of withholding 
supplies. However, so much is certain that taxes and other 
sources of the national income which have once been voted 
cannot be discontinued in consequence of the veto of the 
Reichstag." 

The Imperial Constitution had laid down the principle 
that there was to be one member of the Reichstag for every 
100,000 inhabitants. Germany had in 1871 a little less 
than 40,000,000 inhabitants, and in accordance with the 



REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 315 

population of the time the new Imperial Reichstag waa 
composed of 397 members. The Germans were a liberal- 
minded people. The middle classes in the towns had 
agitated during many decades for democratic and parlia- 
mentary government, and they had received with delight 
the gift of universal manhood suffrage, which seemed to 
promise the advent of parliamentary government. Liberal- 
ism was in excelsis, and not unnaturally it became the 
controUing element in the new Reichstag. At the first 
Election in the German Empire, that of 1871, the Liberal 
Groups elected 203 members, and had therefore the absolute 
majority in the House. At the second Election, that of 
1874, they were represented by 212 members, and com- 
manded an increased majority. Bismarck had meant to 
give to Germany only the semblance of parliamentary 
government. He did not wish to see his policy circum- 
scribed by a Party which possessed the majority in the 
Reichstag. Therefore he endeavoured to break up the great 
Liberal Party, and he succeeded. Through Bismarck's 
activity the Liberal Party was divided and subdivided into 
a number of quarrelling and powerless factions. 

In all countries Liberalism has found its adherents chiefly 
in the large towns, and especially among the working men 
in shop and factory. The German Liberal Party, the Party 
which strove for real parliamentary government, and which, 
therefore, was dangerous to the Government, could be 
rendered impotent by separating the middle class of the 
towns, which furnished the leaders, from the working men 
in the towns, who were their natural followers. When the 
Social Democratic Party arose, Bismarck saw his oppor- 
tunity of crippling German Liberahsm. Two attempts on 
the life of the Emperor William I. gave him the opportunity 
of accusing the Social Democrats of that crime, and of 
branding them as a Party of traitors, of assassins, and of 
enemies to the established order. He instituted a campaign 
of persecution. He raised the red spectre. He declared 
that the Social Democrats were the enemies of religion, the 
nation, and the fatherland, and that it was the duty of all 



316 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 

good citizens to combine in fighting " the Party of revolution 
and of subversion." 

Imperial Germany had a considerable number of parties 
and political groups, and these were apt to undergo kaleido- 
scopic changes — between 1871 and 1912 there have been 
11 Conservative Parties, 14 Liberal Parties, 2 Clerical Parties, 
9 Nationalist and Particularist Parties, and 5 Socialist 
Parties — but in reahty Germany, like every other country, 
had only two great Parties, a Conservative Party and a 
Liberal Party, Each of these two great Parties was, 
through the lack of Party discipline and through Govern- 
mental machinations, subdivided into a number of Groups. 
The Clerical Centre Party, which represented chiefly the 
Roman Catholic country districts of Germany, was naturally 
Conservative in character. The Conservative and the 
Centre Parties would probably have formed one great Party 
had not Bismarck divided them by his persecution of 
Roman Catholicism, the Kulturkampf, which made the 
Roman CathoHc section a close union for mutual defence, 
and which divided the Conservative Party into a Roman 
Catholic and into a Protestant Group, which for a long time 
fought one another. The old Liberal Party of Germany 
had been broken up into a number of more and of less 
advanced sections, and the Social Democratic Party was, 
rightly considered, not a revolutionary Party, and not even 
a Socialist Party, but only the most advanced and the 
most dissatisfied wing of the old Liberal Party of Germany. 
Formerly the German working men voted for the Liberal 
candidates, and they would probably have continued to do 
so had it not been for Bismarck's policy. 

The Social Democratic Party was created by a number 
of enthusiastic working men and of friends of the working 
men. It was in the beginning merely a small working-men's 
Party, which was led by working men and by a few im- 
practical poHtical enthusiasts, doctrinaires, and philan- 
thropists. Bismarck's persecution of the Social Democrats 
had a threefold effect. In the first place it converted the 
workmen leaders of the Party into martyrs, and caused the 



REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 317 

workmen to join in thousands the Social Democratic Party. 
In the second place, it embittered the Social Democratic 
leaders, drove them to extreme views, caused them to make 
violent speeches, and gave colour to their doctrine of the 
Class War. In the third place, it caused the Liberal leaders 
and the Liberal Party to become suspicious of working men 
inclined towards Socialism, and of every measure which 
might be interpreted and denounced by the Government as 
helpful to Social Democracy. Thus a gulf was dug between 
Liberalism and Labour. Labour was driven out of the 
Liberal Party through the Government's pohcy. The 
German Social Democratic Party was in reality a Liberal 
Party which was largely recruited from the working men, 
and which was led by Social Democratic spokesmen who 
propounded somewhat out-of-date doctrines and Party 
programmes. 

Germany was until recently, as she had been in 1871, an 
absolutely ruled country with a democratic franchise. A 
German comic paper, the SimpUcissimus , printed just before 
the Election of 1912 a cartoon in which a gentleman of 
aristocratic appearance was addressing a number of people. 
Underneath were the words : " Gentlemen, you have now 
to fulfil that most important duty of German citizens of 
voting for the Reichstag. When you have done so, it will 
again be the Emperor's turn during the next five years." 

At the General Election of 1912 the Conservative Parties 
proper and the Central Party polled together 4,500,000 
votes, while the Liberal and Socialist Parties polled together 
no less than 7,500,000 votes. One may therefore say that 
there was a majority of 3,000,000 votes against the Govern- 
ment, that the Conservative Parties which supported the 
Government were in a small minority. These figures make 
it clear that it was of the utmost importance to the German 
Grovernment to prevent a true representation of the people 
in the Reichstag, and to prevent the representatives of the 
7,500,000 voters, who were opposed to Conservatism, acting 
in union. It was of the utmost importance for the Govern- 
ment that the Liberal Party should remain irreconcilably 



318 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 

divided against itself, that they should continue to form a 
capitalistic section and a Socialistic section, and that these 
two sections should make war upon one another in accord- 
ance with Bismarck's policy up to 1914. Bismarck had 
four successors, but every one of them saw the danger which 
threatened Germany's established form of uncontrolled 
and pseudo-popular Government from a reunion of the 
great Liberal Party of 1871 through a reconciUation of the 
Liberal sections with the Social Democratic section. Hence 
every one of Bismarck's successors entreated all good 
citizens to combine against " the Party of subversion and 
of revolution." Before the General Election of 1907 it was 
Prince Biilow, and before that of 1912 it was Herr von 
Bethmann Hollweg, who painted to the electors in lurid 
colours the danger of the " Red Peril." 

Germany had a peculiar form of election. A candidate 
was elected only when he received an absolute majority of 
all the votes given. If, owing to the number of candidates 
standing for the Reichstag, none of them received an 
absolute majority, a second poll was held between those 
two candidates who had received the largest number of votes 
and therefore headed the poll. If, as was frequently the 
case, there were three candidates — let us say a Conservative, 
a Liberal, and a Social Democratic candidate — who fairly 
evenly divided the poll between them, a second poll had to 
take place. If now the " State-supporting Parties " could 
be induced to vote against the Social Democrat and for the 
Conservative candidate, the Liberal Party strengthened the 
Conservative Party and the Government to its own harm. 
Therefore the Government found it particularly important 
at Election times to bring out the Red Peril, and especially 
at the moment when the arrangements for the second polls 
had to be made. That was always the time when the 
German Government found it most desirable to keep wide 
open the division between the capitalistic and the Social 
Democratic wing of the Liberal Party by persuading all 
good citizens to vote against the Red Peril. The importance 
of the second poll may be gauged from the fact that in 1912 



REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 319 

out cf the 397 members of the Reichstag only 206 were 
elected at the first poll. It was, therefore, not unnatural 
that en the 13th of January 1912, the day following the first 
poll, vhich had shown a great decrease in the votes given to 
the Conservative Parties and an enormous increase in those 
given to the Liberal Parties, the North German Gazette 
publiied a Government appeal which stated : 

" A) the second polls Social Democracy cannot conquer 
by its own strength. Every mandate which it wins it will 
owe t) the non-Socialist citizens of Germany. The non- 
Socialst Parties themselves will have to bear the blame if 
the r«d flood rises still higher. . . . What non-Socialist 
Party can make common cause with an enemy who proudly 
shrieks his furious hatred in the face of them all and of the 
wholeexisting order of the State ? And what is the attitude 
of Sodal Democracy to our national demands and tasks ? 
At hone the Socialists strive to isolate the working classes 
from fU the other classes of the people. The Class War is 
the ebment in which they live. Social Revolution, with 
the atolition of private property, is their goal. Whilst they 
fomen; hatred and practise terrorism at home, they worship 
the piantom of universal brotherhood among nations 
abroac. Therefore they are the hope of the foreign nations 
which 3nvy and oppose the German Empire. 

" Oir peace and prosperity can be preserved only if we 
maintan ourselves as a strong and united nation able to 
face tie world. Among the immediate tasks of the new 
Reichsag will be the task of increasing our armed strength. 
A Pary which calls itself international and which dares to 
entertan the thought of a general strike in case of a mobilisa- 
tion is by its very nature incapable of fulfilling these im- 
portan tasks." 

Hypcritical and hysterical appeals against the Social 
Democats such as the foregoing emanated not only from 
Germai officials and from the politicians belonging to the 
Conserative Parties. The Emperor himself had branded 
the Sodal Democrats in various speeches as "a band of 
fellows lot worthy to bear the names of Germans," " enemies 
to the livine order of things without a fatherland," etc. It 
was of ourse ridiculous to describe a Party which embraced 



320 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 

more than 4,250,000 grown-up men and considerably more 
than one-third of the German population as " not "worthy 
to bear the name of Germans," " enemies to the Divine order 
of things without a fatherland." It was, however, equally 
ridiculous to believe that the 4,250,329 people who in 1912 
gave their votes to Social Democratic candidates would 
subscribe to the orthodox Socialist doctrines. As a matter 
of fact, the SociaHst Party had in 1911 only 837,0CD sub- 
scribing members, of whom 108,000 were women. Deduct- 
ing the women, we find that of the 4,250,329 Social Demo- 
cratic voters only 729,000, or about one-sixth, were avowed 
Socialists. We may therefore, perhaps, conclude that the 
remaining five-sixths were men who voted for Social Demo- 
cratic candidates without being convinced Socialist.'. 

The reason that millions of Germans belonging to all 
classes of society — bankers, merchants, doctors, school 
teachers, and a very large number of Government oflfcials — 
voted for Social Democratic candidates lay in this, tiat the 
Social Democrats were the only Party which deterninedly 
and unceasingly opposed the German Governmert, and 
fought continually for real parliamentary govenment. 
All the other Parties, the capitalistic Liberal Parties 
included, opposed the Government only here and tiere in 
the hope of becoming the Government Party and beiefiting 
by the Government's bounty. The German Govenment 
was not averse from rewarding political services with official 
positions, rapid promotion in the Government anploy, 
titles, decorations, and even with financial favours. There- 
fore all opponents to the Government were meek andmild in 
their criticism of the Government's poUcy and of the merman 
institutions, and they accepted uncomplainingly tie sub- 
ordinate position given to the people and its represeitatives. 
I give one example out of many. The German Enperor's 
indiscretion in pubfishing in the Daily Telegraph n 1908, 
without the Chancellor's consent, an interview wHch was 
very damaging to Germany's foreign policy, creafcd enor- 
mous excitement throughout the country, and led to what 
was called a " constitutional crisis." All the Part^ leaders 



REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 321 

made violent speeches against the Emperor's usurpation of 
political action in violation of the German Constitution, 
which expressly lays down that every political act of the 
Emperor must be approved of and countersigned by the 
Imperial Chancellor. However, only the Social Democrats 
took pohtical steps devised to make the German Govern- 
ment responsible to Parliament by moving various amend- 
ments to the German Constitution, the principal of which 
ran as follows : " The Imperial Chancellor is responsible for 
his official actions. His responsibility covers all political 
actions of the Emperor, The Imperial Chancellor must be 
dismissed if the Reichstag demands it." It is scarcely 
necessary to say that the other Parties opposed the Social 
Democratic proposals, which would have introduced the 
beginning of parliamentary government. 

The German Government tried to prevent the Liberal 
Party becoming too powerful in the Reichstag, not only 
by endeavouring unceasingly to keep it divided against 
itself, but also by securing the over-representation in the 
Reichstag of the Conservative and the under-representation 
of the Liberal section of the community. Since 1871, and 
especially since 1879, when Protection was introduced into 
Germany, the population of the industrial and commercial 
centres had grown enormously, while that of the country 
districts had remained almost stationary. The towns 
in Germany, as the towns in all countries, were the strong- 
holds of Liberalism, Radicalism, and Socialism. Now, 
although the population of the German towns had grown 
enormously, no redistribution of the electoral districts had 
been effected. In 1914 the Reichstag had still 397 members 
as in 1871. Berlin had still only six representatives in the 
Reichstag, although, according to its population, it should 
have had more than twenty. However, by giving Berlin 
fourteen additional representatives, the Government would 
merely have added fourteen members to the Liberal and 
Social Democratic Parties. Therefore Berlin had to be 
satisfied with six members. A similar state of affairs pre- 
vailed in all the large towns. 



322 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 

German parliamentary government — if one can speak of 
parliamentary government in Germany under the Imperial 
regime — was based on minority rule. By refusing the read- 
justment of electoral districts, the German Government 
tried to establish minority rule in permanence and to se- 
cure the predominance of the Conservative and reactionary 
Parties. 

Parliamentary misrepresentation of the people was the 
ideal of the Prussian aristocrats and bureaucrats, who hated 
popular government, and who had had experience of the 
advantages which the Prussian franchise gave to the 
privileged classes. 

The Imperial German Government, which was merely 
the Prussian Government writ large, had no particular 
liking for parliamentarism, and it did everything in its power 
to hinder its development. The humiliating way in which 
the payment of the Reichstag members was arranged was 
characteristic of the Government's attitude towards them. 
Since 1906 every member of the Reichstag was paid £150 
per year, but from this sum £1 was deducted for every day 
on which a member had either not attended at all or had 
not attended a division. In order to prove that he had 
actually attended the sitting, every member had, like an 
office boy, to put down his name in an attendance book 
provided for the purpose of control. 

From year to year it was becoming more difficult for the 
Government to continue governing the country with a 
Reichstag elected under a manhood franchise and with a 
Reichstag majority representing only a small minority of the 
people. The German population was increasing by about 
800,000 per year, and that increase took place practically 
exclusively in the towns, the strongholds of Liberalism and 
of Social Democracy. Through this natural growth of the 
population the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties were 
likely to receive every year an accession of about 200,000 
voters. Year by year the minority rule became more 
absurd and indefensible. Difficulties in domestic politics 
no doubt contributed to the war of 1914. 



REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 323 

While the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties drew 
their strength chiefly from the towns, the Conservative 
and Centre Parties drew theirs chiefly from the country. 
The German towns, the seats of Germany's wealth, industry, 
and intelligence, were getting more and more impatient of 
being ruled and taxed by the country, or rather by the 
country squires, the " Junkers " and their Clerical allies. 
They were getting more and more impatient of being 
governed and shepherded and ordered about by bureaucrats 
over whom they had no control. They were getting more 
and more impatient of the constant and irksome restraints 
which were imposed upon them by a paternal, honest, and 
hard-working, but clumsily and constantly interfering, 
police and officialdom. They had at last discovered that, 
however they voted at Election time, they could not influ- 
ence in the slightest Germany's legislation and adminis- 
tration. They had discovered that they could not, with 
their votes, give effective expression to their desire for the 
redress of their grievances or compel the institution of those 
reforms which they desired, that parliamentary govern- 
ment was a sham. 

In concluding this chapter, which first appeared in the 
fourth edition of this book, and which was published in 
July 1912, I stated : 

" Possibly the Government may try to escape from the 
critical domestic position towards which it is drifting by 
engaging in a great war, which, if it be victorious, would 
give new prestige and a fresh lease of power to the German 
autocracy." 

This forecast was to come true two years after it 
had been published. 



CHAPTER XXI 

WHY AND HOW GERMANY BROUGHT ABOUT 
THE GREAT WAR ^ 

During the first half of 1914 peace in Europe seemed firmly 
and permanently established. Although the situation in 
Ireland was causing much anxiety, the people thought of 
their holidays, and as foreign affairs were quite uneventful 
and uninteresting the newspapers and periodicals filled the 
space usually devoted to foreign poUtics with the discussion 
of schemes for abolishing war and restricting national 
armaments. In August five of the six European Great 
Powers, with more than 400,000,000 people, were at war. 
More than 20,000,000 soldiers had been mobilised and were 
dealing out death and destruction. The greatest war the 
world has seen, and perhaps the greatest the world will ever 
see, had begun. People were asking : Why did the German 
Emperor make war ? What was its real cause ? What 
wiU be its issue and its consequences ? 

Many people in England were surprised and amazed 
that the German Emperor, who was considered to be the 
strongest defender of the world's peace, should recklessly 
have plunged all Europe into war ; that he should rashly 
have jeopardised the existence of his country and of his 
dynasty on account of Austria's quarrel with Serbia ; that 
the Triple AUiance, which only recently had been renewed, 
and which was proclaimed to be an absolutely reliable 
partnership, should have broken down before the first shot 
was fired ; that Germany, which was supposed to be the 
best governed and administered country in the world, and 
which imder Bismarck had always known how to isolate 

^ From the Nineteenth Century and After, September 1914. 

324 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 325 

her enemies and secure for herself the support of the leading 
Powers, should, in company with Austria- Hungary and 
Turkey, have gone to war with six powerful nations — 
France, Russia, Great Britain, Belgium, Serbia, and Japan 
— whose ranks seemed likely to increase to eight if, as 
appeared probable, Italy and Roumania should range them- 
selves on the side of Germany's opponents ; that the German 
Navy should have remained absolutely inactive during the 
first critical weeks of the war, when its value and influence 
would have been greatest, and that the celebrated German 
Army should have begun the campaign by a series of palpable 
mistakes. However, the readers of the earlier editions of 
this book and of the Nineteenth Century and After could 
scarcely be surprised, for I had frequently and emphatically 
foretold the War during more than a decade. Year after 
year I warned the British and the German peoples with all 
my strength of the coming catastrophe. Year by year I 
watched with increasing concern the mistakes of Germany's 
foreign and domestic policy, which were bound to lead to 
disaster. In the preface to the fourth edition of this book, 
published in the autumn of 1912, I wrote : 

" During the last few years Germany's failures, to which 
I had drawn attention in previous editions, have become 
more saUent and more frequent. During twenty years the 
German Foreign Office has serenely marched from failure 
to failure. The Morocco fiasco is merely the last of a large 
number of mistaken and unsuccessful enterprises. 

" By her pohcy towards Great Britain, Germany has 
brought into being the Triple Entente and that isolation 
about which she has so frequently complained, and she is 
accelerating the unification of the British Empire, which 
she wishes to prevent and has tried to prevent. The failure 
of her domestic pohcy is proclaimed by the constant increase 
of the Social Democratic Party, which polled more than 
4,250,000 votes at the Election of 1912. Germany's pros- 
perity is admittedly phenomenal. Still, a careful observer 
cannot help noticing that her economic progress is slackening. 
Germany's future seems no longer as bright as it used to 
appear." 



326 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

Although intimate friends of the Emperor often assured 
me that he was a prince of peace, I never ceased to describe 
him as immoderately ambitious, reckless, and dangerous to 
the peace of the world, and I indicated almost the exact 
moment when he would strike. In an article " England, 
Germany, and the Baltic," which was given first place in the 
Nineteenth Century in July 1907, 1 pointed out the enormous 
strategical importance of the Baltic and Norths Sea Canal, 
which was being greatly enlarged so as to make it available 
to the largest German Dreadnoughts and which would 
practically double the striking power of the German Fleet. 
In one of the concluding paragraphs I said with aU the 
emphasis which I could bring to bear : 

" It is expected that eight years will be required to finish 
the Baltic and North Sea Canal. Therefore during the 
next eight years Germany will be unable to avail herself of 
the great advantages furnished by the Baltic and North Sea 
Canal, except for her smaller and older ships. Her magnifi- 
cent new ships will for about eight years be restricted to 
one of the German seas. Consequently Germany will, during 
the next eight years, do all in her power to avoid a conflict 
with a first-class naval Power. During the next eight years 
Germany has every reason to keep the peace. Only when 
the enlargement of the Baltic and North Sea Canal has been 
accomplished will she be ready for a great naval war." 

The article, and especially its conclusion, attracted a 
great deal of attention, both in England and abroad. By 
accelerating the work, the Kiel Canal was finished not in 
eight years, but in seven. Its completion was celebrated 
on the 24th of June 1914, five weeks before the outbreak of 
the War, and by the irony of fate English warships took a 
prominent part in the festivities. 

To those who had given the matter some consideration 
it was clear that if Germany should embark upon a world 
war the Netherlands might become its principal theatre. 
In an article, " The Absorption of Holland by Germany," 
I wrote in the Nineteenth Century in July 1906 : 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 327 

" During four centuries the Netherlands have been the 
centre of gravity to the European Great Powers. The 
sceptre of Europe lies buried not on the banks of the Bos- 
phorus, but at the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt. 
Therefore the Netherlands have during four centuries been 
the battlefield on which the struggle for the mastery of 
Europe and of the world has been decided. In the Nether- 
lands the mighty armies with which PhiUp II. , Louis XIV. , 
Louis XV., and Napoleon I. strove to subdue Europe and 
to conquer the world were broken to pieces, and in the 
Netherlands Germany may find either her Gembloux, her 
Breda, or her Waterloo." 

WHben William 11. came to the throne Germany domin- 
ated Europe. Her position was impregnable and unas- 
sailable. The Triple Alliance was absolutely reliable and 
Germany's possible antagonists were isolated, for Bismarck 
had with marvellous skill created a strong antagonism 
between France and Italy, by giving Tunis, which was 
claimed by Italy, to France. Besides, he had estranged 
France and England by inciting France to encroach upon 
England's Colonial domain and to pursue an anti-British 
poUcy, and he had increased the differences between 
England and Russia by encouraging Russia to press upon 
England in Asia. As both France and Russia were an- 
tagonistic to England, Germany could always count upon 
Great Britain's support, or at least upon her benevolent 
neutrality, in case of that war on two fronts which Bis- 
marck dreaded so much. 

The great value which the Iron Chancellor attached to 
good and cordial relations with England was apparent from 
many of his pubUc utterances. On the 10th of July 1885, 
for instance, on the occasion of some colonial dispute be- 
tween England and Germany, he stated in the Reichstag : 

" I would ask the last speaker not to make any attempt 
to disturb the good relations between England and Germany, 
or to diminish the confidence that peace between these two 
Powers will be maintained by hinting that some day we may 
find ourselves in an armed conflict with England. I abso- 
22 



328 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

lutely deny that possibility. It does not exist, and all the 
questions which are at present being discussed between 
England and Germany are not of sufficient importance to 
justify a breach of the peace on either side of the North 
Sea. Besides, I really do not know what dispute could 
arise between England and Germany." 

Four years later, on the 26th of January 1889, Bismarck 
stated in the Reichstag with reference to Anglo-German 
differences' regarding Zanzibar : 

" The preservation of Anglo-Grerman goodwill is, after 
all, the most important thing for us. I see in England an 
old and traditional ally. No differences exist between 
England and Germany. If I speak of England as our ally, 
I am not using a diplomatic term. We have no alliance 
with England, However, I wish to remain in close contact 
with England also in colonial questions. The two nations 
have marched side by side during at least a hundred and 
fifty years, and if I should discover that we might lose 
touch with England, I should act with caution and endeavour 
to avoid losing England's goodwill." 

Bismarck desired that Germany's relations with Great 
Britain should be most cordial, because he counted upon 
British support in case of a war with France and Russia 
combined. He dreaded England's hostility not only 
because Germany was vulnerable at sea, but also because 
he knew that Germany and Austria- Hungary could reckon 
upon the loyal support of allied Italy only as long as Great 
Britain was either friendly or observed a benevolent 
neutrahty. As Italy has very extensive coasts, as most of 
her large towns can be sheUed from the sea, as her most 
important strategic and commercial railways run close to 
the seashore, and can easily be destroyed by the warships 
of a superior naval Power, and as she is economically as 
dependent upon her sea trade as is Great Britain, it was 
clear that England's hostiUty to Germany and Austria- 
Hungary would automatically lead to Italy deserting her 
allies in case of war. Italy's desertion was foretold long 
before the War by those acquainted with the true position, 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 329 

as I, for instance, did in the chapter of this book which 
deals with the Triple AlUance and which was published in 
the Fortnightly Review in 1912. 

Under Bismarck's guidance Germany had grown great 
by three victorious wars. Having created Germany's 
unity and firmly estabUshed the State, Bismarck desired to 
estabhsh its permanence and security by pursuing a peaceful, 
prudent, moderate, and concihatory foreign policy, rightly 
fearing that a poHcy of dash and adventure, of interference, 
provocation, and bluster, would raise dangerous enemies to 
the new State. In one of the concluding chapters of his 
Memoirs, his poHtical testament, that great statesman laid 
down on large lines the policy which Germany ought to 
pursue in the future, in the following phrases : 

" In the future not only sufficient military equipment, 
but also a correct political eye, will be required to guide the 
German ship of State through the currents of coahtion to 
which, in consequence of our geographical position and our 
previous history, we are exposed. 

" We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling 
among the nations, which has been called forth through our 
growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honourable 
and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world 
that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less 
partisan, and also less harmful for the freedom of other 
nations, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia, 
or England. 

" In order to produce this confidence, it is above every- 
thing necessary that we should act honourably and openly, 
and be easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward 
events." 

In 1888 William II. came to the throne. Believing that 
he possessed the genius and the universality of Frederick 
the Great, and being confirmed in that opinion by the 
flatterers surrounding him, the young Emperor declared in 
his overweening self-confidence that he was divinely in- 
spired, that he had received his crown from God, and that 
he was responsible only to God. 

Intoxicated by the exuberance of his own verbosity and 



330 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

I 

by the adulation of his entourage, and animated by a bound- [ 
less confidence in himself, WiUiam II., like another Frederick | 
the Great, took the control of all the great departments n 
of State out of the hands of his responsible Ministers and i 
assumed their direction. Soon after his accession he dis- 
missed Prince Bismarck, who refused to carry out the hasty, 
crude, and iU-considered views of the new Emperor. After 
Bismarck's dismissal the young Emperor declared, with : 
the admiring applause of his flattering courtiers, that he : 
would steer the ship of State over a new course, his own 
course, that he would lead the nation to a great and glorious I 
future, that henceforth he would be his own Chancellor. 
Pursuing a purely personal policy, and allowing himself to t 
be swayed by the impulses of the moment, he threw caution s 
to the wind, and irritated and exasperated, by his restless ' 
and interfering policy, not only the continental Powers, : 
both large and small, but also Great Britain, Germany's j 
" old and traditional ally," and the United States. 

From his retirement Bismarck looked upon the Emperor's « 
activity with anxiety and dismay. He feared that William . 
II. would endanger Germany's future. Obviously referring \ 
to William II. and to the flattering courtiers surrounding 
him, and comparing him with his grandfather, the Em- 
peror William I., the founder of the German Empire, ' 
Bismarck wrote in his Memoirs : 

" The Emperor William I. was completely free from 
vanity of this kind ; on the other hand he had in a high ' 
degree a peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his ^ 
contemporaries and of posterity. 

" No one would have dared to flatter him openly to his i 
face. In his feehng of royal dignity he would have thought 
' If any one has the right of praising me to my face, he i 
has also the right of blaming me to my face.' He would , 
not admit either. 

" What I fear is, that by following the road in which we 
are walking our future will be sacrificed to the impulses 
of the moment. Former rulers looked more to the capacity 
than the obedience of their advisers ; if obedience alone is ( 
the qualification, then demands will be made on the general 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 331 

ability of the monarch, which even a Frederick the Great 
could not satisfy, although in his time politics, both 
in war and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day." 

WiUiam II. disregarded Bismarck's wise advice that 
Germany should follow a frank and conciliatory policy, and 
that she should endeavour to avoid friction with other 
nations ; and, in addition, he made the fatal mistake of 
challenging Great Britain's naval supremacy. Thus he 
converted Germany's " old and traditional ally " into a 
dangerous opponent. 

Clearly recognising that Germany's naval policy would, 
in case of a great European conflict, compel England to 
support Germany's opponents, the writer of this book 
repeatedly urged the danger of Germany's naval and anti- 
British poUcy upon Prince Biilow, Admiral von Tirpitz, 
and other leading Germans, but he preached to deaf ears. 

In the summer of 1911 the second Morocco crisis broke 
out in consequence of the dispatch of the Panther to Agadir. 
It nearly led to war between France and Germany. Both 
in England and in Germany war was expected, and Mr. 
Lloyd George plainly announced in his Mansion House 
speech that if Germany should attack France, Great Britain 
would aid France in her defence. The tension between 
Great Britain and Germany reached the breaking point. 
In December 1911, when the Morocco question had been 
settled, I happened to see one of the leading German 
diplomats at the German Foreign Office. In the course of 
a long conversation I pointed out once more that Germany's 
trans-maritime policy not only endangered her security, 
but was bound to lead to the break-up of the Triple AUiance ; 
that she rashly risked her very existence ; that Germany's 
safety on the Continent depended on good relations with 
Great Britain ; that she would act wisely in ceasing to 
antagonise France ; that she should not increase her fleet 
beyond the provisions of her gigantic naval programme ; 
that she should stop the anti-British agitation of the German 
navy party ; that if Germany continued on the course on 



332 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

which she had embarked a collision between Great Britain 
and Germany was inevitable. I added that an Anglo- 
German war might lead not merely to Germany's defeat, but 
to her downfall ; and that my action was undertaken rather 
in the interest of Germany than in that of Great Britain, 
for if the two countries should unhappily go to war Germany 
would risk very much, while Great Britain would risk but 
little. The eminent personage before whom I put these 
considerations treated me with studied discourtesy. The 
leaders of Germany's foreign policy seemed struck with 
blindness. 

A few weeks after this conversation the German Navy 
programme received another enormous expansion. The 
whole German Fleet was to be put on a permanent war 
footing in time of peace. More ships were to be laid down, 
and once more a virulent and extremely malicious anti- 
British agitation was engineered in the German Press by the 
Press Bureau of the German Admiralty. Shortly after my 
return I wrote an article on " Anglo- German Differences and 
Sir Edward Grey," which appeared in the Fortnightly Review, 
and which was addressed to the German Foreign Office. In 
,^ that article I gave the following warning : 

" Great Britain has little cause to plead for Germany's 
goodwill, for she suffers little through the existing Anglo- 
German tension, while isolated Germany suffers much and 
risks more. While Great Britain's position throughout the 
world is secure, that of Germany is very precarious because 
of her exposed frontiers. As matters stand at present 
Germany has far more need of Great Britain's support 
than Great Britain has of Germany's. It is true that Ger- 
many possesses still the strongest army in Europe, but it is 
not strong enough to face a great European combination. 
She is no longer a danger to the peace of the world, owing to 
her isolation and to the estrangement of Great Britain. The 
minds of her statesmen must rather be preoccupied with 
the problem of defending Germany than with ambitious 
wars of aggression. Under these circumstances it is mad- 
ness for Germany's rulers to continue proclaiming that 
Germany requires more Dreadnoughts, and still more 



TIJE OUTBREAK OF WAR 333 

Dreadnoughts, and ever more Dreadnoughts against Great 
Britam, 

" Germany's prospects are dark and threatening. She 
is not rich enough and not strong enough to maintain at 
the same time the strongest army and a navy able to 
challenge the strongest navy. Every nation which has 
tried to become supreme on land and sea has failed." 

When it became clear that Germany was determined to 
continue her dangerous anti-British poHcy, I stated in an 
article pubHshed in the Nineteenth Century in June 1912, 
and entitled " The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany " : 

" A nation can safely embark upon a bold and costly 
trans-maritime policy only if it is secure on land, if it 
either occupies an island, like Great Britain and Japan, 
or if it occupies an isolated position and cannot be invaded 
by its neighbours, Hke the United States. Germany has 
three great land Powers for neighbours. Two of them, 
France and Russia, are not friendly to Germany, and she 
cannot rely with absolute certainty upon the support of 
her third neighbour, Austria-Hungary, a fact of which Bis- 
marck warned her in his Memoirs. Under these circum- 
stances it is obvious that Germany's greatest need is not 
expansion oversea, but defence on land ; that her greatest 
interests lie not on the sea, but on terra firma.'^ 

It was obvious to many that, owing to the unwise policy 
of William II., the Triple Alliance had become a sham, 
that Germany could no longer rely on Italy's support in 
the hour of need. I wrote in the Nineteenth Century in 
Jime 1912 : 

" In matters of foreign policy praise or blame must be 
meted out according to results. At the time of Bismarck's 
dismissal the Triple Alliance was a solid and reliable partner- 
ship, and as France on one side of Germany, Russia on 
another, and Great Britain on a third were isolated, Ger- 
many's position in the world was absolutely secure. She 
dominated the Continent. 

" By pursuing an anti-British poUcy, Germany has not 
only driven Great Britain from Germany's side and has 
driven her into the arms of France and Russia, but she 



334 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

has at the same time greatly weakened the formerly reliable 
Triple Alliance. Few Germans believe that Germany can 
count on Italy's support in the hour of need. Thus Grer- 
many has simultaneously created the Triple Entente and 
weakened, if not destroyed, the Triple AUiance. It is true 
the Triple Alliance exists still — on paper. However, Italy 
would not think of supporting Germany in a war against 
France, and still less in a war against Great Britain or against 
Great Britain and France combined. 

" Few intelligent Germans reckon upon Italy's support. 
Most think that in a great European war Italy will either 
remain neutral or will be found on the side of Germany's 
enemies." 

In Bismarck's time, and at the beginning of the reign 
of WiUiam II., Germany's position was absolutely secure. 
Not only were Germany's enemies isolated, but the 
Triple Alliance was in reality a Quintuple Alliance in 
disguise. The loyalty of Italy was then undoubted, and 
Germany could firmly reckon upon the support of Turkey 
and of Roumania in case of need. Turkey and Roumania 
could have afforded invaluable assistance to the Triple 
Alliance in case of a war with Russia. By allowing Turkey 
to be attacked and despoiled in quick succession, first by 
Italy and then by the Balkan States, Germany seriously 
changed the balance of power in Europe to her disadvantage ; 
and Roumania, recognising that the central European group 
of Powers was no longer the stronger one of the two, not 
unnaturally turned towards the Powers of the Triple Entente 
for support, especially as she desired to acquire those vast 
territories of Austria-Hungary which border upon Rou- 
mania, and which were inhabited by three million Rou- 
manians. Through the foolish poUcy of the Emperor, 
Turkey had been crippled and Roumania had been estranged. 
Commenting on Germany's impolicy, I wrote in an article 
" The Changing of the Balance of Power," published in the 
Nineteenth Century Review in June 1913 : 

" In view of the fact that Germany had driven Great 
Britain into the arms of France and Russia, and had exposed 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 336 

herself to the possibility of being simultaneously involved 
in a great war by land and sea, it was of course of the 
utmost importance to her that her position on land should 
be absolutely impregnable. In these circumstances it was 
clearly the first and most urgent duty of German states- 
manship to take care that Austria-Hungary and Italy 
should be as strong as possible, and that Roumania and 
Turkey — and especially Turkey, the support of which 
should be invaluable in case of complications with Great 
Britain — should be firmly attached to Germany or to the 
Triple AUiance. But with the same incredible short-sighted- 
ness and levity with which Germany had embarked upon 
an anti- British course, she allowed Turkey to be attacked 
first by Italy and then by the Balkan States, and to be 
utterly defeated. If Germany had possessed a poUcy, if 
her diplomacy had been guided by a statesman, or merely 
by a man possessed of common sense, she would have known 
that the support of Turkey would be more valuable to her 
in the hour of need than that of Italy. She would, there- 
fore, either have attached Turkey to the Triple Alliance 
by treaty, as General von Bernhardi had suggested, or she 
would have rephed to Italy's ultimatum to Turkey by an 
ultimatum of her own addressed to Italy, which very likely 
would have prevented the war." 

Year by year it became clearer that the German Emperor's 
unceasing, imnecessary, and exasperating activity in all 
quarters of the globe had made Germany's policy univer- 
sally disliked and suspected, that Germany had come to 
take that place among the nations which France occupied 
in the time of Napoleon III., that Germany had become 
the disturber of the world's peace, and was in danger of 
being treated as such by the generality of nations. In an 
article entitled " German Designs in Airica," published in 
the Nineteenth Century and After in August 1911, 1 wrote : 

" War has been brought within the limits of vision. It 
is to be hoped that Germany will turn away from the very 
dangerous course upon which she has embarked, a course 
which in a very short time may bring her into a coUision 
not only with France, but with several Great Powers ; and 
as the Triple Alliance is believed to be a purely defensive 



336 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

alliance relating only to Europe, Grermany may find herself 
deserted by her allies in the hour of trouble. Let us hope 
that the Morocco crisis can be explained away as the mistake 
of a single man. Let us hope that Herr von Kiderlen- 
Waechter will be replaced without delay. That will solve 
and explain the crisis, and the Morocco incident will soon 
be forgotten. Persistence on the dangerous and unprece- 
dented course which Germany is steering at the present 
moment may imperil Germany's future, and may cost the 
Emperor his throne. The German nation is intensely 
loyal and patriotic, but it would never forgive a monarch 
who had driven the nation into a disastrous war without 
adequate reason." 

Germany had become a danger to the peace of the world. 
Time after time she had dragged the nations to the very 
brink of a world- war. By his ceaseless, neurotic activity, 
William II. was likely to raise a great coalition against 
Germany. He was likely to be confronted in the hour of 
trial by a Europe in arms, as was Napoleon I. a century 
ago. In my article " The Failure of Post-Bismarckian 
Germany," pubhshed in the Nineteenth Century and After 
in June 1912, I wrote : 

" Bismarck was constantly haunted by the thought of 
the formation of a great European coalition against Germany. 
This will be seen from his Memoirs, and from many of his 
letters and conversations. Bismarck's worst fear may be 
realised before long. Germany's post-Bismarckian diplomacy 
is doing its best to destroy the work of the great Chancellor. 
It has already destroyed Germany's security on the Conti- 
nent. Yet there is no sign that the ' new course ' will be 
abandoned." 

The forecasts made came true in every particular. Ger- 
many, which was the undisputed leader of the strongest 
group of Powers in Europe, which dominated a Quintuple 
Alliance, and which kept the other Powers in a state of 
isolation and mutual distrust, had in August 1914 scarcely 
a single real friend, and she was at war with nearly all 
Europe. 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 337 

It has been asserted that Germany went to war in order 
to acquire the hegemony of Europe. That assertion is not 
correct. Germany possessed the hegemony of Europe in 
the time of Bismarck. She lost it through the mistaken 
poUcy of William II., and she was trying to regain by force 
what she has lost through her own folly. 

Until 1914 the German Army was considered to be by far 
the best army in the world. However, those who had 
studied mihtary matters closely and without prejudice 
were aware that the influence of William II. had been 
as fatal to the German Army as it had been to Germany's 
diplomacy. In the first place, since the time when the 
German Emperor embarked upon naval competition with 
Great Britain, the army was relatively neglected. It was 
starved of money and men for the sake of the navy. In the 
second place, William II. insisted upon being not only 
his own Chancellor and Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, but also his own Commander-in-Chief of the army 
and navy, and his own Chief of the Staff of both services. 
At the time when the Emperor made the nephew of the 
Great Moltke Chief of the Staff, appointing him to the same 
position which his uncle had fiUed with such wonderful 
success, the rumour was current in weU-informed circles 
in Berlin that von Moltke had asked not to be given that 
most responsible position, because he thought that he did 
not possess the necessary high qualifications, but that the 
Emperor had replied, "Never mind, Moltke. You can 
safely take the post. What you don't know I do, and I can 
do the work for you." At a time when nobody dared to 
question the pre-eminence and excellence of the German 
Army, I wrote in the Nineteenth Century Review, in an 
article entitled " The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Ger- 
many," published in June 1912 : 

" Guided by the maxim ' Germany's future lies upon the 
water,' the leaders of the ' new course ' have been so anxious 
to strengthen the navy that the German Army has been 
neglected both quantitatively and qualitatively. Grer- 
many's expenditure on the navy has been comparatively 



338 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

extravagant, and that on her army scarcely sufficient. Not 
only quantitatively but qualitatively as well has the German 
Army suffered during the ' new course.' German generals 
complain that promotions are made less by merit and more 
by favour than in former times. Similar complaints are 
heard in most Government offices. They complain that 
the officers are no longer as good as they used to be. Owing 
to the rise in wages the German Army can no longer obtain 
a sufficient number of good non-commissioned officers. The 
German war material also is scarcely up to date. The 
miUtary outfit of France is superior to that of Germany. 
According to Lieutenant-Colonel Beyel, of the French 
artillery, and many other experts, the German artillery is 
inferior to the French. The tactics of the German Army 
have become antiquated. According to various German 
writers Germany has failed to learn the lessons of the 
Boer War and of the Russo-Japanese War. Major Hoppen- 
stedt pubHshed in 1910 a book, Bind wir Kriegsfertig ? in 
which he showed that the German Army is too much occu- 
pied with barracks-square drill and too little with warlike 
training. Many officers attribute the neglect of the army 
to the influence of the Emperor, who is severely criticised. 
William I. was a soldier by nature. The army was his 
principal interest. He did not understand the navy. 
He tolerated no flatterers, and knew no favouritism. He 
worked incessantly on the improvement of the army. 
William II. has made the navy his hobby and attends 
to the army perfunctorily, and many say that it is little 
better managed than his Foreign Office." 

After the Morocco crisis of 1911 Germany hastily tried to 
improve her somewhat neglected army by greatly increasing 
the establishment, improving arms and appliances, strength- 
ening fortresses, etc. Her military expenditure rose from 
£47,200,000 in 1912 to £50,400,000 in 1913, and to no less 
than £83,500,000 in 1914, and a special "war levy" of 
£50,000,000 was voted by the Reichstag for bringing the 
army up to date. However, armies and navies are largely 
spiritual things of slow organic growth. They cannot be 
improvised, nor can they be rapidly improved if they have 
been neglected for a long time, even if money is poured out 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 339 

like water. Besides, monetary expenditure, however lavish, 
cannot alter the spirit of an army and its supreme direction. 
Money neither gives foresight nor does it destroy conceit 
in the leaders. It neither replaces officers appointed by 
favour by men of merit, nor does it improve a defective 
organisation and faulty tactics. 

Modesty, concentration, thoroughness, and hard work 
command success in diplomacy and war. While modesty 
and thoroughness were the great characteristics of William I. 
and of his time, the reign of William II. had become 
notorious for luxury, ostentation, arrogance, favouritism, 
amateurishness, self-praise, self-advertisement, and con- 
ceit. During the reign of WiUiam II. the old Prussian 
virtues of frugality, modesty, and thoroughness disap- 
peared. German idealism died, and Berlin became a 
centre of coarse materiaUsm, of luxury, and of immorality. 
Encouraged by the most exalted circles, all Germany gave 
itself over to self-admiration and self-praise. In the 
Emperor's speeches and in innumerable articles, lectures, 
pamphlets, and books, the Germans were told that they 
were, to quote the Emperor, " the salt of the earth," the 
wisest, ablest, strongest, and most valiant nation in the 
world, and that they were, therefore, entitled to rule the 
universe. Foreign nations, especially the English, were 
looked upon with undisguised contempt. Being convinced 
of their irresistible might and their great destiny, many 
Germans thought that Germany should become supreme 
in the world by the free and unscrupulous use of her irre- 
sistible strength. Although Bismarck had eloquently 
warned the nation against Machtpolitik, against pursuing a 
policy based on force, against the policy which had caused 
the downfall of Napoleonic France, the idea of Machtpolitik 
became the guiding principle of the German nation, and 
the word Machtpolitik was in every one's mouth. Unfortun- 
ately Bismarck had not practised in the earlier years of his 
career what he preached in the later. In three great wars 
he had given to little Prussia the hegemony of Europe. 
Young Germany hoped, by another series of successful wars, 



340 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

to conquer the hegemony of the world. By sheer force and 
audacity the world was to be made German. 

The Government, following the fatal precedents set by 
Bismarck, continued to rely on force in its foreign and 
domestic policy. By force Germany was to conquer for 
herself " a place in the sun." By force were the Poles, 
Danes, and Frenchmen in the conquered provinces to be 
denationalised. By force were Socialism and popular 
dissatisfaction to be crushed. By force was the German 
people to be governed against its will, and By force were 
the rudimentary parliamentary institutions of Germany to 
be abolished if parliament should cease to obey the will of 
the ruling class. Patriotic Germans in their thousands had 
been converted to the gospel of force, and they endeavoured 
to aid the poKcy of the Government by creating enormous 
organisations which advocated solving all German problems 
by that means. The Navy League, with more than a miUion 
members, demanded that Germany should have the strongest 
fleet, the Army League that she should have the strongest 
army, the Air League that she should rule the air. The 
Ostmarkenverein and Nordmarkenverein agitated in 
favour of denationalising the Poles and Danes dwelling in 
the conquered provinces by force. A Government-aided 
league made war on Socialism, and the Pan- Germanic League, 
founded three years after the Emperor's accession, advo- 
cated Germany's conquest of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, 
the Baltic provinces of Russia, etc. It advocated the 
Germanisation of Europe and of the world. An enormous 
literature arose in which " the war of the future " was 
vividly and patriotically described, Li hundreds of 
romances the German people, and especially the younger 
generation, were told how Germany would conquer France 
and Russia, defeat the EngUsh Fleet, raise Lidia in rebellion, 
invade England, deprive her of her colonies, punish the 
United States for their arrogance, and tear up the Monroe 
doctrine. Scarcely in any of these romances, or in any 
serious books, was the possibihty of a German defeat 
contemplated. Countless admirals, generals, university 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 341 

professors, lecturers, authors, and journalists unceasingly 
preached the need of power, but none the need of wisdom, 
of caution, and of fairness. To discuss even the possibility 
of disaster or to advocate moderation was considered un- 
patriotic. 

The Germans were a most docile nation. They were 
what their rulers had made them. They might be arrogant 
to foreigners, but they were always most obedient and re- 
spectful to their rulers. That lay in their training. They 
took from their rulers their policy and their opinions. Since 
the advent of William II. an evil spirit had taken pos- 
session of Germany. A quarter of a century of stirring 
Imperial oratory, of Jingoist self-admiration, self-praise, 
and brag had totally corrupted both the sterling character 
and the mind of the German nation. 

During the early part of the Emperor's reign the advocates 
of Germany's expansion beheved in him. They trusted 
that he, like his ancestors, would be a " Mehrer des Reiches." 
Wilham II. had no doubt the ambition to increase the 
territory and the glory of his country, but he had not 
the ability. When, time after time, the Emperor failed in 
his attempts to acquire new territories, when one diplo- 
matic failure followed the other in quick succession, when 
at last it became generally recognised that he habitually 
threatened but did not act, Germany's leading men sarcas- 
tically referred to him as the Eriedenskaiser, the Theater- 
kaiser, and began openly to call him a coward. After his 
second failure to overawe France by raising the Morocco 
question, the ultra-patriotic Post of Berlin referred to him 
as a " poltron miserable " in leaded print. His friends and 
his own family, especially the Crown Prince, openly showed 
their disgust that the Emperor's bold words were never 
followed by suitable action. Many leading Germans began 
to despair of the Emperor and of the future of their 
country. William II. felt the ground on which he stood 
crumbling under his feet. Deeds, not words, were expected 
of him. 

The Emperor's unceasing activity had alarmed the 



342 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

nations around, and they had made arrangements for their 
mutual protection. Germany felt hampered and circum- 
scribed by the Triple Entente. The balance of power was 
felt to be a powerful check to Germany's desire for expan- 
sion. Many of the most eminent mihtary men demanded 
that Germany should endeavour to break up the Triple 
Entente and destroy the balance of power. General von 
Bernhardi, for instance, wrote in Unsere Zukunft : 

" We can render secure our position on the Continent of 
Europe only if we succeed in bursting the Triple Entente 
and forcing France, which is never likely to co-operate with 
Germany, to accept that position of inferiority which is 
her due." 

Numerous statements of similar import made by leading 
Germans might easily be given. Germany repeatedly tried 
to destroy the Triple Entente, but as her policy was no 
longer directed by a master-hand, every attempt at weaken- 
ing the bonds connecting France, Russia, and Great Britain 
resulted in the strengthening of their determination to sup- 
port each other. So Germany bided her time and waited 
for a favourable opportunity. 

Many patriotic Germans, and especially the leaders of 
the Pan-Germanic League, advocated the creation of a 
Greater Germany, the territories of which should reach 
not only from Hamburg to Trieste, but from Hamburg to 
Constantinople, and to the lands beyond the Straits. Asia 
Minor was to become a German colony, the Bagdad Railway 
a German railway, and thus Egypt and India would fall 
into Germany's hands. 

Austria-Hungary desired to make herself supreme in the 
Balkan Peninsula, and to acquire the harbour of Salonica. 
She allowed the Balkan War to break out, hoping that it 
would result in the defeat of the Slavonic Balkan States, 
or in the weakening of both sides, for either result would 
have facilitated Austria's progress in the direction of 
Salonica, However, Serbia blocked the way. The valley 
of the Vardar is the great natural highroad from Vienna and 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 343 

Pudapest on the one hand to Salonica and on the other hand 
to Constantinople. The Vardar runs through the centre 
of Serbia. To Austria's dismay the Balkan States were 
victorious. A stronger Serbia, holding the gateway to 
Constantinople, was likely to block Austria's and Germany's 
path to the .^gean Sea and the Bosphorus. Desiring to 
ruin Serbia, Austria brought about the second Balkan War. 
In the course of the Balkan War and during the peace 
negotiations she repeatedly threatened little Serbia with 
war by inventing outrages done to Austrians — the most 
notorious case was the infamous invention spread and main- 
tained by the Austrian Government press for weeks that 
the Serbians had perpetrated an unnamable mutilation 
upon the Austrian Consul Prochaska — and by forbidding 
Serbia to acquire an outlet on the Adriatic. However, while 
Austria was threatening and blustering in pubKc, she was 
very kindly but very firmly informed by Mr. Sazonoff in 
private that an Austrian attack upon Serbia would be 
equivalent to an Austrian attack upon Russia, that Russia 
was as strongly interested in Serbia's independence as was 
Great Britain in the independence of Belgium. Austria 
clearly knew what the consequences of an attack on Serbia 
would be. 

When WiUiam II. had dismissed Bismarck he proclaimed 
that he would henceforth be his own Chancellor. He no 
longer required an able Chancellor, but only an obedient 
one. In Bismarck's words quoted above, obedience alone 
was made the qualification of the monarch's principal 
adviser. Up to 1914 Bismarck had four successors : General 
von Capri vi, who was accustomed to disciphne and did what 
he was told ; Prince Hohenlohe, an outworn diplomat, who 
was made Chancellor at the age of seventy-five, and who, 
according to his Memoirs, was very badly treated by the 
Emperor ; Prince Biilow, a sprightly diplomat and an enter- 
taining companion full of good jokes and stories ; and Herr 
von Bethmann-Hollweg, a dull but industrious bureaucrat, 
who had no experience whatever of diplomacy and of 
practical statesmanship. When, in the spring of 1892, 
23 



344 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

Bismarck learnt that General von Caprivi intended resigning, 
he said, according to Harden : 

" I am not pleased with the news. At least he was a 
general. Who will come next ? That is the question. If 
you get for Chancellor a Prussian bureaucrat who has learned 
his trade solely at his desk, then you will see strange happen- 
ings which at present seem unbelievable." 

This prediction of Bismarck's, as so many others, came true. 
The unbelievable happened. 

From evidence which it would lead too far to give in detail 
in these pages it appears that the German Emperor and the 
late Archduke Franz Ferdinand agreed on common action 
against Serbia. Austria- Hungary was to pick a plausible 
quarrel with that country, and Germany was to support the 
action of her ally with her entire strength. Russia would 
either intervene or abstain from action. If she only threat- 
ened but did not act, Russia would lose all credit among 
the Balkan Slavs, and Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany, 
would, through Serbia and the Vardar valley, dominate 
the Balkan Peninsula with Salonica and Constantinople. 
An enormous step in advance would have been taken. If, 
on the other hand, Russia should attack Austria-Hungary, 
war between the two great groups of Powers would ensue. 
As Great Britain had no direct interests in Serbia, it was 
expected that she would keep neutral, especially if she 
should at the time have her hands full with problems of her 
own. If Great Britain should not take part in such a war, 
Italy would no doubt support Germany and Austria-Hungary 
in the hope of receiving valuable territorial compensation 
for her assistance. By raising the Serbian question there 
seemed to be a possibihty of ranging the three Powers of 
the Triple AlUance against France and Russia. A war of 
three Great Powers against two seemed very promising. A 
few weeks before the Archduke's murder he was visited 
by the German Emperor at his castle at Konopischt. It has 
been asserted that a secret treaty was then concluded 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 345 

between Germany and Austria, and very likely it dealt 
with the Serbian question in the manner described above. 

After the Archduke's murder Austria- Hungary kept quiet 
for weeks. Apparently the outrage was to be treated as 
an ordinary crime, and there was much reason to treat it 
as such, for the murderers, though Serbs by race, were 
Austrian citizens. On the 20th of July Sir Edward Grey 
wrote to the British Ambassador in BerUn that Count 
Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, 
had " deprecated the suggestion that the situation [between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia] was grave." Three days 
later, on the 23rd of July, Austria- Hungary dispatched to 
Serbia, without any previous warning, a totally unaccept- 
able ultimatum, accusing Serbia of being responsible for 
the Archduke's death. She gave no proof of her assertion, 
yet she demanded from Serbia that she should, within 
forty-eight hours, divest herself of her sovereign rights and 
place herself under Austria's protection and dependence. 
What had happened in the meantime ? 

The Irish crisis had been watched by all the Continental 
Powers with the greatest interest. Civil war in Great 
Britain seemed unavoidable. At the eleventh hour the King 
called a conference of the leaders of all parties at Bucking- 
ham Palace. A settlement by consent seemed possible. 
That hope quickly disappeared. On the 22nd of July it 
became generally known in London that the Conference 
would be a failure, and on the 24th the leaders held their 
last and purely formal meeting, when the impossi- 
bihty of reaching an agreement was announced. Great 
Britain not only had no direct interest in the Austro-Serbian 
quarrel, but seemed likely to be lamed by the imminence 
of civil war. Besides, Russia was expected to suffer from 
famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and both the 
French President and the French Prime Minister were abroad. 
Last, but not least, the Russian and French armies were not 
ready for war. Russia was about to reorganise and greatly 
increase her army and to construct most important strategi- 
cal railways, while, according to Senator Humbert's report 



346 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

confirmed by the Minister of War, France lacked heavy- 
artillery, ammunition, and boots, and the French fortresses 
required strengthening against the heavy artillery introduced 
in Germany. The whole situation seemed most favourable 
to the Germanic Powers. The longed-for moment had 
arrived at last. Now or never was the time to strike. 
The moment seemed all the more propitious as Germany 
and Austria-Hungary had recently greatly strengthened their 
armies ; as Russia had not yet followed suit and was be- 
lieved to be unprepared ; as, according to Senator Hum- 
bert's report, grave deficiencies existed in the French 
Army ; and as, last but not least, the strategically most 
important Baltic and North Sea Canal had just been 
completed. 

It has been asserted in Berlin that the initiative for 
Austria's Serbian policy came from Vienna. That assertion 
is quite inadmissible. Germany has unmistakably shown 
to Austria-Hungary in the past that she, as the stronger 
Power, was not willing to allow herself to be dragged into 
adventures at the heels of her weaker partner. Besides, 
Austria-Hungary had, ever since 1848, when Francis Joseph 
came to the throne, followed a policy of drift and surrender. 
Hence it seemed most improbable that her aged monarch 
would, at the end of his days, and upon his own initiative, 
act with such unexampled and reckless energy. It is true 
that at the outbreak of the crisis the German Foreign 
Office declared that they had no knowledge of Austria's 
ultimatum to Serbia. However, according to a dispatch 
sent by the British Ambassador in Vienna to Sir Edward 
Grey, " the German Ambassador [in Vienna] knew the text 
of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched 
and telegraphed it to the German Emperor." According to 
the British Ambassador's report the Emperor "endorsed 
every line of it." Apparently the German Emperor either 
inspired the fatal ultimatum himself or at least agreed 
upon it with Austria-Hungary, leaving the German Foreign 
Office in complete ignorance of his action. Similar things 
had happened before. William II. was his own Chancellor 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 347 

and his own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he 
had no use for any but obedient Chancellors and Ministers. 
From the hundred and fifty-nine documents contained in 
the Correspondence respecting the European Crisis (Cd. 7467), 
pubUshed with praiseworthy promptitude by the British 
Foreign Office, it appears that all the Great Powers except 
Germany urged Austria-Hungary to settle her quarrel with 
Serbia by agreement in some form or other. Only Germany 
raised difficulties by ominously declaring that the matter 
did not concern any Power except Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia, that arbitration, conference, or international dis- 
cussion were out of the question, although she knew that 
every Balkan question had so far been treated as one of 
European concern by the Concert of Powers. Assured of 
Germany's unconditional support, Austria-Hungary abso- 
lutely declined all proposals towards an amicable settlement 
made by Sir Edward Grey, and on the 28th of July Count 
Berchtold informed Russia with haughty abruptness that 
he could not even discuss Austria's Note to Serbia. 

- But suddenly the aspect of affairs altered very seriously 
to the disadvantage of Germany and Austria-Hungary. On 
the 30th of July the British parties agreed to bury all their 
differences in view of the critical foreign situation. The 
second reading of the Home Rule Amending Bill was in- 
definitely postponed. Great Britain was united and stood 
ready for action. Immediately Austria's tone changed. 
She now declared in courteous tones her readiness to 
discuss her unacceptable ultimatum, and plainly displayed 
her anxiety to come to an understanding with Russia. 
Peace seemed secure. Unfortunately Austria-Hungary had 
reckoned without Germany. Although Austria was ready 
to negotiate, and although Russia declared on the 30th of 
July that she would " stop all mihtary preparations," the 
German Emperor sent in hot haste an ultimatum to Russia, 
demanding that she should unconditionally demobihse 
within twelve hours. War would be the consequence of 
refusal. In order to make war with Russia absolutely 
certain, the Berlin Lokalanzeiger was made to bring out a 



348 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

special edition which contained the untrue announcement 
that the German Army had been mobilised. That announce- 
ment was immediately telegraphed to Russia by the Am- 
bassador. Soon afterwards the mobihsation of the German 
Army was officially declared to be untrue, but as the Govern- 
ment blocked the wires to Russia, the German denial, which 
also was telegraphed to Russia by the ambassador, did not 
reach his Government, which proceeded to mobilise its army. 
Thus war was brought about, not owing to the differences 
between Austria and Serbia or to Russia's intervention, 
for Russia and Austria were both willing to adjust matters 
peacefully. War was precipitated by the Emperor's action, 
taken apparently against the advice of his Chancellor and his 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 

Why did William II. plunge his country and all Europe 
into war at a moment when peace was in his grasp ? Possibly 
he was urged into war by the war party. Possibly because 
he dreaded the supreme disgrace of another diplomatic 
failure, of another surrender. The governing class and 
his own family were exasperated at the Emperor's surrenders 
on the occasions of the first and second Morocco crises. 
They would never have forgiven him a third surrender, 
which would have been deadly to the prestige of Germany 
and to that of the crown. In rushing into this war the 
Emperor probably knew that he was endangering the very 
existence of the Empire, that Germany might possibly be 
defeated, for, addressing from the balcony of his Berlin 
castle the citizens below on the 31st of July, he said : 

" A fateful hour has fallen for Germany. Envious people 
everywhere are compelling us to our just defence. The 
sword has been forced into our hands. I hope that if my 
efforts at the last hour do not succeed in bringing our 
opponents to see eye to eye with us, and in maintaining 
peace, we shall with God's help so wield the sword that we 
shall restore it to its sheath again with honour. War would 
demand of us enormous sacrifices in property and life, 
but we should show our enemies what it means to pro- 
voke Germany. And now I commend you to God. Go to 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 349 

church and kneel before God and pray for His help and for 
our gallant army." 

While the Emperor asserted in his speech that Germany 
was wantonly attacked, the White Book regarding the out- 
break of war, published by his own Government, stated that 
Germany unconditionally backed up Austria-Hungary in 
her Serbian poUcy, with a view to foiling the poUcy of 
Russia, who aimed at disintegrating and destrojdng the 
Dual Monarchy ; in other words, that she dehberately 
challenged that country. And, while protesting in an in- 
troductory memorandum that Germany urged Austria to 
preserve the peace, the German Government failed to publish 
a single one of its dispatches sent to Vienna at that critical 
period. No official document was published to show 
that Germany recommended moderation in Vienna. That 
omission was noteworthy. Germany was well aware that 
she would appear to be the aggressor, and herein lies perhaps 
the reason why the German Ambassador, shortly before 
leaving Paris, drove repeatedly up and down the Quai 
d'Orsay through the seething mass of the people. Perhaps 
he had orders if possible to produce an incident which would 
put France into the wrong. However, the Paris populace 
kept its temper and offered no insult to the Ambassador. 

Germany protested to the world that she was attacked. 
Those who wish to find out whether Germany or her oppon- 
ents were in the wrong need not study the numerous official 
publications of the governments concerned. The fact 
that Great Britain, France, and Russia promptly pubUshed 
all their dispatches shows that they had little to conceal. 
The fact that Germany pubHshed only a few picked com- 
munications, and none of the vitally important ones which 
she pretended she had addressed to Austria in the interest 
of peace, gravely prejudiced Germany in the eyes of the 
world. Moreover, it was most improbable that the miUtary 
unready Powers should have attacked fully prepared Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary. As a rule the prepared, not 
the unprepared, army is the aggressor. 



350 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

At the moment when Germany sent her ultimatum to 
Russia it was evident that her position would be an extremely 
dangerous one in case of war. Although Germany and 
Austria-Hungary could conceivably hope to defeat France, 
Russia, and Serbia on land, they could hardly hope to 
defeat Great Britain on the sea. Besides, Italy was likely 
to desert Germany and Austria-Hungary, and would have to 
fear the vengeance of her former partners. Consequently 
she became vitally interested in the defeat of Germany and 
Austria- Hungary. Hence it was clear that, apart from higher 
considerations, she would draw the sword and help in the 
downfall of her former aUies so as to establish her own 
security. Italy would in all probability try to recover 
from Austria- Hungary the ItaHan Tyrol, Trentino, and 
Trieste. These considerations must have been in the 
Emperor's mind and in that of his diplomatic advisers on 
the fatal 31st of July. Unfortunately military and naval 
men were closeted with the Emperor and his diplomats, 
and none of the Emperor's civil advisers possessed Bis- 
marck's authority and determination and was ready to risk 
his position for the sake of his country. Bismarck would 
never have consented to such a suicidal war. He would 
rather have raised the country against his Emperor. How- 
ever, it was observed that when, after the fatal and final 
decision, the Emperor and his Chancellor drove into Berlin, 
the Chancellor's face was so distorted that the people in 
the streets did not recognise him. Possibly he thought 
that the Emperor had signed the death warrant of Germany 
and of his dynasty. 

When the Emperor resolved upon war with France and 
Russia it was perhaps still somewhat doubtful whether 
Great Britain would come to the aid of France, but soon 
the Emperor made Great Britain's hostility certain by 
invading Luxemburg and Belgium. That attack was not 
unexpected. The strategical intentions of a military 
nation in case of war can clearly be gauged by its strategical 
railways and especially by their military platforms. To 
detrain rapidly the gigantic armies used in modern war, 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 361 

hundreds of thousands of horses and tens of thousands of 
guns and vehicles, enormous military platforms and sidings 
are required. By comparing the detraining capacity of the 
military platforms on the Belgo- German frontier with that 
on the Franco-German frontier, it was clear that Germany 
intended to strike at France by way of Belgium. As France 
had powerfully fortified her eastern frontier, it had been an 
open secret for more than thirty years that Germany would 
try to enter France by breaking through Belgium. In a confi- 
dential and authoritative monograph Sketch of the Defences 
of France against Invasion from Germany, marked " Secret," 
and published by Harrison & Sons in 1887, we read : 

" It is from the recognition of the extraordinary strength 
of the north-eastern barrier that it is argued that Germany 
will in a future war be forced to direct her attack by way 
of Belgium. The best, shortest, and safest fine of invasion 
from North or Central Germany, having Paris for its objec- 
tive, lies unquestionably by the Meuse, Sambre, and Oise, 
and foUows the latter river up to the gates of the capital. 
The roads and railways connecting Cologne and Diisseldorf 
with Aix-la-Chapelle lead thence on Liege, the northern 
key to the vaUey of the Meuse and distant only about nine- 
teen miles (a two days' march) from the German frontier. 
From Li^ge, the valley of the Meuse, prolonged by the 
valley of the Sambre, opens up a broad road into France, 
which carries an invader without sensible interruption from 
the plains of the Meuse basin into those of the Seine basin." 

The general staffs of all nations were prepared for Ger- 
many's breach of Belgium's neutrality. However, with 
regrettable insincerity the German Government pretended 
that France and Belgium were to be blamed for the univer- 
sally expected invasion. On the 3 1st of July the German 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs complained to the 
British Ambassador that Belgium had " already com- 
mitted hostile acts by placing an embargo on a consign- 
ment of corn to Germany." General von Emmich, the Com- 
mander of the invading army, put forth the still more 
ridiculous claim that invasion was justified because " some 
French officers had crossed the Belgian frontier in disguise 



352 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

in motor-cars." His Proclamation to the Belgian people 
was as follows : 

" To my great regret German troops are compelled to cross 
the frontier by inevitable necessity, the neutrality of Belgium 
having been abeady violated by French officers who crossed 
the frontier in disguise in motor-cars. Our greatest de- 
sire is to avoid a conflict between our peoples, who have 
hitherto been friendly and were formerly allies. Remember 
Waterloo, where the German armies contributed to found 
the independence of your country ! But we must have a 
clear road. The destruction of bridges, tunnels, and rail- 
ways will have to be considered hostile actions. I hope 
that the German Army on the Meuse will not be called upon 
to fight you. We want a clear road to attack those who 
wish to attack us. I guarantee that the Belgian popula- 
tion will not have to suffer the horrors of war. We will 
pay for provisions, and our soldiers will show themselves 
to be the best friends of a people for whom we have the 
highest esteem and the greatest sympathy. It depends 
upon your prudence and patriotism to avoid the horrors of 
war for your country." 

Lastly the Imperial Chancellor, with greater candour 
than the German Foreign Secretary and the invading General, 
pleaded simply necessity in the following speech delivered 
in the Reichstag : 

" Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and 
necessity knows no law ! Our troops have occupied Luxem- 
burg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. That, 
gentlemen, is contrary to the dictates of international law. 
It is true that the French Government has declared at 
Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium as long as her opponents respect it. We knew, 
however, that France stood ready for the invasion. France 
could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement 
upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been 
disastrous. So we were compelled to override the justified 
protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. 
The wrong — I speak openly — that we are committing we 
will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal 
has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 353 

are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, 
can have only one thought — how he is to hack his way 
through." 

These mutually contradictory and insincere explanations 
were highly suggestive, as were the equally clumsy attempts 
of the German Government to induce Belgium not to 
resist the German armies by promising to restore her inde- 
pendence " after a German victory " ; and the incredibly 
foolish attempt of the Chancellor to induce Great Britain 
to forsake France, by promising on the 29th of July that 
in case of victory Germany would take no French territory, 
but only the French colonies — two days later, on the 1st of 
August, he improved this offer by stating that Germany 
might guarantee " the integrity of France and her colonies " 
— and to tolerate the invasion of Belgium against a promise 
that Germany would evacuate the country at the end of 
the War. They show that the German Foreign Office, which, 
under Bismarck's control, was the best organised and best 
informed Foreign Office in the world, had, under the per- 
sonal government of William II. and under the nominal con- 
trol of a bureaucrat unacquainted with diplomacy, become 
a byword for incapacity, confusion, and ignorance among 
the world's diplomats. The three contradictory explanations 
of Germany's reasons for invading Belgium were due either 
to the fact that the Foreign Office gave one explanation, 
while the Emperor gave totally different instructions without 
informing the Foreign Office, or to the fact that the Emperor 
himself, within a few hours, three times changed his mind 
as to the explanation which should be given. The German 
Ambassadors were appointed by the Emperor. They 
owed their position rather to favour than to merit, and they 
had learned that they would fare best if they reported not 
what was true and useful, but what the Emperor desired 
to hear. Of course there were exceptions to the rule. Prince 
Lichnowsky did his best to enUghten Berlin as to Great 
Britain's attitude. Still, in the misinformation suppUed 
by her diplomatic representatives lay probably the reason 



354 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

of Germany's endeavours by ridiculous and palpably in- 
sincere promises to induce Great Britain and Belgium to 
abandon their most vital interests without a stroke. Fore- 
seeing that the War would lead to Germany's economic ruin, 
I stated in the Nineteenth Century Review in September 
1914: 

" Although Germany no longer actually feeds herself, 
although, after the United Kingdom, she is the largest 
importer of food, she can resist almost indefinitely as far 
as food is concerned. She produces about nine-tenths of 
her bread corn, and the remaining tenth can be replaced 
by potatoes and sugar, of which she has a huge surplus. . . . 
On the other hand, there should be a serious deficiency in 
butter, eggs, cheese, fish, coffee, tea, cocoa, and tobacco, 
of which she imports large quantities. 

" While, even if the War lasts a year and longer, Germany 
will scarcely suffer from a shortage of the most necessary 
foods, her industries will suffer very severely through the 
cessation of her foreign trade and through shortage of coal 
and lack of imported raw materials, such as wool, cotton, 
silk, ore. Her people may also suffer from lack of coal, 
as the vast majority of the miners have been called into 
the army. . . . The war may well result in the destruction of 
Germany's manufacturing industries, shipping, and foreign 
trade, and in the general impoverishment of the people. 

" If Germany should be defeated her political and economic 
position will become a very serious one. She will probably 
be deprived of large territories in the East, West, and 
North. She will certainly lose to France Alsace-Lorraine, 
the iron-ore beds of which are indispensable to her magnifi- 
cent iron and steel trade, which is by far the largest German 
industry. ... 

*' Germany's manufacturing industries, Germany's ship- 
ping and Germany's foreign trade may never recover from 
the War. When the War is over, and especially if it is very 
protracted, much of the German business will have fallen 
into foreign hands. In addition impoverished Germany 
may have to pay to the victors an indemnity compared 
with which that paid by France would appear a trifle, . . . 

" Poverty combined with high taxation does not afford 
a congenial soil to the manufacturing industries. In the 



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 366 

countries of her antagonists, France, Belgium, Great Britain, 
and Russia, German business men have acquired huge 
interests, and these also will in part be lost. The War may 
totally destroy the great industrial position which Germany 
has acquired during the past three or four decades. It 
may convert Germany from a wealthy into a poverty- 
stricken land, and the Germans may be compelled to 
emigrate by the million to the United States and the British 
Colonies in the same way in which the Irish emigrated after 
the Potato Famine of 1 846. The outlook for Germany would 
be terrible." 

In the same article I foretold that Germany's defeat 
would lead to revolution and the break-up of the Empire. 
I wrote : 

" The war may jeopardise, and perhaps destroy, not only 
the entire Ufe-work of Bismarck and part of that of Frederick 
the Great, it may not only impoverish Germany very 
greatly, but it may also damage Germany's good name 
for generations. With the same ruthlessness with which 
her diplomats, following the principles of MachtpoUtik, 
have disregarded the sacredness of treaties, making Ger- 
many's advantage their only law, her soldiers have dis- 
regarded the written laws of war, and, what is worse, the 
unwritten law of humanity. According to numerous 
accounts, the German soldiers have bombarded open and 
undefended towns, wantonly burned down villages, killed 
wounded soldiers and peaceful inhabitants of both sexes, 
and executed all Belgian civilians caught with arms in their 
hands, although, according to Article 2 of the Regulations 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War, signed at The 
Hague on the 18th of October 1907 by Germany herself : 

' The inhabitants of a territory not under occupation 
who, on the approach of an enemy, spontaneously take up 
arms to resist the invading troops without having had 
time to organise themselves in accordance with Article 1, 
shall be regarded as belHgerents if they carry arms openly, 
and if they respect the laws and customs of war.' 

" Though many of the accounts pubhshed may be untrue, 
there is bound to be a considerable substratum of truth. 



356 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

By these actions and by the infliction of crushing fines upon 
the conquered towns and territories, the German Govern- 
ment is not weakening resistance, but increasing the bitter- 
ness and determination of its opponents, and it is doing 
irremediable harm to the reputation of the race throughout 
the world. . . . 

" The question now arises whether the docile Germans 
will bear their misfortunes patiently, or whether they will 
rebel against the crowned criminal who has brought about 
their misery. A revolt is possible, and it may take a two- 
fold shape. Conceivably the Southern States might, after 
a serious defeat of the German Army, detach themselves 
from Prussia, refusing to fight any longer for the German 
Emperor. The Empire may be dissolved. The secession 
of the Southern States would no doubt be encouraged by a 
victorious French Army, On the other hand, it is possible 
that there would be a general rising of the people against 
their rulers. The great majority of Germans are dissatisfied 
with their form of government. A well-educated people 
does not like to be governed like children. An absolutism 
thinly disguised by parliamentary forms is tolerable only 
as long as it is successful, and as the people are prosperous. 
The vast majority of the Germans are Liberals, Radicals, and 
Socialists. This majority has at present no influence what- 
ever upon the government and policy of the country. 
Failure of the Government in the present war would make 
absolute government impossible in Germany. If Germany 
should experience a serious defeat, she may either become 
a strictly limited monarchy on the English model, or a 
republic. As both the Emperor and the Crown Prince are 
equally responsible for the present war, it may well happen 
that the German people wiU refuse to be ruled any longer 
by the Hohenzollerns. The rise of a German repubhc is 
certainly within the limits of possibiUty." 

My forecast of the economic and pohtical consequences 
of the War, which was made immediately upon its outbreak, 
was to prove correct. 



CHAPTER XXII 

WHY THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BROKE DOWN IN 1914 * 

Agreements between States are frequently compared 
with agreements between individuals because of the simi- 
larity of the quasi-legal wording used in both. However, 
notwithstanding the analogy of the language used, and the 
apparent similarity of the transaction, such comparison is 
not justified. A civil agreement is absolutely binding 
upon its signatories and can be enforced by a court of 
law. A merchant who has agreed to sell certain goods at 
a certain price cannot successfully try to avoid performance 
by advancing the plea that fulfilment of the contract would 
be unprofitable or disastrous to him. The binding force 
of a civil contract is absolute. On the other hand, an 
agreement between nations possesses neither imconditional 
vaHdity nor unlimited binding force. By signing a contract 
a merchant binds only himself, and he must fulfil the 
contract even if he has signed away his property. His 
misfortune affects only himself. Hence it is right that 
the law courts enforce the unconditional fulfilment of private 
contracts. But an agreement between States bears a 
totally different character. Such an agreement is concluded, 
not by the principals — that is, by the nations themselves — 
acting in full knowledge of the case and of their responsi- 
biUty, but only by their temporary agents who are acting 
on the nation's behalf, by statesmen who have been 
appointed to promote the interests of the nation and to 
increase the prosperity of the people. They are the trustees 

* From the Fortnightly Review, January 1912. 
357 



368 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 

of the nation, and they are neither entitled to sign away 
the happiness and prosperity of the nation on behalf of 
which they are acting, nor to fulfil treaty obligations if they 
are convinced that their performance would be ruinous to 
the people. Hence a statesman is in certain circumstances 
bound to deny the validity and binding force of an inter- 
national agreement, even if it has been signed, not by a 
predecessor in office, but by himself. Treaties of alliance 
resemble laws in their conditional validity. Laws lapse 
automatically when they are no longer in accordance with 
the spirit of the time. 

On the British statute book there are many laws which 
can no longer be enforced, although they have not been 
formally repealed. Similarly treaties of alliance, having 
been concluded between nations with the object of promoting 
their common interests, lapse automatically when the treaty 
Powers cease to possess those common interests and aims in 
furtherance of which the treaties were originally concluded. 
Bismarck, the father of modern statesmanship, explained 
repeatedly with his usual directness and lucidity that treaties 
of aUiance possess neither unconditional vahdity nor un- 
limited binding force, that both were affected by changing 
times and circumstances. He stated, for instance, in the 
Reichstag on the 6th of February 1888 : 

" No great Power can, for any length of time, be tied 
by the wording of a treaty which is opposed to the interests 
of the people, and if it has done so it will eventually be 
compelled openly to declare : ' The times have altered. I 
cannot do it.' And it must justify its action before the 
people and before its aUies as best it can. But to ruin its 
own people by fulfiUing one's treaty duties to the letter, 
that is an action which no great Power can assent to. How- 
ever, this is by no means demanded in any treaty. . . . 
Treaties are only the expression of a community of aims and 
of risks which are run by the treaty-concluding Powers." 

In his political testament, his Oedanken und Erinnerungen, 
Bismarck wrote : 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 359 

" All contracts between great States cease to be uncon- 
ditionally binding as soon as they are tested by the struggle 
for existence. No great nation will ever be induced to 
sacrifice its existence on the altar of treaty fidelity. . . . 
To-day it is hardly possible for the Government of a great 
Power to place its resources at the disposal of a friendly 
State when the sentiment of the people disapproves of it. 
. . . The clause Rebus sic stantibus is tacitly understood to 
apply to aU treaties which involve performance." 

The Triple Alliance was a purely defensive instrument. 
It was repeatedly renewed and retained its defensive char- 
acter. Bismarck foresaw that this Alliance might come 
to an end by a change in the pohtical conditions of Europe, 
for he wrote in his Qedanken und Erinnerungen : 

*' The Triple Alliance has the significance of a strategical 
position which was taken up in view of the threatening 
dangers which prevailed at the time of its conclusion. It 
has been prolonged from time to time, and it may be 
possible to prolong it still further, but eternal duration is 
assured to no treaty between great Powers, and it would 
be unwise to consider it as affording a permanently secure 
guarantee against all possible contingencies which may 
modify the political, material, and moral conditions under 
which it was brought into being. The Triple AUiance no 
more constitutes a foundation capable of offering perennial 
resistance to time and change than did the numerous other 
Triple or Quadruple Alliances which preceded it." 

The great German statesman actually foretold that the 
Triple AUiance would come to an end if the relations between 
Italy and France should become friendly, that Italy might 
turn against Austria-Hungary if she could feel secure of 
French aggression. He told Moritz Busch in 1888 : 

" We cannot quite rely upon Italy. The French may 
again gain ground in that country. France and Italy may 
become friends not only after a change has taken place in 
France's form of Government, but even if the Republic 
should be maintained. In case of a reconciliation with 
24 



360 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 

France, Italy might resume her Irredentist policy and 
renew her claims upon Austrian territory." 

Bismarck had created bitter hostility between France and 
Italy by giving at the Congress of Berlin Tunis to France. 
Tunis lies at a distance of only a hundred miles from the 
coast of Sicily and from that of Sardinia, Italy had the 
strongest claims upon Tunis, partly because of her 
geographical proximity, partly because nearly all the 
European residents in Tunis were Italian citizens. Under 
these circumstances France's occupation of Tunis was felt 
as a serious attack upon Italy's interests. Soon after having 
taken possession of Tunis, France converted into a first- 
class arsenal and war harbour the port of Bizerta, which 
is equidistant from Sicily and Sardinia, and stationed a 
fleet there. Thus she was able to threaten Italy's enormous 
and exposed coast-line simultaneously in the north-west 
from Toulon and in the extreme south of the country. 
It is widely known that Bismarck caused Italy to join the 
Austro-German Alliance by giving Tunis to France, but only 
a few people, most of whom are diplomats, are aware that 
Bismarck threatened Italy with a war with Austria-Hungary 
unless she would ally herself with the two Germanic States, 
that Italy did not join the Austro-German AUiance by her 
own free choice, but was actually coerced into joining it. 
Describing the foreign policy of Count Robilant, a former 
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who took a very promi- 
nent part in the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, the Mar- 
chese Cappelli, who himself has been a Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, wrote in his book, La Politica estera del conte de 
Robilant : 

" None knew better than Count Robilant how much we 
were isolated and how great was the danger arising from 
the hostihty which certain Powers displayed towards us. 
When Prince Bismarck went to Vienna in 1879 in connection 
with the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance, the 
Itahan Ambassador was the only Ambassador in Vienna 
who was not visited by the Prince. That was not the only 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 361 

evidence of Germany's attitude towards Italy. The 
Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Andrassy, told 
Bismarck that Austria had been constantly provoked by 
the agitation of the Italian Irredentists and that she might 
at last feel compelled to make war upon Italy, and he asked 
the Prince whether, in that event, Germany would have 
any objection to Austria taking possession of part of those 
ItaHan Provinces which had been Austrian and which Austria 
had lost to Italy in 1859 and 1866, Bismarck hesitated a 
moment and then answered : ' No, we would not raise any 
objections. Italy is none of our friends.' About the same 
time the Papal Nuncio inquired whether Germany would 
object to the re-estabhshment, or at least the partial re- 
estabhshment, of the Pope's temporal power, and he received 
exactly the same reply. These utterances showed Ger- 
many's sentiments towards Italy." 

Monsieur A. BiUot, who from 1890 to 1897 was the 
French Ambassador in Rome, wrote : 

" Italy's hesitation to join the Austro-German AlUance 
was overcome by alarming the Italian Government. Ger- 
many pretended to be favourably inchned towards the 
Vatican, and took openly steps towards a reconciUation 
with the Pope. Thus Italy was trapped into an alliance of 
which the first advantage was to be this— that Italy would 
be guaranteed against all attempts to restore the temporal 
power of the Pope, a policy which was favoured, or at least 
not disapproved of, by Germany." 

Bismarck had the greatest contempt for Italy. In 
1880 he said to Busch : " The Italians are like carrion crows 
on the battlefield that let others provide their food. They 
were prepared in 1870 to fall upon us with others if they 
were promised a piece of Tyrol. At that time a Russian 
diplomat said : ' What ! They are asking for something 
again, although they have not yet lost a battle ! ' " Never- 
theless he forced Italy into joining the Austro- Germany 
AUiance, because he wished to be sure that in a war between 
Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one side, and France 
and Russia on the other side, Austria-Hungary should be 
able to use her entire army against Russia. 



362 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 

Long before 1883, the year when Italy joined the Austro- 
German Alliance, it had been Bismarck's policy to create 
difEerences between France and Italy with regard to the 
Mediterranean, differences which, by weakening France, 
were likely to benefit Germany. He wrote, for instance, in 
1868 to Count Usedom, his Ambassador in Italy : 

" Italy is France's natural rival, and the two countries 
wiU always be rivals and sometimes enemies. Nature has 
thrown between the two an apple of contention, for which 
they will fight for ever : the Mediterranean, that wonderful 
inter-continental harbour of Europe, Asia, and Africa, that 
channel between the Atlantic and the Pacific, that basin 
which is surrounded by the fairest countries in the world. 
It is surely not idle to believe that France envies Italy and 
its position, which stretches far into the Mediterranean, and 
which possesses the most beautiful shores and the shortest 
route to the Orient. France and Italy can never become 
AUies, sharing the advantages of the Mediterranean, for 
this is an indivisible heritage. It belongs undoubtedly to 
Italy, whose Mediterranean shores are twelve times as 
extensive as are the Mediterranean shores of France." 

How deeply Italy was wounded by France's occupation 
of Tunis will be seen from the fact that the signature of the 
Franco-Tunisian Treaty on the 12th of May 1881 was followed 
two days later by the fall of the Cairoli Cabinet. Franco - 
Italian relations became exceedingly strained. Italy began 
in haste to increase her army and to build a fleet able to 
encounter the strong French Navy. The tension between 
the two countries caused the outbreak of a customs war 
which lasted ten years. Her vast expenses on armaments, 
and the virtual closing of the French frontier to Italian pro- 
ducts, and of the Paris money market to Italian loans, im- 
poverished Italy greatly and brought her to the verge of 
national bankruptcy. 

The policy of keeping France and Italy apart by artificial 
means was successful only as long as Bismarck directed 
Germany's policy. After his dismissal Germany's policy 
lacked a firm, directing hand, France began to display 



\ THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 363 

independent diplomatic initiative, and to pull the diplo- 
matic wires of Europe as Bismarck had done during thirty- 
years. Monsieur Delcasse resolved to clear away the 
differences which Bismarck had created between France 
and Great Britain on the one side, and between France and 
Italy on the other, and he succeeded. The Franco-Italian 
understanding began with the Agreement of 1898 regarding 
Crete, and with a Treaty regarding Tripoli in 1899, The 
Franco-ItaUan customs war, which had been so disastrous 
to Italy, was ended. France and Italy arrived at a thorough 
understanding as to the Mediterranean, and the two Powers 
became friends. Italy felt no longer threatened by France, 
for France acted towards her with the greatest loyalty. 
As far as Italy was concerned, the Triple Alliance was no 
longer a necessity. 

If we wish to understand Italy's foreign policy in the 
past, we must before all be acquainted with the Irredentist 
movement. Irredenta Italia means the unredeemed Italy. 
The larger part of Italy, including Florence, Milan, and 
Venice, was until lately under Austrian domination. Austria 
had terribly ill-treated her Italian subjects. The poUcy 
of the Irredentists was to " redeem " those territories 
which, though Italian in character, still belonged to foreign 
countries, and to unite them with the kingdom of Italy. 
The lands which the Irredentists claimed most loudly and 
most persistently belonged to Austria-Hungary. They were 
the Southern Tyrol and parts of the provinces of Istria and 
Dalmatia, with the towns of Trieste, Pola, etc. The spirit 
of the Irredentist became the spirit of Young Italy. In 
the school-book history of Giovanni Soli, which was used 
in the majority of elementary schools in Italy, occurs the 
following passage : " By the conquest of Rome Italy was 
freed nearly entirely from the domination of foreigners. We 
say nearly entirely, because two parts of Italy belong still 
to Austria — namely, the South of Tyrol and Istria with 
Trieste, two beautiful countries which possess more than 
1,000,000 inhabitants." 

The first need of a great country is security from foreign 



364 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 

aggression. The Italian Irredentists, indeed all Italian 
patriots, were anxious that their country should be secure 
from foreign attack. However, the mountain ranges which 
separated Italy from Austria-Hungary were situated, not 
on Italian but on Austrian soil, although their inhabitants 
were Italians. An Austrian army could without difficulty 
descend from the Tyrolese mountains into the plains of 
Italy, and, by the irony of Fate, the very Tyrolese moun- 
tains which should have protected Italy were inhabited 
by Italians. 

Italy was extremely vulnerable, not only on her Austrian 
land frontier, but also on the coasts, and especially on the 
coasts of the Adriatic facing Austria. Many large towns, 
such as Genoa, Livorno, Naples, Reggio, Messina, Palermo, 
Catania, Taranto, Brindisi, Ancona, Venice, and countless 
smaller ones, are open coast towns which are exposed to 
forced contribution, bombardment, and capture from the 
sea. Rome, Padua, Ravenna, Pisa lie only about ten miles 
from the coast. Italy's principal railways and high-roads 
hug the shore from one end to the other of the peninsula, 
and they can easily be destroyed in many places by small 
landing-parties . 

Nature had been very partial in creating the Adriatic. 
She had given an open and almost defenceless coast to Italy, 
and had created a large number of excellent, natural har- 
bours protected by high surrounding hills and mountains 
all along the coast which faces Italy. The western, or 
Italian, shore of the Adriatic is mostly flat and sandy, and 
is devoid of natural bays and harbours. Therefore the 
ships anchoring in the small Italian ports are exposed to 
all winds, and especially to the Bora, the most dangerous 
wind of the Adriatic. The flatness of the shore makes 
the landing of an army on the beach easy. The eastern 
shore of the Adriatic is rocky and mountainous, and possesses 
a profusion of deep and excellent bays, harbours, and inlets. 
The Austrian ports of Pola, Cattaro, and Sebenico were 
among the finest and largest protected natural harbours in 
the world. Between Pola and Ragusa, a distance of three 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 366 

hundred miles, there were some sixty ports on the Austrian 
part of the Adriatic shore which could be used as stations 
for torpedo-boats and submarines. The southern pro- 
longation of the Austrian coast, the Albanian coast, also 
had excellent natural harbours, which could easily be forti- 
fied and converted into war harbours. Austria threatened 
Italy as much on sea as on land. 

The modern history of Italy is the history of her wars 
with Austria. In the Southern Tyrol Austria held the key 
to Italy's door. In the Adriatic and in the Balkan Peninsula 
Austria opposed Italy's political and economic expansion. 
Besides, she oppressed the Italians living in Austria. Italy 
had been forced against her will to enter the Austro- Germany 
AUiance. It is therefore only natural that many patriotic 
ItaUans were bitterly opposed to Austria and to the Triple 
Alliance. 

In the year 1906 Signor Pellegrini wrote in his important 
book. Verso la Guerra ? — II dissidio fra V Italia e V Austria : 

" I beUeve we cannot live any longer under an illusion 
which deceives us. We have lived under the impression 
that the internal difficulties of Austria-Hungary are so 
great as to prevent her from aggressive action towards our- 
selves and from expansion towards the East. We have 
beUeved that Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces after 
the death of the present Emperor. These views are 
erroneous. If the political crisis in Austria- Hungary should 
become more acute, and there is reason for doubting this, 
Austria-Hungary's need to expand and to acquire new 
markets in the East will become all the greater. And as 
long as Itahan commerce pursues its triumphant course 
in the East, the more are the opposing interests of the two 
nations likely to bring about the final collision. . . . 

" We cannot continue a policy of vassalage which will 
compromise for all time Italy's future in order to preserve 
the outward form of the Triple Alhance. We must ask 
ourselves : What are our interests ? Are we ready to 
defend them ? What are the conditions of the Italians 
who dwell on the shore of the Adriatic under foreign domina- 
tion ? What are our interests on the Adriatic compared 
with those of Austria ? What are the wishes of our people. 



366 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 

and what is Italy's mission in the Balkan Peninsula ? Is 
it possible to avoid a conflict with Austria ? I believe I 
have shown that Austria-Hungary is at the same time our 
aUy and our open enemy, against whom we must prepare 
for war." 

Signor Pellegrini proposed to meet the danger of a 
collision with Austria-Hungary by an Alliance between 
Italy and Russia : 

" We have to calculate in the future with the fact that 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though nominally our ally, 
is our determined enemy in the Balkan Peninsula. There- 
fore, it is meet that we should enter into more intimate 
relations with Russia, the only nation which, in co-opera- 
tion with Italy, can act as an adequate counterpoise. Only 
thus we can secure the maintenance of the threatened 
balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula." 

Already in 1902 Monsieur Delcasse had recommended 
to Italy, in an interview which was published in the 
Giornale d' Italia on the 4th of January of that year, that 
she should enter upon intimate relations with France and 
Russia for the protection of her interests in the Balkan 
Peninsula. 

For some considerable time the Itahans had been earnestly 
considering the possibility of a war with Austria-Hungary. 
The Eassegna Contemporanea began pubhshing in July 
1911 a series of articles by Colonel Angelo Tragni, entitled 
" Ai Confini d' Italia," in which the military factors which 
are important in a war with Austria-Hungary are discussed 
at length. Italian military and naval men published 
many books, pamphlets, and articles on the same subject. 
However, the ItaUan soldiers were not alone in considering 
professionally and publicly the possibility of an Austro- 
Italian war, for their Austrian colleagues were similarly 
occupied. One of the leading Austrian military papers, 
the very important Danzer's Armeezeitung , printed during 
1911 a series of articles on a possible Austro-Italian war. 
They were subsequently printed in pamphlet form under the 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 367 

significant title, Without Victory on Sea no Victory on Land : 
the Decisive Significance of a Naval Victory in the Conduct 
of a Land War with Italy. The pamphlet had a preface 
written by the Austrian Vice- Admiral Chiari, in which we 
read : 

" Alliances do not last for ever and the ally of to-day may 
be the enemy of to-morrow. One must not under-estimate 
one's opponents. We should no longer meet the Italian 
soldiers who were beaten by the Austrians at No vara, and 
still less the Italian sailors who were beaten by the Austrians 
at Lissa. I have always admired the splendid naval 
material of Italy with feelings of envy." 

The most important passages of the pamphlet itself 
foUow, and I would mention that the italicised portions 
of its preface and of its text were also italicised in the 
original. All military technicalities have been omitted : 

" The crisis during the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina has shown that notwithstanding our alliances we must 
still reckon with the possibility of a war on several fronts. . . . 
In Italy nearly all warlike preparations are directed against 
Austria, her hereditary enemy, and her standard of arma- 
ments is suppUed not by Italy's interests, but by our own 
mihtary power. We must prepare armaments sufficient to 
meet the whole force of Italy, but not of the Italy of to-day, 
but of the Italy of to-morrow, when the unavoidable collision 
will occur. . . . It is certain that we have to reckon with a war 
on several fronts. Without hesitation one can prophesy 
that our ally in peace will be our enemy in war, that Italy 
will rather be found on the side of our enemies than on 
our side, that we shall have to meet the combined armies 
of Russia, Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro. That was 
probably in the mind of the Minister of War when he spoke 
of the possibility of a war on several fronts. . . . We should 
naturally aim our first and our strongest blow at our nearest 
and most dangerous opponent, at Italy. . . . 

" During forty-five years we have been perfecting Austria's 
armaments in order to arrive at mihtary superiority in 
general, and, since some time, to be able to defeat Italy in 



368 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 

particular. But we must not deceive ourselves. We shall 
no longer meet the Italians of No vara and Custoza, for Italy 
has not stood still. Nor shall we meet the Italians who 
were defeated on the Adowa, for she has made up for past 
neglect with redoubled energy. . . . 

"Is, in case of a European conflagration, the superiority 
of our armies operating in the Italian province of Venetia 
against the Italian army so striking that we may reckon upon 
the immediate and sweeping success which is necessary for 
us in view of the difficult position in which we may find 
ourselves ? Consideration of all factors shows that this 
question must be answered in the negative. Our superiority 
is not sufficiently great. The Italian army is, through its 
numbers, organisation, armament, and training, able to 
offer the most determined resistance even against the 
mightiest enemy, and its power of resistance will be greatly 
increased in a war which the Italian nation will wage with 
all its heart. . . . 

" Whilst the North-east of Austria- Hungary has sufficient 
room for employing armies of from fifteen to twenty army 
corps, the territory of Venetia is limited. Its narrowness 
is a factor of the greatest importance. Owing to its narrow- 
ness we can turn the flank of the Italian army only by operating 
oversea, and herein lies one of our best chances and the abso- 
lutely necessary condition of a victory on land. A decisive 
victory of our fleet enables us to turn the Italian position and 
leaves undefended the great centres of the country. Prepara- 
tions must be made on the largest scale for the transport of 
troops across the sea in very large numbers. A decisive 
victory on sea ! That will be the principal need of the situa- 
tion in a land war against Italy. The protection of our 
coasts and harbours, which, according to semi-official 
statements is the object of our fleet, is, in reahty, an un- 
important matter." 

Deeds reveal most clearly a country's aims and intentions. 
For years the Italian and Austrian naval manoeuvres were 
merely rehearsals of an Austro-ItaUan war. Both Italy 
and Austria greatly strengthened their fortifications and 
their garrisons on the Austro-Italian frontier, and, following 
Germany's example, Austria-Hungary began building a 
large fleet. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 369 

An alliance is an impossibility without mutual trust 
and without a community of aims and interests. Between 
Italy and Austria-Hungary there existed no trust and 
besides, there existed not a community, but an incompati- 
bility, of aims and interests. The Triple Alliance was 
boimd to break down on the day of trial. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY * 

The true character of the former German government, the 
fact that the military was absolutely supreme over the 
civil power, was startUngly revealed to the world six months 
before the outbreak of the Great War. The escapades of 
a very young lieutenant in the little German garrison of 
Zabern late in 1913, and the consequent differences between 
the military and the civil population of the town, filled 
the papers of the world during a couple of months and 
very nearly led to a most serious constitutional crisis in 
Germany in the beginning of 1914. The Zabern affair 
was most characteristic of modern Germany, and the 
little lieutenant may some day occupy a considerable space 
in the constitutional histories of that country. 

The whole world was greatly interested in the conflict 
— the Italian papers in the South of Sicily, where I was 
staying at the time, published every day two columns of 
news regarding it — because it was generally recognised that 
the Zabern conflict was not an event but a symptom. It 
was not only a conflict between the officers and citizens of 
an unimportant town, but a trial of strength between the 
military and the civil authorities of Germany, between 
reaction and progress, between might and right, between 
absolutism and democracy, and herein lay its importance. 
There were two powerful currents in Germany, an auto- 
cratic and a democratic one, and no one can understand 
Imperial Germany's foreign and domestic policy who is not 
acquainted with the elements which clashed at Zabern. 

1 From the Nineteenth Century and After, February 1914. '^^ 
370 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 371 

Therefore it is worth while to consider the foreign and 
domestic policy of Grermany in the light of the Zabern 
events. 

Zabern is a little town of about nine thousand inhabi- 
tants in Alsace. The vast majority of the people were 
Germans by race and by language. They were thoroughly 
loyal to Germany, and there had been no conflicts between 
the civil population and the military Tintil Lieutenant von 
Forstner, a youth of twenty, joined the garrison. He was 
tactless enough to make before his men, some of whom 
were French Alsatians, highly offensive remarks about 
France ; to call the native Alsatian recruits " Wackes," 
which means rowdies, larrikins ; to tell his soldiers that 
they should use their weapons with energy should they come 
into collision with the local civilians ; and to offer a prize 
of ten marks to those who should succeed in " running a 
man through " with their side-arms. His remarks became 
the talk of the town, they found their way into one of the 
local papers, and as the rumour got about that an infantile 
and somewhat ludicrous physical mishap had occurred to 
Lieutenant von Forstner while in a state of intoxication, he 
was laughed at and teased by the people and especially 
by children and youths. His fellow-officers took his part, 
soldiers with fixed bayonets began to accompany the officers 
on their walks through the town, Lieutenant von Forstner 
was seen buying chocolates escorted by soldiers with fixed 
bayonets, and dining at a public restaurant with a revolver 
lying on the table. The merriment of the town increased 
through this ludicrous exhibition, and small crowds began 
to follow the officers and to collect before the barracks 
awaiting developments. Then Colonel von Renter, the 
commander of the regiment, instead of sending Lieutenant 
von Forstner away, after complaining about insufficient 
police protection to the civil authorities, resolved to take 
the law into his own hands. He caUed his soldiers out, 
apparently had ball cartridge served out and machine- 
guns got in readiness, and threatened to fire upon the crowd 
in front of the barracks which, according to his own state- 



372 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

ment before the military court, numbered only from forty 
to one hundred people. The people ran away. Orders 
were then given to the soldiers to arrest every civilian who 
lingered near the barracks or who insulted the soldiers or 
laughed at them, and thirty people were arrested, among 
them some of the local judges who came from the law courts. 
Soldiers, eager to arrest people who were supposed to have 
laughed or jeered, pursued the fugitives into their houses, 
and a front door was broken in during the man-hunt. The 
prisoners secured were locked up in a coal-cellar all night ; 
they were brought next morning before the civil magis- 
trates, who immediately set them at liberty. However, 
Lieutenant von Forstner remained a butt to the populace. 
One day, when marching along with his soldiers, he was 
jeered at by some youths. They were pursued by the 
soldiers, but escaped. A lame shoemaker was left behind. 
He was attacked by Lieutenant von Forstner with his sword 
and received a cut over the head. 

The high-handed action of the military was loudly con- 
demned by all the Liberal, Radical, Clerical, and Socialistic 
people of Germany and their press, but was praised by the 
small but powerful Conservative Party and its papers. 
When the matter was brought up before the Reichstag, 
the Imperial Chancellor, instead of promising immediate 
redress for the injustice done, expressed abstract views on 
the conflict of right and wrong in an impersonal, detached, 
and non-committal way, while the Minister of War, who 
followed him, instead of expressing regret for the occurrences, 
used the opportunity of making a glowing speech in praise 
of the virtues of the Prussian officers and of the army who 
were the defenders of the Throne and of the Fatherland. 
In consequence of the attitude of the Imperial Chancellor 
and the Minister of War, who seemed to flout the German 
ParHament and people, a vote of censure on the Chancellor 
was moved and was passed by the enormous majority of 
two hundred and ninety-three to fifty-four. The Conserva- 
tives alone supported the Government. To allay the anger 
of people and Parliament, a judicial inquiry was announced. 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 373 

and Lieutenant von Forstner was promptly sentenced to 
forty-five days' imprisonment by a military court for 
wounding the shoemaker. Proceedings against Colonel 
von Renter were delayed. Lieutenant von Forstner ap- 
pealed against the sentence, and his appeal and the case 
of Colonel von Renter came simultaneously before the higher 
military court at Strasbourg. 

Before the appeal of the young lieutenant and the case 
of Colonel von Reuter came on for hearing, one of the most 
powerful officials in Germany, Herr von Jagow, the Pohce 
President of Berlin, who was considered a possible successor 
to Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg, published over his name 
in the Conservative Kreuzzeitung a manifesto in form of a 
letter in which he stated : 

" Military exercises are acts of the State. Those who 
try to impede acts of the State are liable to be prosecuted 
and punished. Consequently Lieutenant von Forstner 
could not be placed on trial, and could still less be punished. 
The military court which condemned him has apparently 
failed to be guided by these considerations. If the law stood 
differently, its prompt amendment would be needed. For 
if German officers, who are garrisoned in what is nearly the 
enemy's country, are in danger of being prosecuted for 
illegal detention because they endeavour to make room for 
the exercise of the power of the State, the highest profession 
in the land is disgraced." 

The legal arguments of the President of the BerUn Police 
were scarcely taken seriously, but his attempt to influence 
the decision of the miUtary court in favour of the accused 
officers at a time when the matter was still suh judice, the 
fact that Herr von Jagow tried to use his great position 
and influence in order to secure for the officers a judicial 
verdict in their favour, outraged once more the Liberals, 
Radicals, Clericals, and Socialists of Germany, but was 
applauded by the entire Conservative Press. 

The military court at Strasbourg declared both Colonel 
von Reuter and Lieutenant von Forstner not guilty — the 
colonel because, in detaining people, he had acted in ignorance 



374 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

of the law, and the lieutenant because he had wounded the 
shoemaker in putative self-defence. 

In the struggle between the military and civil power, 
between the military and the people, the military had proved 
victorious. Military absolutism and contempt of law had 
been declared legal by a high military court. The German 
nation was a well-driUed nation. From the tenderest age 
the children were taught in the schools that obedience to 
authority was the foremost duty of the citizen, that military 
officers belong to an exalted and highly privileged class, that 
the military uniform was sacred, that even the youngest 
lieutenant was the representative of the Emperor-King. 
In how high estimation officers were held in Germany may 
be seen from this — that many of the leading business men 
and estate owners whose names are generally known in 
Germany had printed on their visiting cards the fact that 
they were Lieutenants of the Reserve. 

The German people apparently acquiesced in the Stras- 
bourg verdict and were seemingly ready to pocket their 
defeat by the military. The enormous excitement caused 
at the time by the high-handed behaviour of the Zabern 
officers died down. Militarism in Germany became as all- 
powerful as ever. The well-known politician and publicist, 
Herr Eduard Bernstein, wrote in the English Nation of 
the 17th of January : 

"It is no use concealing the truth. The hold of mili- 
tarism on the German nation is certainly stronger than ever. 
Were it otherwise, Mr. Lloyd George's timely remarks upon 
the necessity of stopping the growth of armaments would 
not have been passed over with a few embarrassed remarks 
by the great Liberal Press of the Empire." 

The significance of the Zabern verdict was recognised 
throughout Germany. Democratic Germany was pro- 
foundly depressed and humiliated, while Colonel von 
Renter received more than fifteen thousand letters and 
telegrams of congratulation from the supporters of absolutist 
government. Herr von Jahn, who had presided at the 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 375 

trial at Strasbourg, immediately after having read the 
verdict in court, sent telegrams of congratulation to Herr 
von Jagow, the Berlin President of Police, and to the famous 
Herr von Oldenburg- Januschau, who, as a deputy, had 
declared a few years before in the Reichstag, " The King 
of Prussia and Emperor of Germany must be able to tell 
a lieutenant at any moment : ' Take ten men with you 
and close the Reichstag.' " 

The Zabern affair offers some most valuable and impor- 
tant lessons to all who are interested in Germany. Even 
the most casual observer must be struck with several 
curious phenomena which require explanation. He -will 
ask : How is it that the phlegmatic, patient, and law- 
abiding German population, which is very slow to anger, 
has during the last few years twice been roused into such 
a passion by the action of its rulers — once over the Emperor's 
Daily Telegraph interview and then over the Zabern affair 
— that the vast majority of the newspapers and people 
have demanded an alteration of the Constitution by which 
the people should be given greater power over the national 
executive and administration? How is it that in both 
cases the German Reichstag failed to take action whereby 
to secure some control over the national executive and 
administration ? And how is it that the angry passions 
died down as quickly as they arose ? How is it that the 
Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, instead 
of promising to make similar military excesses impossible 
in the future, adopted a weak and apologetic attitude ? 
How is it that he remained Imperial Chancellor, although 
that vote of censure was the third which the Reichstag 
had passed upon him ? — The inefficient and somewhat 
childish petulance of the German people, when provoked 
by its rulers, the fact that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg 
did not promise that he would make recurrence of events 
like those at Zabern impossible, and the fact that the 
German Parliament did not even try to provide a permanent 
remedy for the grievances of the people by bringing pressure 
to bear upon the German Government and Administration, 
25 



376 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

sprang all from the same source. Germany, which had the 
most democratic franchise in the world, possessed a Parlia- 
ment, but no Parliamentary Government ; Grermany was 
an almost autocratically governed military State which 
possessed merely the semblance of representative Govern- 
ment ; the German Parliament, unlike the British Parlia- 
ment, had not been created by the people, but had been 
bestowed upon the German people as a free gift by its rulers. 
As the Reichstag existed not by the will of the people, but 
by the permission of the Monarch, the Monarch could take 
away his gift as soon as the representatives of the people 
were no longer absolutely loyal and submissive to him and 
to the officials he had appointed, but tried to enter upon 
a conflict with the Imperial Government with a view to 
limiting its practically absolute powers. 

Germany, as William I. said, was merely an enlarged 
Prussia. The Imperial Chancellor, like all German officials, 
was nominated and dismissed by the Emperor, for, accord- 
ing to Art. 18 of the Constitution, " The Emperor appoints 
the Imperial officials, has their oaths taken, and effects 
their dismissal if required." The Reichstag and the Party 
Leaders could neither bring about the appointment of a 
Government official, nor effect his dismissal or his resigna- 
tion by a vote of censure. Moreover, a vote of censure 
upon the Imperial Chancellor would have been an inter- 
ference with the Imperial prerogative, an attempt to influ- 
ence the Imperial will. Therefore it would only have 
caused the censured Chancellor to be retained, for dismissal 
after a vote of censure would have made it appear that the 
Emperor had obeyed Parliament or given way to popular 
pressure. The German Emperor was not likely to do 
that. As the Reichstag knew that its votes of censure had 
no practical effect whatever, it did not take its own votes 
of censure very seriously, nor did any one in Germany. 
Hence the relations between the Reichstag and the censured 
Chancellor remained practically unchanged. 

The arrogant attitude of the Zabern officers and the 
great reserve maintained by the Imperial Chancellor in 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 377 

the Reichstag when dealing with the Zabern events were 
due to the fact that Germany was an almost autocratically 
governed military State. Neither the Reichstag nor the 
Imperial Chancellor had any influence over the army. Bis- 
marck himself was quite powerless where the army was 
concerned. Article 63 of the Imperial German Constitu- 
tion stated : " The whole of the military forces of the 
Empire will form a homogeneous army which is commanded 
by the Emperor in war and in peace." As the Emperor 
kept the command of the army in war and in peace abso- 
lutely in his own hands and allowed no interference from 
any quarter, least of all from any civilian, and as the 
Chancellor's authority extended only to civil affairs, Herr 
von Bethmann-HoUweg was of course powerless to promise 
the Reichstag that Lieutenant von Forstner should be 
punished or Colonel von Renter reprimanded. Where the 
army was concerned the Imperial Chancellor had no greater 
power than any ordinary citizen. 

ALrticle 64 of the German Constitution stated : " All 
German troops are obUged unconditionally to obey the 
Emperor. That obligation is to form part of the mihtary 
oath of fidelity." According to the Constitution, the 
Emperor's power over the army was unhmited. A conflict 
between the Imperial Army and the army of one of the 
smaller German States was unthinkable. The commanders 
of the troops and of the fortresses in the non-Prussian 
States had, according to their oath, to obey the Emperor. 
The independent armies of the individual States existed 
rather in theory than in fact. Moreover, while in all 
civil matters the orders of the Emperor required for their 
validity the counter-signature of the Chancellor, who 
thereby assumed responsibility for them, the Emperor's 
orders regarding the army needed not be countersigned even 
if they indirectly touched the budget. In mihtary matters 
the authority of the Emperor was absolute. Interference 
with the army by the civil government or by Parliament 
was out of the question. 

The German Army was, so to say, the Emperor's body- 



378 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

guard, and had been given a highly privileged position. 
Officers were treated as the highest class of Society, not 
only at Court, but throughout Germany. According to the 
instructions they received, officers were not allowed to draw 
their weapons when insulted, but " immediate use of their 
arms was required should they be assaulted." According 
to Dilthey's widely read textbook " every officer, non- 
commissioned officer, and soldier is entitled to use his 
arms if assaulted. He may use the arms which the Emperor 
has given him for the protection of his person and of his 
honour. Therefore arms must be used on suitable occasions, 
and they must be used with an energy commensurate to 
the dangerousness of the opponent." A civiUan who in 
peace time lifted his hand against a German officer, even if 
the officer was the aggressor, risked being sabred or shot. 
Their highly privileged position and the right to use their 
weapons were apt to make the German officers overbearing, 
create men of the von Forstner type, and arouse much 
dissatisfaction among the body of the citizens. 

At the time of the excitement caused by the publication 
of the German Emperor's interview in the Daily Telegraph 
the Socialist members of the Reichstag proposed that the 
Imperial Chancellor should be made responsible to the 
Reichstag by an amendment of the Constitution. The 
Reichstag did not accept that proposal. After the Zabern 
scandal the Frankfurter Zeitung and other influential Liberal 
and Radical journals proposed that supplies should be with- 
held when the next budget came up for discussion, unless 
the outraged citizens received full satisfaction. However, 
once more it was unUkely that the Reichstag would quarrel 
with the Imperial Government, which meant with the Em- 
peror himself, for the Emperor was the Government. 

Parhament holds the power of the purse. The Reichstag 
could hope to limit the power of absolutism only by with- 
holding supphes and bringing the Government to a stand- 
still. Democratic Parliaments can use that power with 
great effect, but the German Reichstag could not do so. 
In parliamentarily governed countries the refusal of suppUes 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 379 

by the people brings the government to a standstill, and 
automatically brings about the fall of the governing states- 
men. In Germany such a refusal would have had no 
similar efEect. In Great Britain and other democratic 
monarchies the people rule through their elected repre- 
sentatives, who appoint the officials, and the King carries 
out the will of the people. In Germany the Emperor ruled 
through his officials with the assistance of the Reichstag, 
and if the Reichstag, as the less important part of the 
Government, should have refused to assist in governing 
the country, the Government would simply have been carried 
on without its assistance. According to Laband and 
other leading writers on German Constitutional Law the 
co-operation of the Reichstag for providing supplies was 
only theoretically necessary. If suppUes were not voted, 
the last year's taxes and imposts were automatically 
renewed, and were collected by the officials, for the Reich- 
stag had no authority to abrogate existing taxation. The 
Handbuch fiir Sozialdemokratische Wdhler stated quite 
correctly : 

" Opinions differ as to the Reichstag's power of with- 
holding suppUes. However, so much is certain, that 
taxes and other sources of the national income, which have 
once been voted, cannot be discontinued in consequence 
of the Reichstag's veto." 

The question whether Prusso-Germany could be governed 
if the deputies should have refused to vote supplies was in 
the last resort rather a question of practical politics than 
of constitutional theory. In 1863 the Prussian Parliament 
refused to allow the doubhng of the army and refused 
supplies. Nevertheless the army was doubled. Bismarck 
did not shrink from a conflict with Parliament, and the 
necessary taxes were collected against Parliament's will. 
The German citizens were very law-abiding and they 
possessed a strong sense of caution. It would have been 
dangerous for them to quarrel with a ruler who disposed 



S80 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

of 1,350,000 officials and of an army of 800,000 men in time 
of peace. 

Both at the time of the Daily Telegraph interview and 
of the Zabern incident the Reichstag refused to act with 
vigour against the Government because it recognised its 
powerlessness. Had it entered upon a conflict with the 
Government, which would have meant with the Emperor, 
it would probably have been defeated by the Emperor, 
who not only absolutely controlled the bureaucracy and 
the army, but who had power over the national purse as 
well. In every conflict between the people and the Govern- 
ment the passionate outbursts of the Reichstag were only 
of momentary duration, because its members were aware 
that a serious conflict with the Emperor's Government 
would not have led to the resignation of the Chancellor or to 
the diminution of the Emperor's prerogative, but that it 
would have led either to the dissolution of the Reichstag — 
according to Article 12 of the Constitution the Emperor 
had the right to dissolve it — or to a coup d'etat and an 
alteration of the Constitution, which would have made the 
Reichstag powerless for the future. 

Prussia was a strongly Conservative, one might almost 
say an anti-democratic, State. Yet Bismarck created in 
the German Reichstag a Parliament based on the most 
democratic franchise in the world. He did so, not actuated 
by a sense of justice and fitness, but compelled by necessity. 
When, in 1866, Prussia risked her existence in a struggle 
with Austria, Bismarck offered to the people, who had been 
vainly clamouring for parhamentary institutions for de- 
cades, a democratic Parliament so as to obtain the neces- 
sary support of the very influential German Liberals and 
Democrats for that most dangerous war. However, Bis- 
marck was not in love with the democratic franchise. He 
did not endeavour to democratise the Prussian Parliament 
(the Landtag), which was elected under the most anti- 
democratic franchise in the world, and he quarrelled inces- 
santly with the Reichstag and contemplated its destruction 
by a coup d'etat. 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 381 

The historian Professor Hans Deibriick, a well-informed 
man, has told us in volumes 147 and 153 of the Preussische 
Jahrbiicher, and in his Regierung und Volkswille, that 
Bismarck intended to destroy the power of the Reichstag 
by a coup d'etat. In 1884 the Federal Council, which 
represented the rulers and the Governments of the individual 
German States, had, at Bismarck's desire, solemnly declared 
that the German Empire was a free and voluntary federa- 
tion of the German sovereigns, and that this federation 
could, in case of need, again be dissolved. When William II. 
came to the throne Bismarck thought that the time was 
ripe for action. Having found himself confronted by a 
hostile majority in the Reichstag, he mapped out the fol- 
lowing plan. He wished to dissolve the Reichstag by the 
Emperor's authority — expecting that the sudden dissolu- 
tion would lead to Socialist demonstrations in the streets. 
These would be repressed with the greatest energy. 
Blood would flow in the principal towns. Riots and revolts 
would take place. A state approaching civil war would 
be created. Then the German Emperor was to declare that 
he could no longer govern Germany under the existing 
conditions. He would renounce the Imperial Grown. 
All the German sovereigns would be called to a conference. 
The suggestion would then be made by them that the 
German Empire should be reconstituted under the Presi- 
dency of the King of Prussia, but the King of Prussia would 
declare that he would be willing to reassume the Imperial 
Crown only if the Imperial Constitution was altered, if all 
those Germans who pursued a policy hostile to the State, 
and especially all Socialists, were disfranchised, and if the 
secrecy of the ballot was abolished. The sanguinary riots 
and the dramatic renunciation of the Crown by the German 
Emperor would have created an enormous sensation through- 
out Germany. In their patriotic excitement and zeal the 
German people would probably have enthusiastically 
supported the projected reform of the franchise. The 
crisis would have been over in a few days, and the electors 
would have discovered when it was too late that th,ey had 



382 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

assisted in destroying the only democratic institution of 
Germany. 

Herr Delbriick's information as to Bismarck's intentions 
is amply corroborated by conversations between Prince 
Bismarck and the Prime Minister of Wiirtemberg, von 
Mittnacht, and between the German Emperor and Prince 
Hohenlohe reported in their Memoirs, by a conversation 
between Bismarck and Herr Kaemmel, published by the 
Grenzhoten in 1907, and by Bismarck's letter to Herr von 
Helldorf, the leader of the Conservative Party, written in 
1887, in which Bismarck stated : " I will devote the last 
years of my life to correcting my greatest mistake, the 
universal vote and the secrecy of the poU." Numerous 
allusions to the necessity of abolishing the secrecy of the 
vote and of disfranchising the Socialists and other enemies 
of the Empire may be found in Bismarck's public speeches 
and in his reported conversations. In his Memoirs we 
read : "I have hinted in public speeches that the King of 
Prussia might find himself compelled to lean for support 
on the foundations afforded to him by the Prussian Con- 
stitution, if the Reichstag should carry its hindrance to the 
monarchical establishment beyond the limits of the endur- 
able." In other places also Bismarck expressed the hope 
that the German people would have the courage and 
strength to rid themselves of the Reichstag if it should 
prove itself a hindrance to Germany's development. Accord- 
ing to the Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe, WiUiam II. told 
the Prince that he was unwilling to act upon Bismarck's 
suggestion and to begin his reign by shooting his subjects 
and effecting a coup d'etat. The Emperor's refusal to act 
his part was apparently the principal reason for his rupture 
with Prince Bismarck and for Bismarck's subsequent dis- 
missal. 

Since Bismarck's dismissal the idea of weakening the 
Reichstag and of abolishing Germany's democratic franchise 
by a coup d'etat has frequently been contemplated by Ger- 
man statesmen and politicians. Especially the small but 
mighty party of the feudal Conservatives, who hate demo- 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 383 

cracy, had been anxious that the Government should destroy 
the Reichstag's power by violence. 

In 1906-1907, when there was a great agitation for the 
increase of the German Navy, and when the Reichstag 
seemed disinchned to vote the funds required, many leading 
German politicians and newspapers recommended that 
the Government should provide the necessary funds by a 
cowp d'etat, should the Reichstag prove obdurate ; that 
the Government should levy the necessary taxes with or 
without the Reichstag, and should, in case of need, govern 
against the will of Parliament or without Parliament. 
At the time of the General Election of 1907 the possibility 
of a coup d'etat was again universally discussed. Many 
Conservative politicians and many prominent Conservative 
journals, such as the Kreuz-Zeitung , the Post, the Deutsche 
Tageszeitung, the Hamburger Nachrichten, demanded an 
Imperial coup d'etat disguised in the phrase " Reform of 
the Franchise " ; and Prince Biilow seemed to contemplate 
the possibility of abolishing, or at least modifying, parlia- 
mentary government in Germany by force of arms if an 
anti-expansionist Reichstag should be elected, for in his 
election manifesto he threatened the anti-expansionist part 
of the German community in no uncertain tone with " the 
sword of Buonaparte." On the 19th of February 1910 
Prince Hatzfeldt said in the Reichstag : 

" The universal and secret vote has a history. The 
present franchise is indissolubly connected with the German 
Empire. It has welded together North and South Germany. 
However, an alteration of the franchise may come in ques- 
tion if the Reichstag should have a majority which threatens 
the conditions essential to the life of the Empire." 

Until 1918 the Conservatives maintained a predominant 
position in the Reichstag, partly because the Conservative 
deputies belonged to the ruling caste and because the 
Conservative Party was considered to be the Government 
party, partly because they knew how to increase their 
weight in that assembly by a skilful policy and by a judicious 



384 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

co-operation with other parties, partly because they were 
much over-represented. In 1871 Germany was divided into 
parliamentary districts. Since that time the population 
in the rural districts, which were dominated by the Con- 
servatives, had remained stationary and had dechned in 
many instances, while the population in the industrial towns 
had increased enormously. The Government and the 
Conservative Party had strenuously opposed the redistri- 
bution of seats, and the result was that the democratic 
towns were greatly under-represented, while the Conserva- 
tive rural districts were greatly over-represented in the 
Reichstag. In 1907 the electoral district of Teltow near 
Berlin had 248,000 electors, while that of Lauenburg had 
only 13,000 ; the district of Bochum-Gelsenkirchen had 
144,000 voters, while Schaumburg-Lippe had only 10,000 
voters, etc. The parhamentary strength of the Conserva- 
tive Party was largely due to the prevalence of rotten 
boroughs and to the intimidation of the rural voters by the 
Conservative landowners. 

The under-representation of the democratic parties in 
the Lower House of Prussia was still more startling owing 
to the three-classes system by which the Prussian masses 
were disfranchised. By far the largest party in Germany 
were the Social Democratic Party. Yet, until 1908, not a 
single Social Democrat had been able to obtain a seat in 
the " Representative " Assembly of Prussia, while the Con- 
servative contingent always exceeded two hundred. Pre- 
vious to the War there were in the Prussian Landtag only 
six Social Democrats, as compared with 212 Conservatives, 
although there were in Prussia three times as many Social 
Democratic voters as Conservative voters. 

Dissatisfaction with Governmental absolutism in all its 
manifestations — the Zabern incident was only one out 
of thousands — had greatly strengthened the democratic 
parties of Germany, and the overbearing attitude of the 
German bureaucracy and the sense of injustice done to the 
people had particularly increased the number of the demo- 
cratic extremists, the Socialists. Since the foundation of 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 385 

the Empire the number of SociaHst votes polled at the 
Reichstag elections had increased as follows : 



1871 


101,927 vote* 


1881 


311,969 ,, 


1890 


. 1,427,098 „ 


1903 


. 3,010,771 „ 


1912 


. 4,260,400 „ 



In 1912 considerably more than one-third of the men who 
voted for the Reichstag voted for Socialist candidates. 
That fact alone shows that there was something radically 
wrong in German domestic politics, that there was wide- 
spread dissatisfaction among the German people. While 
in 1912 the Socialists polled 4,250,400, the two Conservative 
parties poUed together only 1,493,500 votes. Yet the 
influence of the fifty-eight Conservative members in the 
Reichstag was far greater than that of the 110 Socialists. 
Bismarck skilfully split up the German Liberal Party, 
setting one faction against the other. Had the democratic 
parties united, had the German Liberals and Socialists co- 
operated in the Reichstag against the Conservative parties, 
they would have had the majority. Although they could 
not have controlled the German administration, over which 
the Reichstag had no influence, they could at least have 
controlled German legislation, and absolutist legislation 
would have become impossible. Considering the parUa- 
mentary position of Germany, I wrote in the Nineteenth 
Century and After in February 1914 : 



" The Government is so strongly entrenched in its position 
by the Emperor's control over the services and over the 
national purse, and by Germany's feudal constitution, that 
a Democratic Parliament cannot hope to obtain control 
over the Government by gradual pressure, by orderly parlia- 
mentary means. A democratic Reichstag can obtain such 
control only by a revolution, and a revolution is impossible 
in Germany as long as the army remains loyal to the 
Emperor. Only a great defeat might democratise the 
country." 



386 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

From year to year the German people was becoming 
more democratically inclined. From year to year the dis- 
satisfaction of the population with the form of Government 
was increasing. With nearly every election the strength 
of the democratic elements in the Reichstag was growing, 
while that of the Conservative elements was dwindling. 
From year to year the Conservative elements were more 
hardly pressed by the advance of Democracy. Every year 
absolutist legislation became more impossible. German 
absolutism felt that its influence was waning. Hence its 
most daring supporters called from year to year more 
loudly for violent measures with which to stem the demo- 
cratic tide. 

Germany was rich, but Germany was very dissatisfied. 
Those who were powerful were discontented because they 
were not wealthy, and those who were wealthy because 
they were not powerful. The Conservatives were dis- 
satisfied because Liberalism and Socialism were rapidly 
increasing, and the Liberals and Socialists because they 
had no power and no influence, although they formed the 
large majority of the citizens, possessed the bulk of the 
country's wealth, and paid by far the largest part of the 
taxes. 

The German Conservatives believed in force as a policy. 
They wished to Prussianise Germany by force, and to 
establish by force the supremacy of absolutism in Germany, 
and the supremacy of Germany in Europe and in the world. 

The views of many German Conservatives as to Germany's 
domestic policy were unreservedly given in Frymann's 
Wenn Ich der Kaiser War' (Leipzig, 1912). The book cost 
35., and had a large circulation. The copy in my possession 
is marked 12th to 15th thousand. " Frymann " is a pseu- 
donym. As the author intimated that he was grown up 
at the time of the Franco-German War, he must have been 
about sixty years old. The views of German Conservatives 
as to Germany's foreign policy were well stated in the book 
Unsere Zukunft by General von Bernhardi (Berlin, 1912). 
An English translation of this book has been published 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 387 

under the title Britain as Germany's Vassal, by Messrs. Wm. 
Dawson & Sous, Ltd., London. Both books were repre- 
sentative of a large literature. ^ 

" Frymann," like most German Conservatives, was very 
dissatisfied with the German franchise. He urged a reform 
of the election law and advocated the formation of five 
classes of electors. Votes should not merely be counted 
but be weighed. Agricultural estate-owners and other 
large employers of labour should be given a number of votes 
corresponding to the number of hands employed. On 
principle the weight of votes should be proportionate to the 
amount of taxation paid, but men of high culture and of 
great administrative ability should receive a considerable 
number of votes. Those paying no taxes should have no 
vote. The result of the policy advocated would be that 
the property-owning and educated classes would at all 
times command a majority in Parliament. Continuing, the 
author proposed that the Government should alter the 
franchise by a coup d'etat. He wrote : 

" We must alter the electoral law at any price, and even 
at the price of a conflict between the Government and 
people, at the price of a coup d'etat. That sounds frivolous 
and brutal. However, it is the same thing as if a father 
resolves that a serious operation must be performed upon 
his child in order to save its life. Pohtically the German 
nation is ill unto death. It can be saved only by an altera- 
tion of the Constitution, and if the Constitution cannot be 
altered owing to the opposition of Parliament, then it must 
be altered notwithstanding the will of Parliament, exactly 
as a father orders the surgeon to operate on a child against 
the child's will. 

" We must consider in this connexion the possible occur- 
rence of foreign difficulties. England's envy, France's 
thirst for revenge, and Germany's need of expansion create 
antagonisms which cannot be aboUshed unless Germany is 
wilUng to abandon her position as a Great Power. Therefore 
all who love the German people, and wish to accelerate the 
advent of a crisis, will long for the outbreak of a war which 
will wake all the wholesome and strong forces of the nation. 

" If Germany should be victorious there will occur a great 



388 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

moral revival similar to that resulting from the Franco- 
German War, and it will have similar political results. A 
Reichstag with a large patriotic majority will be elected. 
As that sentiment may be only transient, it should immedi- 
ately be utilised. Immediately the Constitution should be 
altered by the aboHtion of the present franchise. 

"If we should be defeated — that, after all, is possible — 
the present internal disunion would increase. It would 
become a curse. It could be converted into order only by 
the absolute will of a Dictator. A Dictatorship, supported 
by the Army and all patriots, could then effect the necessary 
revision of the Constitution." 

*' Frymann " was anxious to combat Socialism by a 
drastic anti- Socialist Law drafted after the Bismarckian 
model. He wrote : 

" In accordance with its provisions every action should be 
prohibited which might serve to undermine, or threaten to 
undermine, the existing order of State and Society. Meetings, 
societies, journals, and periodicals of subversive tendency 
should not be tolerated. The masses should be freed from the 
present leaders of the Party of Subversion. All Sociahst 
members of the Imperial Diet and the various State Parlia- 
ments, all leaders and officers of the Sociahst Party, all 
editors, pubhshers, and journaUsts connected with Socialist 
papers and pubhcations, and all Socialist officers of Trades 
Unions, in short, all who stand in the service of the Socialist 
propaganda, should be expelled from the German Empire. 
All Anarchists should receive the same treatment." 

The author was, of course, an uncompromising anti- 
Semite : 

"It is absolutely necessary that the frontiers should be 
completely closed against the immigration of Jews. It is 
equally indispensable that foreign Jews who have not yet 
acquired citizen rights should be expelled without delay 
and without consideration. 

" However hard it may seem to the German sense of 
justice, we must restrict the rights of resident Jews. The 
good may suffer together with the bad, but necessity must 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 389 

steel our hearts to pity. We must demand that all Jews in 
Germany be placed under alien law. 

" The question at once arises : Wlio is a Jew ? We must 
differentiate between race and faith. Jews are a race, and 
those who have changed their faith are Jews still. We 
must further re-establish the old Germanic principle that in 
case of marriages between Jews and Christians the descend- 
ants belong to the inferior race. Therefore it should be 
laid down that all those are Jews who belonged to the 
Jewish faith on the 18th of January 1871 or who are de- 
scendants of those who were Jews at that date, even if only 
one of the parents was a Jew." 

The following measures should be taken : 

" Jews should be excluded from all public employments 
in the gift of the Empire, the single States and the local 
authorities, whether such emplojmaent be in consideration 
of a remuneration or purely honorary and gratuitous. Jews 
should not be admitted to the service of the Army and Navy. 
Jews should neither vote nor be elected. They should be 
excluded from the profession of the law, and they should not 
teach in schools. They should not manage theatres. News- 
papers which have Jews for contributors should clearly 
state that fact. The other newspapers, which one may 
call German newspapers, should neither be owned by Jews 
nor have Jewish managers, editors, or journalists. Banks 
should not be conducted by Jews unless they are private 
banks. Landed property should neither be owned by Jews 
nor be hypothecated to them. In consideration for the 
protection which Jews enjoy as aliens they should have to 
pay double taxes." 

The miUions of Poles, Frenchmen, and Danes annexed by 
Germany should, according to " Frymann," be Germanised 
by force : 

" We must demand that the members elected by the 
PoUsh nation into the German ParUament should have 
only the right to speak, but not to vote, and that they 
could demand to be heard only on questions which 
touch the Poles or the district inhabited by them. If it 
should be found that this provision is evaded by their co- 



390 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

operating with one of the ParUamentary parties, the right 
to vote and the right to be elected should be definitely 
taken away from the Poles. Pohsh newspapers and 
periodicals should under all circumstances give a German 
translation of the Polish text, and the only language per- 
missible at public meetings of Poles should be German. . . . 
". . . We have acquired Alsace-Lorraine because the 
territory is militarily necessary to us. The inhabitants 
were thrown in. We have given them the option either to 
become German subjects or to emigrate into France after 
the acquisition of their country. Now we must give them 
a second option, but a more thorough one. Every inhabi- 
tant of Alsace-Lorraine who is of age should publicly de- 
clare that he is an unconditional supporter of the German 
Empire and he should enter into the obligation not to use 
the French language in public or within his own house, nor 
should he obtain newspapers, periodicals, or books from 
France. Those who refuse to enter into this obligation 
should have to leave the country without delay. Those 
who contravene the foregoing should be expelled. All 
private schools should be closed, and French should be 
taught only as a foreign language, and no more time should 
be devoted to it than is devoted to French in the other 
parts of Germany. Newspapers printed in French should be 
compelled to issue at the same time a German translation 
of the French text. The Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine 
should be aboUshed and its administration be placed under 
a Minister with dictatorial powers. The Danes in Schleswig- 
Holstein should receive the same treatment." 

While " Frymann " recommended estabHshing the supre- 
macy of absolutism in Germany by force, General von 
Bernhardi proposed in Unsere Zukunft to establish by 
force the supremacy of Germany in Europe and throughout 
the world. He recognised that Germany's expansion was 
restrained by the balance of power in Europe, that Germany 
could not expand because the forces of the Triple Alliance 
and the Triple Entente were about equally strong : 

" We can render secure our position on the Continent of 
Europe only if we succeed in bursting the Triple Entente 
and forcing France, which is never likelv to co-operate with 



HOW THE mLITARY RULED GER]\IANY 391 

Germany, to accept that position of inferiority which is 
her due." 

General von Bernhardi hated Great Britain with a pas- 
sionate hatred, partly because her adhesion to the Franco- 
Russian Alliance had re-established the balance of power 
in Europe, partly because he envied Great Britain her 
enormous possessions, partly because he despised her for 
not possessing a national army. According to him " armed 
strength in its moral, intellectual, and physical aspects is 
the truest measure of civiUsation." Moreover, he beheved 
that Great Britain wished to destroy Germany : 

" Only England has an interest in bringing about a general 
European war which would necessarily involve Germany. In 
the first place England finds it from day to day more difficult 
to man her rapidly increasing fleet. She seems to be approach- 
ing the limits of her naval capacity. In the second place 
the Baltic and North Sea Canal will soon be finished, and its 
completion wiU yield considerable military advantages to 
Germany. Lastly, the German Navy grows from year to 
year, so that the conclusion lies near that the comparative 
strength of the two countries will gradually be altered to 
England's disadvantage. In the Mediterranean the Austrian 
and the Italian navies are about to be strengthened. All 
these circumstances make it clearly desirable for England 
to bring about a war as soon as possible and to obtain the 
assistance of France and Russia for such an undertaking. . . . 

" German competition, German enterprise, and German 
industry hamper Englishmen throughout the world, and 
often prove superior. It is England's interest to destroy 
Germany's competition, especially as the German nation 
has the greatest ability among the nations of Europe and 
the greatest hope of expansion, for it is a maritime State 
of the first rank. It threatens to obtain a predominant 
position on the Continent, to disturb the balance of power 
in Europe which is so profitable to England, and to develop 
a navy which may become dangerous to Great Britain. 
Great Britain has aUied herself with Russia and France in 
order to keep Germany down, to prevent her political 
development and to destroy her fleet. We cannot be 
deceived on that point. The German Fleet must be de- 
26 



392 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

stroyed. That is the Alpha and the Omega of British policy. 
It is the necessary and logical consequence of the Triple 
Entente." 

General von Bernhardi had not a very high opinion of 
the British Fleet : 

" The British Fleet is an extremely powerful opponent. 
However, it suffers from a national weakness. It is already 
difficult to secure a sufficient supply of men, and especially 
of the higher ratings. Therefore, unless universal com- 
pulsory service be introduced, a distinct limit is put to the 
increase of the British Fleet. Besides, the German artillery 
is at least as good as the English ; perhaps it is better. 
The same apphes to the torpedo boats. Lastly, the newest 
English ships correspond in no way to expectations." 

The General thought that a war with Great Britain 
was inevitable because Great Britain would never allow 
Germany to acquire great colonial possessions. He wrote : 

" We must enlarge Germany's colonial possessions and 
acquire adequate territories suitable for the settlement of 
white men. However, we cannot disguise from ourselves 
the fact that England will undoubtedly oppose Germany's 
acquisition of valuable Colonies, of coaUng stations and 
naval bases. Colonies situated in the Temperate Zone can 
scarcely be acquired without a war with other States. 

" Exactly as Bismarck clearly recognised in his time, 
that a healthy development of Prussia and Germany would 
be possible only when the differences between Austria and 
Prussia had finally been settled, so every German who looks 
at the matter without prejudice is convinced that Germany's 
further development as a world -Power is possible only when 
the existing Anglo-German competition has come to an end. 
Exactly as a cordial alhance was possible between Germany 
and Austria only after the Austro-German War of 1866, so 
we shall obtain an understanding with England, which 
from many points of view is desirable, only after an Anglo - 
German war." 

General von Bernhardi recommended that Grermany 
should secure the co-operation of the United States against 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 393 

Great Britain and that Germany should weaken Great 
Britain's power of resistance by fomenting risings through- 
out the British Empire : 

" There is a distinct conflict of interests between the 
United States and England, firstly, because the United 
States are England's most dangerous competitor in the 
trade of the world and especially with Eastern Asia ; 
secondly, because the United States are determined not in 
any case to submit to England's naval predominance. The 
Dominion of Canada forms another point of friction between 
the two States, whilst there are no material differences 
between the United States and Germany. It is true that 
peaceful division of the world between England and the 
United States is conceivable. However, no indications 
can at present be found of such an understanding. As 
matters are at present, the enormous increase in England's 
power which would flow from the defeat of Germany would 
be opposed to the interests of the United States. It follows 
that the co-operation of the United States and of Germany 
would be in the interests of both countries. 

"It is to be borne in mind that in the English Colonies, 
in India, South Africa, and Egypt, there is explosive material 
in large quantities, so that it seems by no means unthinkable 
that revolts and national risings would occur in the event 
that England should be engaged in an unfortunate or 
dangerous war. These are circumstances with which we 
have to count, and it is our duty to make the best use of 
them. . . . England would probably feel inclined to con- 
clude peace if, in the course of a European war in which 
she was engaged, risings and revolts took place in her Colonies 
which threatened her pre-eminent position. It may be 
considered as a matter which does not admit of dispute that 
in India, in Egypt, and in South Africa there is sufficient 
inflammable material." 

General von Bernhardi thought that Great Britain and 
Germany could come to an understanding only if Great 
Britain was wilUng to abandon her allies on the Continent 
and allow Germany to deal with them as she pleased. He 
thought that Great Britain and Germany could conclude 
an alliance only if Great Britain agreed not to oppose in 
any way Germany's oversea expansion, and if she agreed to 



394 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

redistribute her fleet so as to allow Germany to rule the 
North Sea. The General wrote : 

" There are two possibilities of arriving at an under- 
standing with England. An agreement with her can be 
either lasting or transient. If a lasting agreement is desired, 
the important interests of Germany must be safeguarded. 
Nothing must remain that could impede their necessary 
development. This demand makes it necessary for England 
to abandon its claim to a predominant position in the world. 
It involves England's recognition that England and Germany 
have equal rights. England would have to give an absolutely 
free hand to Germany in Europe, and would have to agree 
beforehand to any increase of power of Germany on the 
Continent which might arise out of a Central-European 
federation of States or out of a Franco-German war. England 
would have to abandon its diplomatic opposition to Ger- 
many's colonial policy as long as Germany does not strive to 
acquire Colonies at England's cost. England would have 
to agree not to oppose Austria's expansion in the Balkan 
Peninsula, nor to oppose Germany's economic policy in 
Asia Minor, nor the development of the German Navy and 
the acquisition of coahng stations. 

" Whether such an understanding would take the form 
of an alhance is an open question. In reality it would for 
most purposes be equal to an Anglo-German alliance, and 
on the basis of such an understanding England and Germany 
could peacefully settle their economic interests. Such an 
agreement of the two great Germanic States would create 
an irresistible political force which would promote the 
development of both nations in every way. It would 
create a factor for civilisation which would more than any 
other promote human progress. Thus a practical way 
would be found to banish war and the danger of war for 
ever, or at least to restrict its danger. Peace in Europe 
would be secured by England's approaching the Triple 
Alhance. At the same time a powerful counterpoise would 
be created to the growing influence of the United States. 
The pressure of East European Slavism would be diminished 
and a powerful wall would be raised against the millions 
of yellow men in the Far East. 

" It would be seen that such an understanding between 
England and Germany would have the most far-reaching 



HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 395 

advantages not only to the two countries but to all mankind. 
However, it is clear that England would have to alter her 
entire policy. The basis of all negotiations should be the 
demand that England would abandon the Triple Entente 
and redistribute her fleet. After all, it is clear to every 
thinking man that England and Germany can never enter 
into friendly and cordial relations as long as Great Britain 
is alhed with Germany's enemies. Besides, Germany 
could never have any confidence as to the honesty of 
England's peaceful intentions as long as the entire British 
Navy is concentrated in the North Sea and kept ready for 
an attack upon Germany." 

General von Bernhardi evidently strove to secure for 
Germany not only supremacy in Europe but supremacy 
throughout the world. He wished to conclude an Anglo- 
German alliance, but Germany was to be the predominant 
partner. Great Britain was to help Germany to become 
a world-Power, but in order to be on good terms with 
Germany she was to disarm. She was to redistribute her 
fleet and apparently leave the protection of her shores to 
Germany. According to General von Bernhardi a durable 
understanding between the two Powers could be concluded 
only if Great Britain would consent to become Grermany's 
vassal. 

Concluding my article in the Nineteenth Century and After 
in February 1914 upon which this chapter is based I stated : 

" The Germans are frequently described as a peaceful 
nation. They would more correctly be described as a well- 
drilled and well-disciphned nation. They are firmly ruled 
by a small class through an all-powerful bureaucracy, army, 
and police. Absolute obedience to official orders is the first 
duty of the citizen and the first law of the State. The well- 
drilled Germans are a law-abiding people and their obedience 
is absolute. Orderly grumbhng, if done in moderation, 
is permitted. Hence, if the people are dissatisfied with 
their rulers or disapprove of their policy, they may pro- 
test but they will obey. That was seen in 1866. Then the 
Prussians passionately protested against the " Bruderkrieg,'* 
the fratricidal war, against Austria. Yet they obeyed and 
fought. The Government has crushed the spirit of the 



396 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 

people. This lack of spirit constitutes Grermany's strength 
but also her weakness. German enthusiasts have always 
greatly admired, democratic government, but, unlike French- 
men, Englishmen, Americans, Italians, Swiss, and Dutch, 
they have never seriously fought for it. They were at best 
half-hearted supporters of revolution. The nation rose 
only, as in 1813 against Napoleon, when ordered by the 
Government. In Germany the Government does not carry 
out the will of the people, but the people execute the will 
of the Government, and those who try to prove that Ger- 
many is peaceful because the German merchants, clergy- 
men, and working men do not wish for war, only show 
that they are unacquainted with Germany's political char- 
acter and organisation and with the elementary facts of 
German history. The majority of Germans are undoubtedly 
peaceful, hut that peaceful majority will go to war with alacrity 
as soon as the ruling minority gives the signal. There is a 
great difference between democratic and autocratic Germany, 
a difference which is not sufficiently appreciated in other 
countries. Democratic Germany talks much, but does not 
act ; autocratic Germany acts, but does not talk. Democratic 
Germany has filled the newspapers with loud complaints 
about the Zabern incident ; autocratic Germany has not 
talked at Zabern, but has acted, and the incident has closed 
with the victory of autocratic Germany, Herein lies the 
lesson of Zabern." 

Only too soon my forecast was to come true. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

HOW THE ARMY HAS RUINED GERMANY i 

On the 28th of February 1870, four months before the 
outbreak of the Franco -German ¥7ar, Colonel Stoffel, the 
French Military Attache in Berlin, sent to his Government 
a report in which he stated : "La Prusse n'est pas un 
pays qui a une armee ; c'est une armee qui possede un 
pays." Careful investigation will show that not the German 
Emperor, the Crown Prince, the Junkers, or the professors, 
but the German Army was chiefly responsible for the great 
tragedy of the War ; that the army was largely responsible 
for the mismanagement of Germany's foreign poHcy before 
the outbreak ; that the army had forced Great Britain and 
Italy into the ranks of Germany's enemies ; that the 
army was responsible for the unexampled treachery and 
mendacity of Germany's diplomacy ; that the army was 
responsible for the hideous barbarities perpetrated by 
Germany everywhere ; that the army drove the United 
States into open hostility with Germany. The army which 
had made modern Germany has been responsible for Grer- 
many's downfall not only by its illegitimate activities in 
the political sphere, but even by its professional faiUngs, 
which will be described in these pages. Hence the army, 
not only its head, the Emperor, should be held responsible 
by the world, and especially by the German people them- 
selves. In the course of these pages I shall show that 
the control of the German Army had fallen into the hands 
of military intriguers who completely mismanaged the War. 
I shall show in these pages that, had Germany followed 

1 From the Nineteenth Century and After, April 1916. 
397 



398 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

the wise and far-seeing plan of campaign laid down by 
Moltke, with Bismarck's co-operation, for the eventuality 
of a war with France and Russia, Great Britain and Italy 
might have remained neutral and Germany might easily 
have defeated France and Russia and have acquired the 
domination of the Continent of Europe in a few months, 
and possibly in a few weeks, at a comparatively trifling cost 
in human lives and treasure. I shall show, furthermore, 
that she failed in this because she allowed the direction 
of her foreign policy and of the State to be grasped by 
reckless mihtary adventurers who mismanaged both her 
diplomatic and her miUtary campaigns. 

Bismarck and Moltke had accustomed Germany to short 
and decisive wars, prepared by faultless diplomacy and 
carried out by matchless strategy. The war of 1864 against 
Denmark lasted only a few days. The war of Prussia against 
Austria, the Seven Weeks' War, began on the 26th of June 
1866 with the fighting at Hiihnerwasser. On the 3rd of July 
the battle of Koniggratz was won. The war was decided 
by seven days' fighting. On the 19th of July 1870 France 
declared war on Prussia. On the 2nd of August the first 
encounter took place at Saarbriicken. By the 2nd of Sep- 
tember Napoleon III. and his entire army had been made 
prisoners at Sedan, and the remaining two French armies 
had been severely defeated and had withdrawn into Metz, 
which was closely invested by German troops. The issue 
of the war had been decided in exactly a month's fighting. 
If General Steinmetz had obeyed Moltke's orders, the two 
French armies would not have succeeded in reaching Metz, 
but would have found their Sedan in front of that fortress. 
All Germany looked, and not without reason, for another 
lightning campaign at the outbreak of the War. 

Although it is universally believed that warfare by a few 
strokes of lightning-like rapidity was initiated by Moltke, 
that it is a Prussian invention, this is a mistake. It was 
first practised by Napoleon I. The most rapid and the 
most complete defeat known to military history was his 
defeat of Prussia in the Jena campaign of 1806. Modern 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 399 

German strategy was based not on that of Frederick the 
Great but on that of Napoleon I. As Prussia had, in 1806, 
been completely defeated in a great and decisive battle 
three days after the beginning of hostilities, surprise attack 
and sudden defeat by a great and decisive battle became 
the watchword of German strategists. Karl von Clause- 
witz, the greatest German writer on strategy and a pupil 
of the celebrated Scharnhorst, who had taken part in the 
terrible Jena campaign as aide-de-camp to Prince August 
of Prussia, wrote in his classical treatise On War : 

" From the very conception of war it is obvious that the 
following are the principal maxims regarding the use of 
battles : 

" (1) The destruction of the enemy's military force is the 
most important object of war. 

" (2) This destruction can best be effected by means of 
a battle. 

" (3) Only great and general battles can have a decisive 
effect upon warfare. 

" The battle is the bloodiest way of solving the problem 
of war. Its principal effect consists not in killing the 
enemy's soldiers, but in destroying his courage. A true 
conception of war and general experience lead us to look 
only to a great battle for the decision of a war. Instances 
of a great battle deciding the whole campaign have been 
frequent in modern times. A deliberately planned great 
battle must therefore be regarded as the principal aim and 
object of a campaign. A General must strive to throw his 
whole weight into the scales in the first battle. He must 
endeavour to win everjrthing by a single but most powerful 
stroke. Bonaparte hardly ever entered upon a war without 
endeavouring to defeat the enemy and to conquer his country 
in a first and decisive encounter." 

The wars of 1866 and 1870, like Napoleon's model cam- 
paign of 1806, were won by superior preparedness and 
superior numbers, by a surprise attack made with the 
greatest energy upon an unready and hesitating enemy. 
In accordance with Clause witz's precept, they were rather 
won by killing the enemy's courage than by killing his 



400 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

soldiers. One might almost say that these wars were won 
by bluff, for they were won at an incredibly small cost in 
lives. According to the German official account the two 
great wars by which modern Germany was created resulted 
in the following losses : 

Prussian Losses in the Wab of 1866 

4,450 killed in battle 
6,427 died of disease 
16,177 wounded 



Total . . 27,054 

The casualties of the Franco-German War of 1870-71 are 
stated in greater detail in the official history. They were 
as follows : 

German Losses in the War of 1870-71 





OflBcers. 


Men. 


Homes. 


Killed or died of wounds . 


1,871 


26,397 


7,325 


Wounded 


4,184 


84,304 


5,547 


Missing . . . . 


102 


12,752 


1,723 



Total . . . 6,157 123,453 14,595 

Prussia defeated Austria in 1866 and acquired vast terri- 
tories and the leadership of Germany at the cost of merely 
10,877 human lives, and Germany defeated France in 1870-71 
and acquired Alsace-Lorraine with more than 2,000,000 
inhabitants at the cost of only 28,268 human lives. Com- 
pared with the present war, which has infficted at least 
8,000,000 casualties upon Germany, they were almost 
bloodless. Besides they were extremely profitable. They 
added vast territories and many millions of industrious 
citizens to the State, In addition, like Napoleon's campaign 
of 1806, they brought in vast sums of money owing to the 
heavy contributions and the colossal monetary indenmities 
exacted. 

Germany owed her victory over France in 1870-71 chiefly 
to her overwhelming superiority in men and guns. According 
to the German official history the French and German 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 401 

forces compared at the beginning of August 1870, when 
hostilities were opened, as follows : 





German Army. 


French Army. 


Battalions of Infantry 


474 


332 


Squadrons of Cavalry 


382 


222 


Giina . . . . 


. 1,584 


780 



Napoleon III. wrote in his (Euvres Posthumes : 

" Instead of having in line, as might have been expected, 
385,000 men to oppose the 430,000 of Northern Germany 
combined with the Southern States, the army, when the 
Emperor arrived at Metz on the 25th, of July, amounted 
only to 220,000, and, moreover, not only were the effectives 
not up to their full complement, but much indispensable 
war material was wanting." 

On paper the German and French forces stood almost in 
the proportion of two to one. If superior readiness, better 
leading, and the moral factor be taken into account, they 
stood approximately in the relation of three to one. France 
had no chance against Germany. According to the official 
Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften of 1889 the French and 
German forces engaged in some of the most telling battles 
were as follows : 





German Strength. 


French Strength. 


At Weissenburg 


48,000 infantry 


4,650 infantry 




2,950 cavalry 


'650 cavalry 




144 guns 


18 guns 


At Worth 


89,000 infantry 


42,800 infantry 




7,750 cavalry 


5,750 cavalry 




342 guns 


167 guns 


At Spichem . 


30,100 infantry 


24,400 infantry 




4,500 cavalry 


3,200 cavalry 




108 gions 


90 guns 


At Gravelotte 


. 166,400 infantry 


99,500 infantry 




21,200 cavalry 


13,300 cavalry^ 




732 guns 


520 guns 


At Beaumont 


. 116,200 infantry 


90,700 infantry 




16,100 cavalry 


10,000 cavalry 




*545 guna 


,468 guns 


At Sedan 


. 133,500 infantry 


90,000|^"^^^*^y 
I cavalry 




21,350 cavalry 




701 guns 


408 guns 



402 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

It will be noticed that Germany, especially in the open- 
ing battles of the war, had an absolutely overwhelming 
superiority in infantry, cavalry, and guns. 

Tactics largely depend upon strategy. As Germany had 
made it a strategical principle to attack by surprise and in 
overwhelming numbers, she made it a rule to fight with 
sledge-hammer blows. In view of her enormous superiority 
in men and guns, she could afford to employ in battle the 
most sanguinary form of attack against the French, who 
usually stood on the defensive. The German generals sacri- 
ficed their men lavishly though not recklessly. That be- 
comes clear from the casualty statistics given in this chapter. 

Diplomacy and strategy, to be successful, must work 
hand in hand. After the Franco-German War, Moltke and 
Bismarck began to contemplate the contingency of a war 
with France and Russia combined and to prepare for it. 
Henceforth the possibihty of a war on two fronts became 
the principal care and pre-occupation of these two men. 
That pre-occupation dictated Bismarck's foreign policy. 
To weaken Germany's possible antagonists, the Chancellor 
strove to keep France occupied with Colonial adventures 
in Africa and Asia, and he encouraged Russia to advance 
towards Constantinople and India. By skilful diplomacy he 
created friction between Russia and Great Britain, between 
France and Great Britain, between Italy and France, and 
he brought about the conclusion of the Triple Alliance which, 
by the adhesion of Turkey and Roumania, became a Quin- 
tuple Alliance in disguise. Bismarck thought Germany 
to be large and strong enough and he wished for peace. 
That may be seen from his posthumous memoirs and from 
his numerous speeches, letters, newspaper articles, and con- 
versations. The Triple AJliance was a purely defensive, a 
conservative, instrument. Prince Biilow wrote in his book 
Imperial Germany, confirming the views expressed by 
Bismarck in his Memoirs : 

" One may characterise the Triple Alliance as an alliance 
with emphatically conservative tendencies. . . . The three 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 403 

Central- European States are bound to each other by the 
firm resolve to maintain the existing balance of power in 
Europe, and, should a forcible change of that balance be 
attempted, to prevent it, if need be, by force. The united 
strength of Central Europe stands in the path of any revolu- 
tionary European policy which might elect to follow the 
courses pursued by Louis XIV. or Napoleon I. , . . The 
founders of the Triple AlUance intentionally created a 
guarantee of peace. 

As the Triple Alhance was a purely defensive and con- 
servative arrangement devised to restrain rulers of the type 
of Louis XIV. and Napoleon I., it was obvious that a policy 
of aggression, such as that pursued by Germany, would very 
likely bring about its dissolution. 

Bismarck attached the greatest value to Great Britain's 
good-will and support -in case of a great war, especially as 
Italy was likely to follow England's lead. Soon after Bis- 
marck's dismissal, William II., by estranging Russia and 
antagonising England, reversed Bismarck's policy and thus 
destroyed the political system which the great Chancellor 
had created by years of labour, a system which assured 
Germany's peace and her supremacy in Europe. I have 
shown in my book The Foundations of Germany by means 
of numerous newspaper articles emanating from the Chan- 
cellor, which had not previously been published in the English 
language, that Bismarck not only opposed the Emperor's 
venturesome policy with all his strength, but that he fore- 
told in the clearest and most emphatic language that the 
Emperor's incessant and provocative meddling in foreign 
politics would lead to a great European war ; that the 
war would be brought about by Austria's Balkan policy in 
which Germany had no interest ; that Germany thus 
would be compelled to foUow Austria's lead ; that the 
unnecessary estrangement from England was bound to bring 
about Italy's desertion in the hour of trial ; that Germany's 
interference in the Far East and her shameful treatment 
of Japan, whom she had ousted from Port Arthur, might 
arouse the hostility of that country ; that the Emperor's 



404 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

neurotic and exasperating activity and his bluster might 
bring about the creation of a world-wide combination of 
Powers hostile to Germany, and that it might lead to the 
ruin of his country. I shall now show by most interesting 
documents which also have not yet been pubHshed in 
England that, incited by military intriguers, William II. 
destroyed Moltke's work as recklessly as he destroyed that 
of Prince Bismarck. 

In studying the possibility of a war on two fronts, Moltke 
attached the greatest value to the integrity of Switzerland, 
Luxemburg, and Belgium, for a twofold reason. These 
neutral States greatly shortened the frontier which Germany 
had to defend towards France. Besides they protected, 
like two huge fortresses, the Northern and Southern flanks 
of the German Army in the West. The Rhine, the Black 
Forest, and the Vosges provided a most powerful natural 
bulwark in the West of Germany. On Moltke's advice the 
vast natural strength of this position had been very greatly 
increased by extensive and most powerful fortifications. 
In Moltke's opinion the Western frontier of Germany was, 
owing to these enormously strong natural and artificial 
obstacles, the most formidable defensive position in the 
world. 

The vast strength of the Western frontier of Germany 
and the advantage of its being protected on both flanks 
by neutral States and the special position of Belgium, the 
violation of which was likely to induce Great Britain to 
enter the War in defence of that country, were recognised 
in the leading military circles in Germany. Bernhardi gave 
expression to the highest military opinion in writing in his 
book Unsere Zukunft, which came out shortly before the out- 
break of the War : 



" Germany's Western frontier is exceedingly favourable 
for defence. Here a weak army can hold its own during 
a long time and inflict heavy losses upon the enemy. If the 
aggressor should endeavour to avoid the powerful Rhine 
front by marching through Belgium or through Switzerland, 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 405 

he would raise further enemies against himself, and thus 
strengthen Germany." 

Taking advantage of the tremendous strength of her 
Western frontier Moltke had prepared the following plan 
of campaign in case of a war with France and Russia com- 
bined. Germany was, in the beginning of such a war, to 
limit herself to the defensive on her almost impregnable 
Western frontier with by far the smaller part of her army, 
while the bulk of her forces was to be employed in the East. 
According to Moltke' s plan, Germany was to defeat and 
destroy with the bulk of her forces, and with the help of 
her aUies, the Russian Army, and after Russia's collapse 
she was to attack France with her whole strength. 

That plan of campaign was safe and sound, and it had 
inestimable advantages for Germany. By respecting the 
neutraUty of Belgium and Luxemburg she was likely to 
secure to herseK the good-will, or at least the neutrality, 
of Great Britain. Besides, if England stood aside, Italy 
was Ukely either to co-operate against France, or at least 
to observe a benevolent neutrality, even if Germany should 
be the aggressor. If France, on the other hand, desiring 
to come to Russia's aid and being unable to break through 
Germany's immensely strong position in Alsace-Lorraine, 
should endeavour to get round the German flank, if she 
should try to invade Germany by marching through 
Belgium and Luxemburg, she would arouse the hostility of 
Great Britain. The only weak spot in Western Germany 
was the extreme south of Alsace. There a small and com- 
paratively unimportant district was dominated by the 
fortress of Belfort. That was the only disadvantage of 
Moltke's scheme, and it was after all only a negligible one. 
The invasion of Southern Alsace could hardly be avoided 
under any plan of campaign, and indeed this district was 
invaded by the French at the beginning of this War and 
remained occupied by them throughout its course. 

After Bismarck's dismissal in 1890 Germany's foreign 
pohcy was reversed, as I have shown in another chapter 



406 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

and in my book The Foundations of Germany, and her 
military policy was reversed as well. Moltke resigned 
immediately after the Emperor's accession and died in 1891. 
His successors apparently intended to change the plan of 
campaign which that master of sane strategy had evolved 
with Bismarck's co-operation. The security of the small 
southern corner of Alsace against an attack from Belfort 
was made a welcome pretext for demanding a change of 
plans by those military men who, in case of a great war, 
wished to strike immediately at France with Germany's 
full force and desired to begin a war on two fronts by invad- 
ing France by the easiest route, by way of Belgium. The 
German Press has often served as a mouthpiece not only to 
the Government, but also to powerful political and military 
intriguers. The danger which threatened Western Germany 
from Belfort was pointed out to the people in newspaper 
articles calculated to impress them with the seriousness 
of the position, which was greatly exaggerated. Bismarck 
was a great patriot, and through his friends he was kept 
well informed on current affairs after his dismissal. Desiring 
to prevent irremediable mischief, he did not hesitate to 
reveal Moltke's plan of campaign in a number of articles 
in the Hamburger Nachrichten, in order to be able to defend 
it. Ostensibly replying to those who had reproached him 
in the Press for not having acquired Belfort in 1870, as he 
might have done, Bismarck wrote on the 9th of January 
1893 in that journal : 

Field-Marshal Count von Moltke was so convinced of the 
strength of Germany's position in the West with the for- 
tresses of Strassburg, Metz, Mainz, and Coblenz that he 
thought that, in case of a war on two fronts, it would be 
possible for Germany to fight on the Western frontier on 
the defensive until the war with Russia was brought to an 
end. Moltke was of opinion that, in view of the excellence 
of the railway system and the strength of the German 
fortifications in the West, the French Army would be unable 
to break through into Germany. Therefore he beheved 
that Germany would be able to restrict herself to the 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 407 

defensive in the West, and that she should embark upon an 
attack upon France only after the Russian war had been 
brought to an end," 

A week later, on the 16th of January, he returned to the 
charge and stated in the Hamburger Nachrichten : 

" It is a fact which cannot be doubted that Count von 
Moltke was of opinion that Germany, if engaged in a war 
with France and Russia, could, in the possession of Metz, 
Strassburg, Mainz, Cologne, and Coblenz, fight on the 
defensive for an unlimited time in the West, employing the 
bulk of her army in the East, ... It might be considered 
an impertinence to reinforce the views of the great German 
strategist with a non-military opinion. Still, it should be 
added that in case of defensive warfare towards France, 
the left shore of the Rhine, where it flows near the French 
frontier, would be adequately protected. Only a part of 
Alsace would lack the protection of the German troops. 
Moreover, the position of the German Army, acting on the 
defensive, would be protected by the neutral territory of 
Belgium and Luxemburg on the one flank and by that of 
Switzerland on the other flank. Besides, if the French, 
issuing from Belfort, should invade Alsace, they might easily 
be thrown across the frontier into Switzerland." 

On the 1st of February the great Chancellor wrote in 
the Hamburger Nachrichten : 

It cannot be doubted that Moltke did not attribute an 
exaggerated importance to Belfort. It can as little be 
doubted that the Field-Marshal, when officially discussing 
with the Imperial Chancellor the possibility of a simul- 
taneous war with France and Russia, declared in the clearest, 
in the most categorical, and in the most detailed manner 
that in case of such an undesirable event Germany should 
limit herself to the defensive in the West until the decisive 
battles had been fought and won in the East, Further- 
more, when doubt was expressed whether such proceeding 
was advisable, he stated that the Rhine, with its fortresses, 
constituted the strongest defensive position possessed by 
any of the Great Powers. 

It will be noticed that in her diplomatic and in her mihtary 
campaign Germany acted in flagrant opposition to the plan 

27 



40S How THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

which Moltke, with Bismarck's co-operation and approval, 
had laid down. Its abandonment by the German General 
Staff, and the consenof &h e German Emperor and Foreign 
Office to the violation of Belgium's neutrality at the bidding 
of military adventures, has proved the cause of Germany's 
ruin. 

If the German General Staff had intended to carry through 
the wise and far-seeing plan of campaign devised by Moltke 
and Bismarck, Germany might, at the beginning of the 
Russo- Austrian controversy regarding Serbia, have declared, 
as indeed she did, that it was a purely Austro-Serbian 
quarrel. She might, in addition, have stated that, in case 
of a ' totally unjustifiable ' Russian attack upon Austria, 
she would of course have to act in accordance with her 
defensive treaty and come to Austria's aid ; that Austria was 
too weak to resist gigantic Russia single-handed ; that Ger- 
many's assistance alone could save Austria from destruction. 
Lastly, the German diplomats might have expressed the 
hope that France would keep neutral in the quarrel in which 
France had no concern, that Germany would in no case 
attack France, but that she would of course defend herself 
with the strength of despair should France wantonly in- 
vade innocent and inoffensive Germany. In addition, the 
German statesmen might have appealed to England and 
have asked hei to use her influence with France for the 
sake of peace. Had this been done, British pubhc opinion, 
though perhaps not condemning France for coming to 
Russia's aid and attacking Germany, would scarcely have 
approved of Great Britain's intervention on France's behalf. 
It seems practically certain that the pacificist section of the 
Cabinet would have prevailed, that Great Britain would 
have observed an attitude of neutrality. Meanwhile, the 
two Central Powers, aided by Turkey and perhaps by 
Roumania as well, might have rapidly defeated Russia 
while the French were battering desperately but in vain 
against the powerful frontier position of Alsace-Lorraine. 
After Russia's defeat the Germans and Austrians, who 
possibly would have been reinforced, and would scarcely 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 409 

have been opposed, by the Italians, would have defeated 
France. A comparatively short campaign would have 
brought about the downfall of France and Russia, and 
would have secured to Germany the undisputed predomin- 
ance on the Continent and perhaps the possession of the 
French Colonies as well. A Greater Germany would have 
been organised, and in ten or twenty years she would prob- 
ably have become so wealthy and powerful as to be able 
to challenge successfully Great Britain and the United 
States for the mastery of the sea and of the world. Thus 
Germany might have surprised the world with a fait accompli 
as did Bismarck and Moltke half a century before. The 
British people would have awakened to their deadly danger 
only when it was too late. 

Why was the sane and safe diplomatic and strategical 
plan of campaign devised by Bismarck and Moltke aban- 
doned ? Why did the German Army invade Belgium, 
although that step was likely to arouse Great Britain's 
hostihty and bring about Italy's secession ? It is easy to 
surmise the reason. The German Emperor's chief charac- 
teristic was his vanity, and the military intriguers sur- 
rounding him played successfully on his weakness. They 
probably promised him the most dazzling military triumph 
known to history, a victory compared with which those 
won by Napoleon in 1806 and by Moltke in 1866 and 1870 
would pale into insignificance. 

Before the fatal invasion of Belgium the best-informed 
Germans had warned France not to come to Russia's aid 
should the Austro- Serbian quarrel lead to war between 
Russia on the one side and Germany and Austria-Hungary 
on the other. They had publicly and solemnly warned her 
that if she kept faith with her ally, the German troops would 
enter Paris within a month. They had foretold, in the 
same masterful tone which Napoleon employed towards 
Frederick WiUiam III. in 1806, that if France stirred she 
would be crushed in a few weeks. The Geiman supreme 
command intended to destroy the power of France by a 
lightning campaign similar to that of 1806, and was firmly 



410 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

convinced that success was certain. There was indeed 
good reason for this belief. France had assembled the bulk 
of her troops on her Eastern frontier, facing Alsace-Lorraine, 
anticipating that Germany would attack from the direction 
of Metz and Strasbourg. Germany, on the other hand, 
had sent to Alsace-Lorraine only sufficient troops to de- 
fend that powerful position against a French attack. The 
few German army corps which had been assembled there 
were to act on the defensive. They would occupy and 
detain the French main army. Meanwhile the principal 
body of the German troops was to rush through Belgium, 
to overthrow the few French army corps on the Franco- 
Belgian border, and to march upon Paris. Paris would 
be reached in about three weeks. Germany's colossal 
mortars, the existence of which was not suspected, would 
destroy the forts in a few hours. Paris would fall. Having 
seized the capital, the Germans would immediately wheel 
round and attack the French main army in the flank and 
rear, driving it against the walls of Strasbourg and Metz 
and across the Swiss frontier. It is an interesting link in 
the chain of evidence that the German Government, after 
invading Belgium and declaring that that country's resist- 
ance to the German invasion was a crime, admonished 
Switzerland by telegraph * ' to maintain and defend by all 
means in its power the neutrality and inviolabihty of its 
territory . . . trusting that the Confederation, owing to 
the unshakable will of the entire Swiss nation, will succeed 
in repelling any violation of its neutrality." In other 
words, Germany admonished the Swiss to disarm and intern 
the French army corps which, attacked in the rear, might 
be forced to cross into Switzerland. Had the German plan 
not miscarried, all France might indeed have been con- 
quered in a month. Paris, the greatest fortress in the 
world, was believed by all Frenchmen to be impregnable. 
Had Germany, within about a month, taken Paris and 
destroyed and captured practically the whole of the mobilised 
French armies, the bewildered French, suddenly deprived 
of both capital and army, might indeed have given way to 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 411 

despair and have abandoned all hope and all thought of 
resistance and have asked for peace, especially if their 
capital had been threatened with the fate of Louvain, as 
was apparently intended. Germany had undoubtedly 
invaded Belgium hoping, in the manner described, to create 
for the whole of the French armies a gigantic Sedan, to 
catch them as in a net, and thus to achieve a victory com- 
pared with which that won in 1870-71 would appear trifling. 

The daring plan of the German General Staff to destroy 
or capture the whole of the French armies and to enter 
Paris within a month miscarried owing to Belgium's un- 
expected resistance, Liege blocked Germany's way for 
more than a week. As the German troops entering Belgium 
had no heavy siege artillery with them, orders were given 
to take the town and forts by assault at any cost. The 
German troops were mown down by the thousand. Accord- 
ing to Baron de Beyens 36,000 German soldiers were killed 
in this desperate but unsuccessful effort. If that figure is 
correct, and there is no reason to doubt its approximate 
correctness, the Germans lost before Liege alone a con- 
siderably larger number of men than they lost during the 
whole war of 1870-71, in which, as shown on another page, 
only 28,268 men were killed in battle and died of wounds. 

Who made the plan of invading France by way of Belgium ? 
Who was responsible for that insane step which brought Ger- 
many no advantage, but which secured to her the hostility 
of Great Britain and Italy and the reprobation of the 
civilised world ? The plan was probably adopted about 
the time when Bismarck made his disclosures in the Ham- 
burger Nachrichten. His articles attracted at the time little 
attention because their meaning was understood only by 
the initiated few. However, the responsibility for carrying 
out the plan lay of course not with Count Waldersee, or 
any other General who first brought it forward, but with 
von Moltke junior, the nephew of the great Moltke, who 
was the Chief of the German General Staff at the outbreak 
of the Great War ; with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the 
Imperial Chancellor, who, however, only approved of it 



412 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

more or less unwillingly, and especially with the Supreme 
Commander, the German Emperor, who, it is true, acted 
upon the advice of Moltke junior. This explains his resigna- 
tion, soon after the beginning of the War, " for reasons 
of health." 

The Nineteenth Century of June 1912 contained an article 
of mine, " The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany," in 
which I dwelt on the defects of the German Army, stating : 
" German generals complain that promotions are made 
less by merit and more by favour than in former times. 
. . . William II. has made the navy his hobby and attends 
to the army perfunctorily, and many say it is little better 
managed than his Foreign Office." In making this statement 
I thought particularly of von Moltke junior, the Chief of 
the General Staff. 

The invasion of Belgium did not lead to the destruction 
and capture of all the French armies, the seizure of Paris 
and the surrender of all France, but merely to Great Britain's 
intervention. The violation of Belgium brought Germany 
no gain, but enormous loss. The greatest military triumph 
the world has seen did not materialise. The German Army 
leaders made the most fearful miscalculation and the most 
fearful blunder. 

Of all her opponents Germany hated little Belgium prob- 
ably most. By resisting the onslaught of her mighty 
opponent, Belgium made Germany's intended surprise 
attack upon France a failure. The German Army leaders, 
having grossly, and fatally, mismanaged the German cam- 
paign by disregarding the wise plan for the conduct of a 
war on two fronts laid down by the elder Moltke in collabora- 
tion with Bismark, damaged Germany still further by ill- 
treating the unhappy Belgians, by venting upon them 
their spirit of baffled rage, by deliberately practising upon 
them every kind of brutality, inhumanity, indignity, arid 
extortion. The German Army thus destroyed not only 
Germany's hope of victory, but Germany's good name as 
well. The army, not the Emperor, was chiefly responsible 
for the atrocities perpetrated first in Belgium and then 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 413 

elsewhere. The Emperor was essentially a vain and weak 
man, and, like Napoleon III., whom he resembled in many 
respects, the tool of the army. 

In 1592, more than three centuries ago, the great Lord 
Bacon wrote in his Certain Observations upon a Libel : 

" Wars are no massacres and confusions ; but they are 
the highest trials of right ; when princes and States, that 
acknowledge no superior upon earth, shall put themselves 
upon the justice of God for the deciding of their contro- 
versies by such success, as it shall please Him to give on 
either side. And as in the process of particular pleas between 
private men, all things ought to be ordered by the rules of 
civil laws ; so in the proceedings of the war nothing ought 
to be done against the law of nations, or the law of honour." 

To the horror of mankind Germany disregarded the law of 
nations, the laws of war, and the law of humanity. She 
deliberately tried to plunge the world into barbarism and 
savagery. 

The German Army and the German Navy stood, according 
to the Imperial Constitution, under the direct command of 
the Emperor. He was no doubt legally responsible for all 
the abominations which the German forces have committed 
on land and sea. However, study of German military 
literature makes it clear that the guilt lies perhaps not so 
much with the Emperor as with the Army. During the rule 
of William II. the Army had become a State within the 
State, as will presently be shown. It had become the 
principal governing factor. It had ceased to be a tool. It 
had established its own laws. For decades the mihtary 
leaders of the forward school had been allowed to preach 
the doctrine of ruthlessness in war. They had taught that 
both in diplomacy, which they wished to control, and in 
warfare all means were good which were expedient, which 
were advantageous to Germany. That may be seen from 
the writings of many of the most eminent German soldiers — 
Bernhardi is a characteristic representative of that class — • 
and from the handbook Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, the 



414 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

Customs of War, published by the General Staff in Berlin 
in 1902, and translated into English by Professor Morgan. 
The Government Committee presided over by Lord 
Bryce concluded its Report on Germany's outrages in 
Belgium as follows : 

" It is proved 

"I. That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate 
and systematically organised massacres of the civil popula- 
tion, accompanied by many isolated murders and other 
outrages. 

" II. That in the conduct of the War generally innocent 
civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large 
numbers, women violated, and children murdered. 

"III. That looting, house-burning, and the wanton 
destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by 
the officers of the German Army, that elaborate provision 
had been made for the systematic incendiarism at the very 
outbreak of the War, and that the burnings and destruction 
were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged, 
being, indeed, part of a system of general terrorisation. 

" IV. That the rules and usages of war were frequently 
broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including 
women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed 
to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, 
and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White 
Flag. 

" Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, 
the Committee conceive that they would be doing less than 
their duty if they failed to record them as fully established 
by the evidence. Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over 
many parts of Belgium on a scale unparalleled in any war 
between civilised nations during the last three centuries." 

Surprise has been expressed that the citizens of a cultured, 
well-ordered, and highly disciplined nation should have 
been able to perpetrate the horrors described in Lord Bryce's 
Report, not only in Belgium but elsewhere as well ; that 
people who until recently were supposed to be kindly, 
humane, and somewhat over-sentimental should have 
been able to commit crimes for which savages would blush. 
I think the fault lay not in the character of the German 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 415 

people, but in the teachings which they had received from 
their military leaders. The principal characteristic of the 
German people was their docility, their wilHngness to do 
as they were told. They were passive instruments in the 
hands of their rulers and superiors, as they always have 
been. The Germans were the only nation in Europe which, 
though suffering from tjrranny and misrule, had never 
successfully revolted against their tyrants. The German 
soldiers were ordered to murder, burn, and plunder, and they 
did this as conscientiously and as unquestioningly as they 
obeyed the innumerable vexatious regulations and restric- 
tions of their country. 

Formerly the army and the militant section of the German 
nation were kept in bounds. Soldiers interested themselves 
only in their duties and did not mingle in politics. Louis 
Schneider, the reader of William I., has told us in his Memoirs 
that the old Emperor would neither tolerate that officers 
should discuss with him political questions nor would he 
allow Prince Bismarck to talk with him on miHtary affairs. 
All this had changed under William II. The King of Prussia, 
the Emperor of Germany, was by tradition a soldier. Prusso- 
Germany was a military State. The army was the support 
of the throne. It was the true aristocracy, the ruling class, 
of the country. The military officers were naturally im- 
patient of peace and were apt to demand war whenever 
political complications arose. Bismarck succeeded in 
curbing their ardour, in keeping them within bounds. He 
checked the aggressive proclivities of the army and the 
desire of the leading officers to give a warlike direction to 
the national policy. However, he foresaw that, under a 
weak and vain monarch, such as William II., the army might 
become the predominating factor and dictate the national 
policy. He foretold that under his rule the national policy 
might be directed by the General Staff. Desiring to protect 
his country against that danger, he wrote in his posthumous 
Memoirs : 

" How keenly Moltke wanted to put in practice his mili- 
tary and strategic tastes and abilities I observed not only 



416 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

on this occasion, in July 1870, when war with France seemed 
impending, but also in the days before the outbreak of the 
war of 1866 against Austria. . . . 

" In both cases his love of combat and delight in battles 
were a great support to me in carrying out the policy which 
I regarded as necessary, and which I had to carry out in 
opposition to the intelligible and justifiable aversions in a 
most influential quarter. His desire for war proved incon- 
venient to me in 1867, in the Luxemburg question, and in 
1875 and afterwards when the question arose whether it 
was desirable, as regards a war with France which we should 
probably have to face sooner or later, to bring it on antici- 
pando before the adversary could improve his preparations. 
I have always opposed the theory which advocates aggres- 
sive wars, wars of precaution, of prevention, not only at 
the Luxemburg period, but likewise subsequently for twenty 
years, in the conviction that even victorious wars cannot 
be justified unless they are forced upon one and that one 
cannot look into the cards of Providence far enough ahead 
to anticipate historical developments and make one's own 
calculations accordingly. 

" It is natural that in the Staff of the Army not only young 
officers desirous of promotion, but also experienced strate- 
gists, should feel the need of turning to account the efficiency 
of their troops and their own capacity to lead, and of making 
themselves prominent in history. It would be a matter of 
regret if an enterprising military spirit did not exist in the 
Army. It is the duty of the political, not the military, 
heads of the State to keep these sentiments within the 
limits which the nation's need of peace can justly claim. 
That at the time of the Luxemburg question, during the 
crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchakoff and France, and 
even down to the most recent times, the General Staff and 
its leaders have allowed themselves to be led astray and to 
endanger peace lies necessarily in the very spirit of the 
institution, which I would not forgo. It only becomes 
dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of 
proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally 
unjustifiable influences." 

William II. was the monarch " whose policy lacks sense 
of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitu- 
tionally unjustifiable influences," described in Bismarck's 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 417 

Political Testament. The German Foreign Office had be- 
come an annexe of the General Staff. In a most important 
German Official Secret Report, emanating apparently from 
the German General Staff, and relating to the proposed 
very great increase of the German Army which was effected 
previously to the War, dated the 19th of March 1913, and 
published in the French Yellow Book, we read : 

" We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our 
people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments 
and policy of the French. We must accustom them to 
think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order 
to combat the provocation of our adversaries. We must 
act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid 
a crisis which might injure our economic existence. We 
must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of 
powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained 
political relations an outbreak {Losschlagen) should be con- 
sidered as a relief, because after it would come decades of 
peace and prosperity, as after 1870." 

The higher German officers did not disguise the fact that 
they meant to direct Germany's foreign policy, which was 
supposed to be managed by the Foreign Office. On the 
6th of May 1913 the French Ambassador in Berlin reported 
to his Government in Paris : 

" I have been informed of some remarks made in a German 
milieu by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the 
most distinguished officer of the German Army. The inten- 
tion of the General Staff is to act by surprise. ' We must 
put on one side,' said General von Moltke, ' all commonplaces 
as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has 
become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way 
as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success 
alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to 
leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged 
to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that 
she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of 
inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly,' added the 
General, ' we must anticipate our principal adversary as 
soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and 



418 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resist- 
ance.' This represents exactly the attitude of military 
circles, and it corresponds with that of political circles." 

It will be noticed that the German Army, as represented 
by its chiefs, considered itself to be not an instrument of 
government, but the Government, the State. 

When complications arose between Serbia and Austria- 
Hungary, not the German diplomats, but the Generals, 
absolutely controlled the nation's foreign policy. The chiefs 
of the German Foreign Office had to make the humiliating 
admission that not they, but the heads of the Army, 
directed Germany's diplomacy. On the 30th of July 1914 
M. Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berhn, reported 
to his Government two conversations which he had had 
with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, and with the Under- 
Secretary of State, Herr Zimmermann, which he summarised 
as follows : 

" I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had 
himself told me that Germany would only consider herself 
obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German 
frontiers, and that this was not being done. He replied 
that this was true, but that the heads of the Army were insisting 
on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German 
Army. . . ." 

In another telegram of the same day M. Cambon re- 
ported : 

" According to the Under-Secretary of State, the military 
authorities are very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered, 
because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advant- 
ages. Nevertheless, up to the present the haste of the Ger:eral 
Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, has been successfully 
prevented."" 

M. Cambon's statements were confirmed by Baron de 
Beyens, the Belgian representative in Berlin. He wrote on 
the 1st of August to his Government : 

" Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann went to the 
Chancellor and to the Emperor, in order to secure that the 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 410 

order for general mobilisation should not be issued to-day, 
but they were met by the inflexible opposition of the Minister 
for War and the Chiefs of the Army, who must have repre- 
sented to the Emperor the fatal consequences of a twenty- 
four hours' delay. The order was immediately issued and 
brought to the knowledge of the general public by a special 
edition of the Lokal-Anzeiger. I telegraphed it to you 
immediately." 

It is a well-known fact that at the last moment Austria 
wished to draw back, but that Germany precipitated the 
War, making Austria's intended concessions towards 
Russia impossible by presenting an ultimatum at Petrograd. 
At the critical moment the Army leaders prevented the 
peaceful arrangement of the political difficulties. They 
forced the Emperor's hands. 

On the 5th of August 1914 Baron de Beyens had a final 
conversation with Herr von Jagow, the Secretary, and Herr 
Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary, of the German Foreign 
Office. That conversation is reported in the second Belgian 
Grey Book. The Belgian Minister reported : 

"... Herr Zimmermann simply repUed that the Depart- 
ment for Foreign Affairs was powerless. Since the order 
for mobiUsation had been issued by the Emperor, all power 
now belonged to the miUtary authorities. It was they who 
had considered the invasion of Belgium to be an indispen- 
sable operation of war. ' I hope,' he added with emphasis, 
' that this war will be the last. It must also mark the end 
of the poHcy of aUiances which has led to this result.' 

" From this interview I brought away the impression that 
Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary sincerity 
and that the Department for Foreign Affairs, since the 
opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict, had been on the 
side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that 
its views and counsels had not prevailed. To-day, even, 
it is my belief, contrary to what I wrote you at first, that 
Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann spoke the truth 
when they assured my colleagues and myself that they did 
not know beforehand the text itself of the ultimatum 
addressed by Austria-Hungary to Serbia. A superior 
power intervened to precipitate the march of events." 



420 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

The fact** that the German Foreign Office, and even the 
Imperial Chancellor, had become subordinates to the 
General Staff, that generals, not statesmen, guided Germany's 
foreign policy, may be shown by numerous incidents of which 
I will mention only one because it was particularly striking. 
As I have previously stated, the Imperial Chancellor, Herr 
von Bethmann-Hollweg, probably agreed more or less 
unwiUingly to the violation of Belgium, being unable to 
resist, in view of the assurance of the General Staff that the 
result would be a complete victory of unparalleled magni- 
tude which would completely eliminate France as a mili- 
tary factor. Immediately after the invasion of Belgium 
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg confessed candidly in the 
Reichstag that, in invading that country, Germany had 
perpetrated a wrong. The military evidently did not approve 
of the Chancellor's sincerity. General von Emmich, in 
invading Belgium, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants 
which probably had previously been drafted by the General 
Staff in Berlin. He stated in it that the German forces 
invaded Belgium because the neutrality of that country had 
previously been violated by the French. The miUtary and 
the civil power contradicted one another. The civil power 
admitted a great wrong and the miUtary pleaded justifica- 
tion. The German Government was bound to choose 
between the two views. Being under the control of the 
Army, the military view was adopted. It was proclaimed 
everywhere that France had " forced " Germany to invade 
Belgium by violating that country's neutrality. The 
highest officials at the German Foreign Office were perfectly 
aware that Germany had been in the wrong, that the viola- 
tion could not be justified with the mendacious pretexts 
employed by the Army. That was made clear by Herr 
Zimmermann in his conversation with Baron de Beyens on 
the 5th of August, for the Belgian representative reported : 

" Herr Zimmermann expressed to me, with much emotion, 
his profound regrets for the cause of my departure. But, 
he added, the passage through Belgium is an absolute 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 421 

necessity for us — a question of life or death (Sein oder nicht 
sein). Germany must crush France as quickly as possible 
in order to be able then to turn against Russia. 

" Herr Zimmermann sought no pretext to excuse the 
violation of our neutrality. He did not invoke the supposed 
French plan, alleged against France by the Chancellor in 
the speech which he had delivered the evening before in 
the Reichstag, of passing through Belgium in order to attack 
Germany on the lower Rhine, a plan to which Herr von 
Jagow had alluded in his conversation with me." 

German policy was controlled by the military. The 
Foreign Office was a dependency of the General Staff. The 
Chancellor and the highest officials at the Foreign Office 
were forced to eat their words and to recant. As the 
General Staff pleaded justification they had to do the same. 
Official Germany proclaimed everywhere that the invasion 
of Belgium was justified because France, which had practic- 
ally no troops on the Franco- Belgian border, intended to 
invade that country, and because Belgium " had sold her- 
self " to England by discussing measures of defence with 
her in case the country should be invaded by Germany. 
The Belgian and the British Governments were, of course, 
entitled to discuss measures of defence in case of a German 
invasion which was threatened, long before the outbreak 
of the War, by Germany's strategical railways and mihtary 
preparations which pointed to an attack upon Belgium. 
However, the Foreign Office authorities of Germany not 
merely repeated, hke lackeys, the instructions which they 
received from the General Staff, but they endeavoured to 
*' prove " Belgium's guilt by deliberate forgery, by changing 
the word " conversation " into the word " convention " 
in the document which recorded the Anglo-Belgian Con- 
versations regarding the measures to be taken should 
Germany invade the country. 

The German Army was also responsible for the U-boat 
campaign, for Hindenburg and Ludendorff controlled the 
navy. Thus the army forced the United States into the 
War with disastrous results for Germany. The army, not 



422 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

the diplomats, were responsible for the peace of Brest- 
Litovsk and for that of Bucharest which finally disgraced 
Germany. 

It has frequently been stated that not merely the German 
Emperor and Germany's leaders were responsible for the 
War, but that the whole nation was responsible for it because 
the whole nation enthusiastically approved of the aggression. 
It is true that the nation went to war with wild enthusiasm. 
However, it must not be forgotten that that enthusiasm 
was carefully raised before the War by the military leaders. 
The German officers were not satisfied with running the 
Government. They were not satisfied with dominating 
the Emperor, the Chancellor, and the Foreign Office. They 
strove, and strove successfully, to educate the nation and to 
arouse in it a spirit of reckless aggression. It is a fairly 
weU-known fact that the German Press was, during the War, 
edited by the General Staff, but it is not so well known that 
during many years previous to its outbreak German military 
men had carried on a nation-wide campaign of incitement 
to war. In 1913 Professor Nippold published in Berlin 
a small but important volume, Der Deutsche Chauvinismus, 
which seems almost unknown. It contained numerous 
extracts from the German Jingo Press, and it summed up 
the character of the war agitators and their aims as 
follows : 

" The German Chauvinists advocate war not merely 
occasionally ; they arouse systematically in the German 
nation a desire for war. They show not merely that the 
people should prepare for war ; they teach that the nation 
urgently requires war. War is depicted not as a possibility, 
but as a necessity. It must come, and the sooner the better. 
In the eyes of these men war is a necessity to the German 
people, and a prolonged peace is an evil. They do not care 
whether there is a reason for war or not. If there is no 
reason, one must simply make war without a reason. . . . 

"It is interesting to study the policy pursued by our 
war agitators. They begin their activity with the children. 
We have seen in the Jungdeutschland-Post [the paper of 
an extensive boys' organisation of which General von der 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 423 

Goltz is President] war described as the most desirable 
event. Some organisations strive to arouse the war fever 
in the young and some in the grown-up. Among the latter 
the Alldeutsche Verhand and the Wehrverein should be 
mentioned. Their teaching may be summed up thus : A 
great war is a necessity, and it should arouse the delight of 
the whole nation. . . . 

" These agitators have raised the dogma that war is in- 
evitable, and as it is in their opinion inevitable, they advo- 
cate an aggressive war, a war of prevention, arguing ' As 
war is bound to break out, let us see that it will break out 
at the moment most favourable to Germany. Let us attack 
the others as soon as it suits us, and before all let us attack 
as soon as possible,' Having abandoned the idea of a de- 
fensive, of a necessary, war, they preach an aggressive war 
without cause, and believe that by their preaching they have 
succeeded in converting the German people from a peaceful 
nation into a nation of firebrands, eager to pick quarrels 
with others. In their opinion armaments are not intended 
to preserve the peace. Oh no ! The German nation needs 
a war, and it would be a pity to leave the ready German 
Army unused. 

" The leading war agitators are the Nationalist Press, the 
war organisations, such as the Alldeutsche Verhand, and 
war-preaching Generals such as Generals Keim, Liebert, 
Bemhardi, Eichhorn, Wrochem. These men have lost all 
sense of responsibihty. General Keim, who is probably 
the worst war agitator living, has ventured to assert that 
Germany was free from Chauvinism ! 

" In the eyes of these men Morality and Right are concep- 
tions of little value. They look contemptuously down upon 
these quahties and upon all except the mihtary achievements 
of mankind, preaching the denial of all civihsation, and 
eulogising the rule of unrestricted brutal might. That is 
their great ideal. They recommend us to embark upon a 
piratical war and to disregard international law and all 
moral obligations. Their teaching is bound to lead to the 
moral degeneration of the nation. 

" Our war-preaching generals teach us that without a 
war the moral quahties of the German people would deterio- 
rate. To them the problem of Germany's expansion is 
not a cause of war, for according to them a war would be 
necessary on moral grounds, had Germany all the colonies 
28 



424 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

she could wish for. They consider it a matter of course 
that Germany should embark as early as possible upon a 
war of aggression, and consider the advocacy of peace as a 
sign of weakness. 

" The military should not be allowed to force their class 
ideas upon the German nation. It has never lacked military 
spirit. It is not necessary to arouse it artificially. These 
uniformed demagogues unceasingly raise the bogy of war 
and at the same time sing its praise. To them all profes- 
sions, except that of arms, are contemptible. What is 
international law ? Rubbish ! What modern commerce, 
industry, and science ? Effeminating occupations which 
have diverted the people from their true occupation, from 
war. To them war is the greatest blessing. 

" Our war-generals despise our statesmen and politicians, 
for they wish to control the National PoUcy themselves. 
They think that the direction of the State in all its branches 
should be left to the army. In their eyes the German 
diplomats are incompetent. 

" If the German Chauvinists should unhappily succeed in 
making the Government beheve that they represent the 
people, that they are the people, then war may break out 
at any moment. They may carry the" Government with 
them. These things have happened before, and they may 
happen again. We should bethink ourselves in time, 
for the spirit of aggression which these men have aroused 
constitutes for Germany a grave danger against which one 
can warn the nation neither too often nor too energetically." 

Professor Nippold gave only the names of officers on half- 
pay. He should have added that many of the most eminent 
officers on active service were the principal leaders of the 
Jingo campaign in Germany. Both the Ministry of War 
and the Admiralty stimulated the desire for increased 
armaments and for war by maintaining a widespread agita- 
tion through their Press offices and by other means. Admiral 
Tirpitz was in the first place not a naval administrator, but 
a naval agitator. The Navy League was one of his instru- 
ments of agitation, exactly as the Wehrverein was a tool 
of the highest military authorities. 

The details given in this chapter will suffice to show that 



HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERIVIANY 425 

the German Army was principally responsible for bringing 
about the War ; that the army dominated the German 
Foreign Office and controlled Germany's foreign policy 
before the outbreak of hostilities ; that the German Army 
was responsible for the unparalleled mendacity of German 
diplomacy ; that the German Army was responsible for the 
invasion of Belgium ; that it was responsible for the inter- 
vention of Great Britain and Italy ; that the men who 
brought about the War were responsible for abandoning the 
wise plan of campaign upon which Moltke and Bismarck 
had settled and which might have led to Germany's triumph 
within a few months. They suffice to show that the Army 
was responsible for the abominations of which the German 
forces were guilty, and that the Army, by carefully-planned 
agitation, had corrupted the mind of the nation. A powerful 
army is an invaluable tool, but a dangerous master. The 
German Army leaders had made themselves supreme in the 
State. They had been playing the same part as the Pre- 
torians played in Ancient Rome, the Janissaries in Turkey 
and the Strelitzi in Russia. They have deserved the same 
fate. 

The fear has been expressed that the great strengthening 
of the British Army might introduce militarism into England 
and Prussianise it. That fear is totally unfounded. The 
British Army, however strong, would be under the control 
of Parliament, of the people. In Germany Parliament 
and people had no control and, indeed, no influence what- 
ever, over the army. According to the Imperial Constitu- 
tion the Emperor had sole control over the military forces, 
and by the Constitution the strength of the army was laid 
down for all time, and could therefore not be altered by 
Parliament. By the fundamental law of the Empire every 
German citizen had to serve in the army, and by the same 
document its peace strength was fixed at 1 per cent, of the 
population for all time. 

Imperial Germany was supposed to be a Constitutional 
Empire possessed of representative and very democratic 
institutions, for every male adult was given a vote. If we 



426 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 

look into the Constitution a little more closely we find that 
the country was ruled by a military oligarchy, that its 
democratic institutions were a farce, that the people were 
powerless. As military domination had been imposed 
upon Germany by the Constitution, and as the people 
could not alter the Constitution except with the consent of 
their rulers, it was obvious that Germany could free herself 
from the shackles of militarism only by a successful revolu- 
tion. Germany bore domination by a military caste as long 
as she was prosperous and invariably successful in war. 
When she discovered that the military caste had ruined the 
country, when the immense prestige enjoyed by the army 
had disappeared, when the people saw in it the principal 
cause of their misery, they rose and swept out of existence 
the institutions which had brought about their downfall. 



CHAPTER XXV 

THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN INTELLECTUALS ^ 

The most important factors of public opinion in Germany- 
were three : the governing circles, the business men, and 
the intellectuals. The war aims of the intellectuals were 
authoritatively stated in a petition which was drawn up 
on the 25th of June 1915 and which was sent to the 
Imperial Chancellor. Appended to it were 1,341 signa- 
tures. Among the signatories were 352 University Pro- 
fessors, 158 educationalists and clergymen, 145 high officials, 
burgomasters, and councillors, 148 judges and lawyers, 40 
Parliamentarians, 18 retired admirals and generals, 182 busi- 
ness men, 52 agriculturists, 252 artists, authors, and pub- 
lishers. In view of the great prestige enjoyed by the German 
professors and their vast influence upon public opinion, 
the importance of the professorial demands was very great. 
The weight of the professorial petition was vastly increased 
by the signatures of eminent practical men which also were 
appended to the document. Among these was Herr Kirdorf , 
the principal director of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerk, 
Germany's leading coal and iron undertaking. Herr Kirdorf 
was for many years the President of the powerful organisa- 
tion which represents the Grerman coal and iron industry. 
Petitions which are intended to be signed by many of the 
most influential men are drawn up carefully and cautiously. 
They are as a rule worded with a good deal of reserve and 
restraint in order to avoid discussion and opposition. There- 
fore, the petition cf the professors must not be treated as 

1 From Grumbach, Oermany'a Annexationist Aims, translated by 
J. Ellis Barker, John Murray, 1917. 

427 



428 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 

if it were a rash statement made by some irresponsible hot- 
heads. The document was worded as follows : 



" The Petition of the Professors to the 
Imperial Chancellor 

** The German nation and its Emperor have kept the 
peace during forty-four years. They have kept it until its 
maintenance became incompatible with the demands of 
national honour and of self-preservation. In spite of the 
growing strength and number of its population, Germany 
has never thought of overstepping the narrow limits of its 
continental territories as a conqueror. Its genius merely 
compelled the nation to enter the world's markets in order 
to secure there its economic existence in peaceful competi- 
tion with the other nations. 

" However, Germany's enemies wished to reduce our 
narrow territories and to hamper our indispensable activi- 
ties in the world's markets. They made plans which went 
as far as the destruction of the German Empire. When they 
recognised their danger, the Germans, from the highest to 
the lowest, rose like one man, knowing that they had to 
defend not only their country, but also their individuality, 
their spiritual and moral treasures, the culture of Germany 
and that of Europe, against the flood of barbarians coming 
from the East and the desire of vengeance and the lust of 
domination of the nations of the West. Victoriously, with 
God's help, hand in hand with our faithful Allies, we have 
been able to defend ourselves against half the world. 

" Now, when in Italy a new enemy has arisen to Germany, 
mere defence is no longer sufficient. Our enemies have 
forced the sword into our hands and have compelled us to 
make enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure. Now we 
must protect ourselves against a similar surprise attack 
from all sides, against a whole succession of wars waged with 
our enemies when they have regained their strength. To 
prevent this, we mean to establish ourselves so firmly and 
so broadly in a secured and enlarged homeland that our 
independent existence is guaranteed to us for generations. 
" The people are unanimous and resolved in pursuing 
this principal aim. The plain truth which we meet wherever 
we look is this : There is only one fear among all the classes 
of the people, and that fear is particularly broad and deep 



GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 429 

among the masses of the people. It is the fear that, through 
the delusive idea of foolish conciliatoriness, or through 
nervous impatience, a premature, doubtful, and transient 
peace might be concluded. It is feared that once more the 
diplomat's pen might give up what the sword has victoriously 
won, as happened a century ago. And that might happen 
in the most fateful hour of destiny known to German history, 
when peoples' minds display a greatness and unanimity 
such as have never been known in the past and may never 
be known in the future. 

" Of a truth we do not strive after the domination of 
the world. However, we mean to possess a share of world- 
power proportionate to the greatness of Grermany's cultural, 
economic, and warlike strength. Perhaps it will not be 
possible to achieve simultaneously all the aims of national 
security. This may not be feasible because of the number 
of our enemies. Still, the utmost limit of the possible should 
be obtained. Otherwise, the great sacrifices of the nation 
and our great military efforts during the war will have been 
vain. This is, we repeat it, the firm determination of the 
German nation. 

" It is the duty and the right of those who, through 
their learning and position, have become the intellectual 
leaders and protagonists of pubHc opinion, to give clear 
expression to the resolution and to the firm will of the nation, 
and to place the national wishes before the Government. 
It is their duty to give powerful support to the Government 
in its heavy task of enforcing Germany's necessary claims 
against the faint-hearted individuals within the country 
and against its tenacious enemies abroad, 

" We invite all leaders of public opinion to fulfil this duty. 

" We know full well that one must discriminate between 
the desirable aims of the war and the final conditions obtain- 
able at the peace, that everything depends on the ultimate 
success of our arms, and that it cannot be our task to dis- 
cuss the war objects of Austria -Hungary and Turkey. Hence 
we have in the following merely briefly expressed our opinion 
in giving utterance to our conviction that Germany must 
have certain guarantees for a lasting peace, and that there 
are certain aims which must be reached by the blood-sodden 
road of the present war. 

" (1) France. — We wish to aboHsh for all time the French 
menace. We have been threatened by France for centuries. 



430 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 

We have been assailed with French cries of vengeance from 
1815 to 1870 and from 1871 to 1915. All classes of the 
German people are convinced of this necessity. We cannot 
abolish this danger through useless efforts at concihation, 
to which France has always replied with the utmost 
fanaticism. 

" We would warn all Germans most seriously not to 
indulge in self-deception. Even after the terrible lesson of 
this disastrous war of revenge, France will continue thirsting 
for vengeance as long as she possesses the necessary strength. 
For the sake of our own existence we must enfeeble that 
land politically and economically, without scruple or com- 
punction, and improve Germany's mihtary-strategical posi- 
tion towards France. To achieve this end a thorough -going 
improvement of Germany's western frontier from Belfort 
to the coast is needed. 

" In addition we must, if possible, conquer part of the 
French Channel coast in order to increase our strategical 
security against England and to obtain better access to the 
ocean. 

" Special measures will have to be taken so that the 
German Empire should not be internally weakened by its 
external acquisitions. In order to avoid a position similar 
to that which obtains in Alsace-Lorraine, the undertakings 
and landed properties in the conquered districts which secure 
to their owners power and influence should be transferred 
from hands hostile to Germany to German hands, and the 
indemnification of the original owners should be left to 
France. No influence whatever upon the Empire should 
be allowed to that part of the French population which has 
been taken over by us. 

" Furthermore, it is necessary that France — ^and France 
among all our enemies in the first place — should have 
imposed upon it a high war indemnity, and that no mercy 
should be shown to it, although it has financially been 
terribly bled through its own folly and British selfishness. 
Details will be given further on. 

" We should also remember that France has a dispro- 
portionately large Colonial Empire, and that England might 
enrich itself by seizing the French Colonies unless we seize 
them ourselves. 

" (2) Belgium. — Belgium, which we have won with so 
much of the best German blood, we must firmly hold politic- 



GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 431 

ally, militarily, and economically, whatever reasons may be 
urged against such a step. On no point is the unanimity of 
popular opinion greater. To the nation it is beyond doubt 
a question of honour to hold on to that country. 

" From the political and military points of view it is 
clear that an independent Belgium would be nothing but 
an English base for a very dangerous attack, a shield behind 
which our enemies would gather anew. Economically the 
acquisition of Belgium would mean a vast accession of 
power to Germany. 

" Nationally also Belgium can become a great gain to 
Germany. The Flemish population, which is so closely 
related to the Germans by their culture, may free itself in 
course of time from its French shackles and may remember 
its Germanic origin and character. 

" Of the problems which we have to solve when we have 
acquired Belgium we mention only this- — that the inhabi- 
tants must be allowed no political influence within the 
Empire. As in France, the undertakings and landed pro- 
perties which give power and influence to their owners 
must be taken out of the hands of persons hostile to 
Germany and be placed into the possession of German 
owners. 

" (3) Russia. — On Germany's eastern frontier the popu- 
lation of Russia grows with the greatest rapidity, increasing 
by from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 per year. Within a genera- 
tion Russia's population wiU come to 250,000,000. As this 
overwhelming colossus threatens our eastern flank, con- 
stituting undoubtedly the greatest danger to Germany and 
to Europe in the future, Germany can maintain its place 
in the world only by constructing a firm wall which will 
protect us both against the stealthy progress of Slavism in 
peace-time and against menacing inroads in case of war. 
Besides, the healthy growth of Germany's national strength 
and man-power must be secured by all means. 

" A firm wall of protection and a basis for an increase of 
the German race must be created on the land which Russia 
will have to cede to us. We must have land suitable 
for agricultural settlement, land where can be reared 
healthy peasants who are an inexhaustible source of 
national and racial power. We must have land which will 
receive part of our surplus population and which will afford 
new homes to those Germans abroad who wish to turn 



432 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 

their back on the hostile countries to which they had formerly 
migrated. We must have land which increases Germany's 
economic independence, which suppHes us with food, which 
affords the necessary counterpoise to the progressive indus- 
trialisation and townification of the German people, which 
preserves that balance of economic activities which has 
proved so valuable during this war, and which prevents 
the dangerous development of a one-sided national economy 
such as that of England, We must have land which 
counteracts the reduction in the birth-rate in the towns, 
which prevents emigration and provides housing for the 
needy. We must have land the colonisation and Ger- 
manisation of which give new chances even to the learned 
proletariat. Such land, which is needed for our physical, 
moral, and intellectual welfare, is before all to be found 
towards the east of Germany. 

" The mihtary needs, and particularly our strategical 
requirements, will determine how far Germany's eastern 
frontier should be pushed forward. Along the eastern 
limits of Posen and Silesia, and along the southern frontier 
of East Prussia a belt of territory must be created which, 
as far as possible, is free from non-German owners of land, 
which would therefore be open for settlement to German 
colonists. This German frontier belt will separate the 
Prussian Poles from the Russian Poles and protect them 
against the direct influence of the latter, who may achieve 
their independence. We do not hesitate to point out that 
the Baltic provinces of Russia, which Germans have cul- 
tivated for 700 years, which possess a fruitful soil and 
which are thinly populated, are a promising land suitable 
for colonisation by German settlers. The inhabitants, 
Lithuanians, Esthonians, and Letts, who are racially not 
related to the Russians, will become useful as agricultural 
labourers for temporary work in Germany proper. 

" We demand colonial land from Russia on which we 
can erect a frontier wall and create conditions for promoting 
the growth of our population. The colonial land demanded 
should, however, have a third function. It should be 
Russia's war indemnity paid to us. After the war it will 
probably be impossible to obtain from Russia an indemnity 
paid either in cash or in securities. The disappointment 
of the Russo-Japanese W-^ar, after which no indemnity was 
paid, might repeat itself. But Russia can very easily pay 



GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 433 

an indemnity in kind. The country is overburdened with 
riches in land, arid we demand that the territory which is 
to be ceded to us should to a large part be handed over 
without their owners. In view of Russia's administrative 
practice this is by no means a novel development. In 
Russia the people are not so deeply rooted in the soil as 
they are in Central and in Western Europe. Over and 
over again Russia has transplanted large portions of its 
populations from one district to other districts far away. 
The possibiUty of removing a settled population must not 
be measured with the insufficient standard of German 
civihsation. If the political acquisition of Russian land 
is to bring to us the necessary increase in power, we must 
be able to dispose freely of the bulk of it. A peace with 
Russia which does not bring about the waning of the 
Russian incubus and which fails to supply the land necessary 
to Germany, would mean "that a great opportunity of im- 
proving Germany's poUtical, economic, and social health had 
been thrown away. The final decision between Germany 
and Russia would then be adjourned to some future date. 
Another struggle for the existence of Germany and for 
European culture would then be certain. 

"(4) England, the East, the Colonies, Oversea Matters. — 
Although the struggle with Russia has been particularly 
grand and exceedingly glorious, and although we must 
remember how dangerous the enormous bulk of Russia will 
remain unless we succeed in bringing about its decom- 
position, we must not forget for a moment that this 
war has been in the last resort England's war against the 
industrial, commercial, maritime, and colonial power of 
Germany. 

" The cause of England's hostility must determine Ger- 
many's war aims with regard to England. This means 
that we must assert our position in the world's trade and 
assert Germany's sea power and oversea power as against 
England. 

" We must admit that England has taught us a valuable 
lesson by blockading Germany during the war, and by 
forcing us to organise the country so as to make it a self- 
supporting State. We have learned in the first place — and 
this has particularly been shown in this petition — that we 
require a broader and better secured basis in Europe, so 
that we shall be independent of other nations from the 



434 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 

political, military, and economic points of view. We 
mean, therefore, to create on the Continent and about our 
national frontiers a continental economic sphere which 
should be as large as possible, and which will make us in- 
dependent of England and of other world empires. In this 
respect Austria-Hungary and Turkey must be considered 
in the first place. They will unlock to us the Balkan Penin- 
sula and Asia Minor. Therefore it is necessary to secure 
permanently, against Russian and EngUsh cupidity, Austria- 
Hungary, the Balkan Peninsula, Turkey, and Asia Minor 
as far as the Persian Gulf. The commercial relations with 
our pohtical friends should be made closer with all means 
in our power. 

" Henceforward, in spite of England's hostihty and not- 
withstanding the security of our continental position, we 
must enter again upon the world-trade and become active 
in the lands across the sea. A substantial part of Germany's 
international trade will no doubt have to be established 
in totally different directions. Old-established commercial 
and maritime relations must be regained. In future we 
must learn to stand on our own feet. We must eliminate 
Enghsh mediation in finance and commerce, English arbi- 
trage and English insurance. We have lost confidence in 
England. Hence England must lose the profit which she 
has formerly derived from Germany's commerce. We mean 
to recreate our colonial empire. It should be more closely 
jointed and stronger than it has been hitherto. Central 
Africa would give us large territories, but they are of 
insufiicient value. We must therefore, in addition, acquire 
colonies elsewhere. Herein Lies the importance of Ger- 
many's permanent connection with the world of Islam and 
the necessity of a secure sea-route. Those who, disregard- 
ing Germany's security against England's naval tyranny, 
desire the acquisition of colonies, while being in favour of 
giving up Belgium, under-estimate not merely the import- 
ance of securing Germany's European basis. They make 
the more serious pohtical mistake of striving after colonial 
possessions without securing a safe connection oversea. 
They would once more place Germany at the mercy of 
England. 

" We require the freedom of the sea. We fight England 
with the object of obtaining that freedom for all nations. 
In order to enforce the freedom of the sea, it is in the first 



GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 435 

place necessary that Germany should obtain a strong 
position on the Channel coast. We must, as has previously 
been stated, have Belgium firmly in our grasp, and we 
must, if possible, obtain in addition part of the coast of the 
French Channel. Besides, it is necessary either to break 
the chain of naval bases which England has created around 
the world, or to neutralise them by caUing into existence 
corresponding and equivalent German bases. Egypt, which 
connects England with English Africa, and English Asia 
on the one hand, and with Austraha on the other, and 
which makes the Pacific Ocean an Enghsh lake, Egypt, 
which, to use Bismarck's words, is to the British Empire 
what the nerve at the back of the neck is to a man, is at the 
same time the iron clamp which firmly connects England's 
Eastern and her Western possessions and the instrument 
with which England subdues both. In Egypt England's 
vital nerve can be severed. If we succeed in this, we 
take the great trade-route which leads through the Suez 
Canal out of the hands of a single Power, In doing this 
the rights of Turkey should as far as possible be respected 
and preserved. 

" England's power is based in the main upon its over- 
whelming influence upon Governments and the Press 
throughout the world. We are in bitter need of eUminating 
the English cable and telegram monopoly. Our best ally 
against England's influence throughout the world is the 
freedom which we shall bring to all. In fighting for our 
own deliverance from the Enghsh yoke we fight for the liberty 
of the universe. We do not mean to exploit the nations 
of the world, as the Enghsh have been doing, but, while 
protecting our own interests, to act as the pioneers and 
leaders of Europe who respect and secure the individuality 
and the free development of all nations. 

" (5) War Indemnity. — We desire as far as possible to 
obtain a war indemnity which compensates us for the cost 
of the struggle, which enables us to rebuild what has been 
destroyed in East Prussia and in Alsace-Lorraine, which 
allows us to form a fund from which pensions will be paid 
to war invahds, war widows, and orphans, which permits 
us to make good the losses suffered by private German 
citizens, and allows us to replace and to improve the national 
armaments. 

" We are, of course, aware that the question of war indem- 



436 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 

nities depends not only upon our military successes, but 
also upon the financial ability of our enemies. Should we 
be in the position of exacting an indemnity from England, 
which has always been so thrifty in devoting English 
blood to the war, no amount of money that could be exacted 
would be sufficiently large. England has raised the world 
against Germany chiefly with its money. If we wish to 
strike at the most sensitive part of this nation of hucksterers, 
we must strike at its purse. Before all, we must hit England 
as hard as possible by striking at its money-bags, if we 
have the power. However, it is more probable that 
France, either alone, or, in the first place, must be counted 
upon to furnish an indemnity. We should not hesitate to 
put upon that country the heaviest financial burden. 
Philanthropic sentimentalism would be totally out of place. 
If the French wish to find relief, they may address them- 
selves to their Allies on the other side of the Channel. If 
these refuse to help their Allies financially, we should 
obtain at least a political result with which we may be 
satisfied. [The authors intimate that England's refusal to 
help France paying the indemnity demanded by Germany 
would lead to hostihty between the two countries.] 

" Before all, we believe that it is less important to find 
compensation for the damage suffered than to open to the 
German nation new roads for its powerful development in 
the future. Hence a monetary indemnity which com- 
pensates us for the cost of the war is of comparatively 
inferior importance. On the other hand, it is clear that, 
should we not be able to obtain an adequate monetary 
compensation, our demands for the surrender of land, of 
indubtrial values, and of colonies, stated in the foregoing, 
would gain both in political and in moral justification. We 
must not come out of the war, when it has come to a 
victorious end, with a loss. Otherwise posterity will 
still consider Germany defeated, her victories notwith- 
standing. 

" We abstain from deciding how the important problem 
of compensating Germany for its outlay should be solved, 
but we would point out that it would be valuable to have 
part of the monetary indemnity paid in securities, the 
possession of which would strengthen Germany's economic 
position in the countries of her political friends and which 
would deliver these from the undue influence exercised 



GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 437 

hitherto by England and France. [The signatories advocate 
that England and France should be compelled to hand over 
to Germany their investments in neutral countries.] 

" (6) Kultur and Force. — ^If the signatories of this petition, 
and especially the representatives of science, art, and the 
Church among them, should be reproached that in the 
present petition they have raised only political and economic 
demands, relying upon force, and that they have forgotten 
the spiritual problems of Germany's future, there should 
be a threefold answer : 

" The care of the German spirit is no part of Germany's 
war aims or of Germany's peace conditions. 

" The German spirit is for us the treasure of treasures, 
the most precious possession of the nation and the root 
cause of its superiority among the other nations. Still, 
it is clear that before attending to Germany's spirit we must 
enable the country to live in political and economic security. 
Only then can we cultivate our spiritual treasures with the 
necessary freedom. 

" Lastly, we would say to those who think of the German 
spirit as an abstraction divorced from power, to those who 
wish to pursue what is called a policy of culture pure and 
simple, that we do not wish for a spirituality which means 
disintegration and decay, that we do not wish for an 
unnational cosmopolitanism, which everywhere vainly 
tries to find a home, and which falsifies the national char- 
acter because it lacks a healthy national body. With our 
demands we wish to create a healthy body within which 
the German spirit may dwell. The enlargement of the 
German body politic which we demand will not harm, 
but will benefit, the German spirit, provided that the 
increase is effected under the precautions which we have 
indicated. 

" We are aware that we have put forth great aims, and 
that they are obtainable only if we are determined to make 
all the necessary sacrifices, and to negotiate with the ut- 
most energy. We appeal to the Bismarckian principle : ' In 
political matters faith can indeed remove mountains. In 
political matters courage and victory do not stand in the 
relation of cause and effect, for the two are identical.' " 

It will be noticed that the German intellectuals in their 
petition demanded not only far-reaching annexations in the 



438 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 

East and West, and vast monetary indemnities, but that 
they urged that a large part of the population dwelling 
within the conquered territories should be expropriated and 
expelled, and that the owners of land, industrial undertak- 
ings, etc., should be compensated at the cost of Germany's 
victims. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

GERMAN DEMANDS FOR THE DOMINATION OF THE WORLD ^ 

Many Germans desired to make Germany absolutely para- 
mount on the European Continent, to make their country 
the leader of a Central European Federation of States 
which would comprise 200,000,000 inhabitants or more, and 
which would extend across the Narrows into Asia Minor. 
Many hoped to extend the German Empire far beyond Asia 
Minor, and to make Asia Minor a great military base 
whence the bulk of Africa should be conquered and India 
be threatened and attacked. Many, seeing still farther 
ahead, hoped that their country would dominate the Far 
East and that China would become a German Protectorate. 
The views of German enthusiasts were limitless. Domina- 
tion over the three continents of the old world should, in 
their opinion, logically have led to Germany's domination 
of the world. Diplomats, politicians, publicists, and business 
men shared that hope. A former diplomat, Freiherr von 
Mackay, wrote on the 27th of November 1915 in Das 
Grossere Deutschland : 

" Germany must become the Centre State of Europe ; 
owing to its organising force, and its pohtical, economic, 
and moral superiority, it will become the president of the 
whole world and give the world rest and peace." 

Many Germans saw in the Turkish Empire the indispen- 
sable instrument for the achievement of world domination. 
With the help of Turkey, India and China were to be con- 

^ From Grumbach, Germany's Annexationist Aims, translated by J. Elllis 
Barker, Murray, 1917. 

29 *39 



446 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 

quered. Having conquered these, Germany was to civilise 
and Germanise the world. The German language was to 
become the world language. Herr Theodor Springmann, a 
manufacturer, wrote in Deutschland und der Orient, Hagen, 
1915 : 

" Germany's connection with Turkey has become so 
intimate through their brotherhood in arms that after the 
happy close of the war we should found a friendship-colony. 
We must strengthen Turkey within and without, suppress 
corruption, improve the administration and the schools, 
introduce compulsory and universal military service, organise 
a war-ready army, and construct railways up to the frontiers 
of the Caucasus, as well as towards India and Asia. Enor- 
mous uncultivated territories await exploitation, and these 
can produce so much grain and cotton that Germany would 
never experience want in a future war. Enormous oil- 
weUs, iron-mines, and manganese and copper deposits are 
awaiting us. All these circumstances combined yield such 
favourable conditions for an attack in case of future war 
with Russia or England, and these measures will be such an 
enormous help to us, that their aid will prove decisive. . . . 

" If once we have succeeded in making Turkey a strong, 
faithful, and devoted ally, then we can advance towards 
our aim. India and China will be for Germany the per- 
fection of its development. At the moment Germany is 
not ripe for world-embracing greatness. And it is not our 
misfortune, but a great blessing, that the Hindoos have 
not yet revolted against England. . . . England's old 
Colonial Empire must fall to pieces, for it is based on lies 
and tyranny. . . . We shall tell the awakening nations of the 
East : ' England has given you the knout, but Germany is 
presenting you with golden liberty. Come to us, learn our 
language, and study our achievements.' We shall close 
to our enemies the German schools, the mainsprings of our 
power, but open them to our friends, to India, Islam, and 
China. Then the German language will become the world 
language in this new world." 

While some Germans, in accordance with the opinions of 
Herr Springmann, hoped to dominate the world by conquer- 
ing Africa and Asia and by forcibly depriving the British 



GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 441 

race of its imperial domain, seizing India, Egypt, the African 
possessions, etc., by an attack overland, others were of 
opinion that Germany should obtain the mastery of the 
world and the control of the British Empire by dominating 
the British Isles themselves. The latter recommended an 
invasion of England. After its successful accomplishment, 
Dover was to be permanently occupied by Grerman troops, 
and the British Empire was to be allowed to lead a shadow 
existence. It should be nominally independent, but in 
reality it should be a German possession endowed with the 
appearances of self-government. A well-known publicist, 
Konrad von Winterstetten, wrote in Nordkap-Bagdad, 
Frankfurt, 1915 : 

" A glance at the map shows that the dyke protecting 
Germany against Russia must extend from the North 
Cape to the Black Sea and thence to the Caucasus and to 
the Persian Gulf. ... It is of immense importance that Ger- 
many should possess lands producing cotton and ore. The 
third necessity of world-policy is the possession of settle- 
ment colonies where the surplus population can find 
room. . . . 

" There should be a Federation : Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey — ^these States should 
enjoy full sovereignty in internal affairs. They should be 
firmly connected by a defensive and offensive alliance and 
by binding military and political agreements. Gradually 
a complete customs unity and economic unity would be 
established. A Central European Empire should arise from 
the war. An independent Albania ; Serbia should be 
partitioned ; the three Northern States and the small States 
of the West should be invited to join. This Federal Empire 
would have 185,000,000 inhabitants, and, inclusive of the 
Colonies, 240,000,000 inhabitants. . . . 

" If the Central European State desires to be a World- 
Power it must reach the shores of the Pacific, and it can 
arrive there by way of Bagdad. If it has obtained a footing 
on the Pacific Ocean, it can defend the valuable possessions 
which Holland has in that sea. These Lutch possessions 
must be entrusted to the Central European State, for 
otherwise they may be lost. Holland has no option in this 



442 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 

new epoch of world revolution and in the creation of 
gigantic Empires. It can save its Colonies and independence 
only by entering the Central European Federation. Other- 
wise it will lose both. . . . 

" Germany's territorial booty from France is not a 
problem of arbitrary geographic rearrangement, but one 
of political and economic necessity. It would be foolish 
for Germany to burden itself with more French territory 
than it needs. The ore-beds of Lorraine, the fortress of 
Belfort, and the rest of the frontier-lands cannot escape 
us even if our claims are drawn up with the utmost modesty. 
The appropriation of a belt of territory along the Belgian 
frontier from Verdun to Boulogne will probably be found 
necessary in order to obtain an open door for invading 
France, and a spring-board towards England. That would 
be the best security of the peace. . . . 

" More important than the question of correcting the 
frontiers is the problem of the French Colonies. That 
subject must be discussed elsewhere. It cannot be doubted 
that the actual occupation of the French Colonies by Ger- 
many is possible only after the defeat of the British Fleet. . . . 

" England must be made incapable of ever again fighting 
with Germany. . . . This can probably most easily be accom- 
plished by making ourselves the masters of the European 
head of the British World-Empire. The road from Grave- 
lotte-Verdun to Lunkkk -Boulogne might be continued by 
the occupation of the bridge-head of Uover by means of 
which England can be dominated. That proposal may 
seem fantastic, but it is as feasible as a landing in England 
without which the war would last for years. Only the 
conquest of London makes peace possible. After its con- 
quest one condition of peace will be as easily enforceable as 
any other. England, possessing only part of her Fleet — 
the larger part being in our hands — England being militarily 
always in our power, yet administering freely the World- 
Empire, in which no customs duties would be allowed to be 
levied, would henceforth be a most convenient neighbour to 
Germany." 

It is obvious that if Germany should succeed in making 
itself supreme within the three old continents, and should 
be able to dominate, or at least to over-awe, the British 
Empire, the United States would become a negligible factor. 



GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 443 

Hence little consideration need be paid to the Monroe 
doctrine. Herr Alfred Hettner wrote in Der Deutsche 
Krieg, Berlin, 1915 : 

" We must strive after the enlargement of Germany's 
colonial possessions, especially in Africa, and must particu- 
larly aim at connecting them and rounding them off. It 
would have been far easier to defend our colonies had 
they been interconnected. The idea of an expansion and a 
completion of our African colonies has been desired for a 
long time, . . . 

*' A portion of German public opinion is too modest with 
regard to Ajnerica. Because the United States have raised 
the Monroe doctrine and have, so to speak, told us Euro- 
peans to clear out of America, it does not follow that we 
must bow to that doctrine. If we do it as a rule, this is 
due to the disunion of Europe, which has made it possible 
for the United States to fish in troubled waters. The 
Central and South American States have recognised the 
Monroe doctrine only when it has protected them against 
Europe. However, the three South American Great 
Powers have deliberately opposed it when the United States 
interfered in Mexico. . . . Territorial conquests in America 
are out of the question, for there Germany's interests are 
economic and cultural. . . . 

" Germany cannot confine itself to its European area, 
even if it is enlarged." 

If Germany should succeed in dominating Europe, Asia, 
and Africa, and in crippling or destroying the British 
power, there would be only two Great Powers left in the 
world — Germany and the United States. Some Germans 
beUeved, with Herr Konrad von Winterstetten, that the 
strength of a Germany dominating the three continents of 
the old world would be so vast, if compared with that of 
the United States, that that country need not seriously be 
considered. Others thought that Germany and the United 
States might agree to dominate the world jointly. They 
proposed a partition of the world similar to that which 
Napoleon proposed to the Czar Alexander I. on the raft on 
the River Niemen in 1807. Herr Max Schubert, a manu- 



444 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 

facturer, wrote in Deutschland am Schicksalswege, published 
in Leipzig in 1914 : 

" Belgium, the bulk of whose population is of Germanic 
descent, will, after the disgraceful deeds of the population, 
probably remain permanently a part of Germany. If we 
succeed in seizing, in addition to the Belgian coast, part 
of the Atlantic coast of France, then we should obtain the 
possibility of breaking England's supremacy in European 
waters. If we can enforce peace with France and Russia, 
victory over England will surely foUow. We can enforce 
our will upon apparently inviolable England by means of 
a Continental blockade and similar means. Possibly we 
may succeed also in throwing England out of the Mediter- 
ranean, where it has no business to be. . . . 

" Production in large quantities, which is particularly 
beneficial to the national economy, is possible only within 
large economic areas. Already Germany forms such an 
area. Together with its friends, and aUies, it would form 
a huge economic area which would be beyond compare, 
except in the United States. We could conclude friendship 
with the United States and then we could lay down the law 
to the world." 



CHAPTER XXVII 

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND OF THE GERMAN RACE ^ 

History teaches us that the settlement of difEerences 
between neighbouring nations is a long-drawn-out process. 
England and France fought one another almost continually 
from prehistoric times through the Hundred Years' War 
and through a war period of more than a hundred years 
in the time of Louis XIV., Louis XV., the Repubhc, and 
Napoleon. Nations have long memories. Great, proud, 
and powerful nations, and even small ones, do not easily 
become reconciled to the idea of having been defeated and 
of having lost their position in the world. That may, for 
instance, be seen from the fact that in recent times the 
Serbians rose against the Turks largely in order to avenge 
the disastrous battle of Kossovo which was fought in 1389 
and which they still remembered. Throughout history 
we meet with century-old passionate national resentments 
which have led to war. Hence even a peace dictated by 
the strictest justice and fairness may fail to prevent the 
renewal of the struggle on the part of a defeated nation, 
for if that nation should beUeve that it has a good chance 
of completely reversing the verdict of history, it will prob- 
ably take up arms once more and fight for its rehabiUtation. 
In his great speech on the political situation, delivered on 
the nth of January 1887, Prince Bismarck stated : 

" The fight for the Franco- Glerman frontier began, his- 
torically speaking, when France seized the three Bishoprics 
of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. That event has been almost 
forgotten. However, since then there has been scarcely 

1 Written in November 1918 
446 



446 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

a generation of Germans which has not been compelled to 
draw the sword against France, Has then the epoch of the 
Franco-German frontier struggle now at last come to a 
conclusion ? You, gentlemen, can know that as little as 
can I, I would therefore only express to you my personal 
belief that the period of that struggle will not come to a 
close unless the character of the French nation or the entire 
international position should alter completely. I am of 
opinion that the historical process between Germany and 
France which has filled three centuries has not come to an 
end." 

Bismarck's prediction has proved correct, and we may 
apply his opinion to the position arising from the present 
War. We must therefore ask ourselves : Will the German 
nation, which has been a military and a conquering nation, 
most successful in war, since the time when it destroyed 
the Roman Empire, plundered Rome, and overran and 
devastated all Italy, Greece, the countries on the Danube, 
France, Spain, North Africa, and Asia Minor, acknowledge 
the justice of its defeat and of the peace settlement follow- 
ing it ? Or will it endeavour to regain by war the great 
position which it has lost, if the situation should happen to 
be in its favour ? Germany's statesmen, politicians, his- 
torians, and school-teachers may ascribe Germany's downfall, 
not to her own disgraceful folly and criminal wickedness, 
but to the envy of her opponents and to their overwhelming 
strength, and they may arouse among the people the fervent 
hope of a war of revenge, and of a great national revival 
similar to that which followed the apparently irretrievable 
disaster which overtook Prussia in 1806. What, then, 
will be Germany's miUtary chances in the future ? Can a 
renewal of the War in ten, twenty, or fifty years be prevented? 
These questions are at present on everybody's lips, and I 
shall try to answer them in the following pages. 

It is difficult to foretell the events of the future. Still, 
I will endeavour to analyse the impending evolution of 
Germany, encouraged by the fact that my forecasts of that 
country's course of action have hitherto proved not incorrect. 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 447 

From 1900 onwards I foretold Germany's attack on civilisa- 
tion in numerous articles published in the Nineteenth Cen- 
tury Review and elsewhere. In July 1907 I went so far as to 
assert in that Review, in an article entitled " England, Ger- 
many, and the Baltic," that Germany would begin the Great 
War only after having completed the enlargement of the 
Kiel Canal. I stated : 

" It is expected that eight years will be required to finish 
the Baltic and North Sea Canal, Therefore during the 
next eight years Germany will be unable to avail herself of 
the great advantages furnished by the Baltic and North 
Sea Canal, except for her smaller and older ships. Her 
magnificent new ships will for about eight years be restricted 
to one of the German seas. Consequently Germany will, 
during the next eight years, do all in her power to avoid a 
conflict with a first-class naval Power. During the next 
eight years Germany has every reason to keep the peace. 
Only when the enlargement of the Baltic and the North 
Sea Canal has been accompUshed will she be ready for a 
great naval war." 

Germany actually began her attack four weeks after the 
completion of the Canal. 

Until autumn 1918 it was generally believed that the 
Hohenzollern dynasty was the most firmly-established 
dynasty in the world, that a revolution in Germany was 
inconceivable. Yet I foretold, even before the War, that 
WilUam II. would lose his throne by a revolution if he should 
cause Germany to embark upon a wanton war of aggression 
which would lead to the defeat of his country. I wrote, 
for instance, at the time of the second Morocco crisis, in 
an article entitled " German Designs in Africa," which 
was published in the Nineteenth Century Review in August 
1911 : 

" War has been brought within the limits of vision. . . . 
Persistence on the dangerous and unprecedented course 
which Germany is steering at the present moment may 
imperil Germany's future, and may cost the Emperor his 



448 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

throne. The German nation is intensely loyal and patriotic, 
but it would never forgive a monarch who had driven the 
nation into a disastrous war without adequate reason." 

Immediately after the outbreak of the War I repeated my 
forecast and added that defeat might lead to the break-up 
of the German Federation. In an article entitled " The 
Ultimate Ruin of Germany," which I was allowed to con- 
tribute to the Nineteenth Century Review in September 
1914, I stated: 

" The War may jeopardise, and perhaps destroy, not only 
the entire life-work of Bismarck and part of that of Frederick 
the Great, it may not only impoverish Germany very 
greatly, but it may also damage Germany's good name for 
generations. . . . 

" The question now arises whether the docile Germans 
will bear their misfortunes patiently, or whether they will 
rebel against the crowned criminal who has brought about 
their misery. A revolt is possible, and it may take a two- 
fold shape. Conceivably the Southern States might, after 
a serious defeat of the German Army, detach themselves 
from Prussia, refusing to fight any longer for the German 
Emperor. . . . On the other hand, it is possible that there 
would be a general rising of the people against their rulers. 
The great majority of Germans are dissatisfied with their 
form of government. A well-educated people does not like 
to be governed like children. An absolutism thinly dis- 
guised by parUamentary forms is tolerable only as long as 
it is successful, and as the people are prosperous. The 
vast majority of the Germans are Liberals, Radicals, and 
Sociahsts. This majority has at present no influence what- 
ever upon the government and policy of the country. Failure 
of the Government in the present War would make absolute 
government impossible in Germany. If Germany should 
experience serious defeat, she may either become a strictly 
limited monarchy on the English model, or a republic. 
As both the Emperor and the Crown Prince are equally 
responsible for the present War, it may well happen that the 
German people will refuse to be ruled any longer by the 
Hohenzollerns. The rise of a German republic is certainly 
within the limits of possibiUty. 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 449 

In April 1916 I dealt once more in the Nineteenth Century 
Review with the probabihty of a German revolution in case 
of defeat, and concluded an article entitled " How the Army 
has Ruined Germany " with the words : 

" Germany is supposed to be a Constitutional Empire 
possessed of representative and very democratic institutions, 
for every male adult is given a vote. If we look into the 
Constitution a little more closely we find that the country 
is ruled by a military oligarchy, that its democratic institu- 
tions are a farce, that the people are powerless. As military 
domination has been imposed upon Germany by the Con- 
stitution, and as the people cannot alter the Constitution 
except with the consent of their rulers, it is obvious that 
Germany can free herself from the shackles of militarism 
only by a successful revolution. Germany has borne 
domination by a miUtary caste as long as she was prosperous 
and invariably successful in war. When she discovers that 
the mihtary caste has ruined the country, when the immense 
prestige enjoyed by the army has disappeared, when the 
people see in it the principal cause of their misery, they may 
rise and sweep out of existence the institutions which have 
brought about their downfall." 

Thirteen months later, shortly after the Russian Revolu- 
tion, I stated in an article entitled " Will Germany follow 
Russia's Example ? " * which appeared in the Nineteenth 
Century Review : 

" History teaches us that the German race is as demo- 
cratic as is the British race. ... If we study the causes of 
successful revolution we find that they are two — political 
dissatisfaction and economic distress. People will stand 
oppression patiently and they will stand hunger, but they 
will not easily stand both combined. If the Gt^rmans 
should in due course suffer simultaneously from hunger 
and defeat, they may well turn against their rulers and call 
them to account. . . . 

" Many who consider the possibihty of a revolution in 
Germany imagine that it will be brought about by the 
huge Social Democratic Part3^ They are wrong. In 
1 Nineteenth Century and After, May 1917. 



450 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

Grermany, where Parliament is powerless, a revolution cannot 
be made by a single party, however strong. It can be 
brought about only if the bulk of the nation, regardless of 
party, is determined to change the existing form of govern- 
ment and if the army is with it, A serious German defeat 
would give a fatal blow to the privileges of the ruhng 
aristocracy and of the military caste and to the prosperity 
of the great industrial and commercial middle-class. There- 
fore it seems likely that in case of defeat the aristocracy, 
the army, and the liberal middle-class may turn against 
the Emperor. . . . 

" The German people have no doubt begun to recognise 
the folly and wickedness of the present War. They must 
see that defeat is inevitable, and that it will bring about not 
only the weakening of the State, but that it will leave the 
nation impoverished and disrgraced throughcut the world. 
They must recognise that, owing to the criminal conduct 
of the War, not merely the German State but the German 
race has become an outlaw throughout the world, that 
the German people can rehabilitate themselves in the eyes 
of the world only by repudiating the Emperor and their 
Government and by punishing the guilty. . . . 

A revolution in Germany consequent upon defeat is not 
absolutely certain, but is highly probable in view of the 
historic character of the German nation. The Grerman race 
is naturally democratic, and the events of the War have 
undoubtedly strengthened the democratic spirit to a very 
great extent. That may be seen by the concessions whereby 
the German Government tries vainly now to appease the 
people. What the German people require is not the reform 
of the Prussian franchise, but the direction of the policy 
of the State by their elected representatives. I think the 
German nation is too wise to allow again a single man, 
who may be a degenerate, a madman, a criminal, or merely 
a fool, to send millions of Germans to their death." 

Germany's future may be considered from two very 
different points of view. We may start either with the 
assumption that Germany will retain her political unity 
and her social stability or with the assumption that Ger- 
many will go to pieces either politically or socially, or both 
politically and socially. Let us then in the first instmce 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 451 

consider Germany's future, on the assumption that she will 
succeed in remaining united and in evolving peacefully a 
democratic form of government. 

In 1913 Germany had 67,000,000 inhabitants and France 
had 39,700,000 inhabitants. In consequence of her defeat 
Germany will lose Alsace-Lorraine and her Polish and 
Danish districts. Germany's Alsatian, Polish, and Danish 
subjects number about 7,000,000. The population of 
Alsace-Lorraine is a little less than 2,000,000. Therefore, 
as a result of the War, Germany's population should be 
reduced to 60,000,000 and that of France increased to 
41,700,000 if we disregard the war losses of both countries. 
There would thus be three Germans to every two French- 
men. In man-power Germany would still have a dangerous 
superiority over France. One of the consequences of the 
War may be that France will enter upon the most intimate 
relations with Belgium and Luxemburg. Very likely these 
three countries will form a union for mutual defence. As 
Belgium and Luxemburg have together about 8,000,000 
inhabitants, the French group would then have a popula- 
tion of about 50,000,000. Germany's population would 
still exceed that of France, Belgium, and Luxemburg com- 
bined by 10,000,000. Her superiority in man-power would 
still be very great. 

Germany has been so greatly exhausted by the War that 
an early war of revenge does not seem to lie within the limits 
of the possible. We must therefore rather study the pros- 
pective power of Germany than its present strength. 

Unless the formation of a League of Nations should per- 
manently and fundamentally change the historical character 
of States and the character, ambitions, and strivings of the 
men of whom they are composed, France will probably be 
most exposed to a German attack, for Grermany can hope 
to re-establish her paramount position on the Continent of 
Europe only after having defeated that State which is at 
the same time her century-old opponent and which possesses 
the strongest army on the Continent and is therefore the 
natural protector of Europe against a German domination. 



452 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 



Military power depends largely on man-power. The pros- 
pective development of the man-power of a country can 
to some extent be gauged from its growth and increase in 
the past. According to the official statistics of France and 
of Germany the population of the two countries has grown 
as follows since the time of the Napoleonic Wars : 





Gennany within 


Prance (since 1871, 


Tear. 


the Limits of 


without Alsace- 




1914. 


Lorraine). 


1816 . 


. 24,833,000 


29,480,000 


1830 . 


. 29,520,000 


32,370,000 


1860 . 


. 35,397,000 


35,630,000 


1870 . 


. *40,818,000 


38,440,000 


1871 . 


. 40,997,000 


36,190,000 


1881 . 


. 46,421,000 


37,590,000 


1891 . 


. 49,762,000 -> 38,350,000 


1901 . 


. 56,874,000 


38,980,000 


1911 . 


. 65,359,000 


39,602,000 



Between the years 1816 and 1911 the population of Ger- 
many has increased in round figures by 40,000,000 and that 
of France by only 10,000,000. If we allow for the transfer of 
Alsace-Lorraine, the population of Germany has increased by 
38,000,000 and that of France by only 12,000,000. During 
the century under review, the German people has increased 
more than three times as rapidly as the French population. 
A line divides the table at the significant date of 1870-71. 
It will be noticed that up to 1 870 the population of France 
increased by 9,000,000 and that of Germany within the 
limits of 1914 by 16,000,000. Up to the Franco-German 
War the German population increased a little less than twice 
as fast as the French population. On the other hand, 
between 1871 and 1911 the French population increased 
by only 3,400,000 and the German population by no less 
than 24,500,000 or seven times as fast. The most starthng 
fact, however, is that between 1901 and 1911 the French 
population grew by 620,000, and the German population 
by 8,500,000, or thirteen and a half times as fast as the 
French population. If the population of Germany and of 
France should increase as it has done during the last 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 453 

decade, the population of the reduced Grermany would 
expand from 60,000,000 in 1919 to about 100,000,000 
inhabitants in the year 1950, while that of France, inclusive 
of Alsace-Lorraine, would grow from 42,000,000 to about 
45,000,000 inhabitants. By 1950 Germany's superiority over 
France in man-power would be absolutely overwhelming, 
and by the year 2000 France might militarily occupy 
towards Grermany a position not dissimilar to that which 
Belgium occupied in 1914. A Germany of 100,000,000 
people, especially if supported by Austria and Hungary, 
would, by sheer weight of numbers alone, dominate the 
west and the south of the European Continent. As Russia 
may remain permanently divided against herself, a Germany 
of 100,000,000 inhabitants, especially if supported by a 
populous Austria and Hungary, might dominate the east 
of Europe as well, unless the numerous small nationaUties 
dwelUng about the Danube or the peoples inhabiting what 
once was the Russian Empire should combine in self- 
defence, forming either alliances or federating among them- 
selves. 

The fact that since the Franco-German War of 1870-71 
the expansion of France's population has constantly slack- 
ened and has lately come almost to a standstill, while 
during the same time the population of Germany has 
increased ever more rapidly, is no mere chance coincidence. 
The phenomenon of an increasing expansion of population 
in Germany and of a growing stagnation of population in 
France is not due to racial reasons, to the vigour of the 
Grerman race, and to the selfishness or to the exhaustion 
of the French stock, as the German Professors would have 
us beUeve, but is due to economic causes. Adam Smith 
stated correctly in his Wealth of Nations : 

" The demand for those who live by wages necessarily 
increases with the increase of the revenue and stock of 
every country and cannot possibly increase without it. . . . 
The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country 
is the increase of the number of its inhabitants. . . . 

" The value of children is the greatest of all encourage- 



464 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

ments to marriage. We cannot, therefore, wonder that 
the people in North America should generally marry very 
young. Notwithstanding the great increase occasioned by 
such early marriages, there is a continual complaint of the 
scarcity of hands in North America. The demands for 
labourers, the funds destined for maintaining them, increase, 
it seems, still faster than they can find labourers to 
employ. . . . 

" The demand for men, like that for any other commodity, 
necessarily regulates the production of men ; quickens it 
when it goes on too slowly, and stops it when it advances 
too fast." 



We live in the age of machinery. The advent of powerful 

machinery has vastly increased the productive power of 

men, and the result has been that a single worker can now 

produce as much as a number could by the more primitive 

processes. Hence population in the agricultural districts 

of Europe has become stagnant if not retrogressive. On 

the other hand, machinery has enabled millions of men to 

earn a good living by manufacturing in the cramped areas 

of the towns. For instance, the gigantic increase of the 

German population since 1871 has taken place exclusively 

in the towns, and particularly in the large manufacturing 

towns. Between 1871 and 1910 Germany's population 

in the towns of 100,000 inhabitants and more has increased 

from 1,968,537 to 13,823,348, or by 600 per cent. ; in the 

towns of from 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants it has grown 

from 3,147,272 to 8,677,955, or by 150 per cent. ; in the 

towns of from 5,000 to 20,000 it has increased from 

4,588,364 to 9,172,333, or by 100 per cent. ; in the towns 

of from 2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants it has grown from 

5,190,801 to 7,297,770, or by only 50 per cent., and in the 

.country towns and villages of less than 2,000 inhabitants 

the population has actually decreased from 26,163,818 to 

25,954,587. 

The increase of population in densely inhabited European 
countries depends chiefly, and almost entirely, on the 
progress of the manufacturing industries carried on in the 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 455 

towns, and the expansion of these depends principally 
on the possession of cheap power, on steam raised by 
coal. Hence the possession of coal determines industrial 
power, national income, wealth, population, and military 
strength, for military strength is based upon man-power 
and industrial power. The enormous disadvantage at which 
France has been, compared with Germany, with regard to 
coal may to some extent be gauged from the following 
figures : 

Coal and lignite resources possessed by Germany . 423,356,000,000 tons 

France . 17,583,000,000 „ 

Coal and lignite production of Germany in 1913 . 273,650,000 ,, 

France in 1913 . 40,190,000 „ 

Before the War Germany's store of coal was twenty-five 
times as large as that of France, and Germany's coal pro- 
duction was almost seven times as great as was French 
coal production. However, France suffered not only from 
a crippHng shortage of coal, but from the fact that her coal 
occurs in irregular patches and in strata which are very 
thin and faulty. Hence coal is not only very scarce but is 
extremely dear in France — before the War it was sold in 
many districts at £5 per ton and over — while it is plentiful 
and exceedingly cheap in Germany. Germany owes the 
rapid increase of her wealth, and with her wealth of her 
population, chiefliy to her vast store of cheap coal. 

Population has more and more rapidly increased in 
Germany since 1871 because the industries of the country 
have prospered mightily since the unification of the Empire. 
The victory over France and the inflow of the great indem- 
nity which France had to pay gave a mighty impetus to 
Germany's industries. France, on the other hand, was 
crippled by that war. Her industries suffered not only 
from lack of cheap coal, but they were furthermore handi- 
capped by a great burden of taxation. The war had created 
a vast load of debt upon which interest had to be paid. 
For the sake of self-preservation, the French had to create 
and to maintain an army able to meet the German forces. 
30 



456 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

Of course the rapidly increasing military expenditure pressed 
far more heavily on the smaller French population, chiefly 
engaged in agriculture, than on the much larger and much 
wealthier population of Germany, chiefly engaged in exceed- 
ingly prosperous industries. 

The French race is naturally a prolific race. The 65,000 
Frenchmen who dwelt in Canada when it became Enghsh 
in 1763 have since then increased to about 3,000,000. The 
War of 1914-18 might, and ought to, lead to a vigorous 
expansion of the victorious peoples and to a slackened 
increase, and perhaps to the stagnation, if not to the 
numerical decline, of the German population. 

The Allies have announced that Germany will have to 
make good the gigantic losses which she has inflicted upon 
the civil population of her opponents. These losses alone 
should amount to about £5,000,000,000, while the total 
war expenditure of the Allies should be about ten times 
as large. Germany will be required to pay the AUies to 
the limit of her ability. In addition, Germany will obviously 
have to deal with her own war expenditure either by paying 
interest on her enormous war debt by means of hugely 
increased taxes, or by repudiating her war loans. By the 
latter process she would, of course, utterly ruin her capitahsts, 
both great and small. Germany is quite unprepared for so 
colossal a burden. Her fiinancial plan of campaign has 
been as wildly reckless as her mihtary plan of campaign. 
On the 20th of August 1915, when it must have been obvious 
to all well-informed Germans that Germany might conceiv- 
ably lose the war, Herr Helfferich, the Secretary of the 
Imperial Treasury and a former Director of the Deutsche 
Bank, stated with criminal levity in the Reichstag : 

" As long as the enemy does not condescend to acknow- 
ledge our invincibihty in the field and acts accordingly, 
arms are the only means of convincing him of that fact. 
(Hear, hear.) Therefore, we must continue fighting and 
must bear all the sacrifices which the war involves. (Bravo.) 
Now as far as the necessary financial supplies are concerned 
we shall once more rely upon a loan. I have already in 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 457 

March indicated the reasons which have caused the Govern- 
ment to abstain as long as possible from introducing special 
war taxes. The reasons then given exist still. We do not 
wish to add to the gigantic war burdens borne by the Ger- 
man people by increasing the taxes unless imperative 
necessity should compel us to do so, ... As matters are, 
we mean to adjourn the settlement of our war expenditure 
to the peace and to the period following it. If God gives 
us victory and enables us to order our lives in accordance 
with our requirements, we must not forget the financial 
question, (Loud applause.) That we owe to the future 
of the people. (Hear, hear,) The future life of the German 
people must as far as possible be kept free from the burden 
which has arisen through the war. (Hear, hear.) The 
leaden weight of a debt of thousands of millions should 
deservedly be borne by those who have brought about the 
War. (Hear, hear.) Let our enemies, not the Germans, be 
crushed by that load for decades. (Loud applause.) 

Similar speeches were delivered in the German Reichstag 
and elsewhere almost up to the final catastrophe. Scarcely 
an attempt was made to provide by means of taxes for 
even part of the interest of the huge war debt. Germany 
might have followed England's example and have raised 
in the course of the War £2,000,000,000 in war taxes. Her 
burden will now be doubly crushing to her. 

Germany can, of course, not pay to the countries she 
has damaged indemnities of thousands of millions of pounds 
in cash. In the whole world there exists only about 
£1,000,000,000 in gold. She can pay the foreign indem- 
nities only in goods, and as foreign nations do not wish to 
see their industries swamped and ruined by German manu- 
factured imports, she will have to pay damages partly in 
raw material and partly in the form of services. German 
labour may have to rebuild what German soldiers have 
destroyed. 

By nature's bounty Grermany is exceedingly well sup- 
plied with minerals. Within her frontiers of 1914 she had 
by far the largest coal deposits in Europe, and huge iron 
ore deposits, and her subsoil contained an unfathomable 



458 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

wealth of salts of all kinds. Her potash deposits have 
hitherto had a world monopoly and her deposits of these 
salts, which are of the greatest value to agriculture, and 
which are indispensable for certain chemical purposes, are 
absolutely inexhaustible. At a moderate valuation her 
principal minerals in situ represented before the War the 
following value : 

£ 
423,356,000,000 tons of coal at lO.-*. per ton = 211,678,000,000 

4,000,000,000 tons of iron ore at 5». per ton = 1,000,000,000 

50,000,000,000 tons of potash at 10s. per ton = 25,000,000,000 

Total £237,678,000,000 

The importance of the amount given may be gauged from 
the fact that the so-called national wealth of the United 
Kingdom — which, by the by, merely means the present 
wealth of the present generation — is estimated to amount 
only to about £20,000,000,000 or to one-twelfth of the 
value of Germany's three principal minerals. The Ruhr 
coal-basin alone contains 213,566,000,000 tons of coal, 
which, at the low price of 10s. per ton, would represent 
a capital value of £106,783,000,000. It is therefore 
obvious that Germany can pay in minerals, though not in 
cash, in the course of years all the damage she has done, 
however large the amount may be. 

The gigantic values represented by her minerals were the 
basis of Germany's abounding and rapidly-increasing pros- 
perity, were the principal cause of the rapid growth of her 
population, and of her vast military strength. Unfortun- 
ately for Germany, a very large part of her mineral wealth 
occurs on territory inhabited by nationalities oppressed by 
Germany which will be lost to her in consequence of the 
War. Of her 4,000,000,000 tons of iron ore, 2,630,000,000 
tons, or two-thirds of her store, occur in Lorraine-Luxem- 
burg — Luxemburg was part of the German Zollverein. 
The remaining third is scattered over eighteen separate 
districts and their exploitation is comparatively un- 
economical. Moreover, the quality of her Lorraine ore was 
superior to that of the other German ores. Hence the 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 459 

eighteen iron-ore fields in Germany proper furnished Ger- 
many in 1910 only with about one- tenth of the metallic 
iron which she consumed. 

The War will seriously cripple Germany's purchasing 
power, and if she should be unable to obtain vastly increased 
imports of iron ore from France, Belgium, Sweden, etc., as 
a set-off for her loss of the ore of Lorraine her gigantic iron 
industry may well decUne to insignificance. 

Before the War Germany had by far the largest iron 
industry in Europe. She then produced approximately 
three times as much iron and steel as the United Kingdom. 
Germany's iron exports exceeded those of Great Britain, 
and her exports of machinery, etc., were gigantic. Her 
iron industry was expanding far more rapidly than that of 
the United States. The iron industry occupied in Germany 
a position of commanding pre-eminence. Directly and 
indirectly it employed 2,250,000 workers. The decline of 
the German iron industry would seriously affect many 
German industries connected with it. It would vastly 
reduce Germany's wealth and income and would very 
notably weaken, if not disarm, the country militarily. 
Germany's great miUtary strength was largely due to the 
fact that she produced more iron and steel than all the 
countries of Europe combined. 

Germany's defeat will deprive her not only of the bulk 
of her iron ore but also of vast quantities of coal. Germany 
possesses two large coal-fields and a small one. Her large 
coal-fields are in Southern Silesia and about the Ruhr 
valley. The Ruhr coal-basin lies within Germany proper. 
The other large coal-field, that of Silesia, lies within the 
indisputable Polish zone. It seems likely that at the Peace 
Congress Southern Silesia and its coal-field will be handed 
over to Poland together with the numerous and important 
industries which have arisen on and around the coal measures. 
The Silesian coal-field contains, according to the best 
geological information available, 165,987,000,000 tons of 
coal. The importance of that figure may be seen from 
the fact that the United Kingdom is supposed to possess 



460 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

altogether 189,535,000,000 tons of coal. In other words, 
Germany seems likely to lose to Poland almost as much 
coal as the entire store of coal of the United Kingdom. At 
the low figure of 10s. per ton the coal of Southern Silesia 
would represent a truly fabulous wealth. 

Coal is heavy and bulky. Consequently manufacturers 
like to place their works as closely as possible to the coal- 
pits. Coal-fields attract manufacturing industries from far 
and wide. After the peace, many industries in the north- 
east, the centre, and the south-east of Germany will feel 
compelled, for the sake of the coal which they need, to 
transfer their establishments from German territory to Pohsh 
soil, thus impoverishing Germany and enriching Poland. 
Formerly hundreds of thousands of PoHsh labourers, anxious 
to find work, migrated temporarily to Germany or settled 
permanently in the country. In future hundreds of thou- 
sands of Germans, who will be unable to find work in 
Germany and who wiU have to take to unskilled labour, 
may have to migrate to Poland in order to make a living, 
and they may in course of time become Po Ionised. The 
German Province of East Prussia with about 2,000,000 
inhabitants will become an enclave of the new Polish State. 
That backward province is almost certain to become 
absorbed by the Poles who surround it. 

The portion of Poland which formerly belonged to Russia 
has highly-developed manufacturing industries. Industrial 
Warsaw had before the War 1,000,000 inhabitants, and Lodz 
— the Russian Manchester — had 500,000 inhabitants. In 
view of the vast quantities of coal and of other minerals 
which occur in Polish territory, it cannot be doubted that 
Poland is destined to become one of the greatest industrial 
countries in Europe, especially when the navigation on 
the Vistula, the great natural artery of all Poland, which 
has deliberately been stifled in the past by Germany and 
Russia, is energetically developed. 

The French, as has previously been stated, suffer acutely 
through lack of coal. By the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine 
they will obtain by far the largest iron-ore fields in Europe, 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 461 

and very naturally will try to create in Lorraine the largest 
iron industry of Europe, which hitherto has been possessed 
by Germany, Until now the iron ore of Lorraine has 
been smelted in Lorraine itself, and especially in the Ruhr 
district, with coke made from Ruhr coal. It must, there- 
fore, be expected that Germany will be required at the 
peace to pay the indemnity due to France largely in Ruhr 
coal. Germany cannot complain if this should be made 
one of the peace conditions, for she has created a precedent 
by exacting payments in raw materials and food from 
famished Russia and from ruined Rumania. 

The peace settlement should have very far-reaching 
economic consequences. It should transfer vast quantities 
of coal and numerous valuable industries from Eastern 
Germany to the new Poland, and vast quantities of coal 
and iron ore and many valuable industries depending on 
these minerals from Alsace-Lorraine and from Western 
Germany to France. Besides, France will obtain large 
quantities of potash and of petroleum which are known to 
exist in the regained provinces. 

Raw products determine and dominate manufacturing. 
It is only natural that many of the German manufacturing 
industries which are dependent upon Silesian coal and 
Lorraine iron may have to follow the transferred minerals 
into France and Poland, even if they are located well 
inside the new German frontier. The migration of Ger- 
many's industries towards France and Poland would of 
course be accelerated if taxation should be heavier in Ger- 
many than in France and in Poland, or if manufacturing, 
or social, conditions should be more favourable outside 
Germany than within that country. Moreover, the Govern- 
ments of France and Poland will no doubt do their utmost 
to tempt and to attract the wealth -creating industries of 
Germany across the border by those fiscal and adminis- 
trative measures which Germany has taught them. 

The departure of numerous industries from Germany 
would, of course, lead to a considerable decrease in Germany's 
wealth and income, and would harmfully affect the develop- 



462 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

ment of Germany's population and military strength. On 
the other hand, the rise and growth of powerful industries 
in France and Poland would, in accordance with Adam 
Smith's dictum, lead to a more or less rapid augmentation 
of the population in those countries, for the demand for 
men regulates the supply of men. The transfer of industries 
on a large scale from Germany to her neighbours in the 
east and west would materially alter the balance of man- 
power, and therefore the balance of military power as well, 
between Germany and her neighbours. 

Grermany is principally an industrial State. Her manufac- 
turing industries constitute her chief resource. The Ger- 
man manufacturing industries will suffer not only through 
the loss of vast quantities of coal and of iron ore. Before 
the War Germany was as dependent on foreign raw materials 
— such as cotton, wool, silk, hides, oil, fat, rubber, iron 
ore, copper, tin, fertilisers, etc. — as was Great Britain. In 
addition she imported from abroad coffee, tea, cocoa, 
tobacco, etc., and vast quantities of the most necessary 
food-stuffs for men and beasts. Before the War Germany's 
foreign trade was only slightly smaller than that of the 
United Kingdom. Germany paid for her huge imports 
of indispensable raw material and of food chiefly with 
manufactured articles, particularly with machinery and iron- 
ware, cotton, woollen and silk goods, chemicals, electrical 
ware, glass, porcelain, paper, etc. In the course of the 
War Germany has been absolutely denuded of imported raw 
materials. Their purchase will require gigantic sums. In 
view of the scarcity of shipping, of the urgent necessity 
of repatriating the troops, and of carrying food-stuffs to 
Europe, and in view of the world-wide demand for imported 
raw products, Germany will have to wait a considerable 
time for the materials which her industries require. Besides 
their purchase will be difficult, for Germany has been 
greatly impoverished by the War, and she will have to pay 
vastly enhanced prices owing to the depreciation of her 
currency and exchange. Furthermore she may not find 
it easy to obtain the necessary shippirg, partly because she 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 463 

will have to make good the losses which her U-boats have 
inflicted, partly because the foreign sailors may refuse to 
handle Germany's trade. Lastly some of the raw material 
exporting nations, particularly Australia, may refuse to 
supply her. Hence Germany will be able to obtain the 
indispensable raw materials only with very great delay, 
and her manufacturing rivals have already reserved for 
themselves vast quantities of these raw products. 

Germany can pay for the bulk of her indispensable 
imports only with the exports of manufactured goods. 
However, their sale abroad will be exceedingly difficult 
owing to the universal hatred which she has aroused. Even 
if foreign Governments should not discriminate against 
her by special tariffs, both importers and the public will 
decline for a long time to buy German goods. Luring 
the four years of war Germany's foreign markets have been 
captured by her enemies and the neutrals, and she will 
find it difficult to recover them, for German business men 
and German commercial travellers will be shunned almost 
universally. Germany will find it exceedingly hard to 
re-create her extremely valuable foreign trade, even if she 
carries it on through neutral intermediaries. She will 
have to begin at the bottom rung of the ladder and to work 
her way slowly up. 

Before the War Germany possessed the second largest 
mercantile marine in the world. The War has destroyed 
Germany's great position on the sea and her valuable 
connections abroad. Remembering the U-boat outrages, 
foreign nations may refuse to Grerman ships harbour, dock, 
and coaling facilities, and merchants may refuse for decades 
to employ the German carrying trade. Here again Ger- 
many will have to work her way up from the very bottom. 
Possibly she may try to disguise the identity of her ships 
by placing them under foreign flags. Possibly she will 
abandon her ocean trade altogether. 

Before the War Germany had gigantic and extremely 
profitable investments in foreign countries. She dominated 
the banks and many of the most profitable industries in. 



464 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

Belgium, Italy, Rumania, Russia, Turkey, Argentina, 
ChiU, and various other countries. She had huge invest- 
ments in the United States and in the British Empire. 
Her foreign investments have been liquidated during the 
War. Her financiers and bankers will everywhere be un- 
welcome. In addition to a large portion of her foreign 
investments made before the War, she will lose the enor- 
mous sums which, during the War, she has advanced to 
Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. 

Professor Werner Sombart has correctly pointed out that 
Germany's economic success was very largely due to the 
activity of Jews. They dominated German finance and 
banking (Gwinner, Mendelssohn, Bleichroder), the shipping 
trade (Ballin), the non-ferrous metal trade (Merton, Hirsch), 
the electrical trades (Rathenau), etc. If, as seems likely, 
Germany should become a declining country, her keen 
Jewish business men will probably transfer their energies 
to expanding and progressing lands, especially as they have 
been treated by her as pariahs. 

This necessarily brief and incomplete survey shows that 
the War has inflicted upon the German body economic 
injuries from which Germany will suffer for decades. 
Owing to the War, Germany is bound to lose 7,000,000 
valuable wealth-creating citizens, large agricultural terri- 
tories, the bulk of her iron ore, almost one-half of her coal, 
large quantities of potash and oil, a large portion of her 
foreign trade, the bulk of her shipping trade, the bulk of 
her international financial, banking and insurance business, 
the bulk of her foreign investments, her colonies, and a 
large portion of her manufacturing industries. Yet the 
impoverished German people will have to pay out of their 
vastly diminished income not only their own war expen- 
diture but also a gigantic indemnity. Hence poverty and 
unemployment are likely to become widespread. In 
consequence of their difficulties many manufacturers will 
have to transfer their operations to countries where con- 
ditions are less unfavourable. Germany may therefore 
witness an unprecedented emigration of industries and of 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 465 

the workers employed in them, and in view of the feelings 
which they have aroused German emigrants may obtain 
only the roughest work. 

The increase or decrease of population depends upon 
national economic conditions. Owing to the War the 
population of Germany may become stagnant, and may 
possibly retrocede. She will remain poor for decades. 
Possibly the War has destroyed for all time Grermany's 
greatness and military power by destroying her economic 
position and prosperity. While her population should 
remain stagnant or decline, that of regenerated France 
and of most other countries should rapidly increase. In a 
few decades the British Empire, and even France, may 
be far ahead of Germany in white population. Before long 
Grermany may sink to the position of a second-rate Power, 
and for financial reasons alone she may be unable to 
maintain an army or to think of a war of revenge. Auto- 
cratic Germany led the world in the policy of national 
armaments and military preparedness, A democratic, 
impoverished, and sobered Germany may lead the world 
in the policy of disarmament. 

Germany has lost not only her military preponderance 
and her great economic position in the world, but also her 
prestige and reputation. Her defeat has destroyed the 
legend of the invincibility of her army and of the excellence 
of her generals, and her ghastly diplomatic and adminis- 
trative failures have destroyed the legend of German 
genius for statecraft, organisation, and administration 
which Bismarck had created. The world has come to be- 
lieve that German economic success was largely due to 
unscrupulousness, and Grerman science has become despised 
by the contemptible attitude of her venal, blatant, and 
servile professors during the War. The fact that ninety- 
three of her most eminent scientists — ^among them many 
legists, historians, and theologians — should have addressed 
a manifesto to the world in which they proclaimed that 
innocent Germany had been feloniously attacked by her 
enigmies, that she fought a holy war of self-defence, and 



468 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

that she employed the most civilised methods of warfare 
will never be forgotten, nor will it be forgotten that prac- 
tically all the German historians have falsified not merely 
Prusso-German history in order to glorify the HohenzoUerns 
and to defend their misdeeds, but that they have distorted 
foreign history as well with a view to exalting Prusso- 
Germany and depreciating all the non-German peoples 
and their achievements. Coming generations will find it 
interesting to compare the rhapsodies of Ranke, Sybel, 
Treitschke, and other courtier-historians with the more 
critical and more truthful histories of Germany written 
by the republican German historians of the future, and 
to compare the teachings of the imperial and of the repub- 
lican German professors of philosophy and of international 
law. The crimes perpetrated by the German Army, and 
their condonation by the German people, will discredit for 
decades the educational system of Germany. The whole 
German race has become disgraced. Dr. Muehlon, a former 
Director of Krupps, burning with shame and horror at 
Germany's actions, wrote in his diary, on the 25th and 
27th of August 1914, when Germany's triumph seemed 
certain : 

" They are like savages, drunk with any victory — ^be it 
only over unarmed victims — ^and dividing up the spoils, 
the treasure, and the prisoners with fierce exultation in 
their camp of tents. . . . 

" If the Germans should now achieve the hegemony of 
Europe, a universal flight of Europeans will begin. Even 
the Germans will fall out among themselves and fly from 
one another. Europe's remotest corners will become the 
most coveted havens of refuge. An immense shifting of the 
centres of intellectual life will take place. And should no 
spot in Europe be left free from German rule, a regular 
' migration of the peoples ' will set in, whole peoples flocking 
to the countries oversea, everywhere and anywhere to 
be safe from the Germans. Europe will become so un- 
pleasant a continent that it will haraly be worth while to 
put up with the discomforts of a visit to it. Outside the 
frontiers of the new Germanic Empire, however, no German 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 467 

will be able to show his face. There, either the Germans 
must quit the field or the others will, i.isdain and abhor- 
rence will make every one insist upon being spared the sight 
of a German. . . . 

" Since Germany's cause in this War is the wrong cause, 
Germany's exertions to win adherents can in any case 
only be characterised as attempts at corruption. It is in- 
evitably only the inferior members in the European system 
who are drawn into alliance with Germany : the most 
charitable interpretation of their action is to suppose they 
are deceived or influenced by motives belonging to a lower 
plane of civiUsation. 

On the 6th of October he wrote : 

" No wonder that Germany has not a friend outside the 
country ; she deserves none. To speak frankly, such an 
outside friend would be a suspicious individual, a friend of 
materialism, lies, and bribery." 

The Germans have become a race accursed. Before the 
War Germans abroad were proud of their country of origin, 
were proud of their nationality and tried to preserve it. 
German schools, newspapers, clubs, etc., were to be found 
everywhere. Henceforward, Germans abroad will have 
to hide their heads and to disguise their origin through 
shame. They will endeavour to lose their identity as soon 
as possible and to forget the German language and the fact 
that they have come from a country which has disgraced 
itself for all time. German institutions abroad will dis- 
appear. The German language will not be spoken outside 
of Germany. 

By her inhuman methods of warfare Germany has de- 
stroyed for all time the widely held hope of her patriots 
of a Greater Germany. According to the Handbook of the 
Pan-German League of 1911 the world contained 97,600,000 
Germans. Of these 70,000,000 dwelt in Germany and 
in Austria-Hungary, 2,500,000 inhabited Switzerland, 
12,000,000 were in the United States, 10,000,000 were so- 
called "Low-Germans" — Belgians (Flemish), Dutchmen, 
Luxemburgers, and Dutch Afrikanders — while about 



468 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

3,000,000 Germans were dispersed over the five continents. 
Some of the figures given were of course grossly exaggerated. 
In consequence of the shame which Germany has brought 
upon the race, the Germans in the United States and else- 
where Avill hasten to become completely de- Germanised. The 
hope of attaching to their country, by bonds of affection 
and esteem, the German-Swiss, the Flemish, and the Dutch 
peoples, has been destroyed for all time. The dream of a 
Greater Germany will never materialise. Germany's great- 
ness has been destroyed by the War. She will neither 
become a world- Power nor a great European Power. 

So far Germany's future has been considered with the 
assumption that she will be able to preserve her pohtical 
unity and her social stabiUty. Let us now inquire whether 
this assumption is correct. 

Rightly considered the Germans are not of a single race. 
They are men belonging to several races who happen to 
speak the same language. For practical purposes it will 
suffice to divide the Germans into Prussians and non- 
Prussians. The important point to remember is that the 
Prussians are in the minority in Germany and that that 
Prussian minority has conquered the non- Prussian peoples 
in the south, in the west, and in the north, and has imposed 
upon them by force not a Prussian civihsation but merely 
a Prussian administration. Prussia proper consists of the 
provinces east of the Elbe. To the west of that river 
dwell Saxons, Hanoverians, Westphahans, Hessians, Rhine- 
landers. The people in the south of Germany are Bavarians, 
Wiirtembergers, and Badeners, and the sea-faring people of 
the north call themselves Hanseatics. The Prussians have 
conquered and ruled the peoples of the north, south, and 
west of Germany, but they have failed to assimilate them. 
They have known how to make themselves feared, but they 
have not succeeded in making themselves loved or even 
liked. 

The rule of the Prussians has been exceedingly severe, 
for they are a stiff, hard, and harsh people. They are the 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 469 

Spartans of Germany, and the non-Prussians may perhaps 
be compared to the Athenians and Corinthians. Prussia's 
rule has been imposed by force on the non-Prussians and 
has been borne with reluctance, for the non-Prussians — 
especially the people in the south and west — are genial, 
gay, and easy-going, who hate sullen and brutal martinets. 
Moreover, the people in the south and west are chiefly 
Roman Cathohcs, while the Prussians are unbending Protes- 
tants. Prussia represents force, and particularly military 
force, while the non- Prussians represent German inteUigence, 
sociability, and progress. Prince Biilow wrote in his book 
Imperial Germany : 

" German intellectual life, which the whole world has 
learnt to admire and which even the first Napoleon re- 
spected, is the work of the southern and western German 
lands, achieved under the protection of her princes, small 
States, and free cities. . . . German intellect was developed 
in the west and the south, but the German State in Prussia." 

The great rehgious reformers of Germany, Luther, Melan- 
chthon, Hutten, and Reuchlin, were non-Prussians. Of 
the great German poets and musicians, the following were 
born outside Prussia : Hans Sachs, Opitz, Gellert, Lessing, 
Wieland, Goethe, Schiller, Jean Paul, Schlegel, Korner, 
Arndt, Uhland, Heine, Platen, Grimm, Holderlin, Scheffel, 
Handel, Bach, Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Spohr, 
Weber, Schumann, Schubert, Mendelssohn, Richard Wagner, 
Strauss. Of the German philosophers, scientists, and 
historians born outside Prussia I would mention Leibniz, 
Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, Liebig, Friedrich List, 
Savigny, Mommsen, Ranke, Raumer, Rotteck, Niebuhr, 
Sybel, Treitschke. Not so very long ago Prussia was a 
barbarous country. She owes her rise and growth very 
largely to the abihty of statesmen and generals born outside 
Prussia. Among these were Stein, Hardenberg, Derflinger, 
SeydUtz, Schwerin, Bliicher, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, 
Schill, Moltke, Roon, Voigts-Rhetz, Steinmetz. The 
Hohenzollerns themselves are Suabians, South Germans. 



470 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

Stein, Hardenberg, Bliicher, Gneisenau, Schill, and Scharn- 
horst — the statesmen and soldiers who freed Prussia from 
the yoke of Napoleon ; Fichte, Korner, and Arndt — who 
inspired the Prussian people with their pen during the War 
of Liberation ; Friedrich List — the father of the Zollverein 
and of Bismarck's economic policy ; Schneckenburger who 
wrote The Watch on the Rhine, and Karl Wilhelm who set 
it to music ; Hoffmann von Fallersleben who wrote Deutsch- 
land, Deutschland iiber Alles, and Thiersch who wrote the 
Prussian national anthem ; Nietzsche who provided Prussia 
with the philosophy of the Superman and of ruthlessness ; 
Ranke, Sybel, and Treitschke who falsified Prussia's history ; 
Moltke, Roon, Steinmetz, and Voigts-Rhetz who created 
modern Germany on the battlefields of France ; and Rauch 
and Schliiter who beautified BerHn, were all non-Prussians 
by birth. Nearly all the " great Prussians " were non- 
Prussians, Bismarck, who was of very old Prussian stock, 
is one of the few exceptions. Kant had a Scotch 
grandfather and the brothers Humboldt had Huguenot 
ancestors. 

The fact that German civilisation is almost entirely non- 
Prussian is very little known because the Prussians, after 
having annexed the territory of Germany, annexed Ger- 
man civilisation as well. With the same justification the 
Spartans might have claimed Athenian art, science, com- 
merce, navigation, and industry as their own after the battle 
of Aegospotami. As the Prussians were barbarians, the 
Hohenzollern rulers employed in their public services pre- 
ferably South Germans and foreigners whose immigration 
they favoured. Therefore, a large percentage of the most 
eminent Prussians bear French, Italian, Dutch, Enghsh, 
PoHsh, and Slavonic names, such as Du Bois-Reymond, 
Verdy du Vernois, L'Estocq, Lassalle, Fouque, Francois, 
Hutier, Lucchesini, Brentano, Capri vi, Yorck, Keith, 
Chodowiecki, Lichnowsky, Biilow, Jagow, Virchow, etc. 
Culture and character go hand in hand. Comparison of 
Prussian with non- Prussian civilisation enables us to under- 
stand the fundamental differences which exist between 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 471 

the Prussians and the non-Prussians, and the dislike which 
the Prussians and non-Prussians have for each other. 

It is not unnatural that the people of the south and of 
the west of Germany dislike Prussian manners and Prussian 
methods of government. Prussian administrators and 
Prussian officials have a positive genius for making them- 
selves feared and hated. The vast majority of the people 
of Alsace-Lorraine are German by language — in 1910 only 
204,262 knew French — they bear German names, and they 
may be of German race, as the Germans maintain. Yet the 
vast majority of the people, though ignorant of French, 
were not grateful for their reunion with Germany in 1871. 
On the contrary, they were anxious to return to France 
because they had learnt to hate their Prussian adminis- 
trators and their brutality. When the French troops 
entered the lost provinces they were cheered and hugged 
by delirious people who often did not know a word of French. 
Not so very long ago the South German States and Hanover, 
dreading their Prussian neighbours, wished to place them- 
selves under French protection. When, in 1857, Napo- 
leon III. visited South Germany, he was received with 
universal jubilation. His triumphal progress caused 
amazement and consternation in Berlin. Up to 1866 the 
Germans to the west of the Rhine, who had come under the 
administration of Prussia in 1815 and who thirsted for 
freedom from the Prussian yoke, would gladly have placed 
themselves under French rule. The revolution of the 
Rhenish Provinces in 1848 was anti- Prussian in character. 
Up to 1870 the South German States had hoped that 
France would free them from the Prussians who had become 
their masters in 1866. If, in 1870, Napoleon had won the 
first battles and had crossed the Rhine, all South Germany 
would have risen against Prussia. The South German 
Sovereigns were forced into the North German Confedera- 
tion and into the German Empire and did not dare to resist, 
dreading that they might share the fate of the King of 
Hanover. 

Prussia and the Prussians were in the past bitterly dis- 
31 



472 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

liked and hated in Hanover and in the south and west of 
Germany and they were not liked in the Hanseatic towns. 
In the course of years considerable portions of the popula- 
tion, mesmerised by Prussia's success and prestige and 
Prussianised to some extent by a Prussian education, seemed 
to have become reconciled to Prussia's rule. It remains to 
be seen whether the West Germans, and especially the 
South Germans, will care to remain " Muss-Preussen," 
Prussians by compulsion, subject to Berlin, after the present 
disaster which has destroyed the glamour of Prussia. The 
most powerful cement of Germany was Prussia's strength, 
ability, and prestige, and a common pride in the common 
Imperial Army. That cement has disappeared. Ger- 
many's unity was not a thing of natural growth, but a highly 
artificial political creation. It was an enforced partnership. 
It may not be able to stand the acid test of disaster. Many 
Germans in the south and west are bound to see the cause 
of their sufferings not merely in the person of WiUiam II. 
and his Government, but in the system and traditions of 
the Prussian State and in the character and aspirations 
of the Prussian people. It seems therefore by no means 
impossible that not only the South German States but the 
non-Prussian parts of Prussia also may secede. It is not 
inconceivable that the South and West German people, 
and especially the people west of the Rhine, might wish 
once more to place themselves voluntarily under the pro- 
tection of France as they did in the time of the French 
Revolution and of Napoleon I. The tendency towards 
secession may be strengthened by the hope of thereby 
escaping the penalty of the war indemnity. 

The non- Prussian States have their own government and 
administration. The Bavarians, Saxons, etc., think and 
feel locally. They may create independent democratic 
administrations of their own. They may federate among 
themselves, but it seems questionable whether they would 
care to federate with Prussia, for Prussia's preponderance 
in sheer bulk and numbers is so great that they would 
once more become helpless adjuncts of the Prussian State 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 473 

and be forced to follow once more a Prussian policy and 
to submit to Prussian dictation. As the South Germans 
resemble the Austrians in character, and as both Austria 
and her neighbour Bavaria are Roman Catholic States, 
Bavaria and the other South German States may perhaps 
once more unite with the country on the Danube. 

For decades the Hanoverians have remembered their old 
independence and their former connection with England. 
It is quite possible that they also may wish to cut themselves 
adrift from their Prussian conquerors. 

While racial differences and incompatibilities and strongly 
felt resentments seem to favour a secession of part, or of 
all, the non-Prussian parts of Germany from Prussia, 
powerful economic reasons may conceivably preserve 
Germany's unity, at least for a time. All the individual 
States participate in the great German market. The dis- 
integration of Germany might lead to the erection of customs 
barriers within Germany. It would accentuate the econo- 
mic difficulties of the people. Another cause which may 
counteract the separatist tendencies in the south and west 
of Germany lies in the fact that Prussia possesses practically 
all the coal in Germany, which, however, lies in Westphalian 
and Rhenish territory. 

If the non-Prussian parts of Germany should be guided 
merely by prudential considerations, they will probably 
maintain the connection with Prussia. However, as people, 
especially at revolutionary times, are rather influenced by 
their passions than by cool calculations of profit and loss, 
separation between the Prussians and non-Prussians of 
Germany seems quite possible, especially in view of the 
overbearing character and domineering ways of the Prussians. 
The non- Prussians are probably no longer willing to obey 
their Prussian masters implicitly, and the Prussian bureau- 
cracy and people may not be able to adjust their ways and 
manners to the altered conditions of the times. 

The secession of the non- Prussian parts of Germany would 
be absolutely fatal to Prussia. Prussia proper is a back- 
ward agricultural State which owes to the non-Prussian 



474 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 

parts of Germany not only its culture but also its wealth. 
Prussia's wealth has been created by the conquest of the 
south, west, and north. In the south lie the teeming 
factories of Saxony, in the west the coal-fields of the Ruhr 
and the Rhine Valley, Germany's foreign trade is con- 
centrated in Hamburg and Bremen, and her financial 
strength and ability are derived from Frankfort. Berlin's 
wealth is won in non-Prussian Germany. If the non- 
Prussian portions of Germany should abandon Prussia, 
that country would sink back into its original poverty and 
Berlin would once more become a provincial town. 

So far the German revolution has, as we are told, been 
the most orderly and the most bloodless revolution in 
history. It is ominous that the same praise was bestowed 
upon the Russian revolution at its beginning. It is easy 
enough for an indignant people to depose its ruler, capture 
the government machine, and change the men at the top 
and the ancient symbols of power, but it is difficult for a 
nation which has lived in abject docihty and servility for 
centuries to estabhsh an orderly Government on a demo- 
cratic basis. The Germans have lost the spirit of self- 
reUance and initiative through centuries of drill. Moreover, 
democracies cannot be artificially created. They are plants 
of natural and very slow growth. It takes generations 
of patient endeavour to evolve the democratic spirit and 
democratic traditions, and it is particularly difficult to 
create an orderly democratic Government at a time when 
the passions have been roused and when the people are 
suffering. An orderly democratic Government can be 
created only by men of moderation, who possess the instinct 
of fairness, of reasonableness, and of self-control, who 
possess the spirit of give and take. Unfortunately the 
German Government has only cultivated among the people 
the spirit of " take." By allowing the soldiers to murder, 
plunder, outrage, steal, and burn, the late German 
Government has aroused among the people a spirit of 
violence and of lawlessness for which all Germany is likely 
to suffer in due course. Germany has encouraged and has 



THE FUTURE OF GERMANY .475 

created Bolshevism in Russia. That movement has been 
a mighty weapon to Germany, but it may prove to be one 
in the nature of a boomerang. Germany may conceivably 
become known to history as the first country which has 
produced an orderly and bloodless revolution, but the 
greater probability seems to be that the birth of German 
democracy will by no means be a painless and bloodless 
process. 

Germany will probably remain poor and weak for decades. 
She may never recover from the War. She may decline 
while other nations increase. Perhaps she will for a long 
time be a prey to civil convulsions if not to anarchy. 

Revolutions almost invariably breed counter-revolutions. 
History teaches us that rulers who maintain that they are 
responsible to God alone cannot be bound by any under- 
taking, however solemn. Sovereigns who have abdicated 
have more than once again seized power. William II. is 
absolutely unscrupulous. The Alhes should therefore 
reckon with the possibility that the privileged classes or 
the Emperor may try to seize power by a coup d'etat or by 
trickery. They must reckon with the possibiUty of an 
Imperial revival, of a military dictatorship, of a renewal 
of the War. It seems probable, however, that by her attack 
of 1914 Germany has destroyed not only the Empire but the 
future of the German race. To coming generations it may 
seem as inexplicable that Germany challenged the world 
and for a time held it at bay as it seems to the present 
generation that, a few centuries ago, the Turks made all 
Europe tremble. The Turks have fallen because they put 
all their trust in brute force and in f rightfulness. Thus 
they raised the world against themselves. Turkey was 
ruined because the State became an appendage to its 
standing army, the Janissaries. Those who live by the 
sword shall perish by the sword, or, as the German poet 
put it, Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND OF THE GERMAN RACE 

{continued) — the problem of Austria 

Before the War Germany had 67,000,000 inhabitants. Of 
these about 7,000,000 dwelled in Alsace-Lorraine, in the 
PoUsh district in the east of the country, and in the Danish 
district in the north. Their loss would reduce the German 
population to 60,000,000 if we disregard both Germany's 
losses in men during the War and the excess of births over 
deaths since 1914. Austria-Hungary adjoins Germany in 
the south. German Austria is a prolongation of Bavaria. 
Austria and Bavaria are strictly Roman Catholic countries. 
On racial, on poUtical, and on economic grounds the union 
of Germany and of Austria seems only natural. In case 
of a union of Austria with Bavaria, racial, political, and 
economic reasons for an amalgamation would be reinforced 
by reUgious ones as weU. We are told that Austria-Hungary 
contains 12,000,000 Germans. If these should be united 
to Germany, Germany's population would be increased to 
72,000,000. Germany would therefore be stronger in man- 
power after the War than she had been before its outbreak. 
Under these circumstances, it is only natural that many 
consider the possibility of a German- Austrian reunion with 
grave concern. Hence it seems worth while to study 
Austria's position and to cast a glance into its future. 

German Austria adjoins Bavaria in the east. It stretches 
from Lake Constance in the west to Pressburg in the east, 
and from Gmiind in the north to Klagenfurt in the south. 
Those who believe that 12,000,000 Germans dwell in a 
compact mass in German Austria in immediate contact 
with Bavaria are mistaken. At the Census of 1910 

476 



THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 477 

1 1 ,987,701 Germans were enumerated in the Dual Monarchy, 
and they were distributed as follows : 

In the Provinces of German Austria (Lower and 
Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, 
Tirol, and Vorarlberg) 6,118,546 

In the Czechoslovak Provinces (Bohemia, Moravia, 

and Austrian Silesia) 3,512,682 

In the other Provinces of Austria (Galicia, Bukovina, 

etc.) 319,038 

In Hungary, especially in the Southern and Eastern 

Districts 2,037,435 



Total . ... 11,987,701 

Of the 12,000,000 Germans who were enumerated in 1910 
in Austria- Hungary, only about 6,000,000 lived in German 
Austria in the immediate vicinity of Bavaria. Of the 
remaining 6,000,000 Germans 3,500,000 dwell in the districts 
claimed by the Czecho-Slovaks and 2,500,000 in the extreme 
south and east of the late Dual Monarchy. The 2,500,000 
Germans who live in Southern Hungary and in the far-off 
Bukovina and Galicia are out of all contact with Germany 
and with German Austria. They may be considered to be 
lost to Germany. On the other hand, the bulk of the 
3,500,000 Germans in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian 
Silesia occupy a long and narrow strip of land on the west, 
north, and east of the new Czecho-Slovak State. They 
form a German fringe of that new State along the borders 
of German Silesia and Saxony. 

It should be observed that the Germans are in a distinct 
minority in the lands of the Czecho-Slovaks. According 
to the Census of 1910 the 2,467,724 Germans of Bohemia 
constituted 3676 per cent, of the population of that 
country. The 719,435 Germans of Moravia formed 
27 62 per cent., and the 325,523 Germans of Austrian 
Silesia formed 43 90 per cent, of the population. In the 
remaining provinces of the late Austrian Empire, namely 
Carniola, Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, GaUcia, Bukovina, and 
Dalmatia, the 319,038 Germans formed only 303 per cent. 
of the population. The position of the Germans in Austria 
is therefore as follows : 6,000,000 Germans adjoin Bavaria, 



478 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 

forming a solid block, 2,500,000 Germans live in the far-off 
parts of the late Monarchy or are dispersed in insignificant 
numbers among non-German peoples, and 3,500,000 Germans 
live in the districts claimed by the Czecho-Slovaks, where 
they constitute approximately one-third of the population. 
The question now arises as to the future of the German 
fringe of Czecho-Slovakia, of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian 
Silesia. 

The Czechs claim, and with reason, that the German 
bureaucracy of Austria and the Magyar bureaucracy of 
Hungary have manipulated the census returns for pohtical 
reasons, that the number of Czecho-Slovaks has been very 
seriously understated and that of the Germans and 
Magyars considerably overstated. Possibly there are only 
about 2,500,000 Germans in Greater Bohemia — that is 
Professor Benes's estimate — and many of these live not on 
the German border, but inland among the Czechs. Many 
Germans demand that the frontier districts of Bohemia 
should be separated from that country and either be made 
independent or be joined to Germany proper. On the 
other hand, the Czecho-Slovaks not unnaturally desire to 
retain their historical frontiers which coincide with the 
boundaries set by Nature. 

It is not easy to divide Bohemia along racial lines, for 
the political and natural boundaries of the country coincide. 

The boundary of Bohemia towards Germany is formed 
by a number of important mountain chains— the Bohemian 
Forest, the Ore Mountains, the Giant Mountains, and the 
Sudetes. After all the problem of Bohemia's boundaries 
is not a local but a European question. Bohemia, together 
with Moravia and Austrian Silesia, occupies one of the 
strongest and one of the most important strategical positions 
in Europe. That country separates Berlin from Vienna 
and Buda-Pesth on the one hand and Bavaria from German 
Silesia on the other. It forms a gigantic saUent which 
penetrates deeply into the centre of Germany, and it lies 
right across the great natural high-road along the Elbe 
which runs from Central Germany via Prague and Vienna 



THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 479 

to the Black Sea, to Constantinople and to the Near East. 
Bohemia is easily defendable, for it is a great natural fortress. 
It is surrounded, especially in the direction of Germany, by 
steep and lofty mountain walls, and it contains vast agricul- 
tural, mineral, and industrial resources useful in war and 
a highly intelligent and very martial population. The 
strategical importance of Greater Bohemia may be gauged 
from the fact that within a distance of about fifty miles 
from that country lie some of the most important German, 
Austrian, and Hungarian towns, such as Munich, Nurem- 
berg, Regensburg, Erfurt, Chemnitz, Dresden, Leipzig, 
Glogau, Breslau, Linz, Vienna, Buda-Pesth. The great 
German industrial districts of Upper Silesia and of Saxony 
lie just across the Bohemian border. Bismarck stated 
repeatedly that the Power which controls Bohemia may 
dominate Europe. Professor Lyde wrote in his book. 
The Continent of Europe, London, 1913 : 

" Bohemia, though only two-thirds the size of Scotland, 
is the most important province of the Austrian Empire, 
and its importance, political and historic, has been by no 
means confined to the Empire. Much more truly than 
Switzerland it is the heart of Europe, at about equal 
distances from all the great seas, a marked physical unit 
cut off by forested mountains, and yet with easy access 
to those seas by the Saxon and Moravian, the Austrian 
and the Magyar Gates, holding the balance between the 
north-westward-flowing Elbe and the south-eastward- 
flowing Danube, for centuries a focus of pohtical, intel- 
lectual, and ethnic interests and to-day one of the most 
important industrial areas in the world." 

The Czecho- Slovaks desire to possess the whole of their 
country not only for historical and sentimental reasons, 
but also for very practical considerations. Bohemia is 
naturally an exceedingly wealthy land which has always 
been coveted by its neighbours. Besides, it forms a huge 
wedge, the advance guard of Slavdom, which separates the 
Germans on the Elbe from the Germans on the Danube, 
the Germans on the Upper Rhine from those of Silesia, the 



480 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 

Protestant Germans from the Roman Catholic Germans. 
Because of its great natural wealth and its central and 
dominating position right across the great strategical main- 
road which connects Central Europe with Asia, Bohemia 
has been one of the most important battle-grounds of the 
world since time immemorial. It was, for instance, one 
of the principal theatres of war during the Thirty Years' 
War when its population was reduced from 2,000,000 to 
800,000. An independent and powerful Bohemia restrains 
and restricts Germany's liberty of military action as much 
towards the East as an independent and powerful Belgium 
does towards the West. Therefore the Germans consider 
it a thorn in their side. A strong and hostile Bohemia 
would make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for 
the German peoples to resume their career of conquest in 
the direction of Constantinople. Hence the Czecho- Slovaks 
have to reckon with the possibility that Germany may be 
hostile to them. They must be prepared for a surprise 
attack on the part of the Germans who hem them in on 
three sides. Therefore the Czechs demand that they should 
control the protecting mountain walls which surround their 
country and the passes through which the invader may 
enter. Their security would be gone should the mountain 
barriers be placed into German hands. 

The Czecho-Slovaks have suffered from German hostility 
for centuries. They have tried to shake off the German 
yoke ever since the time of Huss, who was animated quite 
as much by hostility to the tyrannous Germans as by 
religious motives, who was quite as much a patriot as a 
religious reformer. For centuries the Germans have en- 
deavoured to destroy the independence, the language, 
and the culture of the Czechs and to extirpate the race. 
However, the Czechs are too wise to seek revenge for their 
sufferings upon the Germans in their midst who may 
become valuable citizens. President Masaryk has an- 
nounced that the Czech Government will treat the Germans 
dwelling in Bohemia with every consideration, spare their 
susceptibilities, and not interfere with their institutions 



THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 481 

and language. His statesmanlike attitude has been received 
with joy by the Germans of Bohemia, and they will prob- 
ably gladly acquiesce in the supremacy of the Czechs and 
endeavour to co-operate with them. After all, the people 
of the German fringe of Bohemia could scarcely form a 
separate State. They might of course wish to unite with 
Germany for sentimental reasons, but if they did so they 
would obviously have to share in the heavy burdens which, 
in consequence of their defeat, the German people will 
have to bear for decades. Therefore their secession seems 
unlikely. If they choose to remain citizens of Bohemia , they 
will participate in the prosperity which that wealthy country 
is certain to experience. It can therefore scarcely be 
doubted that, prompted by prudence and self-interest, prac- 
tically all the Germans dwelKng in the new Czecho-Slovak 
State will cut themselves adrift from the Germans in 
Grermany and in course of time they will probably become 
completely merged with the dominant people. Freedom, 
toleration, and prosperity are the best nationalisers. In half 
a century the Germans of Bohemia may have become loyal 
Czechs and the German language may have disappeared 
from the country, provided, of course, that the Czecho- 
slovak Government continues pursuing a wise policy towards 
the German citizens. 

It seems most probable that the bulk of the 6,000,000 
Grermans of Austria- Hungary who live dispersed among 
the Magyars, Rumanians, Poles, and Czecho-Slovaks will 
retain their domicile and will earUer or later be absorbed 
by the nationalities which surround them. Let us now 
consider the position of the 6,000,000 German Austrians 
who form a solid block adjoining Bavaria. 

The development and strength of a race depends obviously 
upon the economic factor. A people which possesses 
vast wealth-creating resources can develop large and 
rapidly-expanding industries, and these will give employ- 
ment to an increasing population. A nation which lacks 
adequate resources is condemned to poverty and insignifi- 
cance. Its numbers can increase only slowly. Lastly, a 



482 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 

nation which loses a large portion of its wealth-creating 
resources and which is weighed down by heavy taxes will 
either remain stationary or it will shrink in numbers, because 
the people cannot make a living in their country and are 
forced to seek work abroad. The latter is the position in 
which Austria, and Hungary as well, finds herself owing 
to the War. 

The two principal economic resources of continental 
countries are agriculture and the manufacturing industries, 
for commerce and trade enrich only the few. Besides, 
commerce and trade are dependent for their prosperity on 
a flourishing home market. The provinces of German 
Austria are very unfavourably situated for the pursuit of 
agriculture and of manufacturing. German Austria is a 
very mountainous, and a largely alpine, country in which 
agriculture is only little developed. It is more suitable 
for forestry than for farming. Consequently the popula- 
tion of German Austria depends largely on imported food 
for its subsistence. The imported food consumed by the 
inhabitants of German Austria came hitherto partly from 
Hungary, partly from the non-German provinces of the 
Austrian Empire, especially from Bohemia, Moravia, 
Silesia, and Galicia. German Austria paid for its imports 
of food with exports of manufactured articles. 

Unfortunately German Austria is also very unfavourably 
situated for the pursuit of manufactures. The prosperity 
of modern industry depends on an abundance of machinery, 
depends on the possession of cheap motive power with 
which to set machines in motion, depends very largely on 
an abundance of cheap coal. According to the Report 
Coal Resources of the World which was placed before the 
International Geological Congress held in Canada, 1913, the 
coal possessed by the Dual Monarchy compared as follows with 
the coal possessed by Germany and the United Kingdom : 

Germany . . . 423,356,000,000 tonB of coal and lignite 

United Kingdom . 189,535,000,000 „ „ „ 

Austria . . . 63,876,000,000 

Hungary . . 1,717,000,000 



THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 483 

It will b« noticed that the store of coal possessed by the 
late Austrian Empire was only small, while that possessed 
by the Kingdom of Hungary was quite insignificant. Herein 
lay the reason that the Austrian industries were com- 
paratively small, while Hungary was an almost purely agri- 
cultural country. 

Industries habitually settle on or near the coal measures, 
so as to save the heavy cost of transportation for the bulky 
fuel which they require. Unfortunately for German Austria 
practically all the coal possessed by the late Austrian 
Empire occurs on non-German territory, in Bohemia, 
Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and Galicia. Hence the manu- 
facturing districts of the Austrian Empire were situated on 
territories inhabited by Czecho-Slovaks and Poles, who 
have made themselves independent owing to the War. 
German Austria is a densely populated country which is poor 
both in agricultural and in industrial resources. 

The superiority of the non-German provinces of Austria 
in the production of food and the dependence of the Austro- 
Germans upon food raised by the Czecho-Slovaks of 
Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia and by the Poles of GaHcia 
may be gauged from the following figures, the latest which 
I have been able to obtain : 

Austrian Habvest in 1912 in Qotntals 

Bohemia, Mo- Wheat. Rye. Barley. Gate. Pulse. 

rsvia, Silesia, 

Galicia . . 14,703,661 22,997,531 14,637,698 18,901,686 2,085,922 

All other parts of 

Austria . 4,248,978 6,750,502 2,428,058 5,399,312 407,915 

Total . 18,952,639 29,748,033 17,065,756 24,300,998 2,493,837 



Fodder 
_ , . ,, Hops. Potatoes. Sugar-beet. Roots and Straw. 

Bohemia, Mo- Carrots. 

ravia, Silesia, 

Galicia . . 180,684 105,596,875 74,017,630 24,944,605 136,184,065 

All other parts 

of Austria . 20,776 19,819,230 5,220,065 14,225,572 46,624,328 

Total . 201,460 125,416,105 79,237,695 39,170,177 182,808,393 



4M THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 

HotiM. 0*ttlo. Pigs. 
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, 

Galicia .... 1,328,974 6,793,303 3,626,480 

All other parts of Austria . 473,874 3,366,706 2,805,600 

Total . . . 1,802,848 9,160,009 6,432,080 

It will be noticed that the Czecho-Slovak and the Polish 
provinces of Austria produced in 1912 about three-quarters 
of the wheat, oats, and straw raised by the Austrian Empire, 
about five-sixths of the rye, pulse, and potatoes, about 
six-sevenths of the barley, about two-thirds of the fodder 
roots and carrots, about nine- tenths of the hops, and about 
fifteen-sixteenths of the sugar-beet. The superiority of the 
Czecho-Slovak and Polish districts in live-stock is similarly 
marked, for they possessed in 1912 about two- thirds of the 
cattle, three-fourths of the horses, and three-fifths of the 
pigs. The bulk of the agricultural wealth of the late 
Austrian Empire was situated in the non-German districts 
of the Monarchy. 

By far the most valuable minerals of the Austrian Empire 
were black coal, brown coal (lignite), and mineral oil. These 
three minerals combined furnished exactly seven-eighths of 
the value of the entire mineral production of the country. 
The production of black coal, brown coal, and mineral oil 
was distributed as follows between the Czecho-Slovak and 
PoHsh provinces of Austria and the remaining ones in 
1911, the last year for which I have been able to obtain 
official figures : 

AtrSTBIAN MiNBBAL PbODUOTIGN IN 1911 IN QUINTALS 

Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, BUck Ooal. Brown Goal. Mineral OH,- 

Galicia .... 142,951,315 210,841,498 14,897,824 

All other parts of Austria . 846,857 41,811,840 None 



Total . . . 143,798,172 252,653,338 14,897,824 

Practically all the black coal and four-fifths of the brown 
coal produced by the late Austrian Empire came from 
Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and Galicia, while all 
the mineral oil produced came from Galicia. 



THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 485 

The figures given show that German Austria was depen- 
dent on its subject nations for food and fuel. Consequently 
the revolt of the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles at the end of 
the War led to starvation in Vienna and to a complete 
absence of coal in the capital. 

The great industries of the Austrian Empire were situated 
in the non- German lands of the Monarchy and particularly 
in Bohemia, which is singularly blessed by Nature's bounty 
with agricultural and mineral resources of every kind. The 
great Austrian sugar industry, which provides by far the 
largest export item, was centred in Bohemia. Bohemian 
glass ware, porcelain, earthenware, and musical instruments 
are known throughout the world. The Austrian iron 
industry was domiciled on Czech soil. The guns of the 
Austrian artillery were made at Skoda near Pilsen. About 
one-half of the beer brewed in Austria was made in Bohemia. 
Pilsen beer was exported to all countries. Bohemia pos- 
sesses very important textile industries and excels in the 
production of embroideries, lace, leather, boots, hardware, 
chemicals, furniture, etc. It abounds not only in minerals 
of all kinds, but in mineral springs and health resorts, 
such as Karlsbad, Marienbad, Franzenbad, and many 
others. Bohemia had the most highly-developed railway 
system in Austria and the best roads. The bulk of 
Austria's exports was furnished by Bohemia, which is drained 
by the Elbe. Hence Hamburg on the mouth of that river 
was the most important harbour for Austria's foreign trade. 

The enormous industrial superiority of the non-German 
portions of Austria over the German provinces may be 
gauged from the following figures : 

Factories Camber of Beet-sugar Brewery 

In 1019 Steam production Output In 

™ '■^^^' BoUers. In Quintals. HectoUtws. 
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, 

Galicia .... 10,044 28,868 43,685,473 14,764,326 

All other parta'of Austria . 6,885 10,702 4,333,770 7,945,106 



Total . . . 16,929 39,570 48,019,243 22,709,431 

As the non-German portions of the Empire of Austria pro- 
duced the bulk of the food, minerals, and manufactures 



486 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 

of the country, they created the bulk of the national 
wealth and income and furnished therefore the bulk of the 
national taxes as well. That may be seen from the follow- 
ing comparison : 

Taxes on Oongomption Land Tax in 

In 1911. 1912. 

Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, 

Galicia .... 341,995,090 crowns 44,209,196 crowns 

All other parts of Austria . 103,717,229 „ 25,050,325 

Total . . . 445,712,319 crowns 69,259,521 crowns 



The facts and figures given show that the people of German 
Austria lived by exploiting the non-German portions of the 
Empire. Vienna was wealthy, but its wealth was created 
in the non-German provinces. The wealthy people of 
Vienna derived their income from the non- German lands. 
The Austrian capital was the centre of Austrian Society, of 
the national administration, of science, of art, of music, 
of education, of commerce, of banking, of finance, of sport, 
of amusements of every kind, of fashion, and of the culinary 
arts. It was, to some extent, a cosmopoHtan town. About 
600,000 visitors came to the capital every year. Men 
of non-German nationahty who made their income in 
Bohemia, in Galicia, and elsewhere spent it in gay and 
brilliant Vienna. Besides, the whole coimtry was made 
tributary to Vienna by the wealthy landed aristocracy of 
the Monarchy, by absentee landlords who possessed huge 
estates in the non-German provinces, and by the Viennese 
capitalists who possessed the bulk of the economic under- 
takings which were carried on by the Germans and non- 
Germans in the non-German provinces. The whole Empire 
was thus mortgaged to the Viennese. The magnificent 
Imperial Court and a garrison of 30,000 soldiers brought a 
large amount of money to the capital, and wealthy Czechs, 
Poles, Rumanians, Russians, Turks, Greeks, etc., spent 
habitually a large portion of their income in that toAvn, 
which was considered to be the capital of south-eastern 
Europe. Vienna, being a centre of wealth and of fashion, 



THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 487 

became, like Paris, a centre of the luxury trades which are 
patronised by the rich and the elegant. 

In consequence of the War the wealth of Vienna has dis- 
appeared. The German-Austrian landlords who derived 
their wealth from Polish, Bohemian, and Hungarian estates 
wiU probably be expropriated by the Poles, Czechs, and 
Magyars. The aristocratic idlers of Vienna will have to 
turn to work. The wealthy financiers, bankers, and investors 
of Vienna, to whom the whole Empire was in debt, will be 
compelled to sell the bulk of their investments situated in 
non- German Austria partly owing to the pressure which 
will be probably exercised upon them by the non-German 
peoples, who will dechne to continue paying tribute to 
Vienna, partly owing to the ruin which the War will un- 
doubtedly inflict upon them. The Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, 
Bohemians, etc., will create capitals of their own and will 
shun Vienna. With the disappearance of the Court and 
the wealthy aristocracy the glamour of Vienna will go. 
Vienna which was the capital of a great Empire will become 
the principal town of a small State of 6,000,000 inhabitants. 
It stands to reason that a little nation of 6,000,000 people 
cannot maintain a capital inhabited by 2,000,000. Vienna's 
luxury industries will decline and decay. Prague, Bucharest, 
Warsaw, and Belgrade may put Vienna in the shade. 

The Austro-Germans will suffer through the War in a 
twofold manner. Their income, which was principally 
derived from the non- German districts, will be vastly reduced 
by the loss of their principal wealth-creating resources. In 
addition, they will be weighed down by the burden of the 
war debt and of the indemnities which they will have 
to pay to the countries which the Austrian armies have 
devastated. During the War the Government of the Dual 
Monarchy has raised an enormous debt, which was taken 
up chiefly by the financiers, bankers, and wealthy investors 
of Vienna and Buda-Pesth. The non- German portions of 
the Austrian Empire will of course refuse to take over their 
share. Consequently the 6,000,000 Austro-Germans will 
have to assume a financial burden which would have been 
32 



488 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 

unbearably heavy to the 30,000,000 inhabitants of the 
Austrian Empire. The Austrian Government will there- 
fore be compelled to repudiate the larger part or the whole 
of the National Debt. The Austro- German bankers, finan- 
ciers, and investors will consequently be ruined. 

The new Austria will be an exceedingly small and poor 
country. German Austria will of course not be able to 
support a capital of 2,000,000 people. Vienna will in course 
of time become an insignificant provincial town with a 
rapidly declining population, and house property should 
become exceedingly cheap. Having lost its agricultural, 
mineral, and industrial resources, and the bulk of its paper 
wealth, German Austria may become one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Possibly its population will decline 
very quickly. It is of course conceivable that misfortune 
should cause the Austrian people to pull themselves together 
and to make a new start. Agriculture and forestry in 
German Austria may be improved. Lack of coal may cause 
the Austro- Germans to convert their water-power into 
electricity. New resources may be discovered in the 
country. However, the greater probability seems to be that 
German Austria will decline and decay, for the population 
lacks energy and enterprise. The Austrian manufacturers, 
bankers, and business men will probably go to Bohemia, 
Poland, and other countries where conditions are more 
favourable for the exercise of their abilities, and the Austrian 
workers will emigrate by the hundred thousand from their 
ruined country to the more prosperous lands around them 
and to countries oversea. The position of Magyar Hungary 
is very similar to that of German Austria. Buda-Pesth 
may share the fate of Vienna. On the other hand, the 
Magyars have an advantage over Austria in the possession 
of the exceedingly fruitful Hungarian plain, the productivity 
of which can be enormously increased. 

If German Austria should unite with Grermany, Ger- 
many's population would be augmented not by 12,000,000, 
as is often asserted, but by only 6,000,000, and that number 
may rapidly shrink if economic pressure and distress should 



THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 489 

lead to the reduction of the Austrian population, A Ger- 
man-Austrian reunion may take place, but it need not be 
a lasting and a permanent union. It seems questionable 
whether the Germans and the Austrians will care to com- 
bine. The accession of an utterly impoverished and exhausted 
Austria might appear to the Germans rather a loss than a 
gain. Besides, the Austro- Germans themselves may no 
longer wish to become citizens of Germany. Their desire 
to enter the German Federation was exceedingly strong as 
long as the German Empire enjoyed its great prestige. At 
that time the Austro-Germans were anxious to become 
members of a State which was rapidly progressing, immensely 
wealthy and powerful, reputed invincible, and believed 
destined to achieve the domination of the world. The 
glamour which surrounded Imperial Germany has disap- 
peared. Austria has been disillusioned by the War. Many 
Austrians see in the Germans the cause of their downfall 
and of their sufferings, and they curse the day on which 
they went to war at the bidding of Berlin. During the 
course of the War the Germans have treated the Austrians 
not as aUies, but as underlings, with deliberate insolence 
and contempt. Vienna starved while Berlin feasted. 

Austrian admiration of the Germans may give way to 
resentment and to bitter hatred. The Austro-Germans 
may endeavour to forget that they were ever a great and 
a conquermg nation. They will probably seek peace and 
rest, and they may strive to live their own life in humble 
and isolated insignificance. Possibly the alpine portions 
of Austria which incline towards Switzerland may try to 
find security by joining that country. Vorarlberg may be 
the first province to undertake this step. I think those are 
mistaken who believe that the Austro-Germans desire to 
join the Germans of Germany with the object of embarking 
at Germany's command upon a war of revenge at the 
earhest opportunity. Very possibly the Great War has led 
not only to the downfall of Austria, but to its final extinc- 
tion. It seems not inconceivable that in a few decades the 
stationary or shrinking population of Austria will have been 



490 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 

absorbed by the surrounding Swiss, Italians, Czechs, Mag- 
yars, and Poles. Austria's military and economic strength, 
as that of Magyar Hungary, was derived from its subject 
nations. The War has knocked away the props on which 
both these States were erected. To-day Austria is only a 
shadow of its former self. In a century the State which 
at one time dominated the world may be but a remembrance 
and its history may seem a romance or a fable to those 
reading it. 



ANALYTICAL INDEX 

Note. — The letter f. following a page niimber signifies " and following 
page " ; the letters ff. signify " and following pages." 



Abdication of William I., 312 f. 

Adriatic Sea, 364 

Agadir, 136 f. 

Agricultural Co-operation, 207 ff. 

Schools, 206 f. 
Agricvdture, British, 197 ff. 

German, 184 ff., 279, 
283 
,, and Chemistry, 204 ff. 

Albania, 365 
Albert us, Magnus, 271 
Alliances, Bismarck on, 358 f. 

,, Frederick the Great on, 

47 f. 

Alsace-Lorraine, 390, 406 ff., 445 f. 

Anglo-German Friction, 86 ff., 106 ff. 

Anti-British Policy, 86 ff., 106 ff., 

332 ff., 391 ff., 433 ff., 440 ff. 
Anti-SociaUst Law, 294 ff., 301 f., 

388 
Arbitration, 57 
Architecture, Gterman, 165 
Army, German, 39, 60 ff., 337 f., 

370 ff., 397 ff. 
Austria, Agricultural Wealth, 483 f . 
,, Aristocracy of, 487 
,, Finances of, 487 f. 
„ Future of , 476 ff. 
,, Grermans in, 476 ff. 
„ Harvest of, 483 f. 
,, Industries in, 485 
,, Mineral Wealth of, 484 
,, Resources of, 482 ff. 
,, Taxes in, 486 f. 
,, Wealth of , 486 f. 
Austria- Htmgary, 342 f., 346 ff., 

360ff.,476ff. 
Austro-I^ussian War, 49, 127 f., 

398, 400 
Austro-Italian Differences, 360 ff. 



B 

Bacon, Lord, 233, 413 
Balkan Peninsula, 364 ff. 
Baltic Canal, 326, 346, 447 
Barbarities of army, 355 f., 414 f., 

466 f. 
Barges, Size of, 245 
Bassermann, 91 f. 
fiavaria, 481 
Bebel, A., 292, 296 
Beet-sugar, 205 f., 279 
Belfort, 406 

Belgian Grey Book, 419 ff. 
Belgium, 350 ff., 405 ff., 430 f. 
Benedetti, 49 
Benes, Professor, 478 
Bernhardi, General von, 342, 390 ff 

404 f., 423 
Bernstein, Eduard, 111 ff., 292 

374 
Bethmann-Hollweg, 318, 352 £., 

375, 411 f. 
Beyens, Baron de, 411, 418 ff. 
Biermer, Professor, 178 
Billot, A., 361 
Bismarck, 27 f., 35 f., 49, 50 ff., 

116ff., 126 ff., 130 ff., 154, 175f., 

180 f., 217, 233, 257 f., 269 f. 

293 ff., 299 f., 312 ff., 327 f., 

330 f., 336, 358 ff., 382 f., 402 ff 

415 f., 445 f., 479 
Bizerta, 360 

Board Schools in England, 166 ff. 
Bohemia, 477 ff. 
Brandenburg, Rise of, 12 ff. 
British Empire, 58, 82 ff., 86 ff 

391 ff.,433ff.,440ff. 
Brockhaus's Encyclopedia, 178 
Bryce Commission, 414 
Buda-Pesth, 488 
Building SocietiM, 288 



491 



492 



ANALYTICAL INDEX 



Bfilow, Prince, 91, 318, 383, 402, 

469 
Bvisch, Moritz, 359 f., 361 



C 

Cambon, Ambassador, 418 f . 

Canada, 58 f. 

Canals, 235 ff. 

Cartels, 261 ff., 274 

Centre Party, 309, 310, 315 ff. 

Chancellor, Imperial, 343, 375 ff. 

Chauvinism, 422 ff. 

Chemical Education, 266, 268 f., 

272 ff. 
Chemical Exports, 266, 268 f. 

Industries, 266 ff. 
Chemistry and Agriculture, 204 ff. 
Chiari, Admiral, 367 f. 
China, 440 

Churches, 17 f., 26 f.,149, 155 
Clausewitz, General von, 399 
Clergy, 17f.,26f., 149, 155 
Clerical Party, 309, 310, 315 ff. 
Coal Consimaption, 278 
„ Exports, 277 
,, Production, 277 
,, Resources, 455, 458,482 f. 
Coal-tar Dyes, 266 
Cobden, R., 172 
Colonial Policy, 52 ff., 392 ff. 
Colonies, 52 ff., 392 ff. 
Combinations, Industrial, 261 ff., 

274 
Conservative Party, 303, 309, 310, 

382, 383f.,386ff. 
Constitution, 34 f., 312 ff., 316, 

375 ff., 387 ff. 
Consumption of Food, 287 f. 
„ of Fuel, 278 

of Iron, 278 
Co-operation, Agricultural, 207 ff. 

Industrial, 261 ff., 274 
Co-operative Societies, 289 
Coup d'etat, 380 ff., 387 f. 
Crsimming, 160 f. 
Czecho-Slovaks, 477 ff. 



D 

Daily Telegraph Interview, 320'f., 

378, 380 
Danes, 389 f. 
Daniel, Professor, 20 ff. 
Delbruck, Professor, 96 f., Ill, 308, 

381 f. 
Delcass6, 126, 133 f. 



Domination of the World, 439 ff. 
Duisburg-Ruhrort, 251 
Du Moulin- Eckart, 94 
Dyes, 266 



E 

Edinburgh Review, 172 £. 
Education, Agricultviral, 206 f. 
Chemical, 267 f. 
English, 156 ff., 162 
German, 16 ff., 139 f., 

148 ff. 
Patriotic, 152 ff. 
Egypt, 393, 435 
Elections, German, 298, 304, 309, 

314 ff. 
Emden Canal, 251 f. 
Emigrant Traffic, 264 f. 
Emigration, Prospective, 355, 464 f. 
Emmerich Traffic, 244 
Emmich, General von, 351 f. 
Emperor, Position of, 17 f., 34 f., 

375 ff. 
Empire, British, 58, 82 ff., 86 ff., 

391 ff., 433 ff., 440 ff. 
Employment, 282 ff. 
Engine Power, 279 
England, 76 ff., 86 ff., 106 ff., 327 f., 
391ff.,433ff.,440ff. 
Education in, 156 ff., 162 
Expansionist Policy, 52 ff. 
Exports, Chemical, 266, 268 f. 
,, Manufactured, 281 



F 

Falk, Dr., 152 

Fares, Railway, 230 

Farming, 184 ff. 

Finances, German, 456 ff. 

Fiscal Policy, German, 169 ff., 

257 ff. 
Fischer, Professor, 142 f . 
Food, 21 Iff. 

„ Consumption, 287 f. 

'„ Prices, 21 Iff. 
Forced Sales, 188 
Forstner, Lieutenant von, 371 ff. 
France, 125 ff., 345 ff., 398, 400 f., 
429 f., 442, 451ff.,455f. 
,, Population of, 130, 452 
Franchise, Prussian, 304 
Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 342 f . 
Francis Joseph, Emperor, 346 
Franco-German Relations, 126 ff., 

345ff., 451ff., 465f. 



ANALYTICAL INDEX 



493 



Franco- German War of 1870, 68 f., 

128 f., 398, 400 f, 
Franco-German War, Cost of, 131 
Frankfurter Zeitimg, 119 ff., 162 
Frederick the Great, 45 ff., 62, 

150 f., 163 
Frederick William I., 150 
Freeholds, Rural, 189 ff. 
Free Trade and Protection, 169 ff., 

257 ff. 
Freights, Canal, 245 ff., 248 

Railway, 220 ff.,229ff., 248 
Frenchmen, 389 f. 
French Yellow Book, 417 ff. 
Friendly Societies, 289 
Frymann, 386 ff. 



G 

General Election of 1917, 309, 383 

of 1912, 317 
Generalstab, 65 ff., 408 ff. 
George, Lloyd, 331 
Germany, Agriculture, 184 ff., 279, 
283 
Army, 39, 60 ff., 337 ff., 

370 ff., 397 ff. 
Canals, 235 ff. 
,, Chauvinism, 422 ff. 
„ Chemical Industry, 266 ff. 
Churches, 17 f., 26 f. 
Education, 16 ff., 139 f., 
148 ff. 
,, Finances, 456 ff. 

Fiscal Policy, 169 ff., 
257 ff. 
„ Foreign Investments,l 74, 

463 
,, Foreign Policy, 43 ff. 

Future of , 445 ff. 
,, Industrial Conditions, 
276 ff. 
Mineral Wealth, 457 ff. 
Navy, 39, 72 ff., 91, 102, 
337 f., 391 f. 
,, Political Parties, 304, 

309 f., 311 ff. 
,, Population Increase, 83, 

130, 452 
„ Railways, 214 ff. 
,, Reichstag, 312 ff. 

Rise of, 12 ff.,43ff. 
, , Shipping Industry , 2 55 ff . 
,, Social Democracy, 33 f., 
38f.,103,291ff.,316ff., 
384 ff. 
„ War AimB, 427 ff., 439 ff. 
,, Wax Finance, 466 ff. 



Grermany, Waterways, 235 ff. 

,, World Policy, 82 ff., 
106ff.,427ff., 439 ff. 
and France, 1 2 5 ff . , 34 5 ff . , 
451 ff., 455 ff. 
,, and Great Britain, 76 ff., 

86 ff., 106 ff. 
,, and Morocco Crisis, 126, 
136 ff., 331 
Goltz, General von der, 103 f. 
Grenzboten, 93, 98, 100, 101, 134 f. 
Grey Book, Belgian, 219 ff. 

H 

Hamburg- America Line, 259 ff. 

Hamburger Nachrichten, 406 ff. 

Harden, Maximilian, 344 

Harvest, Gterman, 186, 279 

Hatzfeldt. Prince, 383 

Hay, Production of, 186, 279 

Helfferich, Herr, 456 f. 

Hettner, Alfred, 443 

Hindenburg, 421 

Historians, Teaching of German,] 9, 

465 f. 
Hodel, 293 

Hohenlohe, Prince, 382 
HohenzoUerns, Rise of, 13 ff. 
Holdings, Rural, 189 ff. 
HoUand, 54, 251 f., 326 f., 441 f. 
Horse Powers, 279 
Humbert, Senator, 345 f. 
Hungary, Future of, 488 



Illegitimacy, 155 

Immorality, 304 f. 

Indebtedness, Rural, 193 f. 

Indemnity ,War, 435 ff., 457 ff. 

India, 393, 440 

Indigo, 268 f. 

Industrial Conditions, 276 ff. 

Inland Fleet, German, 244 f. 

Instu-ance, 297 

Intellectuals, War AimB of, 427 ff. 

Intolerance, 155 

Iron Consumption, 278 

„ Ore, 458 ff. 

„ Production, 277, 278 
Irredenta Italia, 362 
Italo-A\istrian Differences, 360 ff. 
Italy, 350, 359 ff. 



Jagow, Police President, 373 
Jagow, Secretary of State, 418 ff. 



494 



ANALYTICAL INDEX 



Jena and Auerstadt, 62 ff. 

Jews, 388 f., 464 
Jhering, Professor, 174 



K 

Kartels, 261 ff., 274 
Keim, General, 423 
Kiderlen-Waechter, 336 
Kiel Canal, 326, 346, 447 
Kirch enzeitung, 123 
Kreuz Zeitung, 110, 373, 383 
Kxuger Telegram, 99 
Kultur, 437 
Kultiirkampf, 316 



Laboratories, Chemical, 272 ff. 

Labour Conditions, 282 ff. 

Labourers, Rural, 199 ff. 

Landing Operations, 72 ff. 

Landowners, German, 195f, 

Land Tenure, 189 ff. 

Leo, Victor, 177 

Liberal Party, German, 309, 310 

Lichnowsky, Prince, 353 

Liebert, General, 423 

Liebig, Justus von, 204, 272 

Liebknecht, W., 292, 296 

Li^ge, 411 

Lignite, 277, 278, 458 

List, Friedrich, 16 9 ff., 215f, 

Live-stock, 186 f., 191 £., 280 

Lloyd George, 331 

Lockroy, 93 

Lokalanzeiger, 305, 419 

London, Port of, 252 f. 

Ludendorff, General, 421 

Luther, 86, 149 

Luxemburg, 350, 352, 405 ff. 

Lyde, Professor, 479 



M 

Machiavelli, 56 
Machinery, 279 

,, Agricultural, 193 

Machtpolitik, 339 f., 355 
Mackay, Freiherr von, 439 
Marschall von Bieberstein, 99 
Masaryk, Professor, 480 f. 
Maybach, 223 
Mayr- Strasbourg, 96 
Meat Consumption, 288 
Merchant Marine, 255 ff. 



Merchant Marine Subsidies, 269 f. 
Middlemen, 211 

Mineral Wealth, German, 457 ff. 
Mining Production, 277 
Mobilisation in 1914, 418 ff. 
Moltke, Senior, 65 ff., 398, 402, 

405 ff., 415 
Moltke, Junior, 337, 417 f. 
Mommsen, 96, 177, 299, 308 
Morocco Crisis, 126, 136 ff., 331 
Muehlon, Dr., 18, 25 f., 466 f. 



N 

Napoleon III., 401 
Nauticus, Year Book, 140 f. 
Navy, German, 39, 72 ff., 91, 102, 

337 f. 391 ff 
Navy BiUof 1900,91, 102 
Navy League, German, 340 
Nippold, Professor, 422 ff. 
Nobiling, 294 
Non- Prussians, 469 ff. 
North German Gazette, 319 
North German Lloyd, 259 ff. 
North Sea Canal, 326, 346, 447 



O 

Oats, Production of, 186, 279 
Occupations, 282 ff. 
Oldenberg, Professor, 179 
Oldenburg-Januschau, Von, 375 
Ownership, Rural, 189 ff. 



Pan-Germans, 340, 423 f., 467 f. 
Parliament, German, 37, 304, 309 f., 
311 ff. 
,, Prussian, 304 

Parties, Parliamentary, 304, 309 f., 

311ff. 
Party Politics, 304, 309 f., 311ff.j 
Pellegrini, Signer, 365 f . 
Penal Servitude Bill, 302 
Per kin, W. H.,271 
Petition on War Aims, 427 ff. 
Plan of Campaign, 405 ff. 
Poland, 49 f., 459 f. 
Poles, 340, 389 f. 
Policy, Fiscal, 169 ff., 257 ff. 
Political Parties, 304, 309 f., 311 ff. 
Poll for Prussian Diet, 304 
„ for Reichstag, 298, 309, 312 ff., 
317 ff. 



ANALYTICAL INDEX 



495 



Poltron ]\Iis6rable, 341 
Population, Increase of French, 
130, 452 
,, Increase of German, 

83, 130,452 
Potash Deposits, 458 
Potatoes, 186, 279, 281 
Production, Agricultural, 185 ff. 
Professors, Views of German, 18 ff., 

53 f., 86, 93 ff., 139 f., 142 f., 

162 f., 174, 177 ff., 308, 381 f., 

427ff.,465f. 
Progranome, Socialist, 305 ff. 
Prussia, Rise of, 12 ff., 43 ff. 
Prussians and non- Prussians, 469 ff. 



R 

Radical Party, 309, 310 
Railway Capital, 232 

, , Nationalisation, 2 1 7 ff . 
Profits, 227 
Railways, 211, 214 ff. 
Rassegna Contemporanea, 366 
Rath, Herr von, 113f. 
Reichstag Poll, 298, 309, 312 ff., 
317 f. 
Powers of, 375 ff. 
Rein, Professor, 162 
Religion, 17 f., 26 f. 
Research, Chemical, 272 ff. 
Renter, Colonel von, 271 ff. 
Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung,138 
Rhine Frontier, 406 ft'. 

„ Valley, 237, 240 ff., 246, 471 
Rhine- Ems Canal, 251 f. 
Robilant, Count, 360 
Roman Catholic Church, 155 
Roon, Von, 68 
Roscher, Professor, 178 
Rtihrort, 251 
Rvual Industries, 184 ff. 
Russia, 47, 345, 431 ff. 
Rye, 186,279 



Sales, Forced, 188 

Savings Banks, 288 

Schaffle, Professor, 95 

Scharnhorst, 64 

Schleswig-Holstein, 51 

SchmoUer, Professor, 94 f., 178, 182 

Schneider, Louis, 415 

Schools, 16 ff., 1391, 148 ff. 
,, Agricultural, 206 f, 
,, Technical, I65f. 



Schroder, Adolf, 109 f. 
Schubert, Captain, 1 10 f. 

Max, 443 f. 
Schulze-Gaevernitz, Professor, 95 
Sedan, 401 

Separatist Tendencies, 469 ff. 
Serbia, 342 f., 346 ff. 
Shipbuilding Industry, 255 ff. 
Shipping Industry, 255 f. 
Ship Subsidies, 259 f. 
Silesia, 459 f. 
Small Holdings, 189 ff. 
Smith, Adam, 453 f. 
Social Democracy, 33 f., 38 f., 103, 

291 ff., 316 ff., 384 ff. 
South Africa, 57 f., 90 f., 99 ff., 

335 f., 393 
South German People, 469 ff. 
States, 469 ff. 
Spanish-American War, 98 
Springmann, Theodor, 440 
State Insurance, 297 

,, Railways, 217 ff. 
Steam Engines, 279 
Steel Trust, German, 262 
Stock-raising, 186 f., 191 f. 
Stosch, Von, 257 
Subsidies, Shipping, 259 f. 
Sugar Beet, 205, 281 

,, Production, 205 f., 279 
Suicides, 155 
Switzerland, 410 
Synthetic Indigo, 68 f. 



Tangiers, 126 

Technical Education, 165 f. 
Tenant Farmers, 189 ff. 
Thaer, Albrecht, 203 
Tirpitz, Admiral, 91 
Tonnage, Inland Shipping, 244 

,, Merchant Marine, 264 
Transport on Canals, 235 ff. 

,, on Railways, 220 ff,, 

229 ff., 248 
Transvaal, 57f.,335f. 
Treaties, Bismarck on, 358 ff. 

,, Frederick the Great on, 
47 f. 
Treitschke, Professor, 64 ff., 90 f., 

99 ff., 177 
Triple Alliance, 36, 327, 333 f., 
359 ff., 402 f. 
,, ,, Breakdown of, 

357 ff. 
Trusts, German, 261 ff., 274 
Tunis, 360 
Turkey, 57, 334, 335, 440 



496 



ANALYTICAL INDEX 



Unemployment, 282 ff. 
United States, 58, 72 ff„ 

98 f., 444 
Universities, 164 
Usedom, Count, 362 



78 ff., 



Venezuela, 58 

Vice in Germany, 304 f . 

Vienna, Fate of , 487 f. 

Voigt, Paul, 179 

Vorwarts, 293 

Voting, Parliamentary, 298, 304 



W 

Wages, 284 ff. 

War Aims, German, 427 ff., 439 ff. 

„ Book, Grerman, 413 

,, Customs of, 355 

„ Finances, German, 456 ff. 

„ Indemnity, 435 ff., 457 ff. 

„ Outbreak of the, 324 ff. 
407 ff. 

„ Plans, German, 405 ff. 



Waterways, 235 ff. 

Wealth, Mineral, 457 ff. 

Wheat Production, 186, 279 

White Book, German, 349 

William I., 35, 293, 312 f., 330 f., 
376,415 
,, Abdication of, 312 f. 

WiUiam II., 27 ff., 31 ff., 89£., 
119 ff., 126, 133, 137, 154, 158, 
299 ff., 320 f., 329 ff., 337 ff., 
348ff.,413ff.,447ff.,475 

Winterstetten, K. von, 441 f. 

Woltmann, Professor, 23 f. 

Women's Position, 304 f. 

Workmen's Insurance, 297 

World Domination, 439 ff. 

„ Policy, German, 82 ff., 106ff. 
„ War, The, 324 ff., 407 ff. 



Yellow Book, French, 417 ff. 



Zabern Incident, 370 ff. 
Zanzibar, 117 f. 
Zimmermann, Herr, 418 ff. 



Printed by Hcuell, Watson <fc ViTiey, Ld., London and Aylesbury, England. 



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